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A Contribution to Settle the Large Pending Issue of Latin 
America
On the initiative of Professors Luis Bértola and Jeffrey Williamson, the Institute for 
the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), together with the 
IDB’s Social Management, the ECLAC, and the World Bank, organized a regional 
conference in December 2014 with the motto “Latin American Inequality in the 
Long Run.” Buenos Aires hosted worldwide experts to identify the historical roots 
of the problem and to contribute proposals to prevent inequality from remaining the 
region’s distinguishing feature.
This book that we are now publishing constitutes a continuity and, at the same time, 
reinforces our commitment to the task. As the challenge is huge, there cannot be 
another way. In Latin America and the Caribbean, there are 175 million people who 
live in poverty conditions, 122 million informal workers without access to social 
security, and abysmal differences that persist in terms of opportunities of access to 
health, housing, and education services.
After a decade in which the middle class has multiplied, and welfare programs 
have proliferated, reaching to a fourth part of Latin Americans, social demands are 
increasingly higher and demand more of public policies. But the deceleration of 
several economies of the region and the stagnation of commerce of the last years 
created additional difficulties to the inclusion process.
In this scenario, regional and global integration is key to revert this trend, as most 
integrated societies—in the region and the world—are the ones that manage to grow 
more harmoniously, reducing the inequality gap between people. Integration and 
inclusion are the two sides of the same coin.
The first part of the book analyses the long-term tendencies in diverse subjects 
that range from income disparity to gender equality. The second part of this book 
examines more recent phenomena, with emphasis on fiscal policy, social policy, and 
agricultural development.
vi
After experiencing gradual improvements during recent times, the countries in 
the region have a shared interest in implementing second generation reforms that, 
disregarding false shortcuts, build the foundations of nations which are more egali-
tarians and integrated to the world.
We must spare no effort. Inequality generates antinomies and fragmentation 
among citizens, scarce social cohesion, and a major tendency to political destabili-
zation, while social inclusion is the most finished example of a democracy that, 
instead of weakening, gains strength.
With a long-term vision that clears up permanent phenomena of transitory situa-
tions, this publication addresses this issue in an original way, with an interdisciplin-
ary approach and scientific accuracy.
This is why we swell with pride of this contribution where different experiences 
and knowledge converge in the same objective: strengthen regional integration that 
implies a higher degree of social inclusion.
Washington, USA Héctor  Salazar Sánchez 
Washington, USA Gustavo Beliz 
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Introduction
Luis Bértola and Jeffrey G. Williamson
After the so-called structural reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, most Latin American 
countries had shown that they could achieve fast growth and deal with structural 
change. However, income per capita failed to converge on the world leaders, and 
growth was followed by increasing inequality and, in some parts of Latin America, 
even increasing poverty. Noting this experience, observers began to wonder whether 
inequality had become a permanent feature of Latin American development and 
whether it had contributed to the region’s disappointing long-run development 
performance (Bértola et al. 2010a).
A few years later, we were discussing something quite different. By 2014, Latin 
America had recorded fast growth for more than a decade and, contrary to what was 
going on in other parts of the world, inequality was falling. Had Latin America 
permanently changed its long-term direction? To what extent was decreasing 
inequality dependent on those high growth rates, and thus was it only temporary? 
What roles did market forces, institutions, and political ideology play during the 
inequality downturn? To start a search for answers, we sent out a call for papers for 
a conference in Buenos Aires, which was organized with support from the Economic 
Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). The conference gathered together economic historians that 
had long been working on the history of Latin American inequality and poverty, 
with economists engaged in the study of inequality in the recent period.
By the time of the conference in December 2014, and even more clearly at the time 
of publication 2 years later, the atmosphere in Latin America had changed yet again. 
L. Bértola (*) 
Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay 
J.G. Williamson 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
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Even if it is too early to guess what will happen to inequality in the near future, we 
know for sure that the commodity-driven boom during the first years of the twenty-
first century has come to an end. In 2014, Latin America was already growing more 
slowly than the OECD, and prospects for 2015 were even worse. The expected 
GDP growth rate for the years ahead is sufficiently low to allow us to say that Latin 
American catch up on the world leaders has come to a halt.
Thus, the original question posed at our conference is even more dramatically 
posed by more recent events. Has Latin America changed direction and was the 
recent inequality downturn just the result of a globally induced economic boom, 
similar to so many other previous booms in Latin America since the nineteenth 
century? Were the recent inequality events transitory with no permanent change in 
political, institutional, and other fundamentals, ones that have been a feature of the 
region for the past two centuries or even longer?
1  The Origins of Latin American Inequality
Most studies of Latin American development written between the 1950s and 1970s 
stressed colonial heritage as the main explanation of its underachievement. 
Competing schools of thought at least agreed on this point: dependency theories, 
modernization theories, Marxist writings, and development economics all agreed 
that Latin America’s colonial heritage contributed two key features: dependency on 
foreign powers, and inequality in civil rights, property rights, and political power. 
Things were made even worse due to the fact that the imperialists, Portugal and 
Spain, were relatively backward themselves compared with Western Europe.
Each of these thought that independence was jeopardized by the lack of a real 
social revolution, by the weakness of the local elites, by the failure to create a Latin 
American federation, and the development of new forms of unequal international 
relations, led by British “informal” imperialism, later followed by US hegemony. 
National states were consolidated during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
They implemented liberal reforms, by which the lands of the church, the peasant 
communities, and the state were privatized thus passing it on to an increasingly 
powerful landowning elite. Wage labor became dominant, but a varied array of 
coercive labor market mechanisms persisted. The landowning elite, together with 
merchants, foreign powers, state bureaucracies, and the military, formed an alliance 
which left the majority—mainly those of Afro-American and Indian ethnic origin—
without property, civil rights, and education.
This process took varied forms in different Latin American countries and regions. 
Three main groups were identified in the literature. The Indo-American group—the 
Andean, Central American, and Mexican regions—was the center in the colonial 
period, densely populated and rich in gold and silver. There, the interplay between 
the haciendas and the peasant communities, together with centralized forced labor 
for the mines, was at the heart of social relations as the region drifted towards capi-
talism (Salvucci 2014). The Afro-American regions (northern Brazil, coastal 
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Columbia, coastal Venezuela, and the Caribbean) were those in which tropical crops 
were produced with slave labor on large plantations. The indigenous American 
mountain and inland regions (Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, and Central America) worked 
the mines and farmed the haciendas. The Euro-American regions (Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, and southern Brazil) were less densely populated, labor was scarce, and 
European settlement played a dominant role. Even in these southern regions the 
concentration of land holdings took place. These interpretations of Latin American 
underdevelopment help explain different attempts to introduce economic, social, 
and political reforms in the middle decades of the twentieth century, including an 
active state involvement in the economy (Cardoso and Brignoli 1979).
After the 1980s, however, the academic and political climate in Latin America 
changed significantly. The region was confronted with the crisis of state-led indus-
trialization, by the debt crisis, and by a “lost decade” of very poor economic perfor-
mance. Pro-market reforms were introduced, often combined with authoritarian 
regimes. The story told by a new political voice said that the problems faced by 
Latin America were not market failures that the state had tried to overcome, but 
rather state involvement itself. Efforts were made to liberalize trade and capital flows, 
as well as to implement macro stabilization policies, and these were consistent with 
pro-global policies flourishing all over the world.
The pattern of development adopted by most Latin American countries since the 
1980s was fueled by export growth, but the domestic sector did not keep pace. 
Inequality increased and the region continued to experience significant macro 
volatility. After every crisis, divergence with world leaders was deepened.
While increasing dissatisfaction spread and developed a more powerful voice in 
the context of the continent’s democratization, the dominant liberal discourse was 
challenged by neo-institutional approaches. While the neo-institutionalists agreed 
with conventional theory that free trade and unfettered capital movements were 
good for growth, they emphasized that domestic institutions were the ultimate factor 
explaining economic performance. Furthermore, institutions could not be expected 
to quickly change their character, since they tended simply to reproduce themselves 
in a path-dependent way. Thus, it was naïve to expect that the imposition of rules 
from outside sources would produce the expected results. Quite the contrary, 
foreign attempts to foster liberal reforms instead reinforced the power of rent- 
seeking elites and their extractive institutions.
When modern neo-institutional thinking entered Latin American debate, it redis-
covered only one part of what we already knew: that domestic institutions were 
extractive, that most of the population worked under coercive mechanisms, that 
large parts of the population did not have civil rights or wealth, and that ethnic fea-
tures were the key carriers of social and political relations. Neo-institutional theo-
ries argued that colonialism was a problem only in colonial times, vanishing 
afterwards while the creation of those domestic institutions in different clothing 
became the center of the story. The origin of bad institutions might reside with the 
colonizing power (North et al. 2000), or with the endowments the conquerors found 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2012), or the domestic interplay between economic 
and political institutions (Robinson 2006). In any case, the problems Latin America 
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faced at the end of the twentieth century had to be interpreted in the light of the 
institutions established shortly after the region was colonized. Changes in interna-
tional economic and political relations, due to events such as the Industrial 
Revolution, the war of independence, the second industrial revolution, the transport 
revolution, mass migration, the process of profound globalization, and more, were 
not taken into consideration by neo-institutional thinking. This literature is consis-
tent with the traditional histories that believed that Latin America was a relatively 
unequal place in the mid-late nineteenth century, that this inequality was consistent 
with institutions that were extractive and rent-seeking, and that these facts helped 
explain Latin America’s disappointing growth performance.
Coastworth (2008) challenged neo-institutional approaches. He argued that the 
problem faced by the independent Latin American economies was their lack of 
inequality. The elites were not powerful enough to expropriate land from inefficient 
peasant communities and a strong state was missing that would otherwise have 
invested in growth-enhancing infrastructure. It was during the first global century’s 
trade boom, from the mid-nineteenth century to World War I, that nation states con-
solidated, inequality soared, accumulation rates rose, and economic growth quick-
ened. Coatsworth’s view was reinforced by the Inequality Possibility Frontier 
approach, developed by Milanovic et al. (2007). These authors argued that per capita 
income had to be high in order to produce a large surplus that could be appropriated 
by the elite, thus generating great inequality. Williamson (2010) has shown that in 
spite of this colonial legacy, inequality was no higher in Latin America just prior to 
its belle époque and early industrialization (c1870s) than in the western leaders prior 
to their industrial revolution (c1800s). Lindert and Williamson (2016) recently 
reported evidence showing that inequality in Latin America was also no higher than 
in the USA in 1860 (under slavery) or 1870 (after emancipation). We also know that 
inequality in Latin America grew significantly from 1870 to 1929 (Prados de la 
Escosura 2007; Bértola et al. 2010b), due in part to the impact of a secular commod-
ity price boom that raised land rents relative to wages, but also because of the class 
power structure. Of course, the kind of inequality matters (Marrero and Rodriquez 
2013; Bértola 2011). Inequality can be good for growth if it simply reflects rewards 
to those accumulating skills, taking risks, and innovating. Inequality can be bad for 
growth if it simply reflects successful rent-seeking or rising rents to land and mineral 
resources. While the assertion has not been confirmed with historical evidence, it 
seems plausible to think that late nineteenth century Latin American inequality was 
more of the “bad” kind while it was more of the “good” kind in the industrial lead-
ers. After all, inequality is not only a matter of income and wealth but also a matter 
of opportunities, property rights, access to education, and civil rights. A continent 
with 25 % slaves and 60 % Indian peasants with very limited access to property, civil 
rights, education, and political power, as the Latin American case was since colonial 
times, can hardly be considered egalitarian whatever the income inequality measure. 
Moreover, Bértola et al. (2015) have shown how dangerous it can be to work with 
aggregate Gini-coefficients alone: during the middle decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, rural areas of Buenos Aires underwent a fall in inequality due to the huge rise 
in the labor share, while land concentration and the rental-wage ratio were increasing. 
In short, a low Gini-coefficient may hide a highly polarized society.
L. Bértola and J.G. Williamson
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Much of the debate about Latin America’s inequality history has now focused on 
the twentieth century. The new question, posed recently by Williamson (2015), is 
whether Latin America failed to join the steep inequality downturn experienced by the 
developed world from World War I to the 1970s. Our knowledge about Latin American 
inequality trends over the period is still limited. We know much more about the 
increasing inequality between the 1960s and 1990s. For the period up to the 1960s, the 
problem is that we cannot generalize from what we know about only a few countries.
Bértola and Ocampo (2012: Chap. 1) identified three Latin American societies 
and all with different inequality trends. During the twentieth century, the Indo- 
American and the Afro-American societies seemed to converge towards labor mar-
kets which behaved like the Lewis unlimited-labor-supply model. In these regions, 
state-led growth and industrialization may have created new forms of inequalities: a 
highly concentrated industrial sector was able to create many jobs for relatively 
skilled and well-organized workers, while a large share of the labor force remained 
marginalized in low productivity jobs. The Euro-American societies in the southern 
cone experienced a different growth pattern. In Uruguay, the increasing inequality of 
the belle époque was followed by a slight reduction up to the 1930s. Afterwards, 
until the 1960s, inequality declined significantly in spite of a terms-of-trade boom. 
Contrary to what happened in previous booms (and contrary to the logic of the pre-
ceding bust of the 1930s), the institutional and political environment produced a 
significant inequality reduction: wage councils, industrial protectionism, welfare 
policies, and multiple exchange rates were tools that favored the egalitarian trend in 
a way that resembled the “Keynesian” atmosphere in the advanced countries (Bértola 
2005). Many of these features could also be seen in Argentina and Chile. What hap-
pened after the 1960s in the Southern Cone is better known. Thus, the century-long 
trends appear to be ones of increasing inequality up to WWI, decreasing inequality 
up to the 1960s, and increasing inequality up to the turn of this century. This pattern 
is also consistent with the Piketty (2014) description of post-World War I develop-
ments as a unique period of decreasing inequality in the middle of the twentieth 
century (see also Lindert and Williamson 2016: Chap. 8). Was this southern cone 
pattern repeated elsewhere in Latin America, or did most of the region miss the Great 
Levelling which occurred among the industrial leaders from WW1 to the 1970s?
This volume contains fresh new contributions to this Latin American inequality 
debate. Part I gives the economic historians a chance to speak to those issues by 
looking back before the recent downturn, and Part II gives the economists a chance 
to look again at the recent downturn with Part I in their rearview mirror.
2  Part I: Looking Backwards for Explanations
In Chap. 2, Pablo Astorga presents new data measuring the functional distribution 
of income, based on four income groups (three groups of wage earners and a group 
of capitalists) for six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
México, and Venezuela), covering the century 1900–2011. The first conclusion to 
be drawn from this new evidence is that no common pattern is shared by all 
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countries. True, Astorga’s new evidence documents that they all underwent 
increased inequality during the last decades of the twentieth century, a result consis-
tent with other evidence. However, prior to 1960 secular trends in inequality differ. 
Argentina, like Uruguay (Bértola 2005), underwent rising inequality in the early 
decades, falling inequality in the middle decades, and then rising inequality in the 
closing decades. This is similar to what Rodríguez Weber finds for Chile (Chap. 3). 
In sharp contrast, Brazil shows stable inequality in the early decades followed by a 
rising trend in the middle decades which levels off in the closing decades. This 
characterization is consistent with what Buccifferro reports regarding Brazilian 
racial inequality in Chap. 8. A common feature found by Astorga is the existence of 
a sustained, even if moderate, narrowing of wage inequality in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century. However, that narrowing was offset by a rising share 
received by the top group, so that polarization widened during the period in all six 
economies, with the exception of Mexico. After 1970, the labor share fell while the 
mean income of the top earners rose, the clear winners over the last century. Another 
stylized fact revealed by Astorga’s new estimates is that countermovements took 
place: there was increasing polarization between the income levels at the two 
extremes of the social scale, while the share of the middle increased. These contra-
dictory trends appear to be consistent with a society composed of two parts, a tradi-
tional one in which unskilled rural labor coexisted with rich landowners, and a 
modern one in which migration from the countryside ended up in more diversified 
urban activities, with higher productivity and higher wage inequality. Later on, a 
large part of this urban labor force was transformed into informal low-skilled 
workers, thus increasing inequality. In any case, Astorga’s contribution begins to fill 
a gap in our knowledge which will influence our thinking about Latin American 
inequality across the twentieth century.
In Chap. 3, Javier Rodríguez Weber explores income inequality in Chile since 
the 1850s. He provides a continuous series that reveals historically high and persis-
tent inequality, with a wave-like pattern. Inequality rose until the 1870s, then 
decreased after the Pacific War, due to a huge expansion of its northern and southern 
frontiers. Inequality rose again during the first decades of the twentieth century with 
the climax of export-led growth. The Great Depression mainly damaged the income 
of the elites, while, like Uruguay, inequality fell after World War II. As in Argentina 
and Uruguay, inequality rose significantly during the military dictatorship. After 
more than two decades of democracy and center-left governments which followed 
the dictatorship, inequality was little changed.
Chile shows very high inequality levels today, among the highest in the world. 
This fact calls for explanations. Rodríguez Weber argues that the elite have been 
able to shape the economic and political institutions in its favor. This power was 
rooted in the high concentration of wealth and the oligopolistic market structure 
which not only promotes high inequality but also undermines democratic institu-
tions. The power of the elite has deep historical roots. Since the nineteenth century, 
the landowning interests in the Central Valley were able to control a weak peasant 
population that lived in the haciendas.
L. Bértola and J.G. Williamson
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The Mexican case is analyzed in Chaps. 4 and 5 using quite different evidence. 
Moromay López Alonso and RobertoVélez Grajales exploit data on heights to mea-
sure improvements and inequality in well-being. Using two different sources (pass-
ports and the army) they find increasing social inequality up to the 1930s. Differences 
between regions were less important than the inequality within regions. Since the 
1930s, the poor population benefited by national public health campaigns as well as 
a (modest) rise of the welfare state thus reducing inequality; before then, the major-
ity of the population was excluded from health services and lacked opportunities for 
advancement. Using data for the period from the 1950s onwards, the authors con-
clude that inequality is higher among women, and that there exists a clear down-
ward bias against the agrarian population. In short, it seems that inequality in living 
standards was reduced mainly during the central decades of the twentieth century. 
It continued to decline thereafter, but at a slower pace, and remaining high. In Chap. 
5, Campos, Domínguez, and Márquez construct a Human Development Index for 
Mexico from 1895 to 2010 with data at the subnational level for illiteracy rates, 
urbanizations rates, and the number of physicians per capita, as proxies for educa-
tion, income, and health, respectively. The authors find a significant increase in 
human development as well as some evidence of regional convergence, especially 
between 1940 and 1980. However, regional disparities increased again after the 
1980s. In short, these studies of the Mexican experience seem to confirm two main 
features: inequality was high and persistent; and inequality was reduced only during 
the central decades of the twentieth century, but rose again during the last two 
decades of the century.
The Brazilian case is analyzed in Chaps. 6, 7, and 8 with quite different 
approaches.
In Chap. 6, Pedro Funari studies the varied development patterns in four Brazilian 
states (Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul), which, 
given their different initial resource endowments and colonial experience, would be 
expected to have different de facto institutions. He explores the connection using 
standard land concentration measures, and a proxy for political concentration (the 
percentage of eligible voters), all at the municipal level. His results support the idea 
that it is difficult to find general rules for the relation between growth and inequality. 
In the fast growing states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, he found a positive rela-
tionship between inequality in 1920 and development outcomes in 2000. The con-
trary is found in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. Pernambuco, a northeastern 
state, presents no evidence of a significant relationship between prior inequality and 
subsequent long-term development outcomes. With respect to political inequality 
and development, no significant relationship could be found. Funari explains this 
latter result as depending on the limited formal power of voters in relation to other 
more important de facto sources of power. It is also probable that inequality among 
landowners is not the best way to capture the impact of inequality on growth, espe-
cially when the economy becomes less dependent on agriculture and when the 
dynamic sectors are mainly urban. In any case, what seems to be confirmed is that 
Brazilian economic growth during most of the twentieth century was compatible 
with a very high level of inequality.
Introduction
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In Chap. 7, Eustaquio Reis studies spatial inequality in Brazil by means of an 
ambitious reconstruction of data at the municipality level for the period 1872–2000. 
His approach is quite different from that of Funari (Chap. 11), since Reis emphasizes 
the role played by geography (land quality, climate, and transport costs), rather than 
informal institutions. He concludes that spatial inequalities did not experience sig-
nificant changes over those 130 years: the rate of convergence is much slower than 
those found in other countries. The period of import substituting industrialization 
appears to have lowered regional inequality, while export-led growth increased it. 
Infrastructure development (particularly the railways) was important: the lack of 
adequate infrastructure investment was a major determinant of relatively slow growth. 
The only “institutional” factor that had an important impact on growth was the immi-
gration rate, while human capital, slavery, land concentration, and political participa-
tion were not significant determinants of per capita income and productivity.
In Chap. 8, Justin Bucciferro studies racial inequalities in Brazil since the early 
nineteenth century, by analyzing data on income, primary school completion rates, 
literacy rates, life expectancy at birth, and occupation, augmented with qualitative 
sources. White, black, mixed race, indigenous, and Asian individuals were consid-
ered. He finds that progress has been made in the reduction of racial inequality in 
terms of health, education, and access to certain occupations, like industrial employ-
ment. However, racial disparities are still very large, and income gaps have not been 
significantly reduced. Bucciferro emphasizes how small the impact of emancipation 
on racial income gaps was since European immigrants undercut the bargaining 
power of the libertos. The Vargas populist period was the one in which most prog-
ress was made, while 1945–1980 recorded years of regression or stagnation in racial 
inequality. However, important progress was made during the last decades of the 
twentieth century and racial inequality seems to be at its lowest level today. If it is 
assumed that once ethnic-based inequality is reduced through cultural change and 
political empowerment, it should prove difficult to revert to previous levels. Thus, 
reductions in ethnic inequality should be long-lasting.
In Chap. 9, José Alejandro Pérez-Cajías asks whether the Bolivian Revolution of 
1952 led to a significant institutional change in the delivery of education. His find-
ings are based on the construction of impressive new evidence. After the revolution 
and until the 1980s, tax collections remained among the lowest in Latin America. 
Nevertheless, education spending as a share of GDP converged on Chile and 
Uruguay, two of the most developed Latin American countries. However, the qual-
ity and distribution of Bolivian education was not significantly modified: public 
spending on education was low and educational outputs were often among the worst 
in the region. Obviously, the main explanation for this was that per capita GDP 
remained extremely low in Bolivia. The question still unanswered is whether an 
increased effort in the educational system could have enhanced growth performance 
in the decades following the revolution.
In Chap. 10, María Camou and Silvana Maubrigades explore gender inequality 
in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay). 
They find a tight correlation between total income inequality and the gender 
income gap. Those countries showing a lower gender wage gap are those that were 
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successful in incorporating a larger share of women in the labor market in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, together with higher educational achievement. 
The countries with bigger gender gaps are those where women were incorporated 
into the labor market more slowly and which had a higher share of Indian and 
black workers with whom women first compete. The gender wage gap also 
increased throughout the period, a result consistent with their relative supply 
growth. In spite of their rising educational attainment, women are still underrepre-
sented in the high-wage occupations.
In Chap. 11, Leticia Arroyo-Abad and Peter Lindert present a multi-country 
history of how Latin American government spending and taxes have reshaped the 
distribution of income. They combine historical time series for six countries with 
evidence on fiscal redistributions in the twenty-first century. While Latin America 
has followed the international trend with social spending increasing with per capita 
GDP growth, this social spending has not had a big distributional impact. As it turns 
out, the elderly have been favored by social spending in the form of pensions, and 
not by education and infrastructure that might have targeted the non-rich. Even 
though the redistribution did not favor the poor, its impact was still moderately posi-
tive, since social spending is distributed less unequally than pretax income and since 
the tax system is slightly progressive. The Southern Cone countries distributed more 
in favor of the elderly, but they were also most progressive in redistribution.
3  Part II: The Recent Inequality Downturn
The recent inequality decline in Latin America poses several questions. The first is 
whether inequality actually declined or whether it was mainly the result of incom-
plete data or incorrect measurement. The recent literature on top incomes has 
shown how much our perception of inequality can change if the results of house-
hold surveys are corrected by accurate measures of the income of the elite. 
Unfortunately, information on top incomes is still scarce: series for the twentieth 
century are only available for Argentina from the mid-1930s, for the first decade of 
this century they are only available for Argentina and Colombia, and estimates for 
a few recent years are available for Uruguay. By combining household surveys and 
top income figures, a more complete view of income distribution can be achieved, 
even though no clear conclusions can yet be drawn from so few cases. However, the 
World Bank (2014, pp. 35–39) concludes that while the drop in inequality is cer-
tainly moderated when top incomes are considered (for the limited sample), the 
downturn shown by household surveys still holds.
Important research has recently been reported on the recent downturn. López-
Calva and Lustig (2010), as well as the same authors together with Campos et al. 
(2016)), argue that a fundamental factor behind the decline in income inequality is 
the rise in supply of workers with post-secondary education. The case of Mexico is 
particularly important, as it is the case of an economy that experienced neither a 
commodity boom nor fast growth.
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Cornia (2014) concludes his edited volume stating that the inequality decline 
across the whole of Latin America can be characterized as a Polanyian process, in the 
sense that several social and political forces reacted against the outcomes of global-
ization and liberalization in the late twentieth century, with the result of increasing 
inequality. He concludes that inequality cannot be further reduced if some structural 
biases, as the lack of industrial policy, low savings, dependence on foreign capital, 
dependence on a few commodities, and reprimarization, remain unaddressed.
ECLAC has also been active in this field, producing a trilogy of reports with 
inequality at the center (2010, 2012, 2014). These reports, while taking into consid-
eration the role played by market forces, emphasize the role played by other social 
factors, as, for example, labor market institutions and the impact of the activity rate, 
including gender issues. Moreover, ECLAC emphasizes the political character of 
distributional issues and links inequality reduction to the structural transformation 
of the Latin American economies.
What follows is then a partial list of possible explanations for the inequality 
decline. First, improvements in education which augmented the supply of skilled 
labor, thus putting downward pressure on the skill premium. To that extent, school-
ing might have won the race with technology (Goldin and Katz 2008). Second, if 
growth based on maquila-industries and natural resource processing favors the 
demand for unskilled labor, inequality might diminish on this count as well. Third, 
fast growth associated with the commodity boom should have raised the employ-
ment rate, thus raising the income of the lowest deciles. Fourth, to the extent that 
political shifts favored pro-poor labor market policies—minimum wages, wage 
councils, formalization of employment, social transfers, and the like—an inequality 
downturn should be reinforced. Finally, the consolidation of democratic rule in most 
of Latin America should have weakened the tacit power of the elite and thus the 
importance of their opposition to pro-poor policies.
The following chapters confirm some of the previous studies, add new evidence, 
explore new topics (as structural change and fiscal policies), and offer some in- 
depth political economy studies of national cases.
In Chap. 12, Verónica Amarante and Antonio Prado present a summary of 
ECLAC’s findings published in what is called the equality trilogy (2010, 2012, 
2014). While accepting the role played by demand and supply forces in the recent 
inequality decline, they stress the role played by labor market institutions. Minimum 
wage increases, for instance, accounted for a third of the recent drop in Argentina’s 
Gini-coefficient, for 84 % in Brazil and for 7 % in Uruguay. Their research also finds 
that changes in formal employment shares and wage differentials between formal 
and informal jobs are as important as returns to education and changes in schooling 
levels—although there is considerable variance across the countries studied. The 
chapter also documents participation rates and income gaps by gender: the region 
exhibits great variation, some countries exhibiting huge gender gaps, and others 
almost parity. An exercise is performed exploring the impact on income inequality 
if these gender gaps closed. In the case of the labor participation rate, a reduction of 
about 5 % points would be achieved in the poorer Latin American countries. In the 
case of income gaps, a reduction of about 4 % would be achieved.
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In Chap. 13, Augusto de la Torre, Julian Messina, and Joana Silva confirm the 
recent decline in labor income inequality and conclude, in line with López-Calva 
and Lustig, that such changes were driven by labor market behavior. Furthermore, 
the reduction was largely driven by a decline in the skill premium (returns to tertiary 
vs. primary education). They note, however, that a similar increase in the supply of 
skilled workers took place in the 1990s, while inequality worsened. To account for 
the difference, they argue that in the recent decade technical change displaced old 
skills thus producing some knowledge obsolescence.
In Chap. 14, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea adopts a multidisciplinary approach to 
study the political economy of policymaking to learn about the explanations for 
Chile’s high inequality. He confirms the persistent concentration of income at the 
top also found by Rodriquez Weber (Chap. 3). A few business groups control large 
segments of the economy, featured by high market and capital concentration, condi-
tions that limit action by the State at the sector level. On the other hand, the State 
has been playing an increasingly active role in redistribution through social policy, 
thus creating opportunities for new progressive cross-class coalitions. In this con-
text, the progress to be made on the margin depends mainly on the capacity to 
increase the tax burden of the elites. Thus, no radical changes are to be expected, 
unless more radical political changes take place.
In Chap. 15, Martin Andersson and Andrés Palacio ask whether the recent reduc-
tion in income inequality was driven, at least in part, by an agricultural resurgence, 
that is, whether the reduction of the rural–urban income gap played an important 
role. This seems to be the case, as agricultural labor productivity grew faster than in 
other sectors, reducing the intersectoral productivity and income gap. Nevertheless, 
the authors point to the fact that a new situation has appeared, featured by the 
increase in the share of the labor force employed in low productivity urban (espe-
cially informal) sectors. Thus, a new pattern of urban inequality may be replacing 
the old one of rural inequality. Furthermore, agrarian inequality can remain an 
important influence since productivity growth has been taking place mainly in large 
and capital intensive estates.
In Chap. 16, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, and Julio Revuelta also explore 
the impact of fiscal policy on Latin American inequality, this time from 1960 to 2012. 
They find that fiscal policy had a much bigger influence during the period 1999–2012, 
than before. For the earlier years, fiscal policy had either a regressive or insignificant 
impact on inequality. During the more recent period, they find that the impact was 
higher in revenues than in expenditures. Furthermore, expenditures had a much big-
ger impact in urban than rural areas. With respect to revenues, direct taxation had a 
much more important impact on inequality reduction than indirect taxes. Given the 
fact that the tax burden in Latin America is much lower than in OECD countries, it is 
clear that a policy which increases the direct tax burden as per capita income grows 
would erase some inequality—although that might be hard to achieve politically.
Finally, in Chap. 17, Suzanne Duryea and coauthors recognize the recent achieve-
ments made by Latin American countries in terms of poverty and inequality reduction. 
But they then ask whether those achievements are sustainable and explore the possibil-
ity that the inequality downturn might cease or even reverse. They focus on three main 
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policy areas that should help insure continued progress: an improved efficiency of 
social policy and the quality of services provided; the promotion of income stability 
and protection without distorting workers’ incentives; and the exercise of caution with 
respect to the creation of potentially costly and irreversible commitments.
So, what do we conclude about recent Latin American inequality trends? While 
there has been great variety across Latin America, it appears that the recent inequal-
ity reduction was due, at least in part, to very specific conditions associated with the 
commodity boom. The boom raised labor participation and lowered unemployment, 
favoring those at the bottom of the distribution and thus reducing inequality. What 
the boom giveth, the bust can taketh away. But the boom combined the impact of 
long-run improvements in human capital formation (lowering skill premiums), with 
an increased demand for unskilled work linked to the export-led boom. More fun-
damentally, a cluster of socio-political shifts favored labor. The new wave of democ-
ratization strengthened the voice of the poor, and their demands for education, 
health, and social transfers. A number of leftist governments and center-left alli-
ances promoted the development of different labor market institutions, which con-
tributed to the income leveling. Tax reforms were introduced in many countries, 
which, combined with better designed spending, has helped improve conditions in 
the lower deciles. Minimum wages were raised in several countries, having an 
important impact on distribution.
An important conclusion is then that it is not possible to reduce the explanation 
of inequality reduction to a single cause. Inequality was reduced even in countries, 
as Mexico and El Salvador, that did not experience a commodity boom. The com-
modity boom cannot per se explain inequality reduction: Latin American economic 
history shows that commodity booms often led to increasing inequality and the 
actual results of booms and busts in terms of inequality cannot be understood with-
out political economy considerations. When considering political economy issues, 
the role of the past becomes important, in the sense of understanding the origins and 
development of Latin American economic, social, and political forces.
The big question is whether this process of declining inequality will be sustained 
and deepened. Many of the forces that were driving the leveling of incomes now are 
gone. The commodity boom has disappeared, and some of its positive impacts may 
be reversed. The activity rate will probably decline and unemployment will  probably 
rise. Demand for unskilled work will probably decline. On the other hand, invest-
ment in social spending may favor education in its race with technology (Goldin and 
Katz 2008), pressing inequality downwards.
Democratic rule is now a permanent feature in Latin America. We can, of course, 
doubt its quality. State powers are still weak, domestic and foreign elites still have 
an influence on governments, and state bureaucracies are still lacking important 
capabilities. The risk of mismanagement of social revenues and expenditures is 
always present, and the possibility that antidemocratic regression might prevail in 
critical situations cannot be excluded.
The future of inequality is not only a matter of pure market forces but also on 
how labor market institutions and the political climate evolve.
L. Bértola and J.G. Williamson
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1  Introduction
Two things are certain about income inequality in Latin America: first, that inequal-
ity reached very high levels in the closing decades of the twentieth century, and, 
second, that it has shown a broadly shared narrowing trend in the last 10 years or so 
of this century.1 This evidence, based on comprehensive and largely consistent 
household budget surveys, raises crucial questions. Those concerned about the 
future are keen to know if this is a sustainable and lasting improvement that can 
survive the end of the recent commodity boom that has helped to finance redistribu-
tive policies. Those studying long-term inequality and its determinants would like 
to know whether inequality has always been high—a structural feature of these 
societies, or rather whether the structural transformation and changes in develop-
ment policies have been key forces shaping the inequality outcome in the region.
According to the dominant view of the institutionalist approach (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 2000; De Ferranti et al. 2004), the story of a highly unequal region largely 
reflects the persistence of the actions and omissions of the Iberian colonisers. 
However, this claim is somehow at odds with evidence that Latin American coun-
tries in the pre-industrial era were not especially unequal in an international com-
parison (Dobado and Garcia 2010; Milanovic et al. 2011). Also, inequality estimates 
during the First Globalisation show a rising trend from circa 1870 to 1920 in coun-
tries in the Southern Cone (Williamson 1999; Willebald 2011; Arroyo 2013), indi-
cating that the region’s relatively high inequality is mainly a late nineteenth- century 
1 Income inequality in Latin America since 1980 or so has been widely studied. Some of the key 
contributions are Morley (2000), López and Perry (2008), López-Calva and Lustig (2010), 
Széquely and Sámano (2012), Gasparini et al. (2011) and Birdsall et al. (2011). Urrutia (1975) 
surveys inequality studies and data in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela covering the middle 
decades.
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phenomenon—though conditioned by inherited structural features. The latest revi-
sionist contribution is Williamson (2015) who, adopting a comparative perspective, 
argues that the colonial inequality burden is a myth. Myth or not, concerns about 
this burden seem to have been overemphasised in the literature at the expense of 
focusing on the influence of forces acting in a more recent period. It is as if, when 
trying to understand certain characteristics of a child, we give priority to investigat-
ing the lives of the great grandparents and fail to ask basic questions about the par-
ents and the sort of upbringing they provided.
Therefore, without assuming that the Big Bang occurred in 1900, this study will 
focus on inequality in the twentieth century and possible explanatory factors acting 
within this period. Here there are interesting inequality stories that we would like to 
explore in the light of a new historical dataset. First, we consider the implications of 
the different development and growth strategies implemented over the century 
(FitzGerald 2008; Prados de la Escosura 2007; Bértola 2005; Frankema 2012). 
Second, by adopting a functional approach in the construction of our inequality 
estimates, we are in a position to track the distributional fate of different occupa-
tional groups, particularly those of the top earners (dominated by property income) 
and the earnings of the unskilled. Thus we can study in a broader time frame Palma’s 
(2011) findings of the dominance of centrifugal forces operating in highly unequal 
middle-income countries (and in particular Chile and Mexico under neo-liberal 
reforms since the 1970s) that resulted in increasing income polarisation. Third, in a 
global comparative perspective, this is the century of the “Great Levelling” from 
1913 to the 1970s in the leading industrial economies (Atkinson et al. 2011; Lindert 
and Williamson 2016, Chap. 8). And it is of interest to know whether Latin America 
experienced a similar phenomenon, and, if not, why not.
In recent years there have been important efforts in quantifying inequality in 
the region in the longer term. Regarding multi-country studies,2 Williamson 
(1999, 2002) teased out developments in inequality by calculating ratios of GDP 
per worker to unskilled wages in the pre-WW2 period for a set of periphery 
countries (including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay).3 
Based on Williamson’s inequality ratios and available household-survey Ginis, 
Prados de la Escosura (2007) constructed pseudo-Ginis over the last century for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (adding Colombia and Mexico since 1913). 
Frankema (2010) studied the pattern of change in the distribution of labour 
income shares in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the twentieth century, 
finding that in all three countries the labour income share peaked in the middle 
decades of the last century. Also Frankema (2012) examines the long-run indus-
trial wage inequality in Argentina, Brazil and Chile based on benchmark indus-
trial surveys and census data.
2 At a country level there are long-term inequality series for Uruguay (Bértola 2005) and Chile 
(Rodriguez Weber 2014). Both studies are valuable inputs to our work.
3 Bértola et al. (2010) constructed Gini benchmarks (based on census data) for Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay. But, unfortunately for our purposes, such benchmarks are far apart and with only one 
Gini in the twentieth century (1920), so that they do not provide an indication of trends.
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However, one important limitation of the above contributions is that they only 
provide a partial picture of long-term trends, as they either cover a limited period; 
are based on benchmark years; concentrate on a small sample of countries; or do not 
make allowances for non-labour income. These limitations make it difficult to pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of long-run inequality, particularly one that can link in 
a consistent manner outcomes from the pre-official statistics period with those of the 
more recent decades with regular household surveys. Some of these limitations are 
addressed by FitzGerald (2008) who assembles a consistent set of yearly estimates 
of earnings for four occupational groups that are used to generate Gini coefficients 
for the 1900–2000 period for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
However, one important shortcoming of these Ginis is that they rely on sectoral 
series of output per economically active person to estimate earning levels in two of 
the four skill groups. This implies well-functioning markets, a strong assumption for 
a developing region, particularly during the first half of the last century. Also, sec-
toral productivity estimates are subject to a large margin of error in the early decades.
Therefore, the first step to study secular inequality and its determinants in the 
region is to construct consistent and comparable series covering the long run. In this 
chapter we adopt the approach used by FitzGerald but calculate the Ginis using a 
newly assembled dataset of real wages for three occupational categories of the 
labour force (low skilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour). In this way we can offer 
new yearly series of functional inequality for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela (LA-6) since 1900. Together the LA-6 have accounted for 
more than 80 % of the region’s population and income since 1900. Perhaps the main 
virtue of this work is to put on the table estimates that should inform us about long- 
term inequality and about differences and similarities across countries. Moreover, 
the methodology adopted can give a rough indication of the property-labour income 
split, as well as the relative contributions made by the income share received by the 
top earners (dominated by non-labour income) and by wage inequality (based on the 
three wage series).
When dealing with inequality in Latin America it is usually assumed that there 
exists a broad commonality in both patterns and timing across countries, so that 
regional averages are representative of individual country performance. Examples 
of this view include the use of a Latin American dummy in cross-country studies 
and its interpretation (Barro 2000), or the prominence given to a shared institutional 
heritage that perpetuates a common path of high inequality in the region 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). However, to the extent that country- specific 
factors have played a dominant role, regional averages might not be representative 
enough and general claims about inequality in the region would need to be qualified, 
or indeed avoided, if the dispersion is high. Commonality and divergence are two 
aspects to which we pay special attention here.
For the sake of brevity, this chapter concentrates on three aspects: the methodol-
ogy used in the construction of the inequality series; the analysis of the contribu-
tions of the top income group, on the one hand, and wage inequality, on the other; 
and regional averages. We largely leave for a future publication a more rigorous 
analysis of fundamental forces associated with structural change, factor endowments, 
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demographic transitions and commodity cycles. The remainder of the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the methodology used to construct the 
functional (between groups) Ginis and provides complementary evidence on the 
estimation of incomes of the top group. Section 3 presents the new Ginis by country 
and a comparison with other inequality measures, and looks at the relative contribu-
tions of the top income group and of wage inequality. Section 4 presents regional 
averages. An Appendix includes charts by country.
2  Methodology4
Our method is akin to that used in the construction of dynamic social tables (com-
bining benchmark years from censa data with annual data on income from other 
sources) for Uruguay (Bértola 2005) and Chile (Rodríguez Weber 2014), as well as 
social tables (using only selected benchmark years) in pre-industrial societies 
(Milanovic et al. 2010; Lindert and Williamson 1982).5 In our case, we rely on 
annual income series (of overall income and three wage categories) and interpola-
tion between benchmarks for the shares of economically active population (EAP). 
Following the occupational categories used in ECLAC (2000), for each country we 
divide the EAP into four groups: Group 1 (employers, managers and profession-
als); Group 2 (technicians and administrators); Group 3 (semi-skilled blue-collar 
workers, other urban workers in relatively low-productivity sectors such as retail-
ing and transport, and artisans); and Group 4 (rural workers and personal service—
including domestic servants—plus unskilled urban workers and street vendors). To 
ensure consistency with the overall EAP series, the labour force in Group 3 is cal-
culated as a residual.
The main rationale for drawing the distinction between the four groups is differ-
ences in education levels and skills.6 This has been a key factor in explaining 
inequality in the region in recent decades (Morley 2000; Contreras and Gallegos 
2011). The reduced number of groups reflects data limitations during most of the 
period covered, especially on income.7 Also some arbitrary aggregation is difficult 
to avoid. For instance, in Group 1 owners of capital and landlords are lumped 
together with managers and professionals. This group is dominated by non-wage 
4 For more details on procedure, assumptions, data issues, sources and by-country figures 
on employment shares and income ratios see the background paper (Astorga 2015a), particularly 
annexes B and C.
5 Our method is also in the spirit of the distribution tables (with three main groups: the bottom 
50 %, the middle 40 % and the top 10 %) used by Piketty (2014, Part III), although a key difference 
is that, in our case, the relative size of our income groups varies over time.
6 The mean years of education by each of the four groups circa 2000 are estimated by ECLAC as 
11.4 years for Group 1; 11.2 years for Group 2; 6.5 years for Group 3; and 3.5 years for Group 4.
7 One example of groupings with higher data demands is Portes and Hoffman (2003) who work 




income, including property income and compensation for labour. Group 2 includes 
a mix of manual and clerical workers (or blue- and white-collar workers) with 
comparable years of formal education (e.g. bank tellers, typists, mechanics, turn-
ers). Group 3 lumps together urban informal workers with precarious incomes and 
highly skilled artisans with rather secure employment. Some administrators of 
micro firms included in Group 2 can have earnings below those of relatively quali-
fied workers in commerce included in Group 3. Finally, Group 4 comprises 
unskilled rural workers, together with workers in personal services, including 
domestic services, largely in urban areas.
Based on the four occupational categories we calculate the EAP share of each 
group (ni), the income share of each group (si), the mean income in each group (yi) 
and the ratio of the mean income in each group to that for the EAP as a whole (ri). 







The income share for Group 1 (s1) is defined as the residual by subtracting the 
income shares for the other three groups. This is then divided by the respective pro-
portion of the EAP to yield the group’s relative income level:
 













The income of Group 1 is likely to capture income from property (profits, 
dividends, interest, and land and natural resource rents) for all the EAP, together 
with earnings from highly paid workers.8 Because of the way it is calculated, the 
income for this group may be subject to a significant margin of error. However, this 
method is likely to generate better estimates in Latin America than calculations 
based on tax data (famously unreliable to gauge income at the top, if available at all) 
and on household surveys (which are only available for the later period and tend to 
miss information on top earners). At the end of this section we offer some comple-
mentary evidence showing that, in general, our estimates for the first half of the last 
century are consistent with data available on top earners. Also, in the following 
section we provide some additional consistency checks for our calculated s1 based 
on comparisons with official estimates of property income shares available for the 
second half of the century.
To estimate mean earnings of the remaining three occupational groups we rely 
on three real wage series assembled to reflect, when possible, differences in skills: 
relatively high, medium and low. We use the same deflator (usually the CPI) for 
8 The long-term evidence in developed economies (Piketty 2014) shows that income from property 
tends to be concentrated in the individuals included in our top group, which means that the mis-
placement of property income of individuals included in the middle and bottom groups is unlikely 
to be significant.
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both overall income per worker and wages, so that the ratios are equivalent to those 
calculated from nominal values. There is a possibility that we are overestimating 
earnings in Group 3 by assigning the average semi-skilled wage to all workers in the 
group which is calculated as a residual and is likely to include workers in the infor-
mal sector. We performed sensitivity analysis to our inequality results by assigning 
the minimum urban wage to the estimated informality share post-1950,9 and found 
no significant impact.
The methodology used to estimate gross income inequality is subject to a number 
of potential measurement biases associated with the subsistence economy and the 
unemployed. As to the size of the subsistence economy there is little systematic and 
consistent evidence for our countries which could be used to make a correction. 
Subsistence agriculture was particularly important in the early decades of the last 
century in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, and less so in the relatively 
more advanced and urbanised economies of Argentina and Chile (Berg 1970). To the 
extent that the measured overall income underestimates the subsistence economy, 
our estimates are biased against inequality because it would reduce the actual size of 
Group 1’s income, which is calculated as a residual. However, this potential bias may 
be offset by the equally likely underestimation of those working outside the market 
economy in the EAP data. The latter would result in an underestimation of the rela-
tive importance of Group 4’s earnings and, as a consequence, in higher inequality.
Regarding unemployment, there is a potential bias when estimating earnings at 
group level. Since the average wage is taken as a proxy for average earnings of the 
three lower income groups, any variance in the unemployment rate across groups 
will impart errors in our estimates. Thus at times of high unemployment, our series 
will overestimate r2, r3 and r4, and underestimate r1, underestimating inequality. This 
problem can be especially relevant during the early years of the Great Depression or 
during the outbreak of the Debt Crisis in the 1980s. In order to minimise the potential 
impact of this bias, we calculate deviations of the unemployment rate (where such 
data are available) from an assumed long-term rate (as a proxy for the natural rate of 
unemployment) and then adjust our overall income per worker series accordingly.
Table 1 presents a summary of our estimated EAP shares and relative income 
ratios for the top and bottom groups for selected years. Differences among the coun-
tries’ EAP shares are largely driven by variations in the urbanisation process, timing 
of the structural change and improvements in the education level of the labour force. 
Broadly speaking, Argentina and Chile already had significant urban populations by 
1900 reflected in relatively lower values for the economically active persons in 
Group 4 dominated by low-paid workers in rural areas, whereas according to these 
estimates, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela started the twentieth century 
with shares for that group between 65 and 75 %.10 All six countries had inflection 
points (preceding acceleration) in population growth in the 1930s and in urbanisa-
9 The average share of urban informality reported for the region during the early 1950s and late 1970s 
is about 25 % (PREALC 1982). We estimate that Group 3 may include 10 % and Group 4 15 %.
10 The estimates for the urbanisation rates circa 1900 are Argentina 38 %, Chile 34 %, Brazil 23 %, 
Mexico 28.3 and Venezuela 11 %. The first observation available for Colombia is 30.9 % in 1938. 
Our calculations are based on censa data.
P. Astorga
23
tion in the 1940s (earlier in Argentina). Differences in the level of development circa 
1900 are also reflected in the timing of the decline of the share of Group 4. The 
initial share for Argentina and Chile (around 40 %) is only reached by 1955 in 
Venezuela, and around 1980 in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. This largely reflects 
different educational realities.11
The relative income ratios for the top group tend to show high and rising values 
during the first half of the last century (especially in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) and then a decline in the second half. The rising trend indicates a grow-
ing share of property income in total income and slow increases in the number of 
top earners. The falling trend reflects an increase in the numbers of EAP in that 
group after 1960 or so (reducing the group’s income per person engaged) in line 
with better access to education and a rapid increase in GDP per worker between 
1950 and 1970 in most countries (raising the denominator of the ratio). Meanwhile, 
the ratios of the bottom group are dominated by a steady decline over the century. 
This is largely the result of increases in the wage of the unskilled lagging behind 
advances in the overall average income. In absolute terms (not shown), the gains of 
the average income of the whole labour force compared to the gains in the mean real 
income or those in Group 4 between the start and the end of the twentieth century 
were 2.1-fold for the overall income and 1-fold for Group 4 in Argentina; 5.9 and 
1.2 in Brazil; 6.2 and 3.1 in Chile, 6.2 and 4 in Colombia; 3.3 and 1.1 in Mexico 
(circa 1921 vs. 2000); and 6.5 and 3.6 in Venezuela.
11 According to the Barro and Lee (2011), the average years of schooling and the percentage share 
of the population without schooling in 1950 were 4.9 years and 15 % in Argentina, 2.1 years and 
63 % in Brazil, 3.7 years and 21 % in Chile, 2.3 years and 40 % in Colombia, 2.2 years and 45 % in 
Mexico and 1.6 years and 49 % in Venezuela.
Table 1 EAP shares and relative income ratios, selected groups and years
Argentina Brazil Chile
n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4
1900 4.0 39.0 11.3 0.42 3.5 72.5 6.9 0.57 6.0 42.1 7.5 0.28
1920 4.3 35.2 12.5 0.32 3.9 69.0 8.4 0.54 5.1 41.9 9.4 0.47
1940 4.6 33.6 10.6 0.34 3.9 64.5 9.1 0.61 5.5 40.9 8.4 0.35
1960 6.2 21.2 8.3 0.32 4.0 55.5 14.0 0.31 7.5 32.5 6.3 0.27
1980 8.3 17.3 6.6 0.17 6.5 43.4 9.8 0.18 9.6 22.7 6.5 0.14
2000 12.1 15.1 4.6 0.22 7.9 31.9 6.8 0.14 13.7 22.0 4.8 0.16
Colombia Mexico Venezuela
n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4
1900 6.2 65.5 6.7 0.37 3.3 70.8 9.6 0.56 4.1 69.6 7.9 0.41
1920 6.0 60.7 7.9 0.37 3.5 70.8 11.9 0.53 4.6 60.0 7.8 0.37
1940 5.7 56.9 9.0 0.35 2.9 66.0 10.7 0.54 4.2 50.3 7.6 0.34
1960 7.3 48.9 7.9 0.30 4.0 55.3 10.8 0.42 5.8 37.8 10.2 0.20
1980 7.5 39.8 7.4 0.31 7.2 40.5 7.4 0.39 12.5 24.3 5.4 0.24
2000 9.1 36.0 6.5 0.27 9.5 32.4 5.8 0.19 12.3 23.7 4.9 0.28
All figures are 3-year averages except those for 1900 based on 2 years
EAP shares circa 2000 use benchmark from ECLAC (2000) except Argentina which uses ILO’s data
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2.1  The Top-Income Group
In this section we provide complementary information for the relative income of top 
earners. Table 2 presents comparisons for four of our countries. For Brazil we cal-
culate a wage ratio using data for Rio de Janeiro for factory managers and semi- 
skilled workers (e.g. masons and carpenters) for the period 1900–1930 (r1 proxy), 
and compare them with our calculated income ratio for Group 1 (r1). Both ratios 
remain stable up to 1915 and then rise to higher values between 1920 and 1930. This 
rising trend continues to be a feature of r1 up to 1950. For Chile (1900–1940) we 
have two complementary ratios: the mean income of employers (representing about 
2 % of the labour force) relative to the average wage (r1 proxy_1) and representative 
salaries of top-rank officials (e.g. ministers and directors)12 relative to an average of 
semi-skilled workers in the public sector (e.g. archivist and postman)—r1 proxy_2. 
Despite different order of magnitude, both r1 and r1 proxy_1 move in line between 
1900 and 1930. The comparison between our ratio and r1 proxy_2 shows values of 
similar magnitude, but with lower coincidence in trends, perhaps reflecting a more 
stable wage structure in the public sector.
12 Although the employment share of the public sector tended to be relatively small in the early 
decades (e.g. about 5 % in Chile and Venezuela), the salaries paid to high-rank officials could well 
be representative of earnings in Group 1.
Table 2 Top earners’ mean income relative to average income (circa values)
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Brazil
r1 proxy 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.0 9.1 n.a. 9.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 6.9 6.8 6.3 5.1 8.4 8.8 8.6 6.7 9.1 11.6 11.5
Chile
r1 proxy_1 12.1 9.8 17.2 20.9 22.9 23.2 18.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 proxy_2 7.0 6.3 6.6 5.6 6.1 5.5 6.3 5.4 5.3 n.a. n.a.
r1 7.5 7.1 6.0 7.0 9.4 10.6 9.5 10.0 8.4 7.6 7.0
Colombia
r1 proxy n.a. n.a. 5.4 4.5 4.2 4.8 5.0 5.8 5.7 4.4 4.9
r1 6.7 6.9 7.9 8.0 7.9 8.9 8.7 8.0 9.0 8.9 8.7
Venezuela
r1 proxy 6.0 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.4 5.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 7.9 7.4 7.2 10.0 7.8 7.0 6.6 8.7 7.6 7.9 9.3
r1: Mean income of Group 1 relative to overall income per worker
r1 proxy, calculated using representative occupations as follows:
Brazil: Salary of a factory manager to a semi-skilled worker (Lobo 1978)
Chile 1: Earnings per employers relative to average wages from Rodriguez Weber (2014)
Chile 2: Salaries of high-rank officials relative to medium salary in the public sector from Rojas 
(1982)
Colombia: Average salary “spokesperson and treasurer” to “doorman” in city councils (Lopéz 
Uribe 2008).




In the case of Colombia (1908–1950) we take as representative earnings for 
Group 1 the average wage of some high-rank officials in local government divided 
by the wage of low-skilled occupations in local government. Both series show 
higher ratios for the period 1925–1940 compared to early values. For Venezuela 
(1900–1936), we use the average wage of top officials in ministries divided by the 
median income in the central government. Although both ratios show similar order 
of magnitude, the proxy ratio shows no trend—again likely to reflect a more stable 
wage structure in the public sector. In sum, this complementary information on top 
earners does not show any significant divergence from our calculated relative 
incomes for Group 1 in the four countries.
3  Functional Inequality
The between-group inequality component (Lambert and Aronson 1993) is calcu-
lated as
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We assume that all individuals within a group earn the mean income of such a 
group, so that the within inequality component is zero.13 Elsewhere (Astorga 2015a), 
we offer some estimates of within-group inequality for selected periods from various 
sources (including ILO’s October Enquiry) for Argentina (1936–1976), Brazil 
(1911–1937), Chile (1938–1971), Mexico (1936–1982) and Venezuela (1940–1982). 
This complementary evidence shows that geographical dispersion in earnings rose 
from early to the middle decades, and thus played a role in boosting group inequal-
ity. Data available for Brazil and Mexico confirms this. The evidence available for 
the middle decades (mostly for wage dispersion in Groups 3 and 4) also suggests 
that within-group inequality trends reinforced those in between-group Ginis. Bértola 
(2005) and Rodriguez Weber (2014) also found such reinforcing trends in Uruguay 
and Chile, respectively. In short, we think that the latter measure is a reasonable 
proxy for trends in overall functional inequality.
3.1  Comparison with Other Inequality Measures
Figure A.1 presents our functional Gini series (Gini_b) as 5-year, centred moving 
averages. We also plot three additional inequality measures. First, available house-
hold income inequality Ginis (Gini_hs):14 Note that our inequality series exclude 
13 Relying on between-group inequality is a common feature in inequality studies covering the long 
run (Milanovic et al. 2011).
14 Thorp (1998, Statistical Appendix), Széquely and Sámano (2012) and ECLAC website.
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taxes and transfers, whereas the household Ginis are usually based on disposable 
income. Secondly, the inverse of the Williamson ratio (W-ratio) from 1900 to circa 
1940 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. And, third, Frankema’s 
Theil index of inter-industry inequality (F_ind, with a fitted moving average line).15 
In Chile we add the income Gini series estimated by Rodríguez Weber (2014). 
In the case of Mexico, because of data limitations and the distortions caused by the 
hyperinflation during the revolution, we estimate separately the earnings Gini for 
the 1900–1910 period. Thus the pre-1910 levels are not fully comparable with those 
after 1921.
The comparison with the household Ginis from a more recent period serves to 
assess the capacity of our between-group Ginis to reflect the trends in overall per-
sonal income inequality. For the years from 1950 to 2000, our series correlate rea-
sonably well with Gini_hs, especially for Brazil, Chile and Colombia. This gives us 
some reassurance that our between-group trend estimates during the first half of the 
last century are also good proxies for personal inequality trends. The association 
between both series in the first decades of this century is poor for Venezuela, which 
may be explained by the fact that our Ginis do not reflect the impact on inequality 
of recent social transfer programmes (Roberts 2012).
On the other hand, the correlation between Gini_b and the W-ratio (1900–1940) 
is mixed, with Argentina and Mexico offering the best fit, confirming a rise in 
inequality up to about 1920, whereas in Brazil and Chile there are important dis-
crepancies in the trends of both measures. Overall, this evidence does not offer 
unambiguous support for claims that the final years of the First Globalisation epi-
sode brought about a significant increase in inequality.
Intra-industry inequality also correlates well with our between-group inequality 
trends, especially for Argentina and Mexico. In Brazil both measures rise from 1920 
up to the 1980s (with an inflection point in the mid-1930s likely to reflect the indus-
trialisation plus urbanisation process), but then diverge during the last two decades 
of the last century or so. In Colombia the limited number of observations for F_ind 
shows an upward trend between the early 1960s and the late 1990s, a trend also 
apparent in Gini_b. And in Mexico, the acceleration in F_ind during the 1990s 
(likely to be associated with the country’s incorporation into NAFTA in January 
1994) is also in line with the rising trend in Gini_b. Overall, rising inequality since 
1960 or so in both measures suggests that skill-biased technological change was a 
contributing force (either by stretching the wage structure or by boosting profits) 
15 We calculate the ratio (1913 = 1) GDP per capita to real unskilled wage using Williamson (1998). 
In Brazil we present only the ratio for the Southeast region. For intra-industry inequality we calcu-
lated an index (1996 = 1) using original data in Frankema (2012). We drop an outlier observation 
in 1984 for Chile. Both indices are plotted on the right-hand side scale of the charts, whereas the 
two Ginis are on the left-hand side. We are not including the pseudo-Ginis series in Prados de la 
Escosura (2007) because they are largely a combination of the Williamson ratios and the house-
hold Ginis, both included in the charts.
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particularly during the closing decades of the last century, which was dominated by 
more open economies and trade liberalisation.16
Some additional comments are in order about our calculations for Brazil and 
Venezuela. Our Gini_b for Brazil shows a relatively low and trendless level up to 
about 1930 (though with significant fluctuations). This outcome is consistent with 
evidence from the 1920 population census of a large share of the labour force (about 
80 %) being rural, illiterate and low skilled (Bértola et al. 2009). Under such cir-
cumstances, it is likely that the maximum feasible income Gini was relatively low 
but that the extraction rate was relatively high, reflecting the fact that poorer societ-
ies have a smaller surplus for the elite to extract (Milanovic et al. 2010). The 
Brazilian daily wage data in rural areas available for the benchmark years 1911, 
1921 and 1936 (IBGE) indicate a relatively stable wage structure. A stable wage 
structure is also confirmed by urban wage series in Rio de Janeiro during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century (Lobo 1978), as well as by data assembled by 
Ball (2013) for industrial workers in selected firms in São Paulo from 1891 to 1930.
There is scant earnings data prior to 1936 for Venezuela, so our estimates for 
those years should be taken as a gross approximation. According to Valecillos 
(2007: 103), the general picture of the labour market is one dominated by roughly 
constant wages and stable wage structure up to the mid-1930s when wages started 
to rise gradually, driven by the growing importance of the oil industry. This situation 
is consistent with a roughly stable inequality shown by our Gini in the early period. 
According to De Corso (2013), GDP per worker rose 1.1 times between 1905 and 
1922, pointing to a relative increase in the remuneration to land and capital during 
the period, but not enough to result in a clear rising trend in functional inequality 
until the oil sector was in full swing.
3.2  The Top-Income Group and the Rest
Here we focus on the relative contributions to inequality of the income share of 
Group 1 (capturing concentration at the top) and a Gini coefficient of the three wage 
groups (capturing developments in the wage structure). Following Alvaredo (2010), 
the overall Gini coefficient can be expressed as
 
Gini Gini n s Gini n s +s n= + -( ) -( ) -Top Rest1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,  (4)
16 Scholars studying the wage structure in the region based on evidence for the middle decades of 
the last century already stressed the tendency of the leading industries to pull up the general level 
of wages in the rest of the economy, with the oil or mining industry (Chile, Venezuela) as prime 
examples (Berg 1968, 4). For Colombia, Cárdenas and Bernal (1999) found that during the period 
1976–1996 both trade liberalisation and skill-complementary technological change had a positive 
impact on skill premia in manufacturing and, in turn, on inequality.
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where s1 and n1 are the income and population shares of the top group and GiniTop 
and GiniRest are the Gini coefficients for the top group and for the rest of the popula-
tion, respectively. For n1 sufficiently small, (Eq. 4) can be approximated as
 
Gini Gini s +s= -( )Rest 1 1 1,  (5)
In our case, because of lack of data GiniTop is equal to zero anyway, and GiniRest is 
approximated by the between-group Gini coefficient of the three wage groups 
(Gini_w). Thus, the overall Gini in (Eq. 5) becomes the between-group Gini (as in 
Eq. 3) and can be expressed as
 
Gini b Gini w s s_ _ .= -( ) +1 1 1  (6)
This decomposition makes it possible to separate the action of the forces affect-
ing property and labour income, a distinction that is missing in Gini coefficients 
based on household income data. Labour income inequality is driven by demand 
and supply conditions in the labour market, as well as by institutional factors such 
as minimum wage legislation or the action of unions. Ultimately, they are influ-
enced by changes in technology, international trade, structural change and 
 developments in human capital formation. In the case of property income, the usual 
dominant forces are savings and investment behaviour, inheritance laws and rate of 
return to wealth. Unambiguous inequality trends emerge when there is a falling top- 
income share and wage compression, or rising top-income share and wage expan-
sion, occurring simultaneously.
Figure A.2 offers time series on s1 (G1%) together with Gini_b and Gini_w. For 
comparative purposes we are also including available official estimates for the prop-
erty income share or, when this is not directly available, the complement of the 
labour share (Prop%).17 Trends in G1% and Prop% are broadly consistent.18 The 
second half of the twentieth century and the 2000s are dominated by upward trends 
in G1%. The rise starts in the early 1940s in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela; in the 
late 1950s in Argentina and Chile; and in the mid-1960s in Mexico. Prior to that, the 
tendency for the secular top-income share was to fluctuate considerably around a 
trendless mean.19
A falling trend in the labour share (or a rising trend in G1%) is a common feature 
in Latin America during the closing decades of the twentieth century dominated by 
17 The sources are the BCRA (1976) in Argentina 1935–1962, van Ginneken (1979) in Mexico 
1950–1967 (our calculation, using labour shares for 1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1967 and 1975 from 
official sources) and the BCV for Venezuela 1957–1997. Otherwise ECLAC website (operating 
profits).
18 Also, our proxies for the labour share behave similarly to the labour shares estimated by Frankema 
(2010) for Argentina (1913–2000), with a 0.69 correlation, and Mexico (1913–2000), with a 0.68 
correlation. And it is partly consistent in Brazil (1920–2000), with a 0.76 correlation in the sub-
period 1950–1980.
19 Relatively low values in the early decades in Brazil are likely to reflect an underestimation of 
income per worker, whereas in Mexico and Venezuela they may reflect an overestimation of wages.
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market-friendly reforms.20 In the cases of Chile and Mexico, Palma (2011) locates 
the origin of the trend with the emergence of a “scissors” effect between the average 
real wage and labour productivity. In Fig. A.3 we show equivalent series for our six 
countries accompanied by the ratio between the mean incomes of Group 1 and 
Group 4 (y1/y4, or top-bottom ratio).21 We also found a “scissors” effect in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, although in the last three cases the gap starts 
developing before the wave of neo-liberal reforms.
As to the behaviour of the top-bottom ratio, there are rising secular trends in 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela starting in the 1920s or the 1930s. 
Argentina is the odd case with a steep fall in this ratio from the first half to the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century (except for the spike in the late 1980s, likely to be 
associated with hyperinflation and a decreed freeze in wages).22 The spike in Mexico 
circa 1950 is consistent with the surge of business opportunities in the country 
(amid subdued wages) created by the war effort in the USA. In Venezuela the dou-
bling of the ratio in the 1950s is associated with a 1.9-fold rise in oil production and 
a 25 % increase in oil prices—which peaked in early 1957 during the Suez Crisis 
(Baptista 1997). Bértola (2005, Chart 9) presents a similar measure in Uruguay 
showing a significant drop during the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, followed by a 
recovery of the ratio later on. In general the evolution of the top-bottom ratio indi-
cates that in most cases the top earners were able to increase—or at least keep—
their position relative to the mean income of the unskilled.
3.3  Wage Inequality
Secular movements in wage inequality (also reflecting the wage structure) and in 
the average real wage are plotted in Figs. A.2 and A.3, respectively. The early 
decades, dominated by export-led growth, are characterised by an expanding or a 
constant wage structure. This is the case only after 1920 or so for Brazil and Chile. 
Our evidence is consistent with the claim that during the first export-led growth era, 
immigration, lack of a well-integrated labour market and coercion (Bulmer-Thomas 
1994: 7) undermined the potential of demand-led growth favouring unskilled labour 
and wage compression (Bértola and Ocampo 2012).
20 Falling labour shares is also a common trend in both developed and developing countries since 
the 1970s or so that has been attributed primarily to globalisation, increased role of financial activ-
ity and labour market deregulation (Stockhammer 2013).
21 The wage series are weighted by the labour shares of Groups 2, 3 and 4. Labour productivity is 
calculated as GDP at constant prices divided by overall EAP. The timing of the scissors effect is 
robust to the use of GDP per worker series using the CPI as deflator.
22 In the case of Argentina, Alvaredo (2010) estimates the top 1 % income share for the period 
1932–1972 and 2002 using tax data. This share reaches a peak in early 1940s, and then, there is a 
significant fall from 1947 to 1952 followed by a steady decline to 1972. This pattern is roughly 
consistent with trends in our top-bottom ratio for the country.
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The middle decades were dominated by the import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy led by the state (Cárdenas et al. 2000). The average real wage experienced 
a sustained rise in all six countries. There was narrowing wage inequality in 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, but a widening in Brazil and Chile.23 
Wage compression was favoured in some cases by government intervention in the 
labour market and by the introduction of minimum wage legislation—particularly 
effective in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (Méndez 1950; Ericksson 1966: 16–17). 
Frankema (2012) studied industrial wage inequality in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
and found significant differences whose origin lies in the nature of the labour mar-
ket policies and political developments, particularly in the post-WW2 decades. 
Whilst in Argentina and Chile major trend breaks can be attributed to political 
regime changes (with military coups in 1976 and 1972, respectively), in Brazil the 
process of wage inequality was gradual and in tune with a strong rise of inter- 
industry labour productivity differentials.
The closing decades show the implementation of market-friendly reforms—
including more flexible labour markets—and the return of export-led growth as the 
dominant strategy. During this period there is a tendency towards a rise in the prop-
erty income share and a widening in wage inequality, amid falling real wages. This 
is particularly clear during the “lost decade” of the 1980s marked by rising top- 
bottom ratios (in most cases, also during the 1990s), indicating that wage earners 
largely bore the cost of the adjustment. In Mexico widening wage inequality was 
driven by the trade liberalisation reform of 1985 which affected unskilled labour 
disproportionately (Hanson and Harrison 1999). Venezuela is the exception with a 
constant (1980s) and falling (1990s) wage inequality, the causes of which are likely 
to be found in the growth implosion that occurred after the end of the 1970s which 
particularly affected wages in the middle groups. In addition, within-group inequal-
ity (by educational categories) grew in Argentina and Brazil (Morley 2000).
In general, widening inequality during this period was driven by institutional 
changes that weakened the power of the unions and by a decline in real minimum 
wages. The military regimes in place in Argentina (1976–1983), Chile (1973–1990) 
and Brazil (1963–1980) effectively restricted—or banned—the action of unions, 
increased flexibility in the labour market and reduced the coverage of the minimum 
wage as part of the reform agenda (Morley 2000). Unionisation plummeted across 
the region averaging only 10.7 % of the workforce in 2005 compared to a peak of 
23 % in the 1970s (Roberts 2012). And, according to ECLAC figures, the average 
real minimum wage for the LA-6 fell, on average, 5.9 % per year during the 1980s, 
followed by a moderate recovery of 1.7 % annual growth in the 1990s. In the first 
decade of the current century wage inequality tended to decline, a trend consistent 
with that shown by labour earnings Ginis calculated from household surveys (World 
Bank 2012: 28).
23 In addition, evidence on within-group wage dispersion for Groups 3 and 4 in Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela (Astorga 2015a) points to narrowing or constant wage spreads in the period.
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4  Regional Averages
In this section we present some regional indices and then proceed to explore whether 
they tend to reflect commonality or if results are driven by country-specific features. 
We calculate regional inequality first as the simple average of individual countries 
using our income Ginis together with a Gini available for Uruguay24 (LA-7) and, 
second, as a population-weighted average. Figure 1 (chart on the left) shows 5-year, 
centred moving averages of the two regional averages for LA-7. We add polynomial 
fitted lines to reflect secular movements. In addition, we show the simple-average 
inequality curve for the Southern Cone—Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. This sepa-
ration is of interest because this group of countries industrialised relatively early 
and tends to display different inequality-growth dynamics.
The LA-7 averages reveal a secular process resembling a “reclined S”-shaped 
curve for 1900–2011 with an inflection point around 1940 and a peak in the closing 
decades. The peak appears a little earlier for the population-weighted Gini. There is 
a moderate decline in inequality in the early decades driven by developments in 
Brazil and Colombia (inequality in the Southern Cone remains stable). According 
to this evidence, the final years of the Belle Époque (1900–1914) were not accom-
panied by rising inequality. In the middle decades, there was a rise in inequality 
driven by the latecomer industrialisation (Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela), but 
inequality fell in the Southern Cone which might be attributed to protectionist poli-
cies favouring urban workers and labour policies fostering wage compression. From 
the 1930s, average inequality rose steeply to a plateau around the “lost decade”, and 
then declined with the turn of the new century. The “reclined S” shape is more pro-
nounced in the case of the population-weighted series.
Figure 1 (chart on the right) shows the LA-6 simple averages of G1%, Gini_w 
and Gini_b. The early decades of the last century show no trend in either the top 
group income share or the inequality among the three wage groups. But there are 
differences after the 1930s. Wage inequality rises less steeply in the 1940s and 
1950s followed by a fairly stable wage structure in the 1960s and 1970s. Then there 
is a relatively rapid rise in wage inequality in the closing decades and wage com-
pression in the 2000s. By contrast, the top-income share accelerates from the mid- 
1930s to the end of the 1970s, followed by a more moderate rise in the closing 
decades. What is apparent in Fig. 1 is that trends in between-group inequality were 
primarily driven by trends in the top group.
The chart on the left of Fig. 2 shows simple averages for the LA-6 of the real 
wage series for the three lower occupational groups (used to estimate the mean 
income of each group), and the resulting EAP-weighted average real wage. To facil-
itate the comparison Gini_w is also included. Both the average wage (wage_avg) 
and wage inequality show a rising trend from the early 1930s up to the 1960s, 
24 For Uruguay we use Bértola (2005) for the period 1908–1966 and then use Gini values based on 
household surveys from ECLAC website to complete the series to 2011. The averages during the 
period 1911–1921 exclude Mexico.
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implying that more skilled workers benefited more than the less skilled. In the 
following two decades or so, the real wage accelerated while the wage structure 
remained roughly stable, indicating that wage earners benefited more evenly from 
economic growth.
The closing decades of the twentieth century were marked by falling real wages 
and widening wage inequality. The average real wage for the unskilled in the LA-6 
(wage_4) around 2000 returned to their 1960 levels (and 30 % below the peak 
around 1975). But there was significant labour mobility. The regional EAP share of 
Group 4 (see Table 1) came down to about 30 % in 2000 from about 45 % in 1960 
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did rather better, seeing a 20 % rise in their average real wage (wage_3) between 
1960 and 2000 (though the 2000 value is about 15 % below the peak reached around 
1975). The average LA-6 worker in Group 2 had a 30 % rise between 1960 and 
2000, and a 10 % fall from a peak around 1980.
4.1  Dispersion and Trend Commonality
Figure 2 (chart on the right) includes three measures to account for dispersion in 
Gini levels and trend commonality. First is the coefficient of variation for the 
between-group Gini for the LA-7 (coef.var._LA7, 5-year moving averages). This 
measures diversion—or convergence—in levels, showing a clear split between two 
periods: one of relatively high average dispersion 1900–1940 (with a trough in the 
early 1920s and two spikes of dispersion in the mid-1910s and mid-1930s), and the 
other of relatively low dispersion 1940–2011 (with a trough around 1950 and two 
spikes of dispersion in the early 1960s and late 1970s).25 One possible interpretation 
of this result is that although the inequality outcome over time differs across the 
seven countries, this reflects a different timing of a common underlying process 
(e.g. of a Kuznets-Lewis type) that would eventually lead to a similar end. This 
interpretation is supported by the outcome of a panel data analysis that reveals 
important regularities in the LA-6 associated with the action of common fundamen-
tal forces (Astorga 2015b).
One drawback of the above measure is that it does not capture commonality or 
divergence in trends, so that a low value in the coefficient of variation can indicate 
catching up in Gini levels but with countries undergoing opposite inequality trends 
(as during the middle decades). To address this limitation, Fig. 2 includes two mea-
sures to track the extent of trend commonality or synchronicity over natural decades 
in the between-group Ginis (B-trend_LA7) and in the wage Ginis (W-trend_LA6). 
A high value in a given natural decade (shown as an observation in the middle of the 
decade) indicates that most countries were experiencing similar trends.26
Over the century there was higher trend synchronicity in the wage Ginis than in 
the overall, between-group, Ginis, pointing to a higher level of uniformity in devel-
opments in the labour markets (e.g. associated with minimum wage legislation and 
unionisation) than in the forces affecting incomes at the top. Movements in both 
25 The pattern of between-country dispersion (not shown) for G1% and Gini_w resembles that 
of Gini_b.
26 The score of trend commonality is calculated in two steps. First, in each country the dominant 
trend pattern in each decade is identified (rising, constant, falling, or a combination of these 
options). Then, the number of times that a given pattern occurs is added up, assigning a “1” for a 
dominant trend over a given decade or a “0.5” when there are two salient patterns (e.g. for the 
B-trend_LA7 in the 1980s: rising = 4.5; constant = 0, falling = 2.5). Those partial results are multi-
plied by itself and then added up to obtain an overall score (4.52 + 02 + 2.52 = 26.5). Finally, the 
overall score is divided by the maximum possible score (26.5/49 = 0.54). See more details in 
Astorga (2015a, Table B-3).
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trend measures show diverging trends in the first half of the twentieth century (con-
sistent with high values for the coefficient of variation) but a clear move towards 
synchronicity during the second half. Overall, based on this evidence, the 1970s and 
the 1980s come out as the decades with the highest commonality in inequality trends.
5  Conclusions
We have presented new estimates of functional income Ginis for the period 1900–
2011 covering six Latin American countries, which use newly assembled wage 
series for three occupational categories. It offers a consistent and comprehensive 
view of long-term inequality. Our method and the data have their limitations, so our 
findings need to be corroborated by future research. That said, the key findings can 
be summarised as follows:
Secular trends as well as fluctuations in inequality across the twentieth century 
exhibit important country variations, particularly prior to 1960. Our series do not 
show a shared inequality rising trend during the end of the Belle Époque, and reveal 
mixed results in the middle decades. But by the early 1960s inequality was on the 
rise in most countries reaching a peak in the closing decades of the last century amid 
the implementation of the “Washington Consensus” policies. The regional Gini 
averages (simple and population weighted) of the LA-7 show a “reclined S” shape 
with an inflection point around 1940 and a peak in the 1990s (a decade earlier in the 
population-weighted curve).
Our evidence on relative incomes and employment shares is broadly consistent 
with the Kuznets-Lewis thesis. The early decades were characterised by a high pro-
portion of rural unskilled labour with polarised income between them and those at 
the top, largely reflecting disparities between capital or land owners and low-skilled 
landless workers. As the structural change got underway, and labour moved from 
low to higher productivity sectors, wage inequality rose. It was expected that the 
urban labour force would improve their educational levels and skills, whilst the fall 
in the rural workforce and the modernisation of agriculture would bid up their 
wages. However, there is a well-known twist to the standard Kuznets-Lewis process 
in Latin America. Industrialisation stagnated in the final quarter of the last century 
and workforce growth swelled the urban informal sector creating the conditions for 
worsening inequality.
There is an absence of episodes in which falling property shares and wage com-
pression reinforced each other, generating a sustained fall in inequality. The ten-
dency for wage compression, or slow wage expansion, during the decades of 
industrialisation under protection suggests that potentially dis-equalising forces—
arising from still limited access to education and a delayed demographic transition 
favouring returns on skills—were curbed, particularly in the Southern Cone, by 
government intervention in the labour market, unionisation and workings of mini-
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mum wage policies. However, overall, they could not offset the action of centrifugal 
forces boosting disparities between those at the top and the rest of the distribution.
Inequality in the twentieth century is a story of increased polarisation but at the 
same time one of significant social mobility. For the LA-6 as an average, the esti-
mated mean real income of top earners rose from 17 times the income of the 
unskilled around 1900, 30 times around 1970 and 27 times around 2000. Those at 
the top experienced a 3.3-fold rise in their mean income between 1900 and 2000 far 
above the 2.4-fold increase of those at the bottom. A second key development was 
the expansion of the middle groups, which went from about 32 % of the overall EAP 
at the start of the century to 62 % by the end. The mean income of those at the 
middle grew 2.9-fold between 1900 and 2000. But in all three occupational wage 
groups the absolute mean income at the end of the century was no higher than that 
of about 1970.
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Fig. A.2 Concentration at the top and wage inequality (lhs: shares; rhs: Gini coefficients; all series 
5-year m.a.)
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Fig. A.3 Average wage, GDP pw and top-bottom ratios (lhs: US$ per worker/month, 1970 prices; 
rhs: ratio; all series 5-year m.a.)
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The Political Economy of Income Inequality 
in Chile Since 1850
Javier E. Rodríguez Weber
1  Introduction1
Inequality is again at the center of the political and economic debate. At the 
beginning of 2014 Barack Obama called it “the defining challenge of our time.”2 
Soon after the publication of the English version of Capital in the 21st Century, 
by Thomas Piketty (2014), aroused a deep debate on the role played by inequal-
ity in developed countries since the eighteenth century and the challenges it 
poses to the future.
Inequality has always been a matter of concern in Latin America. Many believe 
that inequality is the most important obstacle to development and Chile, often 
called an “economic success story,” is one of the most unequal countries in the 
region. Shortly after Obama’s speech and, while assuming for a second time the 
1 This chapter is based on my Ph.D. dissertation. I want to thank to Luis Bértola, its supervisor, 
and those scholars who made insightful comments which helped me throughout the writing pro-
cess: Alfonso Herranz, Branko Milanovic, Brian Loveman, Carolina Román, César Yáñez, Gabriel 
Oddone, Henry Willebald, José Díaz Bahamonde, José Martínez-Carrión, Jorge Álvarez, Marc 
Badía, María Camou, Mario Matus, Natalia Pérez Barreda, Paola Azar, Peter Lindert, Reto Bertoni, 
Rosemary Thorp, Sabrina Siniscalchi, Sebastián Fleitas, Silvana Maubrigades, Tarcísio Botelho, 
Verónica Amarante, Vicente Neira, and y Xavier Taffunel. Jeffrey Williamson was a careful reader 
of an earlier version of this chapter and provided many insightful comments and suggestions, 
for which I am thankful. All mistakes are, of course, my responsibility.
2 Barack Obama: State of the Union Address, on http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address.
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presidency of Chile, Michelle Bachelet said that inequality was the biggest opponent 
of her country.3
This chapter summarizes a 400-page dissertation on the political economy of 
inequality in Chile between 1850 and 2009 (Rodríguez Weber 2014). The thesis 
aims to contribute to understanding the relationship between inequality and eco-
nomic growth in the long run. I analyze the relationship as the result of the inter-
action between market forces and institutions. The aim is to highlight the mutual 
influences and to unravel the relationship between the overall process, historical 
specificities, and contingencies. This is what I call a political economy approach 
to inequality.
In the remainder of this chapter I present the leading evidence and the main 
arguments for a brief economic history of income inequality in Chile between 
1850 and 2009. The second section discusses a methodological strategy capable of 
measuring the main trends of income inequality in the long run, and capturing at 
least part of the relationship between the market forces and the institutions which 
led to these trends. In Sect. 3, the core of the chapter, I report income inequality 
trends and summarize its relationship with the general development process. 
Section 4 concludes with some reflections on the past, the present, and the future 
of Chilean inequality.
2  The Problem, the Approach, the Method, and the Data
2.1  Inequality and Development in Chile
Regardless of where someone lives, his or her life is very different today than it was 
two centuries ago. The place they live, the way they earn their living, the way they 
relate to each other, the political system that makes the laws that rule their behavior, 
and every single aspect of their lives have been radically transformed by the devel-
opments that occurred in the last two centuries. Nevertheless, saying that every part 
of the globe has been affected by the transformation is not the same as saying that 
all have been affected in the same way. Modern economic growth has multiplied the 
capacity to produce goods and services by several times, but these goods and ser-
vices have been unevenly distributed. Economic inequality has two dimensions: 
between regions and/or countries and between people and/or groups inside each 
country. With what is by Latin American standards a homogeneous population, 
Chile—an OECD member—has a GDP per capita which is a half that of OECD 
average. But it is its Gini coefficient of 0.53 (PNUD 2013) that makes Chile a typical 
Latin American country.




I study the relationship between market income distribution and development in 
Chile for two reasons. As I will explain below, I do not think that the complexity of 
this subject can be studied in the aggregate way that characterizes the Kuznets 
Curve literature. Furthermore, the history of Chile is rich enough to study all of the 
problems that the literature has posed as central to the development and inequality 
relationship. In the last century and a half, Chile has been beneficiary of and preju-
diced by the international economy and has gone through many different political 
regimes and development strategies. Therefore, Chile presents a large diversity of 
experiences that can be used to test different theories and hypothesis on how income 
inequality and development are related.
2.2  A Political Economy Approach
Most of the attempts to analyze the relationship between inequality and development 
derive a hypothesis from a general theory and use data to test it. Typically, these 
works assume the ceteris paribus clause. If I want to measure the effect of market 
integration on wage inequality, I must look for cases where nothing else has 
changed. The problem is that development transforms every aspect of social life, 
and changes in one area usually affect others. While economists may try to control 
for everything else but their favored variable, their success is always debatable. 
Certainly it is not possible to study all of them at the same time, so there is a need 
for simplification. I chose to highlight the interaction between institutions and mar-
ket forces, the way that each one influences the other, and how both of them influ-
ence income distribution.
Inequality cannot be studied as the single outcome of market forces. Supply and 
demand are—of course—relevant, but no market factor exists without institutions 
and asymmetric power relations between those who interchange in it. In other 
words, it is necessary to recognize that beyond the market, there are social and 
political relations between individuals and groups, as well as a state that can—and 
usually does—intervene not only in market exchanges, but in what can be called—
broadly speaking—the distributive conflict.
The state can shape market income distribution through different procedures, for 
example, by regulating rights and obligations of those who interchange, like prop-
erty rights and the minimum wage. In other cases, it can intervene directly in a dis-
tributive conflict—by sending the police or military forces to dissolve a strike, or by 
pressuring the entrepreneurs to accept a rise in wages.
This is why a “pure” market income distribution does not exist, in the sense of a 
distribution solely determined by supply and demand forces. The political side of 
the economy is always there, especially when we are talking about inequality 
(Robinson 2010; Piketty 2014, 2015; Atkinson 2015).
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2.3  Estimates: Dynamic Social Tables
How to measure market inequality among Chileans from 1850 to 1970? Income tax 
data is unavailable and using proxies like the ratio between income per capita and 
wages seemed unsatisfactory, so I opted to build dynamic social tables.4 A social 
table is constructed assigning income recipients to different categories, usually 
occupations. Two kinds of data are needed for each category: how many there are 
and how much they earn. Typically, this methodology is used to estimate income 
inequality at a specific point in time. To study the evolution of inequality over time 
requires that social tables are built for different benchmark years (Lindert and 
Williamson 1982, 1983, 2013; Londoño 1995; Bértola et al. 2009). A “dynamic” 
social table estimates instead the number of income recipients and their income for 
each category for every year over a period of time.5 Therefore, what makes a social 
table “dynamic” is the fact that it covers a period of time, not just a year—or a set of 
years. Within that period, the categories remain constant, but the number of people 
included and their income change every year. Metaphorically speaking, if the use of 
different social tables enables the derivation of inequality trends from a set of 
“pictures,” a dynamic social table allows us to “see the whole movie.”6
In order to estimate income inequality and other related variables in Chile, I built 
two dynamic social tables, one for the period 1860–1929 and the other for 1929–
1970. The first one has 49 categories (9 in agriculture—7 of landowners, from  peasant 
to big landlords, and 2 of workers—3 in mining, 10 in industry, 20 of civil servants, 
5 in transport, and 2 in others–professionals and domestic service). The second one 
(1929–1970) has 116 categories. The different sectors and branches represented 
include agriculture, mining (3 branches), industry (23 branches), commerce, trans-
port, and public and private services (3 branches), and they were segregated between 
employers, self-employed, employees (white collar), and workers (blue collar). 
Sometimes one of these categories was also disaggregated, like employers in the agri-
culture sector who were divided into nine categories according to the size and quality 
of their properties. Another problem is that the sources allowed us to measure pretax 
income inequality between income earners only. To estimate inequality after taxes 
and transfers or between households is impossible (at least for the whole period).
The main sources of data were population and economic census, statistical year-
books, and a myriad of secondary sources—mainly historical statistics,7 but also 
historical sources. Many assumptions were necessary, and I grounded them on theo-
retical and historical knowledge—e.g., the composition of peasant incomes, or the 
share of utilities in the mining sector appropriated by foreign capital. Sometimes 
4 Household surveys are only available for Santiago and the metropolitan zone from 1957 onwards.
5 The term “dynamic” was proposed by Branco Milanovic in a workshop in Montevideo in 2011.
6 A similar strategy was carried forward by Lindert and Williamson (2014) and Astorga’s paper in 
this book.
7 For example: Haindl (2007), Díaz et al. (2010), and Matus (2012).
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there were alternative sources—e.g., rural wages between 1880 and 1925 (Bauer 
1975; Matus 2012)—and I used what I thought were the best examples.
It is impossible to describe here the entire methodology applied, but some deci-
sions that were taken are important enough to be presented in some detail.8 This is 
specially the case for the top-income earners. If the estimation of the incomes of the 
top centiles presents several problems in the present, these are even more pronounced 
in the case of historical statistics. In order to deal with these problems, the two tables 
were created following different procedures. In the first table, which covers the years 
between 1860 and 1930, there are four categories of high-income earners. The first 
one is composed by elite civil servants (president, ministers, governors, etc.) where 
I used their annual salaries. Regarding landowners and industrialists, I estimated 
their income for a base year in which I had a reliable source and then projected it by 
an index which takes account of the evolution of prices, productivity, and wages. 
Finally, in the case of mining owners, first I estimated the sector’s GDP at current 
prices for the whole period and then calculated the operating surplus which accrued 
to Chilean capitalists.9 The procedure for estimating the operating surplus was also 
used in the second table (1929–1970), but in this case I used the series of GDP at 
current prices estimated by Haindl (2007). The total profits were then distributed 
between employers through different procedures—for example, in the case of the 
seven categories of landowners they were assigned to them according to the distribu-
tion of property and capital which was estimated from the agricultural censuses.
Many assumptions are controversial. To evaluate how sensitive the results are to 
them, different series were estimated, changing sources or assumptions. Figure 1 
presents the maximum and minimum Gini estimates for each year between 1860 
and 1970. Two conclusions are suggested. First, the different sources and assump-
tions of a wide range in levels of inequality, especially from WWI to early 1920s. 
Second, trends and cycles coincide. In short, level comparisons with other countries 
may be a source of error, but volatility and trends are unlikely to be.10
For the period after 1970 I used household surveys. The period 1850–1859 was 
estimated by a procedure adapted from van Zanden et al. (2011) which was inspired, 
in turn, by the concept of Inequality Possibility Frontier (Milanovic et al. 2011).
Nevertheless, there are some assumptions and sources that are, in my opinion, 
better than others. These lead to what I consider “the best” estimates, presented in 
Figs. 2 and 3. Both figures present two different measures of market income inequal-
ity. The former measures factor income distribution as the profit share in gross 
domestic income. Figure 3, on the other hand, measures market income distribution 
among Chileans and excludes the estimate of profits of foreign capital in the mining 
sector. This “best” estimate will be used in the remainder of the chapter.
8 The reader will find a full description of the methodology in Rodríguez Weber (2014: chapter 3).
9 Note that foreign capital was very important in the mining sector. See Figs. 4 and 6.
10 The reader will find a deeper analysis of the reliability of the estimated data in Rodríguez Weber 
(2014: 110–123).
























































Fig. 2 The “best estimate” of factor income inequality, 1860–1970. Profit share as a percentage of 
gross domestic income in Chile, 1860–1970. Source: Own estimate
Fig. 1 Income distribution among Chileans between 1860 and 1970. Maximum and minimum 
estimations obtained through different sources and methods. Source: Own estimate. The estimates 
differ in their sources and/or assumptions
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3  A Brief History of Income Inequality in Chile
3.1  Globalization and Institutions, 1850–1873
Unlike what happened in most of Latin America after independence, Chile State 
was rapidly consolidated. Although there were civil wars in the 1850s, postindepen-
dence conflicts had ended by 1830. In those decades of political stability, Chile 
benefited from growing international demand for copper and wheat. The first was 
driven by the expansion of the industrial revolution, and the second one by rise in 
world living standards and declining international transport costs. This commodity 
boom generated export-led growth.
Thus began the modern era of Chilean economic history, characterized by a virtu-
ous cycle between exports, imports, and state revenues. Increasing world demand 
stimulated the production of tradables, the increase in foreign exchange earnings 
financed increased imports, and the tariffs on foreign commerce—the main source of 
tax revenues—allowed the expansion of public spending, especially on infrastructure. 
As a result, Chile’s economy grew faster and foreign trade share rose11 (Cariola and 
Sunkel 1982; Collier and Sater 1998; Salazar and Pinto 2002; Ortega 2005).
11 Between 1850 and 1873 the annual growth rate for GDP per capita, exports, imports, and fiscal 





























































(1850-1860) Estimaded through Extraction Ratio
(1860-1929) Dynamic Social Table 1: 1860-1930
(1929-1970) Dynamic Social Table 2: 1929-1970
(1970-2009) Household surveys (Gran Santiago)
Hodrick-Prescott (smoothing parameter=100)
Fig. 3 The “best estimate” of Chilean income earner inequality, 1850–2009. Gini coefficient. 
Source: Own estimate. The different lines and dots represent different estimation methods. The 
pitfalls of each methodology and the splice of estimations obtained through different methodolo-
gies imply that only the midterm tendencies, obtained through the Hodrick-Prescott filter, will be 
used in the historical analysis
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According to Williamson (2002, 2011) these global forces led to an increase in 
the rental/wage ratio which benefited landowners and implied a worsening income 
distribution. This was precisely what happened in Chile between 1850 and the 
 mid- 1870s (Fig. 4). The exports of wheat to California and Australia during the gold 
fever in the 1850s, and to Great Britain the decade that followed, promoted the use 
of land that was previously idle. But this land, although unused, had owners. So, 
new lands were placed into production on established haciendas. In a process which 
has been compared to the “second serfdom” of Eastern Europe, globalization forces 
tended to reinforce the archaic institution of the inquilinos (Bauer 1975, 1992; 
Bengoa 1988).12 Part of the labor force of the haciendas since the seventeenth 
century, the inquilinos were paid with the right to use a piece of land, and they and 
their families had the obligation to work in the landlords’ fields. During this period, 
the value of land rose as a consequence of the increased demand for Chilean wheat 
(Gay 1863), and the obligations of the inquilinos increased as their rights dimin-
ished (Bauer 1975). Pushed by external demand, the economy grew, but the institu-
tional framework which had the hacienda system at its core—which affected the 
lives of 80 % of the Chileans at that time—assured that growth went almost exclu-
sively to the elite. Most people maintained a living standard barely above subsis-
tence. As a consequence, income distribution worsened (Rodríguez Weber 2015).
12 It’s worth noting that, contrary to other Latin American countries, there wasn’t an ethnic divide 
between Chilean peasants and landowners. The Chilean population was homogenous. Thus, at the 
end of the colonial period, the indigenous population accounted only for 9.5 % of total population, 
























































Estimated through Social Table 1860-1930
Estimated through Extraction Ratio
Estimated through income/wage ratio
Fig. 4 Market income inequality among Chileans, 1850–1873. Gini index. Source: Own estimate. 
The period 1850–1859 was estimated by projecting the value of 1860 through two different meth-




3.2  Crisis, Frontier Expansion, and Foreign Investment, 
1873–1903
Income inequality fell between 1873 and 1903, surprisingly since it was still export 
led, but this trend obscures the fact that the period contained two different situa-
tions: 1873–1880 was a time of crisis that ended with the Pacific War (1879–1883), 
and 1880–1903 was a time of expansion.
Global forces that led to growth following the gold fever of the 1850s provoked 
a serious crisis in 1873. The quantity and the prices of exports fell strikingly, fiscal 
incomes sunk, and the whole economy collapsed (Sater 1979; Ortega 2005). The 
elite, and perhaps some civil servants in the middle—in any case the upper decile—
were the only ones affected by the crisis, because most people were at subsistence. 
Reduced incomes in the top, even though it remained stable for the poor, implied a 
reduction in income inequality.
But things changed after 1880, when Chile initiated a second cycle of export-
led growth, this time driven by the nitrate exports. This cycle was characterized by 
a process of frontier expansion in which the area of land controlled by Chile 
increased in almost 50 %. This was a consequence of two military victories: the 
first one over Peru and Bolivia in the North, which allowed Chile to gain control 
over the nitrate fields, and the second one over the mapuches, in the South, which 
allowed Chile to expand its agricultural frontier. As a result, the land/labor ratio 
increased by 30 %. The incorporation of natural resources, above all the nitrate 
fields, led to the second growth cycle of nineteenth century, which ended in 1913 
(Cariola and Sunkel 1982).
Income inequality fell in the 1870s as a consequence of the crisis, but the same 
trend is seen after 1880, in a context of high growth led by nitrate exports. Why did 
this happen? The answer consists of two parts. First, the elite, weakened by the 
crisis, could not preserve the nitrate business for themselves. Instead, it was rapidly 
controlled by foreign capital—mainly the British. Therefore, an important share of 
the profits from the core industry during this period went to foreigners (Fig. 5).
In other words: foreign control of the industry and the burden of taxes collected 
by the state over the nitrate activity implied that a significant portion of income 
which would have gone to Chilean elite, if it had maintained control, ended up in 
foreign hands.
The other process which explains the counterintuitive fall in income inequality 
during this post-1880 period of export-led growth was the impact of frontier expan-
sion on wages. During the last two decades of the century, Chile expanded its terri-
tory both to the north and to the south. In the north, salaries were high enough to 
attract the labor force to work on the inhospitable environment of the nitrate fields. 
In the south, after the Chilean Government won a war against the mapuches, thou-
sands of people from the Central Valley migrated and occupied a piece of land—
which had no owners, except, of course, the mapuches themselves. As a consequence, 
between 1880 and 1900 many people abandoned the rural sector of the Central 
Valley—the mainland of the hacienda system (Table 1).
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Therefore, labor demand increased as a consequence of the emerging nitrate 
industry and the growth of cities, at the same time that people were abandoning the 
rural area of Central Valley. Meanwhile, the growth of public education—enabled 



























































Chilean profits / mining GDP
Taxes paid by mining sector / mining GDP
Foreign profits / mining GDP
Fig. 5 Distribution of mining GDP between foreign investors, local investors, and the state, 1880–
1903. Source: Own estimate. See Rodríguez Weber (2014: Cuadro AE 16)
Table 1 Population by regions and average growth rates between censuses
Region
Population by region (%)
Population growth: Annual rate 
by period (%)







North “Big” north 0.1 4 6 8 48.9 3.9 4.0
“Small” north 11 10 8 7 0.6 −0.9 0.7
Center Central Valley 68 61 60 54 0.9 0.9 0.5
Concepción 13 14 12 11 2.8 −0.5 0.9
South Frontera 0.9 4 6 10 13.9 6.1 5.9
The Lakes 4 5 5 7 3.1 2.0 4.0
Austral 3 3 3 3 1.3 0.6 1.1
Total 100 100 100 100 2.0 1.0 1.5
Sources: Population census (1907) and Hurtado (1966, Cuadro 2). The Big North includes the 
provinces of Tacna, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta. The “Small” North includes the provinces of 
Atacama and Coquimbo. The Central Valley includes the provinces of Aconcagua, Valparaíso, 
Santiago, O’Higgins, Colchagua, Curicó, Talca, Linares, Maule, and y Ñuble. Concepción is 
formed by the provinces of Concepción, Arauco, and Bío-Bío. Frontera region by Malleco and 




the middle classes and an increase in the supply of skilled workers (Rodríguez 
Weber 2014: Cuadro AE 12). All of this led to a bigger increase in unskilled wages—
especially in rural wages—than in the mean income and elite income (Table 2). 
As the counterfactual exercise shown in Fig. 6 demonstrates, the increase in 
unskilled wages was big enough to have an important equalizing effect.
Why is it that we do not see the same evolution in other examples of frontier 
expansion during the same period like Argentina, New Zealand, or Australia? 
Because in these cases the expansion of the frontier went hand in hand with a 
 population explosion due to an important immigration process. In Argentina, for 
example, between 1875 and 1914 the supply of agricultural land increased from 55 
to 83 million of hectares. But population growth was even more important, from 1.7 
Table 2 Annual income by categories of income earners. Constant shields of 1960
Period $





1 % Urban Rural Total Total Total
1880–1884 Shields 
of 1960
298 7.425 299 121 214 1.735 311
1900–1904 Shields 
of 1960





43.9 % 10.2 % 37.7 % 91.1 % 51.4 % 4.4 % 43.4 %


























































Wage increase equals mean growth
Actual estimate
Fig. 6 Estimating the effect of the increase of wages on inequality. Gini coefficient, 1880–1903. 
Source: Own estimate
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to 7.8 million in the same period. As a consequence, the hectares per capita decreased 
from 31 to 11. The same process is seen in New Zealand (Álvarez 2012). That is to 
say, in both cases it followed the opposite tendency than in Chile, when hectares per 
capita increased from 18 to 23 between 1875 and 1885.
In sum, unskilled wages increased at the same time that most of the profits gener-
ated in the nitrate sector went outside the country. As a result, personal income 
distribution among Chileans fell in a context of economic growth led by exports of 
natural resource-intensive goods. Profit share, on the other hand, remained almost 
constant although at a lower level than in the 1860s (Fig. 2).
3.3  Zenith and Decay of the “Oligarchic Republic,” 
1903–1938
Between 1903 and 1913, the real mean income grew at an annual rate of 1.9 %, the 
real income of the top 1 % by 8.0 %, and the real income of the unskilled workers 
decreased at a rate of—1.5 % (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Tabla 7.1). As a result, the 
total real income increased by 33 %, the income of the top percentile rose 137 %, 
and that of the bottom 99 % increased by only 17 %. In other words, the top 1 % 
appropriated 55 % of the total growth of the period. Why the difference between 
1873 and 1903?
The crisis of 1873 affected the income of the elite, but not its power. Their con-
trol over the state was so total that it is accurate to talk about an “oligarchic repub-
lic” (Vial Correa 2010) or “aristocratic regime” (Reinsch 1909). When the effects of 
frontier expansion and internal migration passed, the elite could turn into almost the 
unique beneficiary of the last decade of growth in the nitrate era.13 When growth 
declined after 1913, the elite could keep their privileged situation, until the effects 
of the crisis facilitated a social alliance between urban workers and middle sectors 
which in turn overthrew the oligarchic republic.
To talk about an “oligarchic republic” while studying the political economy of 
income inequality requires a theoretical stance. One can expect that under such a 
regime the state will promote policies beneficial to the elite in their conflicts with 
other classes. Hence, while much has been debated about the impact of oligarchic 
institutions on economic growth in the long run,14 the consequences for inequality 
are much less debatable.
There were three causal mechanisms derived from the elite’s political control 
over the state, which allowed them to become the main beneficiary of the economic 
growth at the end of the nitrate era and which explain the rapid increase in income 
inequality between 1903 and 1913 and into the 1920s (Fig. 3).
13 This time growth was led in the first place by increasing prices. Nitrates were used for explosives, 
so demand increased in the decade before the Great War.




First, the elite took control over the nitrate industry. In fact, between 1901 and 
1925 the participation of the Chilean capital in the industry increased from 14 to 
68 %. Meanwhile, the British share was reduced from 55 to 23 % (Cariola and 
Sunkel 1982: Cuadro 16). At the same time, the portion of the mining GDP col-
lected by the state as tax revenues was significantly reduced (Fig. 7).
Second, during the decade before the Great War, monetary police led to increased 
inflation15 which reduced real wages since nominal wages grew more slowly. When 
urban and mining workers organized in their recently formed unions and demanded 
an increase in nominal wages to match inflation, as well as other improvements in 
labor conditions, they were wildly repressed. The massacre of 1907 in Iquique, 
when more than 2000 mining workers and their families were strafed in a school by 
the army, became the bold symbol of the period.16 After that, the union activity fell 
off, as did real wages (Fig. 8). In sum, the unions could not prevent the fall in real 
wages and the economic growth directly benefited the elite. But this was not the 
result of “impersonal market forces.” It was, instead, the direct consequence of the 
policies carried forward by the oligarchic republic in favor of the elite.
Third, the property rights over the land taken from the mapuches in the South were 
now regularized in a way that they systematically benefited the great landowners in 
detriment to the mapuches and the people who had settled there in the  previous 
15 The increase in the consumer price index was 10 % in 1905, 17.3 % in 1906, 24.4 % in 1907, and 
12.2 % in 1908 (Matus 2012).
16 The number of workers dead as a consequence of state repression during this period was similar 











































Chilean profits over mining GDP Tax revenues over mining GDP
Fig. 7 Chilean profits and tax revenues collected in the mining sector as a percentage of mining 
GDP. Source: Own estimate. See Rodríguez Weber (2014: Cuadro AE 16)
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period. The control of the elite over the state guaranteed that the hacienda system 
expanded to the frontier (Solberg 1969; Bengoa 1988; Almonacid 2009).17
These are the fundamental mechanisms that explain the rapid increase of income 
inequality between 1903 and 1913. After that, inequality remained high, but the 
economic context changed radically.
Between 1913 and 1938, there was hardly any economic growth at all. This was 
the net result of interwar volatility and the Great Depression. This situation of stag-
nation with volatility, if not affected the privileged place of the elite in economic 
terms, at least undermined its political role.
The crisis severely affected fiscal revenues. The taxes on foreign commerce had 
fed state expansion, but now public earning and spending sunk. In 1917 fiscal 
expenditures were at 44 % of their 1912 levels (Diaz et al. 2010). As the state was a 
central player in the skilled labor market—teachers, military officers, and civil ser-
vants—the fiscal crisis reduced the demand for skilled workers, whose wages fell 
jointly with fiscal expenditures. Between 1912 and 1917 skilled wages fell by 38 %. 
They recovered during the 1920s but dropped again after 1930. Between 1912 and 
1937, skilled wages fell at an annual rate of 2.0 %. During the same period the ratio 
between skilled and unskilled wages fell from 6 to 2.9 (Rodríguez Weber 2014: 
Cuadro AE 7). This, together with the increase in the strikes—by that time the 
unions had recovered from their defeat of 1907—fed political discontent, social 
turmoil, and sabre-rattling. The oligarchic republic was in steep decline.
After 1920 different presidents acceded to the government against the elite’s 
desires—something unthinkable a few years earlier. In 1938, after two decades of 




























































Strikes Unskilled real wages
Fig. 8 Index of real wages for unskilled workers (1913 = 100) and number of strikes in Chile, 
1900–1925. Sources: Strikes: Pizarro (1986: cuadros 2 y 7). Real wages: Own estimate
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political turbulence—which included two dictatorships and a first attempt to set up 
a socialist republic—the elections were won by the Frente Popular, a left-wing 
alliance formed by social democrats, socialists, and communists.
3.4  Achievements and Pitfalls of the “Mesocratic Republic,” 
1938–1973
The expansion of education between 1910 and 1940—when Chile narrowed the 
education gap with core countries (Bértola et al. 2012: Cuadros 8 and 9)—allowed 
an increase in skilled labor in the next decades. Thus, the “mesocratic republic,” 
between 1938 and 1973, was a time of expansion and growing importance of the 
middle sectors, both in political and economic terms. It was also a period of an 
increasing role of state regulation on economic activity. Its influence was particu-
larly important in the promotion of industry. This led to a structural change in three 
ways. First, it fed the urbanization process. Between 1940 and 1970 urban popula-
tion increased from 53 to 75 %. Second, the structure of sectoral GDP and  working 
labor changed dramatically. As elsewhere in Latin America, this was an era of 
industrialization (Thorp 1998; Bértola and Ocampo 2012). Between 1935 and 1970 
the industrial share in GDP increased from 12 to 23 %. Meanwhile, the agricultural 
and mining shares fell. In terms of the labor force, the structural change was char-
acterized by the fall in agriculture and the expansion of services. Third, there was a 
relative expansion of employees, especially skilled. Between 1940 and 1970 white-
collar workers increased from 14 to 39 % of the total labor force, and from 21 to 
47 % of the urban workers (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Cuadro AE 12).
The political scene was increasingly dominated by left-wing parties and unions. 
The center-left controlled the executive between 1939 and 1952, and again between 
1964 and 1970. Furthermore, between 1971 and 1973, Chile passed through a revo-
lutionary process under the presidency of Salvador Allende. The new political con-
text of the 1940s and 1960s was correlated with an increase in the union activity. 
Between 1936 and 1941 the unionization rate of white-collar workers increased 
from 20 to 45 %. Although it later declined, it rose again during the Christian 
Democratic government, from 25 % in 1964 to 45 % in 1970. Unionization grew 
also within the industrial sector, but less than in the case of white-collar workers. 
For rural workers, unionization was almost nonexistent before the victory of the 
Christian Democratic Party, but rocketed after 1964, reaching 74 % of the rural 
labor force by 1970 (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Cuadro AE 19).
Between 1940 and 1970, inequality fell as a consequence of various forces. Only 
in the 1950s was this trend partially reversed (Fig. 3). The mechanisms by which 
distribution was improved were of two types. First, the process of structural change 
undermined the importance of a sector which was highly unequal (agriculture) in 
favor of the urban economy, where inequality was lower (Rodríguez Weber 2014: 
Cuadro AE 23).18 More important was the increase in the middle sectors—mainly 
18 The same was true in Colombia and Uruguay (Londoño 1995; Bértola 2005).
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employees—which meant that an augmented portion of workers earned salaries 
nearer the mean of the distribution. Thus, between 1940 and 1970, income recipi-
ents which earned between 50 and 200 % of the mean income increased from 42 to 
55 % of total income earners (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Gráfico 8.14).
The combination of both processes of structural change, between sectors and 
between categories of workers (that is, the increased importance of employees), had 
a strong equalizing effect, especially in the 1940s and 1960s when the process 
accelerated. This can be seen from the counterfactual scenarios presented in Fig. 9. 
The purpose of the exercise was to capture the effect of the different aspects of 
structural change on income inequality, so the level of income for each category 
was maintained constant at its level of 1938. In the first scenario, income inequality 
was estimated assuming that the structural change was only due to the migration of 
unskilled workers between sectors. Thus, scenario 1 captures the effect of the rural 
workers moving on to urban unskilled jobs.19 In scenario 2, inequality was  estimated 
assuming no structural change between sectors but only between categories of 
workers, i.e., between blue-collar workers and white-collar employees. Thus, this 
scenario captures the effect of the “skilling” within sectors. Finally, in scenario 3 
income inequality was estimated assuming shifts between sectors and categories of 
19 The gap between rural and unskilled urban wages grew during the period, in accordance with the 
increasing gap in productivity and differences in the institutions that ruled both labor markets. In 
1938, 1950, and 1970, rural wages were 41, 44, and 24 % of unskilled urban wages (Rodríguez 














































Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scenario 3 Actual estimate (tendency)
Fig. 9 Estimating the effect of structural change on income inequality reduction. Source: Own 
estimates. See text for descriptions of the different scenarios
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workers but, as in the other scenarios, income levels remained constant for all 
categories. As can be seen, if only this had occurred, then income inequality would 
have fallen by about the same magnitude that actually occurred.
The second kind of mechanisms was related to the effect that the new political 
context had in the labor market institutions. During the 1940s, both government 
intervention—especially through the implementation and increase of the minimum 
wage for employees—and union activity favored an increase in the income earned 
by the poorest of the white-collar workers. Between 1940 and 1953, minimum wage 
systematically increased above the inflation rate of the previous year, a policy that 
not only reduced inequality within employees—the Gini coefficient for employees 
fell from 0.40 in 1939 to 0.28 in 1950 (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Cuadro AE 22)—but 
also seemed to affect unskilled wage growth (Rodríguez Weber 2014: 296–297).
Nevertheless, the redistributive goal was put in second place as inflation became 
the first policy concern. As it accelerated, the minimum wage lost its role as a redis-
tributive tool during the 1950s; real wages fell, and income distribution worsened 
for a while (Fig. 3).
During that time, conservative forces gained influence and a monetarist adjust-
ment was attempted.20 The goal was to freeze wages at the reduced level that they 
were after the inflation accelerated. Whereas during the 1940s the increase in the 
legal minimum wage for employees was a tool to promote real wage growth, now it 
was used as a way to contain the growth of prices. Nevertheless, this policy was 
impossible to implement under the institutional conditions of the mesocratic repub-
lic. The white- and blue-collar unions fought against the monetary policy, and it was 
progressively abandoned.
In the 1960s, the redistributive agenda took a new impulse, and it now reached 
the countryside. The agrarian reform led by the Christian Democratic government 
was the last attempt to transform the structure of inequality by ending the hacienda, 
the ancient institution which had its origins in the encomienda system of the colo-
nial times (Loveman 1976; Santana Ulloa 2006; Rodríguez Weber 2013). This path 
of transformation was reinforced by Allende’s victory in 1970. In that election, a 
vast majority of Chileans opted to deepen the structural reforms. However, street 
riots, and the attempt to build a socialist economy, alarmed a vast part of those in the 
middle, which by 1973 sided with the elites in opposition to the government. A military 
coup overthrew Allende on September 11th of 1973.
3.5  The Legacy of Repression and the Debt of Democracy, 
1973–2009
The period 1973–2009 exhibits a unique style of development, characterized by the 
return to the export-led growth strategy, and the withdrawal of the state from the 
economy and a commitment to the centrality of the market in allocating resources, 
20 Due to the Klein-Sacks mission.
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but it is useful to distinguish between two different stages. Between 1973 and 1989 
Chile was under the dictatorship of General Pinochet, whose regime was guilty of 
massive violation of human rights. The state repressed organizations like political 
parties and trade unions which play a central role in distributive conflicts. This was 
also a period of high economic volatility, marked by two deep recessions in 1975 
and 1982/1983, and modest economic growth. It was under such circumstances that 
inequality reached its highest level since the 1930s (Fig. 3).
Chile has been governed by a democratic political system since 1990. This most 
recent period was characterized by greater stability, higher levels of investment, and 
a higher growth rate. Nevertheless, the center-left coalition that ruled Chile between 
1990 and 2009 was unable to reduce the extreme level of inequality which inherited 
from the authoritarian regime.
The high level of inequality that Chile faces today arose in a highly repressive 
political context, characterized by the prohibition of political parties and the repres-
sion of the trade unions and any kind of opposition. It was under these  circumstances 
that the military dictatorship led by General Pinochet and his advisors promoted a 
radical transformation of the economy and society (Gárate Chateau 2012). Inequality 
arose because the policies carried forward by the government led to redistribute in 
favor of the elite. This was evident both in the structural reforms they boosted as 
well as in the short-term measures they adopted in response to the crisis of 1975 and 
1982. The combination of high inflation, unemployment, and repression sank real 
wages. Poverty rocketed and income distribution worsened radically in few years 
(Fig. 3; see also Rodríguez Weber 2014: Cuadros 9.3, 9.6, and 9.8).
But the legacy of inequality that Pinochet and the Chicago boys left to Chilean 
democracy was settled in its structural transformations. First, the privatization of 
public enterprises and services—made in a highly opaque context (Gárate Chateau 
2012; Mönckeberg 2001)—implied that profits could now be made from selling 
services that were considered rights a few years before. Instead of the perfect com-
petitive markets that were promised by the Chicago boys who led the transforma-
tion, these services were increasingly provided by oligopolies which extracted huge 
profits by providing services that were once provided by the state (Solimano 2012).21
Secondly, the liberalization of the labor market, where a reform was introduced 
with the explicit aim of debilitating union’s bargaining power (Coloma and Rojas 
2000), left the vast majority of workers unarmed to face the power of the huge eco-
nomic groups born under the dictatorial rule. And that is the third structural change 
provoked by the dictatorship that anchored inequality until 2009. The extremely 
rich elite,22 whose economic and political power is similar today to what it was 
during the oligarchic republic at the beginning of the twentieth century,23 impose 
21 Even The Economist admitted that Chilean capitalism had several problems on this subject. See 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552566.
22 According to the population of their country, Chilean billionaires are overrepresented in the 
Forbes list. Related to Chile’s GDP, their fortunes are also bigger than in most countries.
23 Between 1913 and 1937 the 28 % of income went to top 1 % of income earners. In the first decade 
of twenty-first century the proportion was about 30 % (Rodríguez Weber 2014: Tabla 9.5).
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formal and informal rules that undermine Chilean democracy (Garretón 2003; 
Gárate Chateau 2012). Even under democracy, the elite have been able to stop 
the timid attempts made by the government to improve income distribution. 
These, jointly with the fears of the parties which ruled between 1990 and 2009 
that progressive policies like labor reform could destabilize the economic and polit-
ical system, explain why inequality did not improve after 20 years of center-left 
governments. Inequality still is, as Michele Bachelet recognized, the major debt of 
democracy.
4  Income Inequality in Chile: Past, Present, Future
Chilean inequality has changed over time because it is part of the broader historical 
process. Among the market forces that have had an impact on income distribution it 
is useful to distinguish between those affecting the supply side from those acting on 
the demand side. The former include the frontier expansion, which in turn increased 
the land/labor ratio, and the expansion of education, which fueled the supply of 
skilled labor. Among the latter, of most importance were the changes in the market 
for Chilean exports. Finally, the processes of structural change—industrialization, 
urbanization, and expansion of the public sector—have affected both the demand 
and supply of labor, resulting in a reallocation of labor between sectors and catego-
ries of workers. However, changes in supply and demand of productive factors have 
never acted separately, and its consequences for inequality have always been medi-
ated by the institutional environment. For example, the capacity of collective actors 
to build organizations like trade unions in defense of their interests, as well as the 
relationships—usually conflictive—they built with other players in the distributive 
conflict influenced the development of redistributive policies carried forward by the 
state, as well as the institutions governing property rights and factor markets. On the 
other hand, state intervention as a relatively autonomous player influenced not only 
the capacity of the agents to succeed in the distributive conflict, but it also affected 
the prices of relative factors. In other words, markets and institutions were the two 
sides of the same coin. It was the development of their relationship as a part of the 
general historical process which shaped inequality trends.
Nevertheless, to say that history matters implies not only that things changed 
over time, but also its persistence, a fact whose importance over the present and 
future of Chilean inequality is difficult to overestimate. At first sight, the fact that 
Chile is nowadays one of the most unequal countries in the world is due to the poli-
cies carried forward under the dictatorship. But a closer scrutiny shows that this was 
the last—although the nastiest—episode of a series in which the state assumed a 
role in promoting inequality. And this is, in turn, a consequence of a long-term 
trend: the control of the elite over the state, which allows it to shape the economic 
and political institutions in its favor. In this sense, and similarly to the argument 
developed by Sánchez-Ancochea in his chapter for this book, to achieve a better 
understanding of Chilean inequality today, but especially to forecast what might 
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happen with it in the future, it is essential to analyze how the actual economic and 
political power of the elite evolves: a power that is rooted in the high concentration 
of wealth and the oligopolistic market structure which not only promotes high 
inequality of wealth and income, but also undermines democratic institutions.24
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Using Heights to Trace Living Standards 
and Inequality in Mexico Since 1850
Moramay López-Alonso and Roberto Vélez-Grajales
1  Introduction
Mexico is a country of inequalities. Since the 1950s economists have devoted enor-
mous time and effort to measure inequalities and design policies to decrease it. The 
purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of inequality since 1850 by using 
anthropometric measures as an indicator of living standards and inequalities. The 
findings show that in Mexico there were different trajectories in the evolution of 
biological standards of living of the population that mirror the evolution of inequal-
ity. The trajectories are defined by region, social strata, health condition (life expec-
tancy), as well as participation in the process of economic modernization and 
growth, progress opportunities, and allocation/protection of property rights. The 
databases for the period 1850–1950 will allow us to identify three trends in living 
standards for three different social groups: the rich, the laboring classes who were 
integrated in the formal economy, and the remainder of the popular classes. The 
group at the top of the social ladder got taller over time. Despite political instability, 
economic stagnation, and poor state of public finances suffered during much of the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the better-off portion of the population expe-
rienced a living standard improvement until the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Working- class people inserted in the formal economy also grew taller albeit 
they were shorter than the elite. In contrast, during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the great majority of the population belonging to the lower income levels 
underwent a gradual deterioration in their biological standards of living. For most 
of the 1850–1950 period, the living standards of the largest portion of the popular 
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classes do not coincide with the evolution of GDP per capita. Neither do they coin-
cide with the evolution of living standards of the middle and upper-middle classes. 
Regional comparisons show that, in general, people from the north and center-north 
(bajío) of the country were taller than people from the center and south.
The analysis for the period 1951–1992 is based on the work by Vélez-Grajales 
(2016), which is an extension of the study by López-Alonso and Vélez-Grajales 
(2015).1 In particular, in comparison with the previous study, in the present one the 
covered period is extended from 1986 to 1992, and female height estimations for the 
post-1950 period are also included. Results show a constant positive trend on 
heights since the late 1960s. The observed increases were not enough to converge 
on height levels of other similar economies (Brazil, Colombia) . Results suggest that 
there is a rural penalty. And even more, estimations show that education disparities 
make significant differences in height. Moreover, the socioeconomic inequality cap-
tured by school attainment differences is even deeper for females. Once the social 
stratification that characterizes Mexico is taken into account, it is easier to under-
stand why average height increases have been moderate. Finally, and based on the 
historical periods analyzed in the present study, we trace a long-run height trend 
from 1850 to 1992. The exercise, made only for males, shows a trend with almost a 
W-shape.
The study is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the sources and methods 
with which human stature can be used as a proxy for living standards and how 
this measure also assesses inequality. In the third section we examine the period 
1850–1950. The fourth section analyzes trends in height for the post-1950 period. 
The fifth section concludes.
2  Sources and Methods
There are several methods to measure changes in living standard and income distri-
bution over time. Anthropometric methods, that use height and body mass, is one 
way of looking at the evolution of living standards and income distribution. Height 
can be used as a proxy of well-being because the final height of an adult is the result 
of the interaction of several variables, which are all related to income.2 These inter-
actions make it a multidimensional measure of well-being as it assesses the effect of 
nutrition, health, education, and income on living standards. The logic behind this is 
as follows: if people during their childhood years have a good nutrition, adequate 
clothing, and reasonable shelter, and receive some schooling, they are more likely 
1 López-Alonso and Vélez-Grajales (2015) “Measuring Inequality” and Vélez-Grajales (2016), 
The Biological Standard of Living During Post-Revolutionary Mexico.
2 Timothy Cuff, The Hidden Cost of Economic Development: The Biological Standard of Living in 
Antebellum Pennsylvania (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 10–11; Kenneth 
Sokolff, “The Heights of Americans in Three Centuries: Some Economic and Demographic 
Implications,” in The Biological Standard of Living on Three Continents: Further Explorations in 
Anthropometric history, ed. John Komlos, (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995), 134.
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on average to grow taller than those people who, despite having the same genetic 
endowment, grow up under less favorable conditions (Steckel 1995, 1998). Not 
being fed by one or several of these inputs puts an individual at a disadvantage to 
fully develop his/her height potential. Thus, in a given society, people from richer 
income strata would be taller than people from poorer income strata. Due to its 
multidimensional nature, and even though there is a vast literature on the subject, 
there is no widely accepted model of income based on heights.3
Two additional points give relevance to height as a measure of living standards 
and income distribution. First, in pre-monetized societies the use of statures is one 
valid way to measure living standards. In the case of agrarian societies where 
peasants receive their income in kind or in the consumption of their own produc-
tion, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate incomes. Second, heights are 
observable in all societies, providing us an easier way to draw comparisons at the 
international level and over time, as economies experienced transformation of the 
productive processes. The challenge would be to have the data availability but 
other measures of well-being share the same challenge. Also, due to its nature, 
arranging adults by cohort allows us to do longitudinal analysis with a single 
cross-section data source.
Some economic historians, however, argue that even if heights are a robust indi-
cator of health and well-being it cannot be taken for granted for all periods and 
regions, and moreover, that its usefulness could fade in the future.4 They also clarify 
that heights can be a useful measure to analyze the effectiveness of social policy, to 
assess well-being in societies that still struggle with income inequality issues, and 
for countries that may suffer from very poor and incomplete data collection.5
Mexico is one case where adult heights remain a valuable proxy to assess well- 
being and inequality. This approach allows us to examine the effects of political 
transformations and the effectiveness of social policies intended to decrease inequal-
ity. The data sources for the analysis are more than just a single one. For the 1850–
1950 period, data will be drawn from sources normally used for historical studies, 
namely military and passport records.6 For the post-1950 period, we will use 
national statistics; this is the 2000 Mexican National Health Survey (ENSA-2000) 
and the 2006 and 2012 Mexican National Survey on Health and Nutrition 
(ENSANUT-2006 and ENSANUT-2012).7 These are all national probabilistic 
surveys, conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública and were designed 
3 For some examples on modeling the relationship between height in income variables see Steckel, 
“Height and Per Capita Income” (1983), Brinkman et al. “Height and income: A new method for 
the estimation of historical national income series” (1988), and Coll, “The relationship between 
human physical stature and GDP (some experiments with European Time Series)” (1998).
4 Timothy Leunig and Hans Joachim Voth, (2006) “Height and the High Life,” in The Economic 
Future in Historical Perspective, p. 419.
5 Idem, p. 431.
6 To have more detailed information on the sources and methods for the 1850–1950 see López-
Alonso Measuring Up, Sect. 2, Chap. 1.
7 To have more detailed information on the sources and methods for the post-1950 period see 
López-Alonso and Vélez-Grajales (2015) “Measuring Inequality” and Vélez-Grajales 2016, The 
Biological Standard of Living During Post-Revolutionary Mexico.
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to obtain information on accessibility, quality, coverage, and use of health services. 
Anthropometric measures such as height and weight are captured.8 The surveys 
were conducted in the 32 Mexican States.
3  Living Standards and Inequality from 1850 to 1950
This section examines the evolution of living standards in Mexico from 1850 to 
1950 by tracking the trends in heights of the population samples presented in the 
previous section. This study focuses on the macro trends in long-term perspective. 
Acknowledging, however, that disparities across regions and across social classes 
are ubiquitous in Mexican history, it remains important to trace their evolution 
within this context as well. We will analyze the evolution of heights over time and 
make inferences on the evolution of biological standards of living and their correla-
tion to the evolution of inequality. As we examine our data, we will indicate which 
of the independent variables that we are working with are the most important deter-
minants of height. We will run the tests of the main sample of heights as well as of 
the subsamples (geographical, socioeconomic, literate/illiterate, urban/rural) to 
evaluate the differences among them in long-term trends. In this way, we can have 
an idea of the compositional changes of the population and their relationship with 
the average heights and the biological standards of living.9
Examining the trajectories in biological standards of living of different groups is 
also a way to analyze inequality in well-being. Human adult stature is an output 
variable that reflects the effects of nutrition, health, education, and income on living 
standards. Hence by analyzing the trends in stature across regions, social classes, 
and other categories we can also ascertain the evolution of inequality. Because 
height is a multidimensional variable we will not be measuring income inequality in 
living standards that encompasses a broader definition of quality of life; this would 
be measuring not only how much people make but also how well they spend it based 
on their knowledge of what enhances living standards.
Applying a regression analysis to the data that we gathered on the heights of 
the Mexican military, rural police, and passport records, we will be able to infer if 
there was a secular increase in the average height of the Mexican population for the 
cohorts born between 1850 and 1950; this will give us an idea of the evolution of 
the biological living standards of the entire population.10 We can also ascertain 
8 Individuals were measured with stadimeter.
9 All these tests will be done with regression analysis techniques. The accuracy of the analysis cor-
responds to the quality of the data; as all anthropometric history literature explain, there will 
always be inaccuracies in the estimations due to data quality when compared to studies of the 
contemporary period. Notwithstanding, it has to be kept in mind that this is a common risk in all 
historical research. By determining the extent and direction of the biases inherent in the data by the 
use of standard techniques we can reach a higher level of accuracy.
10 Anthropometric history literature defines “secular trend” in heights when there is an increasing 
trend in average heights over time when there are periods of economic growth.
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if there were different trends in height, or not, across regions and across social 
classes. As we mentioned earlier, there is no widely accepted model of income 
based on height. As a result, the majority of studies on anthropometric history define 
class in a more sociological way: by occupation or educational status.
3.1  The Trend Analysis
3.1.1  The Military Samples11
There is a downward trend in the height sample for the period 1850–1950. The 
40-year period during which this downward trend lasted corresponds to people 
growing up during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of 
the twentieth century; this suggests deterioration in living standards of the working 
classes during the last half of the nineteenth century. However, we should keep in 
mind that the rurales sample, in which we observe the decline, is drawn from a 
particular portion of the popular classes, farm hands and craftsmen, but not miners 
or factory workers. It was men who worked in trades that were being displaced by 
the introduction of the railroad or artisans driven out of business by machines and 
manufactures.12 For the most part these were men in the mid-30s, temporarily unem-
ployed who enlisted in the rurales, until something better came along. Over time the 
height of this sample declined and this suggests that the biological standard of living 
of this portion of the popular classes was deteriorating, a reflection of what was 
happening in the sectors of the economy where they had worked prior to joining the 
rurales militia. The cause of this decline in height sheds light on how the end of the 
preindustrial era in Mexico affected certain portions of the population. The transfor-
mation of the economy fostered growth but, in the process, it also left some sectors 
of the population out of work; hence their standards of living deteriorated.13 
This phenomenon can also be interpreted as increased inequality as a result of the 
modernization of the economy. Moreover, this trend is also indicative of a rise in 
inequality vis-à-vis those groups who did grew wealthier with the economic takeoff 
experienced in the last decades of the twentieth century.
There is a difference in trends between the rurales and the federales for cohorts 
born in the 1880s and 1890s for the regression results; this difference is driven by 
the number of observations for those decades in each sample. For the 1890s the 
number of rurales born in that decade aged 23 or more is particularly small; most of 
the observations for the decade correspond to young men who had not attained their 
final height. Let us remember that the rural police dissolved in 1913 after Francisco 
11 For a thorough discussion on how to overcome biases when working with military samples 
presented here see López-Alonso and Vélez Grajales, “Measuring Inequality,” 2015.
12 Vanderwood, (1981) Disorder and Progress: Bandits, police and Mexican development, 108–9.
13 Kessing, (1969) “Structural Change in Early Development: Mexico’s changing industrial and 
and occupational structure from 1895 to 1950,” Journal of Economic History, 723; Alan Knight, 
The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants (Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 79–80.
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I. Madero’s assassination. The federal soldiers sample has a higher number of men 
23 and older. Moreover, the recruits in the federales sample come from a wider 
variety of trades than their rurales counterparts (Table 1).
Traditional historiography asserts that the Díaz administration was detrimental 
to the living standards of the popular classes because of the capitalist development 
model with which economic growth was set in motion. This model was based on the 
exploitation of the laboring classes, and in the case of peasants, it also meant the 
seizure of lands.14 Nonetheless, the evidence presented here suggests that the decline 
in standards of living began little over two decades before the Díaz dictatorship was 
actually inaugurated; thus, Porfirian administration policies could not have been the 
only reason for this decline. Political instability, transformation of modes of produc-
tion that marked the end of the preindustrial era and displaced people from their 
traditional occupations, dire circumstances in the public finances, and disentailment 
of communal peasant properties were all causes of this decline.
The federales military sample covers a period that includes generations growing 
up during the Porfiriato, the revolution, and the first decades of the postrevolution-
ary period. Changes are not as steep as one would expect in a period marked by so 
many changes and instability. The first three decades covered in this sample show 
stagnation that would correspond to cohorts born during the last decade of the dic-
tatorship and the revolution, with a decline in average statures for those born and 
growing up in the 1910s and 1920s. The last three decades of the period display a 
recovery trend that accelerates during the 1940s, which coincides with a period of 
growth for the middle classes, rapid population growth, and stagnation of the lower 
income strata.
In terms of evolution of biological standards of living there does not appear to be 
any significant deterioration due to the dictatorship that allegedly induced pauper-
ization of the lower classes; the improvement observed for cohorts born toward the 
end of the Díaz period is modest compared to its economic performance that gener-
ated prosperity for the higher income strata. Industrialization processes taking place 
and economic growth did not produce an improvement in the quality of life of popu-
lations from which the army was getting its recruits. This evolution in the average 
height of soldiers is understandable given that industrialization at its early stages 
does not necessarily translate into an improvement in the biological standards of 
living of a population.15 In addition, as we mentioned earlier, changes in land tenure 
were not conducive to improving the livelihood of the average peasant. All these 
suggest that economic modernization did not narrow the gap in living standards 
across social classes.
The average stature of recruits born in the 1910s decade decreased; these are 
people growing up and during the revolution and the first decades of the postrevolu-
tionary period. It is not surprising to observe a decline. It might, however, be sur-
prising that the decline is not steeper given the chaos created by the years of armed 
14 Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants (Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 79–80.
15 Steckel, (1995) “Stature and the Standard of Living”; Komlos, (1998) “Shrinking.”
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rebellion. After all, this was a violent war that took a heavy toll in human life. One 
explanation for this could be formulated under the Malthusian postulate that any-
thing that raises the death schedule, for example, war, disorder, disease, or poor 
sanitary conditions, will increase material living standards. A fixed amount of 
resources is distributed among fewer people. Although this postulate applies to pre-
industrial societies, given that industrialization was only taking place in a small 
number of regions compared to the extent of the Mexican territory, we would argue 
that in this case the Malthusian argument holds.
The high death rate increasing material living conditions hypothesis is compati-
ble with the meager recovery in stature observed for cohorts born during the follow-
ing two decades. Still, this seems too meager a recovery for a revolution based on 
the granting of worker’s rights and the undertaking of an agrarian reform. The 
improvement observed in living standards is rather deceptive and suggests that insti-
tutional reforms mandated by the 1917 constitution were meant to favor the popular 
classes but were only enforced to ameliorate the lives of a reduced portion of the 
working classes, namely those inserted in the formal economy.
In contrast, the substantial increase in average stature for cohorts born during the 
late 1930s and 1940s coincides with the launching of a welfare state and with gov-
ernment’s commitment and recognition of its responsibility to assist the poor during 
the Lázaro Cárdenas administration, especially with the introduction of universal 
public health initiatives, such as national vaccination campaigns for children. The 
social development that stemmed from this commitment appears to have yielded 
positive results in the standards of living of the population from which the military 
were enlisting their recruits in the mid-twentieth century. We can then argue that 
there was a reduction in inequality in living standards starting in the 1930s.
With regard to regional disparities and differences across social classes in these 
samples, we can say that regression results for both samples are consistent. Recruits 
born in the north and Bajío are taller than their counterparts in other regions. Enlisted 
soldiers who were originally from the central and southern regions were shorter, 
with the exception of Mexico City and Veracruz, which were more economically 
dynamic regions than many parts of the center and south at the time.
Environmental differences play a relevant role, too. The north and Bajío had 
lower densities of population and were big-cattle-raising regions. Lower densities 
of population meant a lower exposure to diseases and epidemics. Throughout his-
tory, it has been observed that hunter-gatherers, seminomadic groups, and 
 communities living in small settlement were less likely to be exposed to infectious 
diseases and epidemics; hence, their health tended to be better in general than that 
of sedentary communities.16 Regions that have significant cattle production nor-
mally will have a higher meat intake in their diet and will sell meat at relatively 
lower prices than regions that do not raise cattle. Traditional diet in the northern and 
Bajío regions was richer in animal protein, and this had a positive impact on final 
adult statures.
16 For a more thorough discussion on the synergies between health, nutrition, and living standards 
see Measuring Up, Sect. 3 Chap. 1.
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Regression results also show that in both samples unskilled workers are slightly 
shorter than skilled workers. Such height differences suggest that men who had a 
trade were taller than those who did not. Being trained in a trade results in a form of 
human capital that correlated positively with a better biological standard of living.
3.2  Passport Sample
The stature of passport applicants increased throughout the period covered in this 
sample. The heights of applicants were also comparable to average heights of sam-
ples of males from the Western World. Such improvement suggests that men in this 
sample were not affected by the urban penalty of growing cities or the disentailment 
and privatization of communal property in the countryside. In contrast, it makes one 
think that the men in this sample benefited from all the positive transformations that 
were taking place, such as economic growth, investments in sanitary infrastructure, 
professionalization of medical services that allowed for more accurate diagnoses 
and prevention of most common infectious diseases, and, last but not least, better 
nutrition due to the increased availability of a wider array of foodstuffs.
Unlike other studies that use medical services as a determinant of human devel-
opment, in this part of the study we do not make a more specific measurement of 
inequality in living standards with respect to health care services because of the 
profound transformation of the medical profession during this period and public 
health services.17 A brief glance at the history of medicine in the world and in 
Mexico will show us that medicine did not become a more scientific profession at 
the end of the nineteenth century; vaccination campaigns did not begin to have sub-
stantial impact on infant mortality until the 1920s; and it is not until the adoption 
and widespread availability of antibiotics that infectious diseases—closely corre-
lated to malnutrition and poverty—we finally reduced. Medical services could only 
be afforded by well-to-do people and doctors tended to live in cities for the most 
part. Most rural areas had no doctors and even in those places where there were 
doctors, there was little they could actually cure until the 1940s. Having access to 
 sanitary infrastructure and a good balanced nutrition was a stronger determinant of 
better health.18
There is a regional disparity in this sample of the same nature as the military 
sample. This means that among passport applicants, males for the south and center 
were shorter than their Bajío and northern counterparts.19 There are disparities 
across social classes, but the gap tends to narrow over time; the elite and  white- collar 
17 See Campos Vásquez and Márquez “Long-Run Human Development in Mexico 1895–2010” in 
this volume.
18 For a more detailed discussion on the relevance of the medicine in the evolution of living stan-
dards see López-Alonso 2012, Sect. 3.
19 Let us not forget that there is an undercount of people from border states in this sample.
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workers are taller than their unskilled and skilled manual counterparts, but there is 
a pattern of convergence (see Table 2).
What may raise some sort of conundrum is that the heights of all subsamples are 
increasing. Why are unskilled and skilled manual workers in this sample getting 
taller while their counterparts from the military sample are following a trend in the 
opposite direction? The answer is inequality across different groups; within the 
working classes there were differences in opportunities for advancement. There 
were groups who benefitted from institutional changes and others that did not. This 
applies to all groups, namely, skilled manual workers, unskilled workers, peasants, 
day laborers, and domestic servants. Passport applicants were individuals who 
Table 2 Regression model for passport applicants
Independent 
variables
Males Females Males Females









1.21b 0.62b 1.06b 0.41a
Elite 2.45a 1.32a 2.33 1.04a
North 2.82a 2.53a 2.59a 2.32a
Bajío 2.11a 1.66a 2.04a 1.57
Center 1.37a 0.81b 1.18a 0.64
South
Age 18
Age 19 −0.77 −0.51
Age 20 0.35 −0.67
Age 21 −0.15 −0.03
Age 22 0.47 0.1
Age 23 or + 0.54 −0.03
Born 1860
Born 1870 0.96 2.54b 0.95 2.59b
Born 1880 1.15 3.97a 1.14 4.01a
Born 1890 2.28b 4.85a 2.27a 4.89a
Born 1900 2.57b 5.16a 2.58a 5.23a
Born 1910 3.06a 5.13a 3.02a 5.15a
Born 1920 3.29a 5.62a (Dropped) 8.59
Constant 164.83a 153.50a 165.64a 153.76a
R2 0.0235 0.0277 0.0229 1.0286
N 11,390 5207 9693 4424
Note: Method OLS, constants refer to adult unskilled workers, from the South of Mexico, born 
between 1860 and 1869
aSignificant at 1 %
bSignificant at 5 %
Source López-Alonso Measuring Up, p. 218
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could travel abroad legally, but for Mexicans going to the USA this was far from 
being the norm: they were literate, and had a birth certificate. They could be catego-
rized as the aristocracy of the laboring classes. Most likely, these applicants were 
workers who did benefit from institutional transformations that granted them more 
rights and higher incomes, and these workers were not affected by the absence of a 
properly defined state welfare system. On the other hand, men from military sam-
ples were representative of a portion of the lower strata of the population different 
from passport applicants; recruits belonged to segment living with a great scarcity 
of resources. Except for recruits born in the 1940s, soldiers in our sample did not 
have to present a birth certificate upon recruitment, and a substantial number were 
illiterate. The average stature of passport applicants improved. Although they 
remained shorter than the better-off strata of the society, there is convergence in 
heights across social classes. This suggests that at least for the better-off portion of 
the working classes, the evolution of biological standards of living looked more 
promising, and access to sanitary infrastructure and a higher income, as well as the 
possibility of a better diet, did become a reality for them.
On the subject of inequality, these trends show dispersion among the different 
groups of the laboring classes, thus suggesting that the process of economic modern-
ization and growth did not impact working classes the same way. Those workers 
inserted in the formal economy followed the same path as the upper income strata 
group. In contrast, those people working on trades negatively affected by the trans-
formation of the economy were left behind and their biological standards of living 
stagnated or deteriorated at a time in which they could have potentially improved just 
by having access to sanitary infrastructure and by not being vulnerable to famines.
3.3  Women’s Statures
In analyzing the trends in statures of the female sample, there are several points that 
need to be considered regarding sexual dimorphism, literacy, and urbanization. 
Sexual dimorphism concerns the differences between males and females. One dif-
ference is adult height. In a given population living under normal circumstances, 
women are on average 12–13 cm shorter than adult men. This is a consequence of a 
different timing in growth spurts, which leaves boys on additional 2 years of growth 
before the end of the spurt.20 Another difference pertains to resilience to environ-
mental insults such as food shortages and diseases that could be caused by war, 
famines, or exposure to a new pathogen. Women’s growth tends to be more resistant 
to deprivation than men’s; therefore, gender difference in stature is relatively larger 
in good times and shrinks under bad conditions.21 In addition, females tend to 
20 Bogin, (2001) Growth of Humanity, 131.
21 J.M. Prince and Richard H. Steckel, “Tallest in the World: Native Americans of the Great Plains 
in Nineteenth Century” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Historical 
Papers No. 112, 1998), 10.
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recover more quickly from environmental insults than males: “similarly girls 
recover from growth arrest more quickly than boys. The physiological reason for this 
greater stability is not known.”22 We should then expect to find less variation in 
stature for female height samples.
All women in the samples are both literate and urban. Both of these features are 
representative of a somewhat privileged minority of the female population on both 
accounts. At that time Mexicans were mainly rural and literacy levels were approxi-
mately 30 %. Being literate in an urban environment in our samples is a potential 
advantage vis-à-vis their illiterate rural counterparts given that they had access to 
the sanitary infrastructure available at the time, they had the skills and access to 
make the most of the information on best hygienic practices, and they had the 
resources to implement their hygienic measures.23
In the passport sample there appears to be no substantial difference in heights across 
regions. Differences across social classes are smaller than in the male sample and they 
also show a convergence pattern. Sexual dimorphism can explain why differences are 
smaller than in the male sample and they also show a convergence pattern. Sexual 
dimorphism can explain why differences are smaller among women than among men. 
For biological reasons, stature variation among females is expected to be smaller, and 
basic material living conditions across social classes in this sample were not too strik-
ingly different. This means that women from the upper and upper-middle classes had a 
substantially higher standard of living; working class women in this sample did have 
means to cover the basic material conditions for good health and nutrition.
By examining the trends of these different samples we conclude that there is not 
one single trajectory in the evolution of the biological standards of living for the 
period 1850–1950. Also, having different trajectories explains the patterns of 
inequality. The trajectory of the military samples (federales and rurales) declines, 
stagnates, and has a slight recovery, a slight decline, and then a substantial recovery 
that leaves cohorts born in the 1950s with a similar height to their counterparts that 
were born a century before. In contrast, the trajectory of the passport sample is one 
of constant increase. The military samples are built with working-class recruits 
from diverse backgrounds (agricultural workers, artisans, factory workers, etc.), 
whereas the passport sample is built with people from different income levels.
Comparing these trajectories in the evolution of standards of living with the 
economic performance during the same period would shed light on the degree of 
prevailing inequality in living standards at the time. One way to establish this com-
parison is to examine the evolution of GDP per capita (see Fig. 1) in contrast with 
22 Tanner, (1978) Foetus into man, 166.
23 “Hygienic education was promoted in books, magazines, fliers and through the free public and 
popular conferences, and certain doctors and hygienists wrote about medical practice or domestic 
hygiene in books in which they gave detailed information of what every member of society would 
have to do to preserve health and prevent diseases. According to the medical profession, women 
were natural allies to hygienist endeavors, mothers in particular since they had a misión of mother-
hood and children’s education” (Claudia Agostoni, “Discurso médico, cultura higiénica y la mujer 
en la ciudad de México al cambio del siglo [XIX-XX], Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 18, 
no. 1 [Agostoni 2002]: 22).
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that of heights of the different groups presented earlier. Passport samples follow a 
similar trend as GDP per capita follows opposite trends, such as for cohorts born and 
growing up during the second half of the nineteenth century. In contrast, there is a period 
when the average statures followed the same trend as GDP per capita, such as the cohorts 
born after the 1930s. These changes in correlation between GDP per capita and adult 
male average stature are plausible in light of the fact that economic growth does not 
necessarily improve the biological standards of living of a given population.
4  Living Standards and Inequality After 195024
After the Great Depression, Mexico experienced a 40-year period of sustained 
economic growth. In particular, since the 1940s, the country shows GDP annual 
average growth rates over 4 %.25 It was until the 1980s economic crisis when such 
positive trend stopped. In this section it is shown that heights also experienced a 
positive trend since the end of the 1960s. However, and given the existent inequali-
ties in other dimensions different than GDP, it is also shown that height differences 
among socioeconomic strata have persisted. National improvements were not lim-
ited to economic growth. Life expectancy at birth, for example, grew from 34 years 
in 1930 to 49 years in 1950, reaching 71 years by 1990.26 In the dimension of educa-
tion, the national literacy rate in 1950 was of 64 % and reached 87 % by 1990.27 
In the case of adult heights, the trend is also positive.
24 This section is mainly taken from Vélez-Grajales (2016), The Biological Standard of Living 
During Post-Revolutionary Mexico.
25 Marquez (2010). “Evolución y estructura del PIB, 1921–2010.”
26 INEGI. Indicadores sociodemográficos de México (1930–2000). México, 2001.
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Fig. 1 Male height and Geary-Khamis GDP per capita (1990 USD)
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4.1  New Height Estimations and International Comparisons: 
1951–1992
A simple model of individual height determinants is estimated to obtain predicted 
average heights for the period 1951–1992. Once it is controlled for birth cohort 
dummies, variables for education attainment and current residence are included as 
determinants of height (see Table 3). As it is reported, birth cohorts are not mak-
ing a significant difference. On the other hand, higher education levels and urban 
current residence result in taller individuals.28 The latter suggests that there is a 
rural penalty.
28 For height estimation models R2s in regressions are always low. That happens because most of 
the variation in adult height is natural (genetic) and unexplained. John Komlos and Benjamín 
E. Lauderdale, (2007) “Spatial Correlates of US Heights,” p. 63.
Table 3 Regression results for female and male heights
Females Males
Birth cohort
1951–1956 (omitted) … …
1957–1962 −0.179 (0.196) −0.083 (0.286)
1963–1968 −0.649*** (0.187) −0.411 (0.275)
1969–1974 −0.453*** (0.180) 0.319 (0.265)
1975–1980 −0.123 (0.177) 0.643** (0.270)
1981–1986 0.268 (0.187) 1.157*** (0.277)
1987–1992 0.873*** (0.193) 1.641*** (0.274)
Education
Incomplete primary 2.268*** (0.234) 1.767*** (0.3745)
Complete primary 4.374*** (0.224) 2.887*** (0.359)
Secondary 5.399*** (0.228) 3.981*** (0.360)
High school 6.957*** (0.238) 6.094*** (0.371)
Bachelor 8.255*** (0.290) 7.160*** (0.412)
Graduate studies 9.208*** (1.056) 7.01 6*** (1.087)
No school (omitted) … …
Current residence
Dummy for rural (1) −0.898*** (0.109) −0.805*** (0.149)
Intercept 148.926*** (0.244) 162.122*** (0.394)
R2 0.104 0.080
N 19,649 12,797






Using Heights to Trace Living Standards and Inequality in Mexico Since 1850
80
In Fig. 2, both female and male height series are shown. In both cases, after a 
stagnation process during the 50s and 60s, a constant and positive height growth 
took place. But how good was such performance? Was it sufficient in order to con-
verge to other country levels? A simple comparison is made with other two Latin 
American countries: Brazil and Colombia. As we can see in Table 4, both Brazilian 
and Colombian males were and are still taller than Mexicans. In the same table a 
similar result is shown for the comparison between Mexican and Colombian 
females. Moreover, the gap for both males and females during the observed period 
was not closed.
The explanation for this poor performance can be related to inequality. In terms 










1951-1956 1957-1962 1963-1968 1969-1974 1975-1980 1981-1986 1987-1992
cm
Females Males
Fig. 2 Predicted national height (in cm) by 6-year birth cohorts, Mexico, 1951–1992 (National 
Surveys)
Table 4 Height comparison: Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, by gender, 1951−1992












1951–1956 168.3 167.9 165.6 156.5 153.1
1957–1962 168.8 168.3 165.2 157.0 152.3
1963–1968 169.2 168.8 165.2 157.3 152.4
1969–1974 169.8 168.9 166.0 157.2 153.0
1975–1980 170.3 169.8 166.3 158.0 153.5
1981–1986 170.6 167.2 158.7 154.1
1987–1992 167.9 155.1
Source: Mexico: own estimations; Colombia: Meisel and Vega (2007); Brazil: Monasterio et al. 
(2006)
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than the lowest one. By 1990 such difference was reduced, but it was still significant: 
a proportion of almost five to one.29 In the case of literacy, in 1950 the highest state 
level rate was more than double the lowest one: 86 versus 39. By 1990, such differ-
ence was also reduced, but still, the difference was significant: 96 versus 70 %.
For the present analysis, it has to be noted that ENSA-2000, ENSANUT-2006, 
and ENSANUT-2012 were not designed to get retrospective information. Moreover, 
they do not include information on the place of origin (birthplace). Dimensions such 
as age, education, and location, however, are commonly good predictors of adult 
height. As a result, the OLS regression for heights in Table 3 includes a set of 
dummy variables: age (cohorts), educational attainment, and current rural–urban 
residence. Results show that socioeconomic differences that we can infer from 
 education and location variables have repercussions on adult heights. The estima-
tion shows that both rural females and rural males are shorter by around 0.8 cm. 
Even more, education disparities make significant difference. As we can see in col-
umns of Fig. 3, those females with no schooling are shorter than those with 
 incomplete primary education by 2.3 cm. The education penalty reaches 9.2 cm 
when the comparison is made between those with no schooling and those with grad-
uate degree. For males, differences for both cases are 1.8 cm and 7 cm, respectively. 
Absolute differences are larger among females, and such differences are even larger 
when they are estimated in relative terms (lines in Fig. 3). This result suggests that 
the socioeconomic inequality captured by school attainment differences is more 
profound for females.
These results beg the question: Has Mexico been capable to tackle the schooling 
inequality problem? One way to measure the effect of public policy in such a matter 
is by estimating the intergenerational mobility on education. As it is reported by 
Vélez, Campos, and Huerta (2013, pp. 32–34), “Educational coverage has widened 
over recent decades, and absolute educational opportunities for the Mexican people 











































Fig. 3 The education penalty: no schooling versus other education levels
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mobility in Mexico is limited at particular levels. For the first levels of education, 
primary and lower secondary school, socioeconomic origin has hardly any influ-
ence on achievement in higher levels of education. However, socioeconomic origin 
does affect achievement in upper secondary school and even more so in tertiary 
education.” Moreover, as estimations on intergenerational mobility presented in 
Fig. 4 show, for the lower (lines) and higher (columns) ends of the spectrum, the 
probability of educational achievement conditional to father’s education level is 
lower for females than for males. These results suggest that status quo, including 
gender inequality, persists in Mexico. In particular, firstly, there is a barrier related 
to socioeconomic origin that limits the options for women to reach upper secondary/
tertiary education for those coming from the lower end of the spectrum; this is 
women from a lower income level. Secondly, females coming from the lower end 
of the spectrum are less capable than their male counterparts to overcome such a 
barrier. And thirdly, even women from an upper income strata show a lower achieve-
ment rate in education than men of the same group. Once these results are translated 
into height trends, and given the social stratification that characterizes Mexico, it is 
easier to understand why average height increases have been moderate.
5  Conclusion
For the period 1850–1950, the evolution of living standards was heterogeneous 
across social classes mirroring inequalities in living standards. The trend in heights 
of the military tells a different story than that of the passport applicants. Passport 

















Females (father with tertiary
education) 0% 0% 0% 3% 42% 54%
Males (father with tertiary
education) 0% 0% 0% 2% 31% 67%
Females (father no schooling) 14% 16% 32% 23% 13% 3%














Fig. 4 Educational attainment by father’s education level in Mexico, by gender: birth cohort 
1947–1986
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deterioration and stagnation and do not recover their 1850s’ height until 1950. There 
are regional disparities in both samples; the northerners and Bajío dwellers are taller 
than their counterparts in the center and south. Regional differences are larger in the 
military sample. Nonetheless, regional differences are not as marked as those across 
social classes; hence inequality in living standards across social classes is sharper 
than across regions.
The comparison in results between passport and military samples shed light on 
poverty and inequality issues. There are passport applicants from different social 
classes and, although the members of the upper strata are taller than applicants from 
the working classes, they all get taller over time and the gap between them decreases 
over time. This trajectory resembles the case of countries of the Western world 
where heights converge over time. This trajectory mirrors the evolution of the 
economy when we draw a comparison with per capita GDP. These results should be 
taken into consideration without losing sight of the fact that passport applicants 
represent a minority of the population and are not representative of the population 
at large. These were all urban, literate people who could afford to travel abroad 
legally. These three features are not common among the average Mexican born 
between 1850 and 1950 since the passport sample is representative only of the 
wealthy and of the small portion of the working classes that were favored by 
Mexico’s economic growth and development during this period. Industrial develop-
ment, export-led growth, and building of sanitary infrastructure contributed to the 
increase in stature of these passport samples. For the latter part of this period, it 
represents workers who did indeed benefit from the new labor legislation stemming 
from the 1917 Constitution. For those born and growing up during the decade of the 
Revolution’s worst warfare (1910–1920), we observe that there is no height penalty. 
This suggests that these people were not hit by biological stressors such as food 
shortages and disease, so ubiquitous in places hit by warfare. The heights of 
working- class passport applicants can be used as a counterfactual hypothesis of 
what would have been the fate of the popular classes had the government’s develop-
ment policies also included efforts to integrate the population at large into the pro-
found transformations that were taking place. The evolution of heights of the sample 
of women is similar to that of men. There is an increase over time.
The evolution of heights of the military samples reveals the impact on the great 
majority of the population of industrialization, displacement of traditional sectors of 
the economy, periods of political instability, and adoption of a development model that 
for the longest time gave little attention to human capital investments. The statures of 
the military recruits decreased for four decades (1850–1890); then they stagnated dur-
ing the last decade of the nineteenth century. There is a modest improvement for the 
generation born around the turn of the century. This improvement is lost for the follow-
ing generation; this reflects the penalty in living conditions for people who did endure 
the ravages of war during the Mexican Revolution. It should come as no surprise that 
the improvement in heights coincides with the launching of national-level public health 
campaigns as well as the launching of a welfare state in the late 1930s that reduced 
inequality in living standards; before then, the majority of the population was excluded 
from positive changes and lacked opportunities for advancement.
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Based on the ENSA-2000, ENSANUT-2006, and ENSANUT-2012, female and 
male average heights are estimated for the period 1951–1992. OLS regressions are 
used to estimate heights. Besides seven birth cohort dummies, variables on educa-
tion and rural–urban residence are included in the regression. Results show that 
after a height stagnation during 1950s and 1960s, height growth continued until the 
end of the period of study. It has to be noted, however, that observed increases were 
not enough to converge to height levels of other similar (Brazil, Colombia) econo-
mies. Finally, in the case of females, Mexicans are still shorter than women from 
countries reported in the present study. Moreover, in comparison with Colombian 
females, the height gap is even bigger than for males.
Macro inequality in dimensions such as life expectancy at birth and education 
has been reduced, but there is still a significant gap. Results suggest that there is a 
rural penalty. Moreover, estimations show that education disparities yield signifi-
cant differences in height. In addition, the socioeconomic inequality captured by 
school attainment differences is more profound for women. Based on evidence for 
levels of educational intergenerational mobility it is argued that status quo,  including 
gender inequality, persists in Mexico. Once these results are translated into trends in 
height, and given that there is high social stratification in Mexico, it is easier to 
understand why average height increases were moderate for cohorts born between 
1950 and 1992.
Finally, and based on the historical periods analyzed in the present study, it is 
possible to trace a long-run height trend in stature. Given the length of the 1850–
1950 series, the exercise is made only for males. Results are presented in Fig. 5. For 
the 1850–1950 period, we use the military sample as one more representative of 
median Mexican. The whole trend shows an almost W-shape. There was a constant 
height decrease during the second half of nineteenth century. The decline did not 
stop until the late Porfiriato (1890s–1900s). However, due to the Mexican civil war 
in 1910 such improvement stopped, and it was just after the end of the civil war 
(circa 1920) and the Great Depression when the height trend became positive 
















































































Fig. 5 Male mean height trends in Mexico, by birth cohorts: 1850–1992
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since the end of the 1960s when it experienced a constant increase until the end of 
the period of study.
For the post-1950 period further research is needed. Firstly, we still have to ana-
lyze the dynamics behind the 1950s’ and 1960s’ height stagnation. And secondly, 
even though it is not possible to control for birthplace, and therefore it is not possi-
ble to check for potential migration biases with ENSANUT, a deeper analysis on 
interregional differences than the one by López-Alonso and Vélez-Grajales (2015) 
is still needed.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included 
in the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory 
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or 
reproduce the material.
References
Agostoni, C. (2002). Discurso Médico, Cultura Higiénica Y La Mujer En La Ciudad de México Al 
Cambio de Siglo (XIX–XX). Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 18(1), 1–22. doi:10.1525/
msem.2002.18.1.1.
Anand, S., & Ravallion, M. (1993). Human development in poor countries: On the role of private 
incomes and public services. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1), 133–150.
Baten, J. (2000). Economic development and the distribution of nutritional resources in Bavaria, 
1797–1839. Journal of Income Distribution, 9(1), 89–106.
Baten, J., Pelger, I., & Twrdek, L. (2009). The anthropometric history of Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru during the 19th and early 20th century. Economics and Human Biology, 7, 319–333.
Bogin, B. (1988). Patterns of human growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bogin, B. (2001). The growth of humanity. New York: Wiley-Liss.
Brinkman, H. J., Drukker, J. W., & Slot, B. (1988). Height and income: A new method for the 
estimation of historical national income series. Explorations in Economic History, 25(3), 
227–264.
Challú, A. (2009). Agricultural crisis and biological well-being in Mexico, 1730–1835. Historia 
Agraria, 47, 21–44.
Coll, S. (1998). The relationship between human physical stature and GDP (some experiments 
with European Time Series). In J. Komlos & J. Baten (Eds.) Biological standard of living in 
comparative perspective. Contributions to the conference held in Munich, January 18–22, 
1997, for the XIIth congress of the International Economic History Association (pp. 384–407). 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Cuff, T. (2005). The hidden cost of economic development: The biological standard of living in 
antebellum Pennsylvania. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
David, P. A., & Thomas, M. (2003). The economic future in historical perspective. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for the British Academy.
Using Heights to Trace Living Standards and Inequality in Mexico Since 1850
86
Eveleth, P. B., & Tanner, J. M. (1990). Worldwide variation in human growth (2nd ed.). Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.
Floud, R. (1984, April). The heights of Europeans since 1750: A new source for European 
economic history. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 1318.
Floud, R., Wachter, K., & Gregory, A. (2006). Height, health and history: Nutritional status in the 
United Kingdom, 1750–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grajales-Porras, A., & López-Alonso, M. (2011). Physical stature of men in eighteenth century 
Mexico: Evidence from puebla. Economics and Human Biology, 9, 265–271.
Haines, M. R., Craig, L. A., & Weiss, T. (2003). The short and the dead: Nutrition, mortality, and the 
“Antebellum Puzzle” in the United States. The Journal of Economic History, 63(2), 382–413.
INEGI, Indicadores sociodemográficos de México. (1930–2000). México, 2001.
Keesing, D. B. (1969). Structural change early in development: Mexico’s changing industrial and 
occupational structure from 1895 to 1950. The Journal of Economic History, 29(04), 
716–738. 
Knight, A. (1986). The Mexican revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Komlos, J. (1987). The height and weight of west point cadets: Dietary change in antebellum 
America. The Journal of Economic History, 47(4), 897–927.
Komlos, J. (1993). The secular trend in the biological standard of living in the United Kingdom, 
1730–1860. The Journal of Economic History, 46(1), 115–144.
Komlos, J. (1995). The biological standard of living on three continents: Further explorations in 
anthropometric history. Boulder: Westview Press.
Komlos, J. (1998). Shrinking in a growing economy? The mystery of physical stature during the 
industrial revolution. The Journal of Economic History, 58(3), 779–802.
Komlos, J. (1999). On the nature of the Malthusian threat in the eighteenth century. The Economic 
History Review, 52(4), 730–748. New Series.
Komlos, J. (2004). How to (and how not to) analyse deficient height samples. Historical Methods, 
37(4), 160–173.
Komlos, J., & Baten, J. (2004). Looking backward and looking forward: Anthropometric research 
and the development of social science history. Social Science History, 28(2), 191–210.
Komlos, J., & Kim, J. H. (1990). Estimating trends in historical heights. Historical Methods, 23(3), 
116–120.
Komlos, J., & Lauderdale, B. E. (2007). Spatial correlates of US heights and body mass indexes, 
2002. Journal of Biosocial Science, 39, 59–78.
Leunig, T., & Voth, H. J. (2006). Height and the high life. In P. A. David & M. Thomas (Eds.), The 
economic future in historical perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
López-Alonso, M. (2007). Growth with inequality: Living standards in Mexico, 1850–1950. 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 39, 81–105.
López-Alonso, M. (2012). Measuring up: A history of living standards in Mexico, 1850–1950. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
López-Alonso, M., & Condey, R. P. (2003). The ups and downs of Mexican economic growth: The 
biological standard of living and inequality, 1870–1950. Economics and Human Biology, 1(2), 
169–186.
López-Alonso, M., & Vélez-Grajales, R. (2015). Measuring inequality in living standards with 
anthropometric indicators: The case of Mexico, 1850–1986. Journal of Human Development 
and Capabilities, 16(3), 374–396.
Margo, R. A., & Steckel, R. H. (1983). Heights of native-born whites during the antebellum period. 
The Journal of Economic History, 43(1), 167–174.
Martínez Carrión, J. M. (2001). Estatura, salud y bienestar en las primeras etapas del crecimiento 
económico español. Una perspectiva comparada de los niveles de vida. Documento de Trabajo, 
Asociación española de historia económica, DT-AEHE no. 102.
Meisel, A., & Vega, M. (2007). The biological standard of living (and its convergence) in Colombia, 
1870–2003: A tropical success story. Economics and Human Biology, 5(1), 100–122.
Monasterio, L. M., Nogueról, L. P. F., & Shikida, C. D. (2006, June). Growth and inequalities of 
height in Brazil (1939–1981). Work presented in the Third Economics and Human Biology 
Conference in Strasbourg, France.
M. López-Alonso and R. Vélez-Grajales
87
Niewenweg, R., Smit, M. L., Walenkamp, M. J. E., & Witt, J. M. (2003). Adult height corrected 
for shrinking and secular trend. Annals of Human Biology, 30(5), 563–569.
PNUD. (2003). Informe de Desarrollo Humano Mexico 2002. Madrid: Mundi-Prensa.
Prince, J. M., & Steckel, R. H. (1998, December). The tallest in the world: Native Americans of the 
great plains in the nineteenth century. Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Quiroga, G., & Coll, S. (2000). Income distribution in the mirror of height differences: The case of 
Spain 1895–1950. Journal of Income Distribution, 9(1), 107–131.
Sen, A. (1985a). Commodities and capabilities. North-Holland: Amsterdam.
Sen, A. (1985b). Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984. Journal of Philosophy, 
82(4), 169–221.
Sen, A. (1987). The standard of living. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sen, A. (2000). A decade of human development. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 
1(1), 17–23.
Sierra, J., & O’Gorman, E. (1969). The political evolution of the Mexican people. With notes and 
a new introduction by Edmundo O’Gorman. Prologue by Alfonso Reyes (C. Ramsdell, Trans.). 
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Sokoloff, K. L. (1995). The heights of Americans in three centuries: Some economic and demo-
graphic implications. In J. Komlos (Ed.), The biological standard of living on three continents: 
Further explorations in anthropometric history (pp. 133–150). Boulder: Westview Press.
Sorkin, J. D., Muller, D. C., & Andres, R. (1999). Longitudinal change in height of men and 
women: Implications for interpretation of the body mass index. American Journal of 
Epidemiology, 150(9), 969–977.
Steckel, R. H. (1983). Height and per capita income. Historical Methods, 16(1), 1–7.
Steckel, R. H. (1995). Stature and the standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(4), 
1903–1940.
Steckel, R. H. (1998). Strategic ideas in the rise of the new anthropometric history and their impli-
cations for interdisciplinary research. The Journal of Economic History, 58(3), 803–821.
Tanner, J. M. (1978). Foetus into man: Physical growth from conception to maturity. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Vanderwood, P. J. (1981). Disorder and progress: Bandits, police, and Mexican development. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Vélez-Grajales, R. (2016). The biological standard of living during post-revolutionary Mexico. 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford.
Voth, H.-H., & Leunig, T. (1996). Did smallpox reduce height? Stature and the standard of living 
in London. Economic History Review, 49(3), 541–560.
Voth, H.-H., & Leunig, T. (2006). Height and the high life. In P. A. David & M. Thomas (Eds.), 
The economic future in historical perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wachter, K. W., & Trussell, J. (1982). Estimating historical heights. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 77(378), 279–293.
Weber, G., Seidler, H., & Hauser, G. (1995). Secular change in height in Austria: An effect of 
population stratification? Annals of Human Biology, 22(4), 277–288.
Moramay López-Alonso is an associate professor of History at Rice University. She is an eco-
nomic historian of Latin America. She is the author of Measuring Up: A History of Living 
Standards in Mexico 1850–1950 (Stanford University Press 2012), winner of the 2013 Mexican 
History Book Prize awarded by the American Historical Association, and published in Spanish 
with Fondo de Cultura Económica in 2015. She holds a Ph.D. in History from Stanford University 
and a degree in Economics from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).
Roberto Vélez Grajales is the director of the Social Mobility Program at the Espinosa Yglesias 
Research Centre in Mexico City. He is an Economist with doctoral studies in Modern History. His 
research interest subjects include social mobility, human development, and anthropometric history. 
On all these areas he has coordinated, authored, or worked as a consultant for several academic 
studies or public policy reports.
Using Heights to Trace Living Standards and Inequality in Mexico Since 1850
89© The Author(s) 2017 
L. Bértola, J. Williamson (eds.), Has Latin American Inequality  
Changed Direction?, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-44621-9_5
Long-Run Human Development in Mexico: 
1895–2010
Raymundo M. Campos-Vazquez, Cristóbal Domínguez Flores, 
and Graciela Márquez
1  Introduction
In 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) proposed an alternative 
measure of development, the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite indica-
tor of health, education, and income. Since then, researchers have increasingly used 
HDI estimates to explain the long-run evolution of standards of living in different 
countries and periods. In this chapter, we use the HDI to study long-run regional 
development in Mexico at subnational levels.
The literature using the HDI to measure well-being over time is extensive. 
Crafts (1997, 2002) calculated estimations for a set of 24 countries in the period 
1870–1999, concluding that by the end of the twentieth century the gaps between 
Western Europe and developing regions were smaller than those present in the 
middle of the century. In a similar study, Prados de la Escosura (2010) concludes 
that the gap between developed and developing countries has narrowed over time, 
although the degree of convergence has slowed since 1970. Astorga et al. (2005) 
construct an HDI series for Latin American countries and conclude that the region 
experienced the largest gains in living standards in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century. Bértola et al. (2010) compute an inequality-adjusted historical 
human development index for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the twentieth 
century. These authors compare the results to developed countries (France, 
Germany, the UK, and the USA) and find divergence in Argentina from the early 
decades of the twentieth century, while Uruguay began the same pattern in the 1950s. 
This chapter has benefitted by comments from the participants of the seminar “Latin American 
Inequality in the Long Run” Buenos Aires, 3–5 December, 2014. We also want to thank the 
insightful suggestions by Jeff Williamson and Luis Bértola. All remaining errors are our 
responsibility.
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Brazil was steadily catching up until 1980, when it finally began to diverge from 
the core countries.1 It is worth noting that these papers compare the indices across 
countries over time, and that little research exists on well-being within countries 
using HDI estimates.
In Mexico, the study of living standards has been developed using different 
approaches, considering income and non-income components. Bortz and Águila 
(2006) analyze real wages from the Porfiriato (1876–1911) to the early twenty-first 
century and conclude that the largest increases took place between 1952 and 1970, 
while the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s caused a drastic reduction in real 
wages. López-Alonso (2007, 2012) uses anthropometric measures (adult heights) 
drawn from military and passport data. These studies identify a deterioration in the 
standard of living of the laboring classes over time, in contrast to an increase for the 
elite and upper middle classes.2 Recently, Challú and Gómez (2015) found that real 
wages of non-skilled workers in Mexico City exhibited a secular decline since the 
mid-eighteenth century and only partially recovered from the late 1860s to 1930. 
Esquivel (1999) finds convergence in GDP per capita at state level from 1940 to 
1960, and a relative constant dispersion thereafter.
Campos-Vazquez and Velez (2012) calculate a human development index to 
study human development at the state level from 1895 to 1910. Their results show 
important improvements in the 1895–1910 period, but these improvements are not 
distributed proportionately among states. Márquez (2012) applies the methodology 
developed by these two authors to study state-level human development in 1930. 
Her study shows an improvement in human development in comparison to the 
1895–1910 period. Interestingly, the regional development pattern found by 
Campos-Vazquez and Velez is also found in this study, suggesting an important 
structural difference in development between the northern and southern regions of 
the country.
In this chapter, we analyze the development of Mexico over the long run 
(1895–2010) using an HDI measurement at the subnational level to facilitate a com-
parison across regions. Our methodology provides a consistent standard of living 
measure based upon proxy variables to those generally used for recent periods.3 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical background 
1 These results are at odds with those of other scholars, which show a general pattern of “conver-
gence in the central decades of the century and relatively stable situation afterwards” (Bértola et al. 
2010, p. 219).
2 See, for example: “The evolution of the biological standards of living of the laboring classes, 
measured as the evolution of stature, does not follow trends in Mexico’s overall economic perfor-
mance, while that of the elite and upper middle classes does. The trends in stature suggest that the 
living standards of the laboring classes gradually deteriorated from the 1870s” (López-Alonso 
2007, p. 102).
3 Esquivel et al. (2003) analyze convergence of HDIs since 1950. García-Verdú (2005) analyzes 
human development at the state level for 2000. Permanyer (2013) calculates HDIs at the municipal 
level in 1990, 2000, and 2010. Recently, Aguilar Retureta (2015) documents relative participation 
of GDP per capita across states in Mexico. He finds, similar to our results, that inequality increases 
up to 1940 and then steadily declines.
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on Mexico’s history since 1895 and the literature that have applied human development 
concepts to the Mexican experience. Section 3 presents the methodology and data 
sources used in our estimates. Following, in Sect. 4, we offer main results of our 
study. Section 5 summarizes our findings and offers some conclusions.
2  Historical Background
Mexico experienced significant economic changes along the twentieth century 
that enabled the country to overcome past obstacles to growth while facing new 
challenges to improve the well-being of the population. In the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century Mexico grew at a sustained rate, in sharp contrast with the per-
formance of the first 50 years after independence. Indeed, from 1821 to around 
1870, Mexico stagnated, with episodes of weak recoveries and decline.4 Although 
economic historians have debated the pace of the slow secular growth, there is con-
sensus on the recovery from the 1870s to the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 
1910. During the Porfiriato (1876–1911) railroad construction, foreign demand for 
mineral and agricultural products, and enactment of regulations to secure property 
rights all contributed to the modernization of crucial sectors of the economy.
By 1910, Mexico was a wealthier economy than 30 years earlier. Ports, major 
cities, mines, and industrial centers were all connected by railroads, larger 
banks had branches throughout the country, and internal taxes increased their 
share of total federal revenue. However, economic growth did not reach all 
regions of the country with the same intensity. Mining districts, industrial cen-
ters, and export-oriented agriculture became engines of growth, but they coexisted 
with low-productivity agriculture and isolated regions with few connections to 
international markets.
The Mexican Revolution had uneven consequences on the economy. The areas 
disputed by different leaders were hit hard by the civil war. But even in this situation 
economic production did not come completely to a halt: the production of foodstuffs 
continued, in many instances promoted by revolutionary leaders; oil fields increased 
their output in response to growing international demand; and the geographic isola-
tion of the Yucatan peninsula allowed henequen haciendas to supply the American 
market. By the end of the armed phase of the revolution a new institutional arrange-
ment, centered in the 1917 Constitution, set in motion a land reform program and 
changes in labor legislation. Also, the government acquired a more interventionist 
stance in the economy which shaped social and economic policy in the decades 
to follow.
The economic disturbances caused by the revolutionary upheaval were neither 
generalized nor permanent, but their consequences differed across regions and sectors. 
In the 1920s mineral and agricultural exports continued to drive economic growth. 
4 For a discussion of the growth trajectory since independence see Cárdenas (2003), Coatsworth 
(1978), Márquez (2013), and Sánchez Santiró (2009).
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New investment in manufacturing also contributed to the recovery of the economy 
while the banking system slowly regained its basic functions. In contrast, Mexico 
was in arrears, without access to foreign loans, and in difficult negotiations with its 
creditors. Private investors were more reluctant to channel resources to agriculture 
than to manufacturing and mining, in part because of uncertainty created by the land 
reform program implemented by postrevolutionary governments.
Also, certain policies changed radically in the new institutional environment. 
In restructuring the economy the federal government introduced direct taxation 
(income tax), created the central bank, and established development banks in sup-
port of agriculture and industry. The provision of education and health services 
became priorities for the federal and state governments. Vaccination campaigns, 
eradication of epidemics, and sewage projects gained support among public officials. 
The School of Public Health was founded in 1922, and national health campaigns 
emerged as part of the social policy of the 1920s. The establishment of the Ministry 
of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP) included an ambitious 
literacy program and the establishment of rural schools, and the federal government 
increased its efforts to centralize education policy (Fierro et al. 2009).
By 1926, as foreign demand for Mexican products tapered off, an economic 
slowdown was evident, and the international crisis in 1929 aggravated an already 
delicate situation. A sharp decline in international prices and the collapse of exter-
nal markets constrained Mexico’s capacity to grow, and that of other countries in 
Latin America, until 1932. However, the resumption of growth in that year initiated 
a 50-year period of sustained economic expansion. The closure of foreign markets 
during the 1930s opened up favorable conditions for the production of consumer 
and intermediate goods, while the early recovery from the external shock guaran-
teed domestic demand. Under the Lázaro Cárdenas administration (1936–1940) 
social expenditure soared and land reform policy broadened. Although the pace of 
land distribution leveled off subsequently, the government performed an active role 
in the economy through public investment in infrastructure, provision of cheap 
energy, and subsidies of raw materials and intermediate goods. Industrialization 
reached its stride with protectionist policies, fiscal incentives, and restrictions on 
foreign capital. The 1950s and early 1960s were characterized by low inflation, 
exchange rate stability, and average GDP yearly growth of more than 6%. In addi-
tion to high growth rates and price stability the expansion of health services and 
public education all contributed to improvements in social welfare and a betterment 
of income distribution.
In the mid-1960s the so-called Mexican miracle showed the first signs of 
profound economic woes. A growing trade and public deficits, lack of competitiveness 
of the industrial sector, and falling productivity in agriculture reveal serious obstacles 
to sustain sound economic growth in the years to come. By the early 1970s, structural 
problems mounted. The government chose fiscal expansion as the means to deal with 
its economic difficulties, resulting in rising inflation, an exploding public deficit, and 
an external deficit that required increased foreign borrowing. Inflation and devalua-
tion ensued. The discovery of rich oil deposits coupled with the rise in international 
oil prices changed the prospects for the Mexican economy at the end of the 1970s. 
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Growth resumed without resolution of the structural problems. Foreign debt was 
initially devoted to building an oil export platform, but the overvaluation of the peso 
and the deindustrialization associated with the so-called Dutch disease soon forced 
the government to increase borrowing. In 1981, international oil prices declined and 
interest rates rose, limiting the possibility of foreign financing. A year later, neither 
the devaluation of the peso nor the exchange rate controls had proven sufficient and, 
in consequence, the government declared a 3-month moratorium on the external debt 
and the nationalization of private banks. Mexico shared with other Latin American 
countries the problem of not only overindebtedness, but also an industrial base 
dependent on imported inputs, overprotected domestic markets, and a lack of inter-
national competitiveness. Severe cuts in public investment, a reduction in bureau-
cracy, elimination of subsidies, and price controls failed to recover a path of sustained 
growth or control inflation. Overall, in the 1980s, growth was mediocre.5
In the midst of the external debt crisis Mexico took a risky gamble. Instead of 
tightening the protectionist barriers, President Miguel de la Madrid (1992–1998) 
decided to liberalize the economy. A first step towards this goal was to join the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which required the elimination of 
quantitative import controls and the lowering of import duties. To avoid future pol-
icy reversals, President Carlos Salinas (1988–1994) promoted the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the USA and Canada. Opening up the econ-
omy had initially aimed at increasing the flow of foreign direct investment; yet 
actual capital flows to the Mexican economy fell short of expectations (both in the 
mid-1980s and in the early 1990s). However, liberalization became the cornerstone 
for a new model of growth, one that placed significant emphasis on exports as the 
driving force of the economy. Completing the shift to this model also required a 
change in the role of the government. The sale of public enterprises at the start of 
the foreign debt crisis began as a measure to reduce the public deficit, but later 
became one of the pillars supporting a shift to a market-oriented economy.6
The changes in the Mexican economy were so profound that some authors did 
not hesitate to describe them as a revolution.7 In addition to NAFTA, President 
Salinas (1988–1994) launched ambitious economic reforms including the land-
holding regime of the ejido to allow peasants to sell their plots, recasting the Bank 
of Mexico as an autonomous agency with a mandate to control inflation, passage 
of an antitrust law with establishment of a Federal Competition Commission, as 
well as privatization of banks, steel plants, the telephone company, television 
stations, and railroads, among other industries. However, these reforms were insuf-
ficient to recover high rates of growth needed to compensate for the “lost decade” 
of the 1980s.8
5 See Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), Chap. 6, and Cárdenas (2010).
6 Haber et al. (2008).
7 “If by ‘revolution’ we mean a dramatic change in the institutions that organize economic, 
political, and social life, then Mexico has undoubtedly been in the midst of a revolution since the 
early 1980s” (ibid., p. 1).
8 Márquez and Meyer (2010).
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A currency crisis in late 1994 led the Mexican economy to a severe drop in output 
equivalent only to that of the 1930s. Despite a quick recovery, the effects on 
well-being were not easy to overcome. After a decade of mediocre growth in the 
1980s, the new crisis deepened the vulnerabilities of the middle- and low-income 
strata of society. In the first decade of this century, social programs coupled with 
macroeconomic stability had ameliorated the effects of years of slow growth. 
However, the international financial turmoil of 2008 caused another large dip in the 
growth trajectory, losing the gains in well-being brought about by social programs.
Over the course of more than a century the Mexican economy experienced a 
profound transformation. At the end of the nineteenth century the majority of the 
population lived and worked in rural areas, the railroad grid was crucial to the trans-
portation of mineral and agricultural exports, and education and health services 
were limited and provided mostly in urban areas. In 2010, most Mexicans lived in 
cities, most children had access to primary education, and the country’s export bas-
ket combined raw materials and manufactures. Between these two moments of 
Mexican history, the country changed its patterns of growth from a primarily export 
model to an import substitution industrialization strategy, and finally to a market- 
oriented economy. How did well-being develop over time? Can we observe any 
continuity in regional patterns? These questions are addressed in the following sec-
tions, where we present the results of estimates of human development indexes from 
1895 to 2010.
3  Methodology and Data
In its original version the HDI was calculated as a simple average of the health, 
education, and income indexes. The health index is related to life expectancy, the 
education index to enrollment and literacy rates, and the income index to per capita 
income. Since 2010, the HDI has been calculated as a geometric mean of its 
components:
 HDI Health Education Income= × ×
1 3 1 3 1 3/ / /
 (1)
This new methodology has several advantages. First, it avoids the perfect substitut-
ability problem of the simple average aggregation. In other words, if one subindex 
gains at the expense of another, the previous formula would not reflect a changed 
HDI, while the new formula does. Second, as a consequence of imperfect substitut-
ability, uneven progress can be accounted for as a negative effect on the overall 
index. Finally, the maxima chosen in the normalization of each subindex are irrel-
evant (Klugman et al. 2011).9
9 We calculate the geometric mean in order to apply the current HDI methodology to our index. 
Using the previous methodology, mean with equal weights to each index, does not change the main 
conclusions of this chapter.
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In order to construct the HDI in Eq. (1), we use proxy variables for each subindex 
following Campos-Vazquez and Velez (2012) and Ian Morris (2013). First, the 
calculation of the education index takes into account the variables and weights pro-
posed by UNDP (2010). The only difference is that we restrict the upper bound of 
the age range of literacy rates for individuals to 12 years instead of 24 years as 
specified by UNDP (2010). We thus calculate the education index as a weighted 
average of literacy rates (LR) for individuals older than 15 years of age and enrollment 
rates (ER) for individuals aged 6–12 years such that
 







Second, instead of using life expectancy, we use the number of physicians for 
each 10,000 inhabitants. Our proxy variable is a good measure of the health stan-
dard if we considered the effect of access to medical services in overall health. 
There is a large range of studies documenting the importance of the number of 
physicians on the health status of the population. For example, Shi (1992, 1994) has 
shown that US states where the number of physicians per capita is higher have bet-
ter health outcomes. This is in line with results of Robst and Graham (1997, 2004) 
also for the USA. They show a positive influence of the number of physicians on the 
health status of the population. Moreover, they find a higher correlation in rural 
areas across the USA than urban areas. Vogel and Ackermann (1998) have shown a 
positive relation between a higher supply of physicians and life expectancy. Finally, 
Pièrard (2009) shows that a higher supply of general practitioners in Canada is cor-
related with better health outcomes, including self-reported measures of health 
status.
Our proxy variable for life expectancy, the number of physicians per 10,000 
inhabitants, is a good measure of the health standard if we consider the effect of 
access to medical services on overall health.10 To construct this subindex, we use the 
number of physicians (NP) per 10,000 inhabitants relative to 35, which was the cor-
responding figure for 2001 in Switzerland, the country in Europe with the highest 








10 There is a large range of studies documenting the importance of the number of physicians to the 
health status of the population. For example, Shi (1992, 1994) and Robst and Graham (1997, 2004) 
show a positive influence of the number of physicians on the health status of the US population; the 
latter, moreover, find a higher correlation in rural areas than in urban ones. Vogel and Ackermann 
(1998) show a positive relation between number of physicians and life expectancy. Finally, Piérard 
(2009) shows that a greater supply of general practitioners in Canada is correlated with better health 
outcomes, including self-reported measures of health status. In the data section, we provide the 
sample correlations of number of physicians and life expectancy for recent years.
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Third, instead of using income, we use urbanization rates. There is a long tradi-
tion in economic history of using urbanization rate as a proxy for economic devel-
opment. Paul Bairoch (1975, 1988) presents a compelling argument that 
urbanization is correlated with economic development for both developed and 
developing regions. A book by Komlos (1994) reaches a similar conclusion. 
Moomaw and Shatter (1996) formally test the previous argument using a panel 
data of countries and find that indeed urbanization increases with GDP per capita. 
More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2002) convincingly argue that population density 
and urbanization are a good proxy for economic development. For a sample of 
Latin American countries, Astorga et al. (2005) find that urbanization is positively 
correlated with living standards in the period 1900–2000. In the study of how cul-
ture affects economic development in Europe, Tabellini (2010) argues that urban-
ization rates are a good proxy for economic development. Nunn and Qian (2011) 
argue that the introduction of potatoes to the Old World improved nutrition and 
agricultural productivity which lead to higher urbanization rates and higher eco-
nomic development. Finally, Cali and Menon (2013) find that urbanization causes 
rural poverty to decline through increased demand for agricultural products in the 
case of Indian districts. Furthermore, disaggregated urbanization data for develop-
ing countries is generally more easy to find whereas GDP per capita estimates were 
often inexistent or lacked precision as the analysis moved back in time. In so doing 
we attempt to provide a basis of comparison with cases or historical periods with 
little information. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that urbanization is a 
good proxy for income in the long run, but urbanization may not follow the 
same short-run fluctuation as income. The positive results of the consistency 
test (see next section) support our choice of urbanization as a proxy for income in 
the long run. As urbanization is already a number between zero and one, we do not 
need to transform it into an index; we simply introduce it in Eq. (1) as proxy of the 
subindex income.
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the subindices explained above. In sum, as 
a proxy for per capita income we use urbanization rate. For health, we use the num-
ber of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants. For education, we can closely mimic the 
official definition in the HDI calculation.
Table 1 Components of HDI as in UNDP (2010) and variables used in the study
Subindex UNDP (2010) Our estimation
Income GDP per capita Urbanization rate
Education Enrollment rate of individuals 
older than 15 years
Enrollment rate of individuals older than 15 
years
Literacy rate in individuals aged 
6–24 years
Literacy rate in individuals aged 6–12 years
Health Life expectancy rate Physicians per 10,000 inhabitants relative to 
35 (physicians in Switzerland in 2001)
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3.1  Construction of the Education Index
Education variables are the best measured variables in our dataset. Literacy rates for 
the population aged 15 years and older are available at the state level for every year 
of interest in Estadísticas Históricas de México (INEGI 2009) and Censo General 
de Población y Vivienda (INEGI 2010a, b). Enrollment rates are defined as the share 
of population aged 6–12 years who are enrolled in school. From 1920 to 2010, 
enrollment rates are calculated using data available in the population censuses. 
Rates from 1900 to 1910 are calculated using data from Estadísticas económicas 
del Porfiriato (Colegio de México 1964) and Estadísticas sociales del Porfiriato 
(Secretaría de Economía 1956). Only the enrollment rates from 1895 have to be 
estimated.11 Both literacy rates and enrollment rates are also calculated using micro-
data from the Population Censuses from 1990 onwards provided by IPUMS 
(Minnesota Population Center 2011).
It would be preferable to use enrollment rates for the population aged 6–24 years, 
but there is not enough data available for 1920, 1930, and 1940 to calculate them. 
Correlations between enrollment rates for persons aged 6–12 years and those aged 
6–24 years for 1950, 1970, and 1990 are 0.98, 0.96, and 0.81, respectively.12
3.2  Construction of the Health Index
The number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants is the best proxy variable that can 
be used for the whole period of study. Although the origin of the data is varied, the 
number of physicians per state is available for most of the years under study. The 
number of doctors at the state level is available in Estadísticas Sociales del 
Porfiriato (Secretaría de Economía 1956) for the period 1895–1910, in Mendizábal 
(1947) for 1930, in Huerta Maldonado (1960) for the mid-1950s, in N. Myers 
(1971) for 1960, and in Frenk et al. (1995) for 1970 and 1990. Numbers for 1980 
11 State-level enrollment rates for 1895 were estimated by pooling ordinary least squares using data 
from 1900 to 1910:
 enroll Dens Prof Dummyi t i t i t, , ,. . . .= + + -11 6 0 19 0 368 7 31  
 se : . . . . .2 19 0 15 0 16 1 37 0 65
2( )( )( )( ) =R  
where enrolli,t is the enrollment rate in percentage points for state i at year t, Densi,t is the popu-
lation density per square kilometer, Profi,t is the number of teachers per 10,000 persons, and 
Dummy is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the enrollment rate is less than 10 % for either of 
the 2 years and zero otherwise.
12 The Spearman correlations for 1950, 1970, and 1990 are 0.99, 0.96, and 0.74, respectively. The 
hypothesis of independence between both variables for every year is rejected at any typically used 
significance level. The correlation between the variables is clearly reduced from 2000 onwards, 
when enrollment rates in elementary school reached levels closer to 90 %.
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were interpolated from the latter source, and yearbooks published by the National 
Statistical Institute (INEGI) provided the observations from 2000 to 2010 in a 
more homogenous manner.13
There is no data available for the number of physicians at the state level for 
1920 and 1940, so we impute these values using econometric methods. Trends of 
physician concentration were clearly different before and after 1930, so two esti-
mations are needed. The number of physicians for 1920 is estimated using data 
from 1895, 1900, 1910, and 1930, and the number for 1940 using data from 1950, 
1960, and 1970.14
Statistical evidence also supports the proposition that the number of physicians 
is a good proxy variable for the health dimension. The correlations between the 
number of physicians and life expectancy for 1950, 1990, and 2000 are 0.78, 0.61, 
and 0.54, which implies a strong positive relation.15 Furthermore, we expect that the 
relationship between physicians and life expectancy should be stronger for earlier 
years of the study, given that transportation costs were higher.
13 Specifically, we are using data from the Anuario de Estadísticas por Entidad Federativa (INEGI 
2004, 2009, 2011).
14 We estimated the number of physicians for 1920 and 1940 using different datasets, pooling 
ordinary least squares. For 1920, we restricted data to 1895, 1900, 1910, and 1930:
 phys Dens Mort regi t i t i t, , ,. . . .= + + -6 78 0 0028 0 034 4 89 1  
 - - - -4 59 2 6 54 3 6 88 4 5 92 5. . . .reg reg reg reg  
 
se : . . . .1 19 0 0012 0 016 0 95( )( )( )( )  
 1 13 0 80 0 74 0 87 0 70
2. . . . .( )( )( )( ) =R  
For 1940, we restricted data to 1950, 1960, and 1970:
 
phys Dens Mort regi t i t i t, , ,. . . .= - - -22 2 0 0007 0 158 14 6 1  
 - - - -15 1 2 16 8 3 16 4 4 16 9 5. . . .reg reg reg reg  
 
se : . . . .4 05 0 0018 0 054 3 93( )( )( )( )  
 3 93 3 81 3 73 3 87 0 71
2. . . . .( )( )( )( ) =R  
where physi,t is the number of physicians for state i at year t, Densi,t is the population density 
per square kilometer, Morti,t is the mortality rate, and reg1–reg5 are dummy variables per region as 
previously defined. We estimated different interpolation models but we obtained qualitatively simi-
lar results.
15 The Spearman correlations for 1950, 1990, and 2000 are 0.69, 0.67, and 0.53, respectively. The 
hypothesis of independence between both variables for every year is rejected at any typically used 
significance level.
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3.3  Construction of the Income Index
The urbanization rate is defined as the share of the population living in communities 
with more than 2500 inhabitants.16 We need to rely on an estimation of the urbaniza-
tion rate only for the year 1895.17 Data available in Estadísticas económicas del 
Porfiriato (El Colegio de México 1964) is used to calculate urbanization rates for 
1900 and 1910, and population census data is used for the period 1920–2010. 
Statistical evidence also supports that urbanization is a good proxy variable for the 
income dimension; correlations between urbanization and per capita income for 
1970, 1990, and 2000 are 0.76, 0.78, and 0.84, respectively.18
4  Results
4.1  Consistency
Table 2 includes the calculations for each subindex in the period 1895–2010 as well 
as the value of the historical HDI using Eq. (1). Before analyzing these results we 
need to establish their relation to existing estimates using the definitions and vari-
ables specified by UNDP (2010). We performed a consistency test comparing our 
estimates with existing HDI estimates for the 1950–2000 period. We obtained 
1950–2010 values of the HDI from the results of Gerardo Esquivel et al. (2003), and 
PNUD (2003, 2012). We contrasted these values (referred as HDI* in Fig. 1) with 
our measure of HDI. The result is shown as a scatterplot in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 shows HDI on the x-axis and HDI* on the y-axis; each dot represents a 
state in the period 1950–2010. We also included a regression line for reference. The 
two series are highly collinear. Indeed, the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.88 
(the Spearman coefficient, 0.87). The slope parameter in the regression line is 0.61 
and is significant at the 1 % level. Because the HDI is highly related to HDI* we are 
16 It might be argued that this threshold is too low. However, homogenous data using a different 
threshold is not available. Moreover, it is not clear that we should use a higher threshold (for 
example 15,000) for recent periods.
17 We use the same estimation as Campos-Vazquez and Velez (2012), p. 616. The data was obtained 
by pooling ordinary least squares:
 
Urb Dens NP Dummyi t i t i t, . . , . , .= + + -31 77 0 094 1 189 8 261  
 se : . . . . .1 649 0 011 0 512 0 879
2 0 884( )( )( )( ) =R  
18 The Spearman correlations for 1970, 1990, and 2000 are 0.73, 0.73, and 0.81, respectively. The 
hypothesis of independence between both variables for every year is rejected at any of the typically 
used significance levels.
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Table 2 National HDI and components
Year Human development index
Subindexes
Urbanization Education Health
1895 0.133 0.277 0.164 0.052
1900 0.151 0.283 0.220 0.055
1910 0.155 0.285 0.230 0.057
1920 0.174 0.309 0.290 0.059
1930 0.195 0.335 0.371 0.060
1940 0.231 0.351 0.379 0.093
1950 0.317 0.426 0.504 0.149
1960 0.364 0.507 0.600 0.159
1970 0.435 0.587 0.696 0.202
1980 0.533 0.663 0.784 0.292
1990 0.605 0.713 0.866 0.358
1995 0.629 0.735 0.906 0.374
2000 0.654 0.746 0.909 0.412
2005 0.673 0.765 0.926 0.431
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Fig. 1 Relationship between official HDI and proposed historical HDI: 1950–2010. Sources: 
Historical HDI obtained from results calculated by the authors. Official HDI from 1950 to 1995 
obtained from Esquivel et al. (2003), 2000 from PNUD (2003), and 2010 from PNUD (2012). 
Notes: Calculated by the authors. Includes all HDI and HDI* values of each state for the period 
1950–2010, including 1995 and 2005. There is a total of 256 observations. The correlation coef-
ficient is equal to 0.878 and the Spearman correlation is equal to 0.868 and significant at the 1 % 
level. The regression obtained is equal to HDI = 0.37 + 0.61 ProposedHDI, with a t-statistic on the 
coefficient of HDI equal to 29.3 and R2 of 0.77
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able to draw inferences on long-run human development for Mexico at the national 
and the regional levels.
4.1.1  Main Results at National Level
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the national-level HDI, calculated as the average of 
state-level HDI weighted by population. Human development shows an improving 
trend over the twentieth century, a result comparable to the rise in heights found by 
Moramay Lopez-Alonso and Roberto Velez in this volume. Furthermore, for the 
period as a whole, Mexico shows an average acceleration rate of 1.45 %,19 very 
close to the figure of 1.4 % reported by Prados de la Escosura (2010) for a sample of 
88 countries in the period 1870–2005, suggesting that Mexico’s experience in 
human development is similar to that of the rest of the world.
The long-term evolution of the HDI allows us to differentiate three periods: one 
before 1940 with moderate increases; a second from 1940 to 1980, with major 
gains in the standard of living; and a third beginning in 1980 with indices of well-
being still increasing but at a slower rate. These three periods are clearly related to 
19 We thank Luis Bértola for pointing out that this is an acceleration rate.


















Fig. 2 HDI, 1895–2010. HDI mean, minimum, and maximum. Notes: Calculations by the authors. 
The figure includes the evolution of HDI for the full sample over time using an average weighted 
for the population in each state and period. The maximum refers to the second maximum, as the 
first maximum is always Mexico City
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the historical processes described in the historical review. First, from 1895 to 1940, 
encompassing the late Porfiriato, the revolution, and the postrevolutionary period, 
Mexico experienced low-to-moderate improvements in standards of living result-
ing from uneven economic growth and erratic social policies. Second, from 1940 
to 1980 there are important gains in human development. As discussed in Sect. 2, 
the manufacturing sector became the engine of growth, and the country registered 
significant increases in public and private investment as well as the establishment 
of social security in 1943, and the expansion of universal primary education, hos-
pitals, and public health campaigns.20 Third, since 1980, improvements in human 
development have slowed down in light of the advancements of those achieved in 
the previous four decades.21 The acceleration rate of the HDI from 1980 to 2010 
was reduced due to sluggish economic performance and the serious macroeco-
nomic shocks of the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, the currency crisis of 1995, 
and the recession of 2008–2009. Social spending has ameliorated the effects on 
well-being, but half of the Mexican population still lives below the poverty line. 
In sum, Mexico showed large gains in human development in the twentieth century, 
but these were mostly driven by policies in the decades of urbanization and rapid 
industrialization.
4.1.2  Convergence
Studies of convergence of the GDP per capita of Mexican states have found a signifi-
cant reduction of regional disparities in the period between 1940 and 1990 (see for 
example Esquivel 1999). Furthermore, Esquivel et al. (2003) in their study of HDI 
from 1950 to 2000 identified absolute convergence for the HDI and its components. 
However, previous studies have not used a long-run series since 1895 as we do in this 
chapter. The literature on convergence identifies “absolute convergence” or “uncon-
ditional convergence” when the poorest states or countries in the initial year grow 
faster during the full period than richest states or countries (on average). Using the 
HDI instead of GDP, we find absolute convergence for the full period 1895–2010. 
Figure 3 plots the average growth rates of the HDI between 1895 and 2010 and the 
log of the HDI in the initial year (1895). The statistical significance of the negative 
slope proves the existence of absolute convergence. Similarly, we find absolute con-
vergence in the HDI components: urbanization, health, and education.22
20 On health and education see Brachet-Márquez (2010) and Loyo (2010).
21 GDP per capita fell during the 1980s in Mexico. However, we find that HDI increased during this 
period, although its growth rate is lower compared to previous periods. It is possible that urbaniza-
tion (our income proxy) is increasing through informal labor of rural workers tied with economic 
decline. We thank Luis Bértola for this remark.
22 In his analysis of the Atlantic economy from 1870 to 1910 George R. Boyer (2007) finds convergence 
in living standard measures with a stronger trend for the non-income components of well-being.
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As shown in Fig. 4, the trends in convergence of regional disparities, we find that 
for the HDI, urbanization and education were relatively stable in the pre-1940 
period. In contrast, the health index trend showed an increase between 1920 and 
1930, perhaps as a result of successful health campaigns with partial coverage of the 
national territory. A sharp convergence was common to all indicators from 1940 to 
1980. The stability of the coefficient of variation from 1980 to 2010 demonstrates 
that the gap among Mexican states has stalled in the last 40 years.
4.1.3  Regional Results
The HDI is calculated on the regional level as the average of the HDI of the states 
in the region weighted by their relative population shares. Figure 5 shows the 
regional HDI for every year of the sample. As in the case of the national data, every 
region shows improvements in human development over the period of analysis, 
described by an S-shaped curve. The most significant improvements in human 
development for every region, excluding Mexico City, occurred between 1950 and 
1970, coinciding with the processes of industrialization and urbanization together 
with the expansion of public education and health services. After 1980 lesser 
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Fig. 3 HDI: absolute convergence. Sources: Historical HDI obtained from results calculated by 
the authors. Notes: Calculated by the authors. The regression obtained is equal to 
growth = 0.16−0.62HDI1895, with a t-statistic on the coefficient of HDI equal to 26 and R2 of 0.96. 
Spearman’s rank correlation of −0.95
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transition to an open economy since the mid-1980s in which macroeconomic 
adjustments included public expenditure cuts and falling real wages.
Important disparities in human development among states have existed since 
1895, as shown in Fig. 5. Mexico City shows the highest standard of living in the 
sample by a large margin in every year. The northeast and northwest regions 
 consistently show development levels above the national level from 1895, which is 
comparable to the findings of taller inhabitants of these regions in the analysis of 
Lopez-Alonso and Velez-Grajales in this volume. In contrast, the center, west- 
center, and south-southeast regions have development levels lower than those of the 
country as a whole. Furthermore, the southern region shows the lowest levels of 
development for the entire period of study.
One of the most interesting features of Fig. 5 is the comparison between the 
center and south-southeast regions. Before 1960, the regions’ development trends 
were nearly identical. However, HDI for the center region subsequently improved, 
catching up with the west-center region and national levels.
The relative positions of the states and the relationship of differences with loca-
tion are shown in Fig. 6 with the states classified according to their relative develop-
ment position for the years 1895, 1920, 1940, 1970, 1990, and 2010. Northern states 
commonly have the highest HDI, while southern and especially southeastern states 
have the lowest. States in the center and west-center regions have more variable 
results but in general they are middle ranked. These results suggest a persistence in 



























Fig. 4 HDI and components: coefficient of variation. Sources: Historical HDI obtained from 
results calculated by the authors. Notes: Calculated by the authors using all periods and states
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Figures 4 and 5 allow us to understand this pattern. In 1895, northern and Yucatan 
Peninsula states and Mexico City showed the highest levels of development. During 
the Porfiriato, foreign trade was key to the economic performance of these states 
and thus their higher standard of living. This pattern became more evident in the 
1920s when northern bordering states rose to the top, along with Mexico City.
The highest dispersion among states is found in 1940. In that year the northern 
border states and Mexico City still show the highest levels of development, and the 
center and southeast regions their lowest levels before import substitution industri-
alization. By 1970, the pattern is not significantly different, although the state of 
Jalisco has a top position in the standard of living ranking. As dispersion between 
states is reduced over time, states in the center and the Yucatan peninsula are less 
uniformly ranked. Guerrero and Oaxaca, however, have ranked in the bottom 25 % 
since 1895.
After the debt crisis of 1982 and structural changes to open the economy, regional 
patterns of development in 1990 remained unaltered. The northern states still ranked 
highest in human development, but Jalisco, Aguascalientes, and Colima were reach-
ing levels similar to those of the north. Southern states continued in the lowest posi-
tions. In 2010, the dispersion had reduced significantly with northern and west-center 
states experiencing similar levels of development. Although the center has made 















1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
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Fig. 5 HDI by region, 1895–2010. Notes: Calculated by the authors, weighted for population of each 
state and period. Regions are defined as follows: Northeast Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo 
León, and Tamaulipas. Northwest Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, and Sonora. 
West-Center Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Querétaro, San Luis 
Potosí, and Zacatecas. Center Hidalgo, Mexico State, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. South and 
Southeast Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán
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Figure 7 shows the scatterplot of the HDI of the states minus their mean for 1895 
(x-axis) against the HDI of the states minus their mean for multiple years of the 
study (y-axis). This plot shows a clear concentration of states in the first and third 
quadrants, confirming that states with above-average development levels since 1895 
remain above average in subsequent periods, and those with below-average levels 
remain below average—an astonishing persistence in relative development among 
states.
Fig. 6 Development of Mexico, (a) 1895, (b) 1920, (c) 1940, (d) 1970, (e) 1990, (f) 2010. Notes: 
Calculated by the authors. Mexico has 32 states including the Federal District (Mexico City). Data 
not available for Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo in 1895 or 1920
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Studies by Crafts (1997, 2002) and Prados de la Escosura (2010) comparing a 
sample of countries over time have found that the main determinant for increases in 
human development is health. Figure 8 shows the decompositions of the sources of 
growth in the HDI results per decade.23
The main determinant of human development until the 1920s is education (mea-
sured in literacy and enrollment rates), which contributes approximately 65 %. Next in 
importance from 1895 to 1910 is health (number of physicians), while for the post-
revolutionary period it is income (urbanization). The 1930s began a trend of health 
(number of physicians) as the main contributor to growth in human development. The 
large expansion in the 1930s can be explained both by the major effort during the 
presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas to expand health coverage in the rural sector and by the 
expansion of the welfare state in the 1940s (Brachet-Márquez 2010). Health continued 
to be the largest contributor to human development after the 1930s (except in the 
23 We follow the decomposition formula as in Prados de la Escosura (2010), p. 18. The formula can 
be easily derived from taking the total differential to Eq. (1) in natural logarithm:
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Fig. 7 HDI minus national mean by state, 1895–2010. Notes: Calculated by the authors. Y-axis 
refers to the difference between the HDI of each state and the mean HDI across states for each 
reference year. Figure does not include Mexico City. States are indicated as follows: AGS- 
Aguascalientes, BCN-Baja California, BCS-Baja California Sur, CAM-Campeche, COA- 
Coahuila, COL-Colima, CHIA-Chiapas, CHIH-Chihuahua, DUR-Durango, GTO-Guanajuato, 
GUE-Guerrero, HID-Hidalgo, JAL-Jalisco, MEX-Mexico State, MICH-Michoacán, MOR- 
Morelos, NAY-Nayarit, NL-Nuevo León, OAX-Oaxaca, PUE-Puebla, QUE-Querétaro, QROO- 
Quintana Roo, SLP-San Luis Potosí, SIN-Sinaloa, SON-Sonora, TAB-Tabasco, TAM-Tamaulipas, 
TLAX-Tlaxcala, VER-Veracruz, YUC-Yucatán, ZAC-Zacatecas
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1950s). On average, health contributes close to 55 % of human development growth 
for the period 1930–2010. Prados de la Escosura (2010) finds that health contributes 
52 % worldwide to human development for the period 1870–2005. Mexico’s develop-
ment is thus relatively close to the international value for the period after 1930.
5  Conclusions
In this chapter, we estimate a measure of long-run development in Mexico by calculating 
a human development index from 1895 to 2010 at subnational level. This is the 
longest homogenous series to date that tracks this phenomenon at the national and 
state levels. We discuss Mexico’s well-being in terms of multidimensional charac-
teristics, but we also focus on measurements at the subnational level in order to 
disentangle regional patterns.
We find that there is a significant increase in human development over the period 
studied. We identified absolute convergence in the HDI and each of its components 
with a trend of sharp convergence in the period 1940–1980. Our index begins at 
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Fig. 8 Decomposition of HDI. Notes: Calculated by the authors. We follow the decomposition 
formula as in Prados de la Escosura (2010), p. 18. The formula can be easily derived by taking the 
total differential to Eq. (1) in natural logarithm: 
























logIncome . The contribution of each index 
is thus calculated as each term in the previous formula over the change in the Q-HDI. The x-axis 
refers to the contribution of each index for all decades. So we compare the growth rate and the 
contribution of each index between 1900 and 1910, 1910 and 1920, and so on. The initial year in 
the 1890 decade is 1895
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For the period from 1895 to 1910, well-being grows at a rapid rate but slows 
down by the end of the period. For the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period 
(1910–1930), standards of living increase, although the increase is not homogenous 
across regions. The largest increases in human development are from 1940 to 1980. 
From 1950 onward, the gap across states decreases substantially, and after 1980, 
disparities increased again. Health contributes close to 65 % of total growth before 
1930, and 55 % thereafter. These patterns of results are similar to those found by 
Prados de la Escosura (2010) in an international sample.
We also find a large persistence in regional development patterns across states. 
Northern states are wealthier than the rest from the beginning of the period, while 
southern states are the poorest. States surrounding Mexico City were as poor as 
southern states at the beginning of the century, but they developed more rapidly 
from 1940 to 1980. The expansion of the welfare state thus failed to modify the 
spatial distribution of relative levels of well-being in the country.
In sum, this chapter makes an important contribution to the long-run measurement 
of well-being in Mexico. Future studies for other countries may take advantage of 
our methodology to analyze regional patterns, and deepen our understanding of the 
determinants of change in well-being across regions within countries.
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1  Introduction
Inequality is a subject of intrinsic interest, in the sense that it is related to moral 
concepts such as justice and fairness.1 Notwithstanding, it is also important for its 
effects, for example, on the growth and educational attainments of a society. 
Ironically, it is one of the most hotly debated subjects within growth and develop-
ment economics literature and one which is far from reaching a consensus.
A first wave of development literature (as characterized by Easterly 2007, p. 756) 
presents the idea that high inequality could promote growth by concentrating income 
in the hands of high-saving capitalists (Kuznets 1955; Kaldor 1956). As presented in 
Aghion et al. (1999b), the view that wealth inequality could be growth enhancing is 
based on three arguments: (1) the marginal propensity to save of the rich is higher 
than that of the poor; (2) investment indivisibilities; and (3) the trade- off between 
productive efficiency and equality. However, later works indicate a possible negative 
effect of economic inequality on growth, both theoretically and empirically.2 Several 
mechanisms were suggested as causes of this, such as political economy mecha-
nisms (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994), imperfect capital 
markets (Banerjee and Newman 1991; Galor and Zeira 1993; Perotti 1992) and 
investment in human capital (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000; Galor et al. 2009; 
Galor and Zeira 1993; Perotti 1996), the composition of the aggregate demand 
(Murphy et al. 1989), and macroeconomic instability (Aghion et al. 1999a).3
P.P.P. Funari (*) 
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1 These concepts and interrelations are investigated since the birth of philosophy in Ancient Greece. 
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2 For comprehensive reviews, see Aghion (1999b) and Bénabou (1996).
3 For the effects of redistribution on growth, see Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Perotti (1996), and 
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Three important studies followed, casting doubt on the robustness of what were 
then considered consistent results, and finding no negative relationship between 
economic inequality and growth. Using new data and panel techniques, Forbes 
(2000) finds a positive relationship between economic inequality and growth. Barro 
(2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also present evidence against such a clear-cut 
negative relationship. However, Easterly (2007), using an insightful instrument, 
finds again a negative relationship between inequality and economic performance.
There are also important studies correlating political inequality and develop-
ment. Acemoglu (2008) shows how political inequality may retard development due 
to the unwillingness of incumbent elites to allow the entry of new agents. Elites 
might also block the introduction of new technologies (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000). Bates (1981) shows how, in a politically concentrated environment, there 
might be little interest in the provision of public goods, including schooling. As 
noted by Acemoglu et al. (2008), political inequality will also tend to be associated 
with the absence of political competition and accountability, two factors that help to 
guarantee that political systems generate desirable outcomes.
Even more important for the present work are Engerman and Sokoloff’s compre-
hensive series of studies on development of the Americas. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997, 2002) argued that factor endowments had a major influence on the coloniza-
tion strategies throughout the American continent that, in turn, established different 
initial levels of inequality that account for the divergent institutional paths of 
American societies that resulted in the differential development standards of these 
regions today. Therefore, in Engerman and Sokoloff’s view, inequality had prejudi-
cial effects on development in a cross-country framework.4
It is to this context of apparently contradictory evidence that Acemoglu et al.’s 
(2008) study belongs. Their study distinguishes empirically between economic and 
political inequality in their exploration of the effects of inequality. As the authors 
correctly note, economic inequality is probably endogenous in regressions without 
a political inequality variable, since we expect them to be linked, and this might bias 
the econometric evidence on the effects of economic inequality. The authors not 
only construct different variables for economic inequality (the land Gini) and politi-
cal inequality (a political concentration index) but also deal with a constant de jure 
institutional environment, the region of Cundinamarca in Colombia, which, accord-
ing to Pande and Udry (2005), might provide deeper insights into the specific chan-
nels through which inequality affects development.
4 Two brief comments on Engerman and Sokoloff’s thesis: (i) Theories presented by North et al. 
(2000), which emphasize the importance of metropolitan objectives in contrast to local conditions, 
and Frankema (2010), which supports the role of precolonial institutions, are likely complemen-
tary to the one by Engerman and Sokoloff (for a review of these theories, see Frankema 2009, 
Chap. 3); and (ii) we believe that the validity of Engerman and Sokoloff’s theory is in a cross-
country framework, and, therefore, studies such as those by Nunn (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2008), 
and Dell (2010) do not necessarily oppose their views. Moreover, as shown by Nugent and 
Robinson (2010), there can be heterogeneities with Latin America.
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The authors present intriguing evidence. Overall, they find a negative relationship 
between economic and political inequality for nineteenth-century Colombia and a 
positive association between economic inequality in the nineteenth century and 
development outcomes in the late twentieth century. These results are unexpected, as 
it is generally expected for Latin American countries to have high inequality, both 
economic and political, and that they are positively correlated (mutually reinforc-
ing each other). The interpretation of the authors, based on Bates’ (1981) insights on 
Africa, is that in “weakly institutionalized” societies, where few constraints were 
imposed on the actions politicians could take, large landowners had the power to 
keep in check the rapacious tendencies of these politicians.5
We provide a similar investigation for the complex case of Brazil. With unique 
data from the beginning of the twentieth century—the Brazilian Economic and 
Demographic Census of 1920—we were able to construct from scratch unique indi-
cators of economic inequality (the land Gini coefficient among landowners) and of 
political inequality (the proportion of individuals that were eligible to vote) at the 
municipal level in selected Brazilian states. However, we not only analyze how 
inequality (both economic and political) is related to long-term development, but we 
also go further into analyzing how inequality is related to long-term development 
within different de facto institutional environments while controlling for a constant 
de jure context (in line with Pande and Udry’s reorientation argument).
Therefore, we are able to integrate both the inequality literature and the recent insti-
tutional literature (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Pande and Udry 2005; 
Banerjee and Iyer 2005).6 We calculate the respective inequality indicators for all the 
municipalities in four Brazilian states: Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio 
Grande do Sul. The states were carefully selected in order to capture how inequality is 
related to long-term development in different de facto institutional environments 
greatly influenced by the unique colonial experiences of these regions. Our analysis 
presents evidence of a heterogeneous relationship between inequality and long-term 
development indicators, broadly consistent with the colonial experiences of the states 
considered, likely a reflection of different de facto institutional environments.
Furthermore, our study intersects with an important recent literature on the 
Brazilian case. Naritomi et al. (2012) present evidence that colonial experiences 
indeed shaped different de facto institutional environments within the country. 
Summerhill (2010), exploring the state of São Paulo, does not find a negative effect 
of land inequality on long-term development.7 Moreover, and in line with our 
results, the author does not find a significant relationship between political inequality 
measured by the extent of the franchise and long-term economic growth. In a state-
level analysis, Wegenast (2010) argues that Brazil’s different agrarian structures 
determined, in the long run, the educational outputs. His analysis suggests that in 
5 The concept of “weakly institutionalized societies” is developed in Acemoglu et al. (2004).
6 For a more systematic approach and review of the institutional literature, see Acemoglu et al. (2005).
7 De Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010), examining the same state of São Paulo at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, find a negative correlation between land concentration and supply of 
public education at that time.
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states with higher land concentration, there were fewer incentives to invest in 
education. Moreover, for the Latin American context, Dell (2010), investigating the 
negative effects of the mita, suggests that land concentration would have been a 
beneficial factor, for it is hypothesized that the long-term presence of large-scale 
landowners in non-mita districts provided a stable land tenure system that encour-
aged public goods provision.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we explore the Brazilian 
development process from a historical perspective. We then proceed to the data 
analysis. Next, we present the econometric results. The last section concludes.
2  The Brazilian Context
2.1  Some History
Brazil was first claimed by modern Europeans in 1500. The interest of Crown and 
settlers would soon turn to the production of sugar, which became the colony’s first 
major export. International prices were high and the supply, especially from Sicily, 
Atlantic islands such as Cape Verde and Madeira, and the East, was low and restricted. 
At the time, the main production centers were in Pernambuco and in Bahia. Brazil 
was the biggest sugar producer in the world until mid-seventeenth century—the 
heyday of the sugar enterprise in Brazil—when competition from Central American 
colonies and the Antilles became stronger (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).8
As expected, geographical characteristics were determinant for the success of 
this enterprise. Moreover, although there was no general overall plan for the sugar 
enterprise, potential problems were largely avoided thanks to favorable circum-
stances. Production techniques, the creation and expansion of a consumer market, 
and financing were largely dealt with by the Dutch, who practically controlled the 
so-called Portuguese enterprise. Due to economies of scale, production was based 
on large land properties with a single owner, called latifúndios, characterized mainly 
by monoculture and slave labor. Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) notes the absence of 
complex methods of production in colonial Brazil, both in terms of space and time, 
or even significant improvement in methods. Production expansion was based on 
the extension of land under cultivation and on slave population growth rather than 
on changes in the production process and increased productivity.9
8 The competition from the Antilles was a direct consequence of the Dutch experience with the 
sugar industry in Brazilian lands before their expulsion in 1654. After learning the technical and 
organizational aspects, they were able to implement a similar structure in the Caribbean territories 
and generate higher profits (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
9 According to Prado Jr., Brazil’s development problems are a direct consequence of the dependence 
of the colony on exports of primary products produced in large properties with slave labor. 
However, Villela (2013) argues that none of these elements can explain for themselves Brazil’s 
lack of growth at the time, the lack of efficiency gains being the fundamental problem.
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Furtado (2006 [1959]) argues that the high profitability of an economy with a 
high import coefficient tends to hinder investments in secondary activities, such as 
food production. The intense specialization of the sugar economy would be then 
associated with its high profitability (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 93). As a result, cattle 
raising shifted to the countryside of the Northeastern region. This activity was 
radically different from the sugar industry, occupying extensive areas of land, and 
the impact of the dry seasons was reflected in the absence of permanent occupation. 
Not only was there no need for large initial capital investments, but also the large 
amount of land available hindered productivity increases.
In the early seventeenth century, sugar exports began to decline, mainly due to 
increasing competition from British, Dutch, and French colonies. Prices continued 
to fall throughout the eighteenth century. With the decline of the sugar industry, 
income fell also in the cattle farming sector, which then became mostly a subsis-
tence activity, allowing a continued growth of the population since the activity could 
be easily expanded due to the availability of land. The growth of the share of the 
cattle farming sector in relation to the sugar industry brought with it a decline in the 
region’s average per capita productivity and income.
The problem was that the accelerated growth of the sugar enterprise had no struc-
tural counterpart. The economic system, under which almost all the net income gen-
erated stayed with the large landowners, often resorted to importing luxury goods, 
slaves, or machines for that same sugar industry, and underwent no significant 
change during this period. Therefore, the whole enterprise depended heavily on the 
external market. With the continued fall in prices and the increased opportunity costs 
due to the emergence of the mining regions, the sugar economy entered a “secular 
lethargy” (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 91) that endured until the nineteenth century.
At the same time, economic enterprises in the Northeast did not completely stagnate 
with the decline of sugar production. The second half of the eighteenth century saw 
a rise in international demand for other agricultural products, particularly cotton, 
due mainly to the Industrial Revolution. The rural parts of the state of Pernambuco, 
being drier and, therefore, more suitable for the production of cotton rather than 
cattle raising, would also benefit.
During most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the southern part of the 
colony was relatively free of direct intervention from the Crown. With the main 
economic interest focused on sugar production, settlers in those other regions lived 
at the margin of the colonial enterprise. Soon after the fall of sugar prices after 1650, 
this geopolitical structure changed. In the last years of the seventeenth century, gold 
and other precious metals were discovered in the countryside of the Portuguese 
territory, especially in Minas Gerais. By the mid-eighteenth century, gold mining had 
reached its greatest land extent and highest levels of production. For almost a century 
(1675–1765) gold mining would be the focus of the attentions of the Crown (Prado 
Jr. 1956 [1945]). Migrants arrived from different parts of the country and new towns 
sprang up in the mining districts. Along with the shift of the colony’s economic 
center from the Northeast to the Southeast, there was also shift in the political center. 
As a consequence, Rio de Janeiro replaced Salvador (Bahia) as the capital of the 
colony in 1763.
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Although mining also made use of slave labor, the social structure was less rigid 
than in the sugar-producing areas. Slaves were never the majority among the popu-
lation. Gold mining led to greater social inclusion, for it was not necessary to have 
important amounts of initial capital. Possibilities were greater even for slaves, who 
could often work for themselves and buy their freedom. Therefore, although the 
average income in the gold economy was inferior to the average income at the 
 apogee of the sugar economy (Furtado 2006 [1959]), income was more broadly 
distributed and the percentage of free people was higher. This influx of wealth led 
the Portuguese Crown to rapidly establish a bureaucratic apparatus to avoid tax eva-
sion.10 The heyday of the Brazilian gold rush was in the 1750s, when exports reached 
2.5 million British pounds (Furtado 2006 [1959]).11
However, the decline of the Brazilian gold rush came soon, due to its geographi-
cal characteristics (alluvial), inferior extraction techniques, and a bureaucracy inca-
pable of providing sustainable incentives to the enterprise. Denis (1911, p. 61) 
notes: “As the surface of the alluvial workings became exhausted by wasteful meth-
ods, a great part of the population was gradually absorbed by agriculture and stock- 
raising. (…) During the nineteenth century the mining activities of Minas were not 
very notable: although it was discovered that the alluvial deposits had been merely 
scratched on the surface.” With the decline of the gold cycle and the persistent low 
international prices for sugar, the last years of the eighteenth century were charac-
terized by economic difficulties in the colony. All in all, “the latifundium, slavery, 
and the export trade remained, as the historian Caio Prado Jr. has said, for more than 
300 years the principal institutions of Brazilian society” (Dean 1971, p. 607).
Early in the nineteenth century, a major political event changed the development 
path followed by the colony. In 1808, by order of Prince Regent Dom João, fleeing 
from Napoleon’s troops, the Portuguese royal family is transferred to Brazilian 
lands.12 In 1822, in a country with approximately 3.9 million inhabitants (of which 
1.2 million approximately were slaves), Dom Pedro—son of Dom João (who was 
then in Portugal), the colony’s regent at the time—declared independence and was 
proclaimed Constitutional Emperor, remaining in power until 1831. After a regency 
period (1831–1840) characterized by great social instability, his son, Dom Pedro II, 
10 Examples of important administrative controls by the Portuguese Crown are the payment of one-
fifth of the production (and their careful supervision through all stages of the mining activity), 
prohibition on individual negotiations, establishment of special trading monopolies, and tight 
control on local manufacturing.
11 In 1780 the value of gold exports was less than one million British pounds (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
12 According to Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) this was effectively the end of the colonial period for Brazil. 
New economic measures were soon adopted. The first and probably the most important measure 
was a manifesto declaring that all Brazilian ports should be considered open to trade with the entire 
world, and that goods might be exported under any flag. At the same time, royal monopolies were 
abolished and import duties reduced, laws prohibiting the establishment of industries were 
repealed, a national press was established (Denis 1911), and new educational and financial institu-
tions (such as the first Banco do Brasil, in 1808) were established as well.
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became the new emperor in 1840. Finally, in 1889 the Republic was proclaimed and 
1891 saw the implementation of a new constitution.
Notwithstanding the government’s intention of dealing with land concentration 
under the Empire, efforts would eventually fail, largely because the political system 
was dominated by a landed elite (Dean 1971). Furthermore, the positive effects on 
prices of the events at the end of the eighteen century and beginning of the nineteenth 
century were due to a confluence of particular circumstances.13 Once international 
markets returned to normal conditions, a new phase of difficulties began for the 
colony: conflicts with England, on which newly independent Brazil had become 
dependent, mainly due to the unilateral application of the liberal economy by the 
former (Furtado 2006 [1959]) and worries with the end of the slave trade, the scarcity 
of the government’s financial resources, and the increasing dissatisfaction in practi-
cally every region led to a series of social rebellions. In the midst of these difficul-
ties, a new source of wealth would emerge: coffee, which led to a new period of 
economic affluence in the country.14
Like Minas Gerais, the region that corresponds to what is today the state of São 
Paulo was only of marginal economic importance during the first centuries of 
 colonization. Although São Paulo was not completely outside the great sugar enter-
prise, it was coffee that made the region especially important. Coffee was introduced 
into the country in 1727 and large-scale production started at the end of the 
eighteenth century.15 However, it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century that 
Brazilian production became significant in international terms.16
It is around this time that the labor question became delicate. With the abolition 
of slavery it became clear that the country’s best option was to import foreign work-
ers. After initial problematic experiences and with government’s generous interven-
tion, it was possible, for the first time in the country’s history, to attract a massive 
influx of European migrants.17 The average numbers of non-slave immigration grew 
steadily from the 1860s to the end of the century.18
13 Important international events were beneficial for a colony whose main activity was the export of 
primary products: the Industrial Revolution, the American War (1775–1783), the French Revolution 
(1789–1799), the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), and the upheaval in many of the Spanish colo-
nies had a significant impact on the supply and, therefore, prices of primary goods in which Brazil 
had an idle production capacity, such as sugar, cotton, and leather.
14 According to Goldsmith (1986), we have the following figures for the average growth in GDP per 
capita: 1850–1860: 1.4 %; 1860–1870: 1.0 %; 1870–1880:−0.2 %; 1880–1890: 0.4 %; 1890–1900: 
−1.7 %. For a different view, see Leff (1997).
15 The USA was the main market for the Brazilian product (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
16 Figures provided by Furtado (2006 [1959]) show that the production was of 3.7 and 5.5 million 
sacks in the periods 1880–1881 and 1890–1891, respectively, rising to 16.3 million between 1901 
and 1902 (one sack was equivalent to 60 kg).
17 For example, after several charges of abuse, Germany prohibited emigration to Brazil in 1859.
18 The figures for the annual average numbers of immigrants, by decade, are 1860–1869: 9850; 
1870–1879: 20,780; 1880–1889: 47,890; 1890–1899:118,170; and 1900–1909: 66,651 (Leff 1972).
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As we have seen, the last years of the nineteenth century were extremely favorable 
for the production of coffee in the Brazilian lands, especially in Rio de Janeiro, São 
Paulo, and Minas Gerais regions. Not only were internal conditions conducive 
towards increasing production, but there was also the auspicious external circumstances 
of supply shortages.19 However, considering the inelasticity of international demand 
and the large availability of lands and relative production advantages, it was inevi-
table that the coffee supply would continue to increase, with a consequent decline 
in prices. The response of the coffee planters and the government (tightly con-
nected) to these adverse prospects was to implement valorization programs that 
consisted in buying and storing the excess coffee so as to control international 
prices.20 However, this mechanism for protecting the coffee economy was only 
“a process that transferred, to the future, the solution of a problem that would only 
become more and more serious” (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 256). The policy was 
relatively successful until the 1920s, when the Great Depression brought Brazil into 
a new era of difficulties and political disruption.
Rio Grande do Sul would only become economically relevant in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. The region’s economy would be based on cattle farming. 
According to Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]), the cattle would reproduce rapidly due to the 
favorable natural environment, providing the region with the greatest concentration 
of cattle in the colony. Production of derivatives such as dairy products and leather 
was also of considerable importance. Agriculture would be developed only in a 
small sector near the coast (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]). Initially, similar to the country 
side of the Northeast region, cattle farming developed as an extensive activity. 
Leather exports helped to maintain what was then a low-profitability activity afloat. 
It was only with the already mentioned discovery of gold that the activity faced a 
“true revolution,” being finally integrated with the rest of the colony (Furtado 2006 
[1959], p. 121).
Following Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), we 
can say that a different colonization method was structured. Variations in geographic 
characteristics such as climate and soil meant that the lands that today form the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul were not suited for the production of tropical products such as 
sugar. In order to protect the region from possible competitors such as Spain, the 
solution was to establish a settlement strategy similar to the one in the USA and 
Canada. Recruitment was made among poor and middle-class Portuguese families 
and peasants and considerable advantages were offered to those willing to emigrate 
(Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
Thus, the settlement of the South region of the country, especially Rio Grande do 
Sul, was unlike any others in Brazilian colonization. Land was more equally divided, 
slave labor was used in much smaller scale, and the population was rather homoge-
neous (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
19 Supply constraints in the main production centers, such as the Portuguese Ceylon—present-day 
Sri Lanka—encouraged the Brazilian production.
20 Brazil had practically a monopoly on coffee production, being responsible, at its height, for 
producing more than three-quarters of the international supply (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
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2.2  Political Aspects
In terms of political participation, Love (1970) states that the end of the Empire and 
the establishment of the Republic (1889) saw a democratization of the formal politi-
cal process at three levels. The first is that the number of elective positions at all 
levels of government was increased (governors and the president and vice president 
of the Republic were now to be elected). Second, suffrage was expanded compared 
to the Empire. Under the first republican Constitution on 1891, all literate males 21 
and older could vote. Finally, authority was decentralized.
There is some divergence between Love’s (1970) and Leal’s (2012 [1948]) views. 
Probably the reality was closer to Leal’s explicit exposition, which notes the great 
fragility and dependence of the municipal administration, despite some increase in 
revenues noted by Love (1970). As we will see in greater detail later, the introduc-
tion of these liberal constitutional mechanisms of government, broader suffrage, and 
decentralization did not result in the type of de facto political structure that the 
members of the 1890–1891 constituent assembly had envisaged (Love 1970).
A central aspect of the Brazilian history for our study is the coronelismo, one of 
the most important characteristics of the First Republic (1889–1930). Leal (2012 
[1948]) defines it as the result of a combination of the representative system of the 
time and an inadequate social and economic structure. In other words, coronelismo 
is a peculiar manifestation of the private sector, an adaptation through which resid-
ual elements of old and excessive private power have managed to coexist in a politi-
cal regime of (theoretically) broad representation. It is a commitment between the 
public sector, progressively strengthened, and the decadent influence of the local 
chiefs, mainly the landowners (Leal 2012 [1948]). “Without the requisite social and 
economic structures, universal suffrage could either produce long-term political sta-
bility or strengthen traditional conservative elements against liberal reforms” (Love 
1970, p. 4), and in the Brazilian case during the First Republic, “the official liberal 
ideology, on which the Constitution of 1891 was based, had outpaced the social and 
economic evolution of the country” (Love 1970, p. 10).
According to Leal (2012 [1948]), these manifestations of private sector power, 
especially in rural areas, are due to the agrarian structure of the country, characterized 
mainly by strongly concentrated land ownership.21 The vast distances and empty 
areas within the territory, as well as the scarcity of people, greatly influenced the 
situation (Carvalho 1946). Therefore, the public sector commitment is explained by 
the sufficiently broad franchise that makes the government dependent on the rural 
electorate. The essence of this commitment is that local chiefs provide  unconditional 
21 According to Love (1970), the nation remained 90 % rural in the early years of the Republic. 
Furthermore, Love (1970) argues that the critical role played by urbanization is based on three 
main points: (i) Brazilian rural society, owing to its historical roots, has a much stronger patriarchal 
tradition than its urban counterpart, and for this reason the rural vote was easier to control; (ii) the 
rural sector offered more opportunity for manipulation of the vote through fraud and violence, 
because the state and its mechanisms for guaranteeing free suffrage were less effective in the coun-
tryside; and (iii) the access of the urban population to greater opportunities for education meant 
that a large percentage of urban dwellers would vote than their rural counterpart.
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support to the “official” candidates in state and federal elections, and in return, the 
states give the local chiefs a free hand in almost all issues that concern the municipality, 
including the appointment of state positions at local level (Leal 2012 [1948]).
In an agrarian society with high land concentration, where the public sphere was 
largely absent in rural areas, the coronel was often responsible for improving local 
conditions, especially in terms of the provision of public goods and services: schools, 
roads, railroads, churches, and hospitals among others. It was, therefore, mostly with 
such improvements (some of which depend only on his political prestige while others 
might demand personal contributions or contributions from friends) that the munici-
pal chief built and maintained his leadership position (Leal 2012 [1948]).
Leal’s (2012 [1948]) analysis stressed the importance of the reciprocity in the sys-
tem. On the one side, the municipal chiefs and the coronéis who decided the choices of 
many voters and, on the other, the politically dominant situation in the state controlled 
the budget, the jobs, the favors, and the police force. The weakness of the municipali-
ties was therefore a deciding factor in maintaining the coronelismo.
Just as coronelismo ruled relations between municipalities and states, the política 
dos governadores (“governors’ policy”) ruled relations between the states and the 
federal government.22 Leal (2012 [1948]) shows clearly the contradiction in the sys-
tem: by arguing that there should be constraints placed on the powers of the munici-
palities to avoid rule by local oligarchies, legislation gave the governors of the states 
every means for encouraging the very same local oligarchies, albeit to their benefit, 
creating state oligarchies and the consequent política dos governadores.23 Both the 
commitment between the governors and the coronéis and the one between the presi-
dent and the governors were based on the inconsistency of the rural electorate, a direct 
consequence of the type of agrarian structure dominant in the country.
3  The Data24
3.1  The Census of 1920
The Census of 1920 is the fourth population census and the first agricultural and 
industrial census to have been conducted in Brazil. In accordance with the 
International Statistical Congress, which took place in Belgium in 1853, the purpose 
22 It was a “system in which the president assured the governors of the states that their parties would 
always win elections in their respective jurisdictions in exchange for support of presidential 
policies in congress (which favored export agriculture) and electoral support of the president’s 
successor” (Love 1970, p. 9).
23 The politics of the coronéis led to the strengthening of the state power in a much more effective 
way than the política dos governadores guaranteed the reinforcement of the federal power, 
especially in terms of the different possibilities of the use of violence (Leal 2012 [1948]).
24 As we can see from Table 2, the number of municipalities has increased considerably between 1920 
and 2000. In order to assess the effects of inequality on development in the long term, we had to match 
the municipalities in 2000 (2150 municipalities) to their counterpart in 1920 (512 municipalities). 
The construction of the comparable territorial units (CTU) was done manually using the reports 
of IBGE of each municipality’s origin. Table 2 presents the number of CTU for each state.
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of an agricultural census is to “indicate the facts in which the complete knowledge 
of the conditions, process, and results of the agrarian statistics of each country at a 
specific time, depends” (IBGE 1923, p. v). Therefore, it is the first reliable survey 
of the agrarian conditions throughout the nation.
The Census contains detailed information on the quantity and average size of 
rural properties at the municipal level, which enables us to construct our measures of 
land inequality, which we use as proxy for economic inequality, for each of the four 
states of interest: Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul.25
The number of rural properties surveyed throughout the country is 648,153, with a 
total area of 175,104,675 ha (Table 1), which corresponds to 20.6 % of the country’s 
entire area. We have data on 115,655 rural properties in the 178 municipalities of 
Minas Gerais, 80,921 rural properties in the 204 municipalities of São Paulo, 23,336 
rural properties in the 59 municipalities of Pernambuco, and 124,990 rural properties 
in the 71 municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul. Specifically, surveyed rural properties 
corresponded to 46.1 % of the area of Minas Gerais (27,393,210 ha of a total of 
59,381,000), 56.2 % of the area of São Paulo (13,904,631 ha of a total of 24,723,900), 
52.0 % of the area of Pernambuco (5,157,198 ha of a total of 9,925,400), and 65.1 % 
of the area of Rio Grande do Sul (18,589,996 ha of a total of 28,528,900).
Table 1 gives us an indication of the concentration of land distribution in Brazil. 
Nearly half (49.0 %) of the properties are smaller than 41 ha. However, these rural 
properties constitute only 3.5 % of the surveyed area. The largest share of the surveyed 
area consists of properties between 2001 and 5000 ha (16.4 %). Impressively, proper-
ties larger than 25,000 ha correspond to 15.6 % of the surveyed area (more than the 
area occupied by properties smaller than 200 ha, which is 14.9 %).
25 The average territorial extension of the rural properties is divided into the following measurements: 
(i) less than 41 ha; (ii) 41–100 ha; (iii) 101–200 ha; (iv) 201–400 ha; (v) 401–1000; (vi) 
1001–2000 ha; (vii) 2001–5000 ha; (viii) 5001–10,000 ha; (ix) 10,001–25,000 ha; and (x) 
25,001 ha or more.
Table 1 Brazilian agricultural statistics, 1920
Extension of the rural 
properties (ha)
Number of rural 
properties
Percentage to 
total (%) Area (ha)
Percentage 
to total (%)
Smaller than 41 317,785 49.0 6,115,158 3.5
41–100 146,094 22.5 9,593,156 5.5
101–200 71,377 11.0 10,454,242 6.0
201–400 48,877 7.6 14,079,761 8.0
401–1000 37,705 5.8 23,881,734 13.6
1001–2000 13,186 2.0 18,891,552 10.8
2001–5000 8963 1.4 28,667,844 16.4
5001–10,000 2498 0.4 17,928,532 10.2
10,001–25,000 1207 0.2 18,256,042 10.4
Bigger than 25,000 461 0.1 27,236,654 15.6
Total 648,153 100.0 175,104,675 100.0
Source: IBGE (1923). Census of 1920. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, Vol. 3
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As expected due to its large area and economic importance, Minas Gerais is the 
most populous state, with a population of 5,888,174 inhabitants. The second most 
populous state is São Paulo (population: 4,592,188), followed by Rio Grande do Sul 
(population: 2,182,713), and finally Pernambuco (population: 2,154,835). However, 
Pernambuco has the highest population density: 0.22 persons per hectare. Figures 
for São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul are 0.19, 0.10, and 0.08, 
respectively (Table 2).
Table 2 also presents figures on the number of foreigners and occupational 
shares. Consistent with the recent inflow of migrants, foreigners represent 18.1 % of 
the population of São Paulo. Figures for Minas Gerais and Pernambuco are much 
lower: 1.5 % and 0.5 %, respectively. Rio Grande do Sul, in between São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, has 6.9 % of its population composed by foreigners. 
Agricultural activities are the main occupation for the four considered states. The 
percentage of individuals working on these activities ranges from 16.9 % in Rio 
Grande do Sul to 21.4 % in Pernambuco. Figures for Minas Gerais and São Paulo 
are 21.0 % and 18.3 %, respectively. Industrial activities include a much lower share 
of the population. Minas Gerais has the lowest share of population working in such 
activities: 2.5 %. As expected, São Paulo has the highest share of population work-
ing in industrial activities: 5.0 %. Figures for Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul 
are 3.3 and 3.9 %. Less than 1.0 % of the respective populations work in “liberal 
professions.”
Considering the large and detailed data set provided by the census, we note with 
curiosity the lack of studies using the data to determine the levels of inequality. One 
possible reason is that the information has not yet been digitalized, which makes 
data collection very onerous. For this study, both data compilation and elaboration 
of the indexes have been done from scratch and have resulted in what are, to our 
knowledge, unique for the municipal level in Brazil for 1920.
3.2  Land Distribution and Political Concentration
Land has been very unequally distributed in Brazil since colonial times. Brazil’s 
agrarian structure has been largely characterized by large landholding. Figures from 
the Census of 1920 show that 71.5 % of the rural properties surveyed were smaller 
than 101 ha, while only 4.1 % were bigger than 1000 ha. However, the same 71.5 % 
of rural properties corresponded to only 9.0 % of the total area surveyed, while the 
4.1 % corresponded to 63.4 % of the total area. Of the 648,153 rural properties sur-
veyed, only 461 (0.1 %) were larger than 25,000 ha, which nevertheless corre-
sponded to 15.6 % of the total area surveyed (a higher proportion than the 535,256 
properties smaller than 201 ha, 14.9 %). However, the larger the landholdings, the 
lower the unit value of land (IBGE 1923, p. xii).
Table 3 presents the figures broken down by state, revealing several important 
features. First, Rio Grande do Sul, with 124,990 rural properties, is the state with the 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































properties while São Paulo and Pernambuco had 80,921 and 23,336 rural proper-
ties, respectively. However, the total area of the properties surveyed is larger in 
Minas Gerais (27,393,210 ha) than in Rio Grande do Sul (18,589,996 ha). This is 
consistent with our second feature: while all states present a similar pattern to the 
country as a whole by presenting a higher concentration of rural properties smaller 
than 101 ha, there are important variations within this pattern. Whereas only 26.5 % 
of the rural properties in Pernambuco are smaller than 41 ha (with 48.1 % smaller 
than 101 ha), a total of 61.7 % of the rural properties in Rio Grande do Sul are 
smaller than 41 ha (with 83.6 % smaller than 101 ha). The figures for São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais are 48.4 % (with 73.7 % smaller than 101 ha) and 32.3 % (with 60.5 % 
smaller than 101 ha), respectively. Third, of the total area surveyed, rural properties 
smaller than 101 ha represent only 9.2 % for Pernambuco (with 2.8 % of properties 
smaller than 41 ha) and 11.1 % for Minas Gerais (with 2.9 % of properties smaller 
than 41 ha). However, properties smaller than 101 ha make up 17.9 % of the sur-
veyed area for Rio Grande do Sul and 15.2 % for São Paulo.
Another important aspect of the agrarian structure of the country is that the larg-
est share of the surveyed area is usually composed of properties between 401 and 
1000 ha: 20.1 % of the area of Minas Gerais, 30.1 % of the area of Pernambuco, and 
18.2 % of the area of São Paulo. However, for Rio Grande do Sul properties between 
2001 and 5000 ha occupy the largest relative area: 19.8 %. Finally, we highlight the 
impressive share of properties bigger than 25,000 ha in São Paulo and Minas Gerais: 
7.4 % and 6.7 %, respectively.
With the available information, we were able to construct two types of measures 
of economic inequality. The first one is the standard land Gini coefficient, which 
measures land inequality among landowners.26 The average land Gini considering 
all the comparable territorial units (CTU) from the four states was 0.61. The average 
coefficient was 0.60 for Minas Gerais, 0.44 for Pernambuco, 0.65 for São Paulo, 
and 0.63 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4).
Although widely used, the standard land Gini does not capture one important 
aspect of economic inequality: it does not take into account individuals who do not 
own land. If, for example, land is divided equally among 10 % of the individuals in 
a given society, while the other 90 % remain without land, the standard land Gini 
coefficient will indicate that this society is perfectly egalitarian. Therefore, if we 
want a proxy for economic inequality for the population as a whole, we need an 




















, where n is the number of rural properties, ai is the farm size, 
and i denotes the rank, where rural properties are ranked in ascending order of ai. The calculation is 
made using the Stata programs ineqdec and ineqdec0.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics (CTU)
All CTU
Minas 
Gerais Pernambuco São Paulo
Rio Grande 
do Sul
Land Gini (1920) 0.61 0.60 0.44 0.65 0.63
(0.13) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18)
Overall land Gini 
(1920)
0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.71
(0.14) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21)
Voters (%, 1920) 7.56 8.14 5.52 6.71 10.71
(2.61) (2.41) (199) (1.85) (2.47)
GDP per capita (log, 
2000)
8.50 (0.62) 8.35 (0.51) 7.65 (0.52) 8.77 (0.51) 8.71 (0.53)
Average years of 
schooling (2000)
5.18 4.93 3.67 5.63 5.68
(111) (0.91) (1.12) (0.87) (0.86)
Infant mortality (2000) 23.50 25.42 54.75 15.53 17.15
(14.03) (6.55) (14.47) (4.90) (3.79)
HDI (2000) 0.76 0.76 0.64 0.79 0.79
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Poverty (%, 2000) 28.76 31.04 62.16 19.17 24.84
(17.60) (14.30) (11.15) (10.26) (9.54)
Income Gini (2000) 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.55
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Source: (1) IBGE. Censuses; (2) IPEA; (3) Own calculations
Notes: (1) Standard deviations in parenthesis; (2) these are descriptive statistics constructed for 
the CTU
overall land Gini. We constructed our overall land Gini for the municipalities in 
1920 using the same formula as Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Summerhill (2010), by 
computing the same equation assigning zero landholdings to the estimated number 
of families that do not have landholdings.27 The average overall land Gini for the 
CTU considered in this study is 0.85. The average overall land Gini coefficients are 
0.87 for Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and São Paulo (with the standard deviation for 
Minas Gerais, 0.06, being half of those for Pernambuco and São Paulo, 0.12 and 
0.13, respectively), and 0.71 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4).
The Census of 1920 also allows the construction of our proxy for political 
inequality in the early twentieth century: the percentage of individuals eligible to 
vote.
According to the Constitution of 1891, only literate Brazilian men 21 and older 
were eligible to vote.28 Therefore, using the data on population and literacy for 
27 Acemoglu et al. (2008) use an estimate of ten members per family, while Summerhill (2010) 
constructs his coefficients by assigning five members per family. We constructed the overall land 
Gini with the assumption of 7, 10, and 15 members per family. Our main variable is the one using 
an estimate of 15 individuals per family because it supposedly includes relatives and other aggre-
gates living in the same property, an important element in early twentieth-century Brazil.
28 The Constitution of 1891 was in force from 1891 to 1934.
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municipalities, we can easily calculate the percentage of the population of each 
municipality which was eligible to vote in 1920. The average percentage of indi-
viduals eligible to vote considering all the CTU of our study is 7.6. In 1920, the 
average percentage of individuals eligible to vote was 8.1 for Minas Gerais, 5.5 for 
Pernambuco, 6.7 for São Paulo, and 10.7 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4). We see 
that Rio Grande do Sul appears to be more equal not only in an economic sense 
(overall land Gini coefficient), but in a political sense as well. Moreover, we see a 
higher level of political inequality in Pernambuco, where a high percentage of the 
population was illiterate at the beginning of the twentieth century.
4  Quantitative Analysis
4.1  Inequality and Long-Term Development
In order to explore the long-term consequences of land (economic) inequality and 
political inequality for development in Brazil, we exploit the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the CTU for our four states of interest: Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, São 
Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul.
We first estimate cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
the form
 y g p xi i i i i
2000 1920 1920= + + +a b d e¢. . .  
where yi2000 is a measure of development for the CTU i for the year 2000, xi is a vec-
tor of control covariates, and εi is an error term. The key variables in this equation 
are gi1920 and pi1920, the (standard) land Gini coefficient for the CTU i in 1920 and the 
constructed variable for political inequality (percentage of eligible voters) for the 
same CTU i in 1920, respectively.29 Therefore, our main interest is the consistent 
estimation of α and β.
The regressions will be estimated with all the observations and dummy interac-
tions, allowing for differential statistical relationships for each state. We will there-
fore be able to capture possible different de facto institutional environments, with 
such differences rooted in specific colonial experiences of each state. As dependent 
variables, we will first use what we call “main outcome variables,” which are GDP 
per capita, average years of schooling, and infant mortality.
As previously discussed, the inclusion of these specific states has a clear purpose. 
Each of these regions is representative of a particular colonial experience within a 
constant de jure environment. This likely led to different de facto institutional envi-
ronments that might cause inequality to relate in heterogeneous ways with each 
29 We note that there is no uniform framework in the literature for the econometric analysis of the 
effects of historical inequality. In this study, we follow mainly Acemoglu et al. (2008).
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development indicator. Pernambuco is representative of the old agrarian structure, 
of great importance during the colonial era due to the sugar production that had 
far-reaching implications for the political, economic, and social structure of the 
region. Minas Gerais was the center of the gold cycle and later became an important 
producer of coffee and a center for the supply of goods for the domestic market. São 
Paulo was the main coffee producer, and in the late nineteenth century became 
Brazil’s most important economic center, a position that it still occupies today. Rio 
Grande do Sul had a later occupation with characteristics associated to those of 
North America (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002), and vast numbers of 
European immigrants (as in São Paulo) shaping its development path.
The main econometric concern with this specification is the possible endogeneity 
bias generated by omitted variables.30 In other words, if omitted factors in εi are cor-
related with the explanatory variables, the estimation by OLS will generate inconsis-
tent estimators. Easterly (2007), based on the extensive economic history developed by 
Engerman and Sokoloff, has argued that growing conditions  (topography, climate, and 
soil) favorable to the production of cash crops contribute to higher inequality. Therefore, 
we will control for a rich set of covariates (included in the vector xi).
4.2  Contemporary Outcomes
We start by providing results of simple regressions (weighted correlations), using as 
independent variables the land Gini (as discussed, among landowners) and the per-
centage of eligible voters (our franchise—political inequality—indicator) and one 
30 The key condition for OLS consistency is the absence of correlation between the independent 
variables and the error term. A sufficient condition is the zero conditional mean assumption: 
E xe /( ) = 0 , which means that the error term is not correlated with any function of the indepen-
dent variables. In applied econometrics, endogeneity arises in one of the three ways: (1)  omitted 
variable bias; (2) measurement error; and (3) simultaneity (Wooldridge 2010). Our main concern 
is the omitted variable bias due to the inability to control directly for variables such as land quality. 





















(Wooldridge 2010, p. 67). Our strategy in this study is to use a proxy variable solution. There are 
two formal requirements for a proxy variable for the omitted variable q: (1) the proxy variable 
should be redundant in the structural equation, E y x q z E x q| , , ,( ) = ( ) , where z is the proxy vari-
able; and (2) the correlation between the omitted variable q and each xj be zero once we partial out 
z: L q x x z L q zk| 1, , , , | 1,1 ¼( ) = ( ) , where L(.) represents a linear projection (Wooldridge 2010).
31 Technically, we have a simple regression when there is only one independent variable. In our 
case, we have at least four dummy interactions for each variable. Aiming to keep language as 
simple as possible, I will use the term “simple regressions” when there is only one independent 
variable of interest (irrespective of the number of interactions).
P.P.P. Funari
131
multiple regression, including both inequality variables.31 As dependent variables 
we will use our “main outcome variables,” namely (natural logarithm of) GDP per 
capita, (natural logarithm of) average years of schooling, and infant mortality.32
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients. As we can see from Column 1, the 
bivariate relationship between the land Gini and GDP per capita is heterogeneous. 
The estimated coefficients for Minas Gerais and São Paulo are positive and highly 
significant (2.43 and 1.25, respectively). While the coefficient for Pernambuco is 
not significant, the estimated coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul is not only signifi-
cant, but also negative (−1.09). The simple regression of GDP per capita on the 
percentage of eligible voters is presented on Column 2. Only for Minas Gerais and 
Rio Grande do Sul the estimated coefficients are significant. Nevertheless, they have 
the expected positive sign. When we regress GDP per capita on both inequality 
variables, the picture remains broadly the same, a reflection of the surprising low 
correlation between the land Gini and the percentage of eligible voters (0.09, 
considering all CTU).
Columns 6 and 11 suggest similar relationships between economic inequality 
in the early twentieth century and average years of schooling and infant mortal-
ity. In other words, we estimated, for both dependent variables, positive and 
highly significant coefficients for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, a negative and 
significant coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul, and a nonsignificant coefficient for 
Pernambuco. Concerning the bivariate relationship between the percentage of 
eligible voters and average years of schooling, the coefficients are positive and 
highly significant (Column 7). There is, however, a surprise when we estimate 
the regressions with infant mortality as the dependent variable: the significant 
coefficient for São Paulo suggests a positive relationship between political equal-
ity and infant mortality (Column 12). We discuss these results in greater detail 
below. Regressions including both inequality variables present similar results 
(Columns 8 and 13).
Although important in their own right, the results discussed above are only 
historical correlations. The natural concern with those correlations is the possible 
bias generated by the inconsistency of OLS estimation in the presence of omitted 
variables. We attempt to correct the estimation for this bias by controlling for a rich 
set of control variables. Another concern is that the positive correlation between the 
political inequality variable is being driven by the association of this variable with 
an educational indicator. In order to construct the franchise indicator, we took the 
number of literate males, which is likely to reflect the educational environment of 
that particular CTU. In order to control for this specific source of bias, we control 
for the educational variables in 1920.
We now discuss the extended results from regressions with GDP per capita as 
the dependent variable. The inclusion of educational controls reduces marginally, for 
Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, the significance of the estimated coefficients 
32 For now on, when I mention “GDP per capita” or “average years of schooling” I will be referring 
to their natural logarithms.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the percentage of eligible voters (Column 4). We note that, while this is not the 
case for average years of schooling (Column 9), the picture is similar when infant 
mortality is the dependent variable (Column 14). When geographic and educa-
tional controls are included, we have a clearer picture. Column 5 shows that the 
results for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, of economic inequality in 1920 being posi-
tively and significantly correlated to GDP per capita in 2000, are robust. For 
Pernambuco, economic inequality appears to be non-correlated with income in the 
long run. For Rio Grande do Sul, economic inequality in 1920 remains negatively 
(and highly significant) correlated to GDP per capita in 2000. Moreover, all esti-
mated coefficients for our political inequality variable become insignificant with the 
inclusion of geographic variables.
However, the results for average years of schooling and infant mortality are dif-
ferent. First, economic inequality in 1920 is only significantly related to average 
years of schooling in 2000 for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the states in which the 
coefficients are positive (Column 10). In other words, only positive relationships 
between economic inequality and educational attainments in the long run are sig-
nificant. Considering infant mortality, we have the opposite picture: only negative 
relationships, as the case of Rio Grande do Sul, between economic inequality and 
development in the long run are significant (reflected in a positive estimated coef-
ficient, Column 15). The percentage of eligible voters does not appear to have had 
important effects on development in the long run. Either the coefficients lose their 
significance or they present small magnitudes (Columns 10 and 15).
We now expand our analysis by introducing the overall land Gini calculated 
index. This variable, as already mentioned, shows the inequality of land distribution 
across the whole population. Extending the analysis in this direction provides fur-
ther insights into the relationship between inequality and long-term development.
Table 6 presents the regression results. Several noteworthy aspects emerge. First, 
when including both Gini variables and the percentage of eligible voters in regres-
sions with no controls and GDP per capita as the dependent variable, the land Gini 
among landowners remains significant for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, while the 
overall land Gini is significant for Pernambuco (Column 1). The inclusion of con-
trols makes all overall land Gini coefficients become insignificant (Column 2). 
Moreover, regressions with the overall land Gini as the only economic inequality 
variable (and with control variables) show no significant relationship (Column 3). 
Regressions with average years of schooling as the dependent variable present simi-
lar results (Columns 4–6), somewhat more favorable to the standard land Gini (the 
coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul is significant, Columns 4 and 5). Coefficients for 
the overall land Gini remain broadly insignificant as well in regressions with infant 
mortality as the dependent variable the inclusion of the control variables (Columns 
8 and 9). Notwithstanding, the comparison of regressions with the standard land 
Gini (Table 5, Columns 5, 10, and 15) with regressions with the overall land Gini 
(Table 6, Columns 3, 6, and 9) indicates a stronger effect of the standard land Gini.
Therefore, our empirical results suggest that the effects of land inequality among 
landowners would possibly dominate over the effects of the inequality of land 
distribution across the population as a whole.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3  De Facto Institutional Environments and Structural 
Change
This section presents the estimated inequality coefficients when controlling for dif-
ferent occupations and for immigration. The reason behind these exercises is 
straightforward: our hypothesis—that the heterogeneous relationships between 
inequality and development indicators within Brazil in the long run reflect the dif-
ferent de facto institutional environments rooted in differing colonial experiences—
is only implicit. However, other elements could plausibly account for our statistical 
results. Our main concern is with possible structural changes that might have taken 
place during our time span. In particular, we control for industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, and immigration in the various considered municipalities.
Fortunately, the Census of 1920 provides detailed data on the number of foreigners 
and of individuals working in particular occupations. We sorted the data for each munic-
ipality and constructed the share of the population dedicated to each particular category. 
Our main control variables are (1) the share of immigrants; (2) the share of individuals 
working in agricultural activities (as a proxy for urbanization); and (3) the share of indi-
viduals working in industry (such as textiles, metallurgy, and construction).
The econometric approach is the same as in previous exercises. Table 7 presents 
the estimated coefficients using the GDP per capita as the dependent variable.
Table 7 OLS regressions with structural controls: GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDP per capita
Immigration Agriculture Industrialization
MG*Gini 2.38*** 1.41*** 2.48*** 1.26** 2.28*** 1.22**
PE*Gini −0.19 −0.31 −0.29 −0.34 −0.15 −0.21
SP*Gini 0.46 0.37 1.15*** 0.60* 0.94*** 0.54
RS*Gini −0.99* * * −0.82*** −1.27*** −0.88*** −1.25*** −0.95***
MG*Voters 0.05*** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.03 0.01
PE*Voters 0.06 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.02
SP*Voters 0.04* 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01










Geographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Educational controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440
R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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An interesting picture emerges. When controlling for the share of individuals 
working in agricultural activities, we still have a positive and significant relation-
ship between economic inequality and GDP per capita in the long run for Minas 
Gerais and São Paulo, even when geographic and educational controls are included; 
for Pernambuco, coefficients remain largely insignificant; as for Rio Grande do Sul 
coefficients remain negative and highly significant (Columns 3 and 4).
However, controlling for immigration the economic inequality coefficient for 
São Paulo is no longer significant even in regressions without further controls 
(Column 1). Although the remaining coefficients maintain similar properties as the 
above-made discussion, this analysis suggests that the effects of land inequality in 
São Paulo might be reflecting the positive effects of immigration. Moreover, when 
controlling for the percentage of individuals in industrial activities São Paulo’s land 
Gini coefficient remains significant only in regressions without geographic and edu-
cational controls (Columns 5 and 6). Finally, we note that, with the exception of 
agriculture in regressions with the usual controls (Column 4), all coefficients of 
structural controls are highly significant and have the expected sign.
Thus, we have presented a robustness check for our hypothesis that the heteroge-
neous relationships between economic inequality and development within Brazil 
are due to the different de facto institutional environments. Several regression spec-
ifications show that controlling for variables proxying structural changes nonethe-
less maintains the heterogeneous results within the country. This evidence is in 
accordance with the hypothesis.
4.4  Inequality Yesterday and Inequality Today
Finally, we present a natural extension of our investigation: the relationship inequal-
ity in the past and inequality today. This is an especially interesting question in the 
Brazilian context, for Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world, often 
portrayed as an example of high structural and persistent inequality.
Using a framework similar to previous investigations, we econometrically exam-
ine the relationship between the (standard) land Gini in 1920 and inequality today, 
measured by the income Gini in 2000. Again, our units of analysis are the CTU. 
Results are in Table 8.
Results are broadly the same across specifications. For Minas Gerais the esti-
mated coefficient for economic inequality in 1920 is not significant in regressions 
with no controls (Column 1) and with the full set of controls (Column 3). Moreover, 
we find no significant relationship between political inequality in 1920 and eco-
nomic inequality today. For São Paulo, although the estimated coefficient changes 
its sign (it is negative in regressions with no controls, Column 1), the land Gini 
estimated coefficient is never significant. The estimated coefficient for the percent-
age of eligible voters is only significant without the inclusion of the controls and is 
very small across specifications. Therefore, we find no statistical significance for 
the relationship between economic or political inequality in the early twentieth 
century and economic inequality in 2000 in Minas Gerais and in São Paulo.
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Results for Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul are different. For Pernambuco, the 
state for which no statistical significance was found for the relationship between the 
land Gini in 1920 and several development outcomes (see Table 5), we now find a posi-
tive and significant relationship between economic inequality in 1920 and economic 
inequality in 2000 (Column 1), a result which remains robust when controls are 
included (Columns 2 and 3). For Rio Grande do Sul, we find even stronger relation-
ships. The estimated coefficient for the land Gini is positive and highly significant in all 
specifications (Columns 1–3). The estimated coefficient for political inequality, 
although sometimes significant, is again of very small magnitude for both states.
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between economic inequality at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and economic inequality in 2000 precisely in 
those states where we do not find a statistically significant positive relationship 
between economic inequality in 1920 and development in the long run. In other 
words, where economic inequality is not “structural,” there is a positive relationship 
between inequality in land distribution and long-term development.
5  Conclusion
This study aimed to investigate the historical consequences of inequality and the 
role of institutions. By focusing on the Brazilian case, we provide evidence of the 
relative and potentially distinct roles of economic inequality and political inequality 
on long-run development. We believe this to be a necessary step to improve our 
understanding of the causes of underdevelopment in Latin America.
We constructed from scratch both economic inequality variables (the standard 




MG*Gini 0.01 0.06* 0.06
PE*Gini 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
SP*Gini −0.02 0.02 0.01
RS*Gini 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.14***
MG*Voters −0.00 0.00 −0.00
PE*Voters 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01**
SP*Voters 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00
RS*Voters 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Educational controls No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
R2 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table 8 OLS regressions for 
the income Gini (2000)
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(the percentage of eligible voters) at the municipal level for the states of Minas 
Gerais, Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. The states were specifi-
cally chosen for their different colonial experiences, which probably shaped their 
de facto institutional environment. Our selection was made on the basis of the 
abundant data provided by the 1920 Census, a source which, surprisingly, had not 
yet been exploited for this purpose.
The results are surprising. First, we find almost no correlation between the land 
Gini and the percentage of eligible voters in Brazilian municipalities in 1920. 
Second, and somewhat unexpectedly, we find a positive relationship between eco-
nomic inequality in early twentieth century and development outcomes in 2000 for 
the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, both from the Southeast region. 
Pernambuco, a Northeastern state, presents no evidence of a significant relation-
ship between economic inequality and long-term development outcomes, while the 
evidence for the South, the state of Rio Grande do Sul, is that the relationship is 
negative. Third, we find no robust significant relationship between political 
inequality, measured by the percentage of eligible voters, and long-term develop-
ment outcomes. Fourth, the effects of economic inequality are largely due to the 
concentration of land among landowners, as shown by the insignificance of the 
overall land Gini.
These are interesting results, for they appear to contradict the general view that 
economic inequality would always be costly for a society and that greater political 
participation would foster development. The answer to part of this riddle might lie 
in the fact that political participation was very low in early twentieth-century Brazil, 
and a marginal increase (the econometrically captured effect) might have given 
more irrelevant votes to a captured political system, leaving the economic outcomes 
unchanged. In other words, greater franchise might not have given the population 
more political participation. With regard to the effects of economic inequality, when 
considering the land Gini in an agrarian structure, these are likely to be strongly 
linked to collective action problems. In a captured political system such as Brazil in 
the Old Republic, land concentration might have differing effects, especially when 
taking into account that, in some regions, landowners were largely responsible for 
the provision of public goods.
Further important analyses were conducted. First, we find evidence that there 
is almost no correlation between economic (land) inequality in the early twenti-
eth century and recent income inequality in states where there is a positive rela-
tionship between economic inequality and long-term development (Minas Gerais 
and São Paulo). In other words, the positive effects of inequality are associated 
with a particular structural organization at a specific time, in contrast to a more 
structural inequality, which, as exemplified by the cases of Pernambuco and Rio 
Grande do Sul, would have either negative or no significant effects on long-term 
development.
Finally, our hypothesis that different de facto institutional environments are 
associated with different relationships between inequality and long-term devel-
opment was, initially, only implicit in our analysis. Important structural changes 
that occurred during this time span might be responsible for the heterogeneous 
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relationships found previously between inequality and long-term development. 
Three elements were our main concern: (1) immigration; (2) industrialization; and 
(3) urbanization. After controlling for these variables, our main results were main-
tained, strengthening our hypothesis.
It is important to note that we do not argue that inequality is conducive to devel-
opment in general. We present evidence that inequality might be associated with 
better development outcomes in the long run in a particular political context in a 
within-country framework. It is possible that the theoretically harmful effects of 
inequality are better reflected in a cross-country framework, in which the mecha-
nisms are related to the different de jure institutional environment. In other words, 
relative equality would be better for a particular country, but within an unequal 
country (with certain sociopolitical and economic characteristics) more inequality 
would be associated with better outcomes.
Much work remains to be done. We mention some possible extensions. First, 
there are few works that attempt to control for different de facto institutional envi-
ronments. Further employment of this strategy likely will provide beneficial 
insights in order to better understand the development paths of societies. Second, 
empirical and theoretical studies that offer a differentiation between within-coun-
try and cross- country effects of variables are largely welcome.33 Third, models 
attempting to capture the within-country effects of variables such as inequality in 
politically captured environments are lacking. Finally, the external validity of our 
results remains questionable. Comparative studies within Latin America are a 
logical next step.
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1  Introduction
Brazil is one of the most unequal societies in contemporary world. From 1960 to 2000, 
the Gini coefficients of income per capita distribution remained practically constant 
around 0.6, one of the highest levels recorded at national level (Ipeadata 2014). In broad 
historical perspective, both institutional and geographic factors played fundamental 
roles in the generation and reproduction of Brazilian inequality in space and time. 
Slavery has had and still has overwhelming implications for social equity. Concentration 
of income and wealth and the low levels of education prevailing today are, to a large 
extent, her legacies. Needless to say, this is not an excuse for the ostensible lack of 
social concerns of government policies during most of the twentieth century.
Geographic factors were also decisive for spatial inequality. The continental 
size and the geographic heterogeneity of the country compounded with very high 
transport costs to create wide spatial disparities in the levels of productivity and 
income per capita. According to our estimates, The Gini coefficient of the distribu-
tion of municipal GDP per capita was above 0.45 in 1872 and remained above 0.4 
from 1940 to 1980 when it started declining to reach 0.3 in 2000. Moreover, Theil 
decomposition exercises show that the contribution of the interregional component 
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to inequality of municipal GDP per capita increased systematically from 20% in 
1872 to almost 50% in 2000 (Barros et al. 1995; Azzoni 1997, 1999; Azzoni et al. 
2000).
The historical roots of regional disparities are widely discussed in the Brazilian 
literature (Bértola et al. 2006; Buescu 1979; Cano 1993, 1997; Castro 1969; 
Denslow 1977; Furtado 1968, 1970; Leff 1972, 1973, 1991; Marcondes 2005). The 
discussion, however, lacks an adequate empirical basis. Statistical evidence when 
available is restricted to sparse data at state or macro-regional level. The sharp eco-
nomic differences inside Brazilian states are completely neglected.
The chapter provides historical perspectives on spatial economic inequalities in 
Brazil. For this purpose it analyzes the spatial patterns of Brazilian economic growth 
making use of a database on Brazilian municipalities from 1872 to 2000. The first 
section offers a succinct account of the geographic forces shaping the secular devel-
opment of the Brazilian economy highlighting the evolution of transport costs. The 
second section uses a series of maps to describe the spatial progression of income 
per capita and labor productivity from 1872 to 2000. In a more rigorous fashion, the 
third section estimates econometric models of growth convergence for municipal 
income per capita and labor productivity during the same period. The econometric 
analysis for the period 1919–2000 is refined in three ways. Firstly, by assuming 
spatial correlation among variables of the model; secondly, by disaggregating the 
model for urban and rural activities; and, thirdly, by enlarging the model to take 
account of the factors conditioning the patterns of spatial growth convergence in the 
twentieth century. The final section summarizes the results and proposes research 
extensions. The database is described in Reis (2014).
The main findings of the chapter are: (1) Municipal concentration of income per 
capita in Brazil, both between and within regions, is extremely high and has deep 
historical roots. (2) Spatial convergence of income per capita since 1872 has been 
very slow when compared to the economies of Europe, the USA, and Japan. (3) 
Spatial convergence, if any, was particularly slow during the import substitution 
phase from 1920 to 1980 compared to the primary export-led phases that took place 
in the other periods. (4) The main factors conditioning the growth of municipal 
income per capita from 1920 to 2000 are the conditions of accessibility (measured 
by the index of potential market in 1920) and transport infrastructure (measured by 
the presence of a railroad station in 1920), as well as the share of foreigners in total 
population in 1920. (5) The effects of railroad on urban output and foreigners on 
rural output were persistent throughout the decades. (6) Otherwise, institutional fac-
tors measured by variables like concentration of wealth (farm ownership in 1920), 
illiteracy rates in 1920, electoral participation in 1914, and share of slaves back in 
1872, individually or jointly considered, have no significant effects on the growth of 
municipalities from 1920 to 2000. Thus, except by the effects of foreigner’s contri-
bution, it is fair to say that institutions played no role and therefore the chapter 
endorses the preeminence of geographic factors as determinants of the growth of 
Brazilian municipalities during the twentieth century.
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2  Geography and History
The main historical driver of the geographic patterns of economic development in 
Brazil was the prohibitive transport costs to the hinterland imposed by the strong 
declivity of the coastal mountain range running parallel to the Atlantic shoreline 
(Ellis 1951; Goulart Filho and Queiroz 2011; Silva 1949; Summerhill 2003). The 
slope of the Serra do Mar—reaching 1000 m 100 km away from the sea—comple-
mented by the intense summer rainfall and the dense rainforest hindered the devel-
opment of a transportation infrastructure and therefore the economic settlement of 
the Brazilian hinterland.
In the Northeast region, the Borborema Range as well as the poor soil and dry 
climate of the Semiarid areas made agricultural settlements hardly unsustainable 
beyond the seashore strip occupied by the sugar plantations since early colonial 
times (Milet 1881; Andrade 1973). The settlement of the mining areas in the Center- 
South region during the eighteenth century was made feasible by the negligible 
transport costs—high specific value—of precious minerals (Cano 1973). But with 
historical hindsight, it is fair to say that after the exhaustion of mines, high transport 
costs became a severe constraint to the economic development of the region during 
most of the nineteenth century (Martins 2004; Bergad 1999; Libby 1988). Finally, 
in the Amazon region where navigable rivers sanctioned low transport costs, the 
wild vegetation, unhealthy climate, and the poor quality of soil precluded agrarian 
settlement up to the last quarter of the twentieth century. Starting in 1850, however, 
rubber extraction supported a thriving regional economy up to 1912 when the com-
petition of Asian plantations brought the collapse to rubber prices and export values 
(Santos 1980; Weinstein 1983).1
The railroad investments in the third quarter of the nineteenth century were 
crucial for the viability of agrarian settlements in the hinterland. Transport cost 
reductions in the order of 80% pushed the coffee frontier towards western São 
Paulo (Matos 1974; Milliet 1982; Summerhill 1997; Pinto 1903) and southeast 
Minas Gerais (Lima 1981, Oliveira 2005). Concomitantly, the city of São Paulo 
emerged as the most important hub (the node with minimum transport cost) of the 
railway network, thus pulling industries to exploit economies of scale and emerg-
ing as the sustainable industrial growth pole of the country in the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Cano 1985). For other regions, however, the reduction in trans-
port costs provided by railways had diverse consequences leading to the special-
ization in agriculture and to the loss of competitiveness in manufacturing and 
handcraft production which were previously protected by the high transport costs 
(Cano 1993; Martins 1983; Reis and Monasterio 2010; Restitutti 2008; Stein 
1957; Trew 2014).
1 The Brazilian Pampas located in the temperate zones of the extreme south of the country is a 
double exception to the extent that soils are flat and thus with low transport costs, and high fertility 
(Bell 1998). Trade costs, however, were high given the frontier situation and the distance to 
Brazilian domestic and international markets. As a consequence, cattle raising remained as an 
extractive activity up to the mid-nineteenth century.
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Starting in the 1890s, the concentration of industry in São Paulo was enhanced by 
the synergies and externalities provided by the agglomeration of technological 
knowledge and human capital of foreign immigrants (Cano 1993; Reis and 
Monasterio 2010; Versiani 1993). Conversely, subsidized foreign immigration 
aggravated the segmentation of the Brazilian labor market reducing their effective-
ness in reducing regional disparities in productivity and income. Thus, until the 
1930s, internal migration to São Paulo was relatively meager despite huge regional 
differences in productivity and income per capita (Graham 1972; Graham and 
Hollanda 1971).
In the second half of the twentieth century, government investment in transport 
infrastructure concentrated on highways which gradually replaced the railroads. 
The initial impact of the highway option, however, was to reinforce the hegemonic 
position of São Paulo, thus preserving regional disparities. Indeed, the dispersed 
network of highways reduced logistics costs of the distribution of manufactured 
goods in the domestic market in relation to the long haul transport cost incurred to 
export primary products. Analogously, it reduced the costs of internal migration, 
thus stimulating the migration flows to large cities and ensuring “unlimited” sup-
ply of labor that dampened pressures for urban wage increases, particularly in Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (Barat 1978; Castro 2003; Galvao 1999; Graham 1972; 
Graham and Hollanda 1971; Oliveira 1977).
During the 1960s, the federal capital moved to Brasília and the federal govern-
ment started to implement other regional development policies, combining invest-
ments in infrastructure, fiscal, and credit incentives. The priority given to highways 
in detriment of railways was inadequate for the transportation requirements of the 
agricultural exports from flatlands of the Cerrado areas in the Center-West and 
North regions of the country. As a consequence, the growth of agricultural produc-
tivity and output in these areas were retarded in the last quarter of the century 
(Castro 2002; Gasques and Yokomizo 1985; Reis and Blanco 2000; Reis and 
Margullis 1990; Silveira 1957; Weinhold and Reis 2008; Andersen et al. 2002).
From 1968 to 1995, the expansion of the road infrastructure reduced the costs 
of moving one unit of cargo to São Paulo (a good proxy for the domestic market) 
more than 40%. Despite that, high transport costs still remain one of the most 
critical obstacles to Brazilian competitiveness and development. In the Cerrado 
areas in the Center-West and North regions, in addition to the reduction of trans-
port costs, the profitability of economic activities was enhanced by the possibili-
ties of agricultural mechanization of the flatlands. Another crucial factor in this 
way was Embrapa’s agricultural research which adapted new cultivars—in par-
ticular soybeans, rice, and cotton—to the ecological conditions prevailing in the 
region (Arantes and Souza 1993; Helfand and Rezende 1998; Homma 2003). 
Naturally, the causal relationships between transport infrastructure, mechaniza-
tion, and biogeochemical innovations are hard to disentangle.
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3  Spatial Patterns of Growth, 1872–2000
This section uses a series of maps and graphs to illustrate the spatial patterns of 
Brazilian development. The number of Brazilian municípios increased from 642 in 
1872 to 5507 in 2000. Thus, to allow consistent inter-temporal analysis, municípios 
are combined in 432 Minima Comparable Geographic Areas from 1872 to 2000 
(MCA 1872–2000; Reis 2008, 2014; Reis et al. 2005, 2011).2 Though the time 
benchmarks of the analysis are primarily determined by Census years, they are use-
ful to provide a fairly broad characterization of the main phases of Brazilian devel-
opment during the period (Reis et al. 2002).
Figure 1a, f shows the huge spatial disparities of income per capita and labor 
productivity in 1872. The Northeast, in particular the semiarid areas of the hinter-
land, was already the poorest region of the country.
The richest areas were located around the city of Rio de Janeiro, which was then 
the capital and the largest port of the country, and the cities of Rio Grande and Porto 
Alegre in the extreme south of the country which were the main ports for the fertile 
Pampas. The high productivity and income per capita levels in the Amazon region 
are explained by the rubber boom. Note, in passing, that the economic activity in the 
highlands was practically restricted to the old mining areas of the Center- South 
region.
From 1872 to 1920, growth was mainly driven by the export of primary com-
modities, in particular rubber in the North region and coffee in the Center-South 
region which pushed the economic frontier in the southwest direction. Figure 1b, g 
shows that, in 1920, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul display the highest levels of 
income per capita and labor productivity, both states combining a very productive 
agriculture with emerging manufacturing activities. By then, the rubber exports in 
the Amazon had busted.
From 1920 to 1950, the country completed the first stage of industrialization 
mainly based upon the import substitution of consumer goods. During this period, 
the city of São Paulo and her surroundings consolidated their place as the dominant 
industrial pole of the country. Figure 1c, h shows that the concentration of income 
per capita in São Paulo was intensified by the mid- twentieth century when the pro-
cesses of urbanization and industrialization reached their peaks. Coffee expansion 
explains the spread of high income per capita towards the southwest areas of São 
Paulo and Paraná.
From 1950 to 1980, coupled with an accelerated urbanization process, high trade 
protection, and strong state intervention, the import substitution industrialization 
deepened going into durable consumer goods, basic raw materials, and capital 
goods industries. Despite record high rates of growth, by the end of this period, the 
Brazilian economy was autarkic and inefficient with a definite policy bias against 
primary exports. Figure 1d, i shows that, during this period, economic activity 
2 The map excludes the State of Acre because in 1872 she was still part of Bolivian territory; only 
in 1905 she became part of the Brazilian territory.
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 definitely turned towards the northwest direction led by the move of the federal 
capital to Brasilia as well as by other regional policies which fostered the expansion 
of the agricultural crops like cattle, rice, soybean, and corn.
After 1980, autarky and inefficiency charged their tolls with debt crisis, hyperin-
flation, and stagnation. In the ensuing decades the unavoidable policies were 
Fig. 1 Brazil: Geographic distribution (AMC 1872–2000) of income per capita (GDP/population) 
and of labor productivity (GDP/labor force) in (a, f) 1872, (b, g) 1919, (c, h) 1949, (d, i) 1980, and 
(e, j) 2000 (units and scale variable). Source: IBGE and author’s estimates
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 stabilization, fiscal adjustment, and liberalization which are still lurking. Trade lib-
eralization policies eliminated a large part of the bias against exports of primary 
commodities which became one of the main sources of growth during this period. 
On top of that, the country faced the end of the urbanization process and the emer-
gence of population ageing. With the vanishing of import substitution policies, the 
high levels of income per capita started spreading towards the agricultural frontier 
in the Center-West and North regions. São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul kept their 
leading positions while the Northeast region lagged far behind the rest of the coun-
try. By 2000, both in terms of income per capita and labor productivity, the secular 
divide of the country in the northwest-southeast direction still persisted.3
Closing this section, Fig. 2 presents Lorenz curves for the municipal income per 
capita distribution for the Census years.4 The highest spatial concentration took 
place in 1872 (Gini = 0.45) with the respective Lorenz curves practically enveloping 
3 It is curious to observe that his division line resembles the southern boundaries of the Inter-
Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) observed in the Brazilian territory around January–April, thus 
suggesting that geographic factors like El Niño might have a persistent effect on the spatial distri-
butions of labor productivity and income per capita.
4 To be precise, Gini coefficients refer to the 432 comparable areas from 1872 to 2000 and not to 
municipalities in each Census year. For that reason inequality figures are downward biased. Using 
comparable areas for 1970–2000, Gini coefficients are 0.5 in 1970, 0.45 in 1980, and 0.41 in 2000, 
but not strictly comparable with previous Census years.
Fig. 2 Lorenz curves of the municipal distributions of GDP according to municipal population, 
1872–2000. Source: Author’s estimates
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the other years. Conversely, the lowest spatial concentration took place in 2000 
(Gini = 0.32) with a Lorenz curve that is practically enveloped by all the other years. 
But the process of spatial dispersion of income per capita was far from monotonic. 
The curves display a strong dispersion from 1872 to 1919 (Gini decreases from 0.45 
to 0.36), when the economy was driven by coffee and rubber exports, and more so 
from 1970 to 2000 (Gini decreases from 0.45 to 0.32) when growth was driven by 
mining and the agricultural frontier in the Cerrado areas of the Center-West region. 
Conversely, there is strong concentration from 1919 to 1970 (Gini increases from 
0.36 to 0.45) during the heydays of urbanization and import substitution industrial-
ization. It should be kept in mind, however, that during the import substitution 
period growth rates of the economy were significantly higher.
4  Secular Patterns of Convergence of Labor Productivity 
and Income Per Capita in Brazil, 1872–2000
This section analyzes the patterns of spatial convergence of municipal income per 
capita and labor productivity from 1872 to 2000. For this purpose, it estimates 
very simple convergence models where the growth rates of income per capita and 
of labor productivity in a period of time are specified as a function of the respec-
tive variable—income per capita or labor productivity—in the initial year of the 
period in case.
The basic specification of the convergence model is thus
 
log / log, ,
/
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y Yi t i t i, , /= ( )Pop  is GDP per capita (or GDP per labor force) in municipality i, 
Census year; Yi,t is GDP per capita in municipality i, Census year t; and Popi,t is 
population (or labor force) in municipality i, Census year t. β is an estimated coef-
ficient that measures the speed of convergence of income per capita (or labor pro-
ductivity) of municipalities.
To further investigate the processes of convergence estimations were also made 
assuming spatial autocorrelation in both the dependent (SACD) and residual 
(SACR) variables of the equations.
The first model (SACD) assumes spatial inertia in the growth of income or of 
labor productivity. Thus, without specifying the underlying causes, the model 
assumes that growth is transmitted to contiguous municipalities through contagion. 
Emulation, migration of labor, capital, and/or technology are possible explanations 
of the contagious processes.
The second model (SACR) assumes that the residuals of the growth variables are 
subject to spatial autocorrelation. That is, the determinants of the growth processes 
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other than the initial income per capita or labor productivity, though unknown, are 
supposed to be subject to spatial inertia as in the case of most geographic variables, 
or else to be subject of spatial contagion through markets, social contacts, shared 
local culture, or institutions. Note, however, that the speed of convergence is now 
measured among groups of contiguous municipalities that have some common 
unspecified determinants of the growth of productivity. In this way, it is a conver-
gence conditionally measured. Spatial clusters of municipalities are converging to 
different steady-state levels of income per capita or labor productivity.
Estimates of β, the speed of municipal convergence, of both income per capita 
(GDP/Population) and labor productivity (GDP/Labor force) for the three models in 
the 1872–2000 period, as well as for the subperiods 1872–1919, 1919–2000, 1919–
1949, 1949–1980, and 1980–2000, are presented in columns 2–5 of Table 1 (Reis 
2014 for more detailed results). Columns 3 and 5 show the coefficients of spatial 
autocorrelations (SAC) of the dependent variables and the residuals of the respec-
tive equation.
Before coming to the regression results it is interesting to observe that, in the 
period 1872–2000, average municipal growth rates were slightly higher for income 
per capita (1.80% p.a.) than for labor productivity (1.65% p.a.), thus indicating that, 
on average, labor force grew a bit faster than population, that is, on average, the 
dependency ratio increased 0.015% during this period. Equivalent figures for 1920–
2000 are 3.4% p.a. and 4.5% p.a., respectively, thus indicating that, on average, the 
dependency ratio decreased 1.1% p.a.
For the whole 1872–2000 period, OLS estimates of β for income per capita and 
labor productivity are −0.006 and −0.005, both significant at 0.001 probability 
level. Thus, municipalities with 1% more in the level of income per capital in 1872 
had 0.005 less in their annual average growth rates from 1872 to 2000. The speed of 
convergence is quite small and practically the same for both income per capita and 
labor productivity.
Spatial autocorrelation effects are relatively large for the residual of the equation 
of income per capita and thus taking account of them makes a difference for the 
estimate of the speed of convergence of income per capita. Thus, from 1872 to 
2000, unexplained geographic as well as other spatially correlated factors (like 
quality of soil, altitude, climate, distance to sea or to the state capital, culture, insti-
tutions) had a significant effect on the growth of municipal income per capita—but 
not on the productivity of labor.
Looking across subperiods, note first that the speed of convergence, β, for the 
1872–1919 period shows a significant increase for labor productivity but not for 
income per capita. A suggested explanation is the effects on labor productivity of 
the changes in the dependency ratio and women participation rates related to the 
demise of slavery and impact of foreign immigration. The second observation is 
that spatial autocorrelation of the residuals in the equation of labor productivity is 
much higher for this period but the convergence of labor productivity is not much 
affected.
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From 1920 to 2000, the speed of convergence of income per capita and labor 
productivity became even slower, except for the estimation taking account of the 
spatial autocorrelation of residuals of the respective equations. Thus, geographic as 
well as other factors correlated in space played an even more important role in the 
processes of municipal growth during the twentieth century. Looking at specific 
subperiods, however, the speed convergence is relatively faster, particularly from 
1980 to 2000.
It is difficult to pinpoint the forces shaping this historical pattern of convergence. 
From 1872 to 1919, the collapse of rubber frontier in the North Region is part of the 
explanation of the slower rates of convergence estimated. From 1919 to 1980, the 
import substitution industrialization was associated with urban concentration, 
economies of scale, and agglomeration, thus implying the slow rates of conver-
gence of income and productivity. After 1970, regional government policies cou-
pled with the natural resources content of the exports of minerals and agricultural 
commodities were responsible for the faster growth dispersion in both industry and 
agriculture. It should be kept in mind, however, that average growth rates were 
much higher in the import substitution phases. Finally, changes in the dependency 
ratio associated with migration and urbanization trends probably played differential 
roles across subperiods.
Compared to other countries, the convergence of municipal income per capita 
in Brazil was quite slow. Indeed, estimates of β are close to –0.02, both in the case 
of personal income in the US states in the period 1950–1980 and of income per 
capita of Japanese municipalities in the period 1955–1987 (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). Equivalent estimates for income per capita of Italian municipalities 
are –0.025 for the period 1951–1970, and –0.003 for the period 1970–2000 (Arbia 
et al. 2002; Felice 2013)). The magnitude of those estimates is significantly higher 
than those estimated for Brazil in the periods 1950–1980 or 1980–2000.
For the whole 1872–2000 period estimations are also disaggregated by main 
regions—North, Northeast, Center-South, South, and Center-West—to get a more 
detailed picture of geographic patterns of convergence of income per capita and 
labor productivity. Results not reported here (see Reis 2014) show that in all regions 
the speed of convergence was a bit faster than in the country as a whole, thus sug-
gesting a secular process of divergence among regions which was counteracted by 
a slow process of spatial convergence inside each region. The concentration of 
import substitution industrialization in the Center-South region of the country and 
the marked regional contrasts in soil aptitude and agricultural development were, 
undoubtedly, major factors in process of regional divergence. Inside the regions, the 
speed of convergence was faster in the South and in the North Region, but slow in 
the Northeast. For all regions, however, β estimates were still exceedingly low in 
international perspective.
In what follows, the analysis of growth convergence of labor productivity in the 
period 1919–2000 will be detailed in two ways: first, by the disaggregation of the 
analysis for urban and rural activities, and, second, by assuming spatial correlation 
among the variables of the model as well as among equations of describing the 
E. Reis
155
processes of urban and rural growth. This is made possible because for the 1919–
2000 period the economic censuses allow the estimation of separate convergence 
 equations for labor productivity in rural (agriculture) and urban (nonagricultural) 
activities.5
A preliminary finding is that the average growth of labor productivity was higher 
in agriculture (2.6% p.a.) than in urban activities (2.4% p.a.). To a large extent the 
explanation lies in the weight of the service sector and all kinds of low-productivity 
informal activities in the growth of urban output and employment.
Convergence was faster for labor productivity than for income per capita, both 
however extremely low when compared with other countries. The faster conver-
gence of labor productivity is difficult to interpret without further analysis of 
demographic patterns of growth—dependency ratio, in particular—during this 
period.
Convergence equation for the growth of labor productivity in rural and urban 
activities in the 1920–2000 period shows that the speed of convergence was faster 
for urban activities, though both are still very low compared to international stan-
dards. This result sounds reasonable given the relatively footloose characteristics of 
urban activities, while agriculture depends on the availability of adequate soils and 
climate which are concentrated in specific areas—particularly in the South and 
Center-West regions—of the country.
It is interesting to observe that both rural and urban activities show higher speed 
of convergence than aggregate labor productivity in the economy, thus suggesting 
that there were synergies and cross-correlations between the processes of growth in 
labor productivity in both sectors. Rural and labor productivity grew faster or slower 
in the same areas, thus characterizing patterns of growth high-high or low-low in 
both sectors.
Finally, the last model combines the assumption of correlation of residuals of the 
growth convergence equations for labor productivity in urban and rural activities 
with the assumption of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of each of the equa-
tions (SURE + SACR). The results are pretty similar to the ones obtained with the 
SACR model. Thus, what matters most for the process of convergence of labor 
productivity in rural and urban activities is the spatial autocorrelation observed for 
each of these activities and not the correlation between the growth of productivity in 
rural and urban activities. Thus, residual factors in the growth convergence equa-
tions of labor productivity in the rural and urban activities and the growth of labor 
productivity in rural and urban activities in the Brazilian economy during the twen-
tieth century were quite independent processes with each of them subject to spatial 
inertia processes.
5 The sectorial disaggregation is not made for income per capita simply because the Census of 1920 
did not collect data on rural and urban population despite collecting data on labor force according 
to major economic activities.
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5  Factors Conditioning Convergence Patterns, 1920–2000
To analyze the determinants of the growth patterns of the Brazilian economy in the 
period 1920–2000, the specifications of the growth convergence equations are 
enlarged to incorporate the determinants of steady-state growth rates of Brazilian 
municipalities. This is made by the specification of a conditional model introducing 
variables like infrastructure, geographical attributes, institutions, and human capi-
tal, among others, as exogenous determinants of the growth of municipalities from 
1920 to 2000.6
In the case of the growth of GDP per capita, the model to be estimated becomes
 
log / log, ,
/
, ,yi t i t n
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yi,t = Yi,t/Popi ( or Yi,t/Labori) is the aggregate, urban, or rural labor productivity 
(GDP/labor force) or GDP per capita of município i in year t.
Yi,t is the aggregate, urban, or rural GDP of município i in year t; Popi,t is the total, 
urban, or rural population of município i in year t.
Labori,t is the aggregate urban or rural labor force of the município i in year t.
Xi,t−n = matrix of explanatory variables including all the exogenous variables that 
explain the steady-state rate of growth of Brazilian municipalities from 1920 to 
2000.
The explanatory factors are listed in the first column of Table 2. They include 
major characteristics of the municipalities in terms of geography (area, latitude, 
longitude, altitude, temperature, precipitation, soil types, etc.), demography (popu-
lation, foreign population, labor force), economy (GDP by sectors, landownership 
concentration, electricity generation, area of farms, share of coffee in cropped area), 
accessibility and transport (existence and age of railway station, distance to sea, and 
distance to capital, potential market index), human capital and education (literacy, 
enrollment, and number of primary schools), and a few institutional dimensions like 
the number of slaves in 1872 and the number of voters in 1910. Most of the variables 
refer to 1920. The exceptions are slavery, schools, and voters which were not avail-
able for 1920, and, obviously, geographic conditions. For a description of the defini-
tion and measurement of exogenous variables see Reis (2014) and Reis et al. (2007).
Estimation results presented in Table 2 show that initial socioeconomic condi-
tions in 1920 explain more than 50% of the variance of the growth rates of Brazilian 
municipalities in the period 1920–2000. Note that the OLS estimations of simple 
growth convergence in equations of Table 2 explained around 15%.
The speed of convergence is approximately equal to 1 for both income per capita 
and labor productivity. For urban and agriculture activities the estimates for GDP 
per worker are 1.2, approximately. These values are relatively small given that they 
6 It was not possible to extend the analysis to 1872 because all the conditional variables available 




Table 2 Brazil: OLS estimation of conditional growth convergence of GDP per capita and labor 


















1 N. obs. 397 397 395 397
2 F-value 7.193 6.898 8.600 6.632
3 R-square 0.552 0.541 0.597 0.532
4 Adj. R-square 0.475 0.463 0.527 0.451
5 Dependent mean 0.034 0.030 0.026 0.024
6 Root MSE 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.006
7 Coeff. var. 16.567 18.419 32.072 22.852
8 Variables
9 Intercept −0.188** −0.155* −0.065 −0.098
10 Log (GDP per capita 
1919)
−0.010**
11 Log (labor 
productivity 1919)
−0.010**








14 Log (population in 
1920)
−0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003
15 Log (labor force 1920) 0.000 0.002 −0.014* 0.003
16 Log (labor force in 
agriculture 1920)
0.002 0.002 0.012** 0.000
17 Log (labor force in 
manufacture1920)
0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000
18 Log (foreigners in 
1920)
0.001** 0.001* 0.002** 0.001
19 Log (literates in 1920) 0.001 0.000 0.004 −0.002
20 Students public 
primary school 1920/
population 1920
−0.128 −0.108 0.018 −0.077
21 Students private 
primary school 1920/
population 1920
0.084 0.082 0.158 0.106
22 Number of state 
primary schools in 
1920/population in 
1920
2.300 1.978 0.487 0.755
23 Number of private 
primary schools in 
1920/population in 
1920
3.313 2.582 −0.684 −0.899
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24 Dummy for railway 
station in 1920
0.148* 0.141* −0.066 0.153**
25 Inaugural year of 
railway in the 
municipality
0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000**
26 Dummy for electricity 
generation station in 
1920
0.277 0.298 0.254 0.340
27 Inaugural year of 
electricity in the 
municipality
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
28 Number of electrical 
motors in municipality 
1920
−0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001
29 Power of electrical 
motors in municipality 
1920 (Kwh)
0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
30 Number of enterprises 
generating 
hydroelectricity 1920
0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.001*
31 Number of registered 
voters in 1914/
Population in 1920
−0.011 −0.005 −0.070* 0.002
32 Share of slaves in total 
population 1872
0.007 0.006 0.000 0.006




0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001
34 Crop area of coffee 
1920/area of farms 
1920
−0.005 −0.006 0.008 −0.001
35 Theil index of 
landownership 
inequality in 1920
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
36 Log (GDP potential 
market in 1919)
0.007** 0.007** −0.002 0.006**
37 Log (geographic area 
of AMC)
0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000
38 Latitude of seat of 
municipality
−0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0015** 0.0000
39 Longitude of 
municipality seat






















40 Dummy for state 
capital
0.0050** 0.0038* 0.0004 0.0032
41 Geodesic distance to 
the state capital (in 
km)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000
42 Geodesic distance to 
the sea (in km)
0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000
43 Share of area w/
altitude 0 a 99 m
0.007** 0.007** 0.006 0.009**
44 Share of area w/
altitude 200 a 499 m
−0.002 −0.003 0.002 −0.001
45 Share of area w/
altitude 500 a 799 m
0.001 0.000 0.008* 0.002
46 Share of area w/
altitude 800 a 1199 m
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
47 Share of area w/
altitude 1200 a 
1799 m
−0.007 −0.005 0.006 −0.002
48 Share of area w/
altitude 1800 a 
3000 m
−0.131 −0.127 0.105 −0.125
49 Share of area 
7.5–15 % declivity-
moderate erosion
−0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.003
50 Share of area 30–45 % 
declivity-strong 
erosion
−0.005 −0.004 −0.006 −0.004
51 Share of municipal 
soil in class 1
0.158* 0.144* 0.062 0.093
52 Share of municipal 
soil in class 2
0.160* 0.145* 0.058 0.095
53 Share of municipal 
soil in class 3
0.144* 0.128* 0.054 0.080
54 Share of municipal 
soil in class 4
0.150* 0.136* 0.057 0.087
55 Share of municipal 
soil in class 5
0.149* 0.135* 0.048 0.091
56 Share of municipal 
soil in class 6
0.156* 0.141* 0.061 0.092
57 Share of municipal 
soil in class 7
0.160* 0.145* 0.059 0.096
58 Share of municipal 
soil in class 8
0.158* 0.143* 0.058 0.094
(continued)
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refer to estimates of the speed of conditional growth convergence of municipalities 
which had similar conditions in 1920. Thus, even among municipalities with similar 
initial conditions the speed of convergence is slow compared to other countries.
In Table 2 the variables with estimated coefficients significant at 5% level are 
considered relevant as growth factors and as such marked with one asterisk. Two 
asterisks denote the threshold of 1% significance level. Whenever meaningful, vari-
ables were specified as logarithm except when there is a high incidence of null 
observations in which case they were specified in per capita terms.
Estimation results show that population in 1920 is not significant in all the equa-
tions (marginally in the case of the growth labor productivity) but is kept as a nor-
malizing variable for all the other variables.
The most important variable is the dummy for the existence of a railway station 
in 1920. Ceteris paribus, that would imply an increase of 14% p.a. in average growth 



















59 Share of municipal 
soil in class 9
0.161* 0.148* 0.083 0.084
60 Share of municipal 
soil in class 10
0.156* 0.141* 0.058 0.092
61 Share of municipal 
soil in class 11
0.146* 0.131* 0.055 0.083
62 Share of municipal 
soil in class 12
−0.049 −0.068 0.309 −0.159
63 Average precipitation 
Dec–Feb 1961–1990
−0.00005* −0.00003 0.00003 −0.00004
64 Average precipitation 
Jun–Aug 1961–1990
−0.00004* −0.00002 0.00009** −0.00002
65 Average precipitation 
Mar–May 1961–1990
0.00004 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000
66 Average precipitation 
Sep–Nov 1961–1990
0.00002 0.00000 −0.00007 0.00003
67 Average temperature 
Dec–Feb 1961–1990
−0.00210 −0.00138 −0.00613** 0.00039
68 Average temperature 
Jun–Aug 1961–1990
−0.00129 −0.00040 −0.00507** 0.00092
69 Average temperature 
Mar–May 1961–1990
0.00189 0.00115 0.00549* −0.00136
70 Average temperature 
Sep–Nov 1961–1990
0.00100 0.00009 0.00743** −0.00060
Source: Author’s estimates (pib14si.xls)
Obs.:
 *Significant at 5 % level
 **Significant at 1 % level
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growth rates of agricultural productivity were not significantly affected by the exis-
tence of a railroad in 1920. The problem with the estimation of this coefficient is 
that railroad stations could be capturing the effects of omitted variables related to 
transportation costs, accessibility, and other previous locational advantages. Places 
which had previous advantages in terms of access and natural resources availability 
were likely to grow faster in the long run and to that extent railroad stations would 
be endogenously located and its coefficient biased upward. A possible solution 
would be to use as instrumental variables describing transport accessibility previous 
to railways like, for example, distance to main seaports by mule troops in pre- 
railways times. The difficulty, however, is the ubiquity of mule roads which imposes 
the need of some qualification. A better alternative, perhaps, would be to use trans-
port costs to main markets instead of railroad station. Our future research will be 
directed in both ways.
The age of the railway station is also significant though it has very small positive 
effect on the average growth rate. Early comers in the railway access have had a 
small lasting growth advantage.
To be a state capital was also an important factor for the secular growth rate of 
both income per capita and labor productivity. The increases in average growth rates 
in the period 1920–2000 were 0.5% for GDP per capita and 0.4% for GDP per 
worker. The suggested explanation is the better accessibility to all kinds of infra-
structure and government services. Surprisingly, perhaps, when we disaggregate the 
results, the effect is only marginally significant in the growth for urban activities, 
and, as expected, not significant for the growth of agricultural productivity.
The distance to a state capital, however, had a positive effect on the growth rate 
of labor productivity in agriculture but none on the other growth variables. It looks 
like as the consequence of home market effects or some form of access to technol-
ogy, since state capital is both more rich and populated as well as sources of knowl-
edge and human capital.
Other infrastructure variables with significant effects have to do with electricity 
generation. Both the number of companies of electricity generation installed in a 
municipality in 1920 and their capacity of generation (in Kw) in that same year had 
a significant positive effect on the secular growth rate of GDP per capita and per 
worker. Each additional company brings 0.1% of increase in the annual average 
secular growth of the municipality. The effect is wholly due to industry. Growth 
rates of GDP per worker in agriculture are not affected by electricity infrastructure, 
as we should expect, given the fact the electrification of rural areas was practically 
absent in 1920.
Apart from infrastructure, the other important factor is the potential market of the 
municipality in 1920 measured by the average GDP of Brazilian municipalities 
weighted by the inverse of their geographic distances to the municipality in case. 
Each percent implied 0.001% more of average growth rates in 1920–2000. Thus, 
municipalities that were close to rich municipalities in 1920 grew more in the 1920–
2000 period. Thus, market agglomeration effects were important and, as a conse-
quence, demand factors and historical accidents probably played important roles in 
the spatial pattern of growth.
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Foreign-born population was also an important factor of productivity and income 
per capita growth. Interestingly, however, the effect was mainly felt in the growth of 
agricultural productivity. For the growth of urban productivity it was not significant. 
Suggested explanations are capital, technology, human capital, as well as cultural 
and institutional innovations introduced by the immigrants in the agricultural sec-
tor.7 It could as well be that migrants anticipated the agricultural growth prospects 
of the areas for where they migrated. In that case, the coefficient would be biased 
upward. Note, however, that coffee as percent of agricultural establishments is not a 
significant explanatory variable. And apart from that fact, it is difficult to envisage 
their successful prospection methods, in particular because they were likely to be 
ignorant about the agronomic conditions and growth possibilities of the different 
areas.
Agricultural activities tend to show some inertial or cumulative features in that 
the growth of agricultural productivity was higher in the municipalities with larger 
labor force in agriculture and area of a larger share of agricultural establishments in 
1920. Note, however, that the size of total labor force tends to decrease the growth 
of agricultural productivity.
Geographic variables have some expected effects and other quite surprising. 
Thus, the effects of temperature and precipitation on the growth of GDP per capita 
are not significant. Moreover, the significance of soils in GDP per capita growth is 
probably capturing the the effects of state dummy that should be introduced as 
shown by the joint significance tests reported below.
Finally, the model tests the importance of some institutional conditions on the 
development of municipalities (Engerman and Sokolloff 1997, 2012; Nunn 2007). 
The proxies of institutional conditions included were the share of slaves in total 
population in 1872; Theil index for landownership concentration in 1920; a group 
of variables related to education including the literacy rate of population in 1920, 
and four other variables describing the availability of schools as well as the atten-
dance of schools in 1907; and, finally, political participation in 1914 as measured by 
the share of registered voters in total population.
The results show that, surprisingly, solely or jointly considered, none of the 
institutional proxies selected were statistically significant (at the 5% level) factors 
for the growth of Brazilian municipalities in the twentieth century. The only signifi-
cant proxy of institutional factors is, therefore, the share of foreign-born population 
in 1920.
To test the institutional hypothesis, variables were jointly tested in three groups 
of variables composed as follows:
 (A) Slavery in 1872 + Registered voters in 1910 + landownership concentration in 
1920
7 For a thoughtful discussion of the interactions of culture and institutions in the development pro-
cess, see (Alesina and Giulano 2013). International comparative analysis and evidence on institu-
tional factors can be found in (Lagerloef 2004, 2005) and (Engerman and Sokoloff 2012).
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 (B) Education condition described by literacy rate in 1920 + students enrolled in 
public and private schools in 1910 + the number of public and private primary 
schools in 1910
 (C) The share of foreign-born population in 1920
As shown in Table 3, F-tests for the joint significance of A, B, A + B, and 
A + B + C were conducted with the result that, at 5% confidence level, A, B, and 
A + B are not significant in all cases. Only A + B + C is significant which is not sur-
prising given that the share of foreign-born population was already significant when 
singly considered. But in the case of the growth of labor productivity in urban 
 activities even A + B + C is not significant. Thus, climate conditions were binding 
factors for Brazilian agricultural growth but soil conditions and altitude were 
circumvented.
Finally, Table 3 also presents test of joint significance for the main geographic 
factors. Results show that, jointly considered, temperature and precipitation were 
significant explanatory factors for the growth of rural labor productivity. Surprisingly, 
however, altitude and geomorphology of soils were significant explanatory factors 
for the growth of income per capita and of labor productivity in the economy, as 
well as of the growth of labor productivity in urban areas, but not for the growth of 
rural labor productivity.
It should be pointed that the prevalence of slavery in 1872 gives a biased picture 
of the secular and persistent effects of the institution because concentration of the 
slave population in the booming coffee areas took place in a few decades during the 
mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, contradicting Nunn (2007), there is a strong posi-
tive correlation between the slave share of population in 1872 and the growth of 
income per capita from 1920 to 2000. Thus, to some extent the share of slaves in 
1872 is also endogenous to the development prospects of this region. To circumvent 
Table 3 F-tests of joint significance for the conditional growth equations of GDP per capita and 
labor productivity, 1919–2000
Groups of variables
Growth of GDP 
per capita
Growth of labor productivity
Aggregate Rural Urban
F-value Pr > F F-value Pr > F F-value Pr > F F-value Pr > F
(A) Slave + politic + farm 
Theil
1.02 0.38 0.34 0.42 1.37 0.25 0.87 0.46
(B) Education 1.78 0.11 1.37 0.24 1.24 0.29 1.27 0.28
(C) A + B 1.51 0.15 1.23 0.28 0.96 0.47 1.13 0.34
(D) A + B + foreign 2.67 0,01 2.08 0.03 3.21 0.00 1.34 0.22
(E) Temperature 0.56 0.69 0.44 0.78 6.84 0.00 0.71 0.59
(F) Precipitation 1.77 0.14 1.07 0.37 7.33 0.00 1.35 0.25
(G) Declivity 1,15 0.32 1.09 0.34 0.53 0.59 0.43 0.65
(H) Altitude classes 3.93 0.00 4.38 0.00 1.60 0.15 4.61 0.00
(I) Soil geo-morphol. 2.30 0.01 2.31 0.01 0.67 0.78 1.73 0.06
Source: Author’s estimates
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this problem we use instead the data on free black population in 1872. The rationale 
is that a large share of free blacks (pardos e pretos livres in 1872) is a better proxy 
for the historical prevalence of slavery in the municipality and thus to capture the 
long-run effects of slavery. Though the correlation with secular growth is negative 
in this case, the coefficients of this variable in the specified model were not 
significant.
A final interesting question to be posed is how persistent were the effects of rail-
roads stations and foreign-born population in 1920 on the growth of Brazilian 
municipalities. To analyze this question we estimate the same conditional growth 
convergence model for each of the subperiods 1919–1950, 1950–1980, and 1980–
2000, that is, using the same specification except by the year of the lagged depen-
dent variable. Figure 3a, b summarizes the values (and standard deviation) of the 
coefficients estimated for B-convergence, the station railroad dummy, and the 
foreign- born population in 1920 for each activity and subperiod. The capped verti-
cal lines show the two standard deviation confidence interval of the estimates of β, 
and the figures in parenthesis in the horizontal axis refer to the number of observa-
tion for each estimation period.8
Figure 3a shows that the effects of 1920 railroad station dummies on growth of 
municipalities were significant and persistent in the case of labor productivity in 
industrial and, to a lesser extent, in urban activities. They were practically nonsig-
nificant for income per capita and total productivity and productivity in urban activi-
ties. Figure 3b shows that the share of foreign-born population had significant 
pervasive effects from 1919 to 1949 but the lasting effects were restricted to the 
rural activities.
6  Conclusions and Extensions
The basic hypothesis of this chapter is the overwhelming role played by the geo-
graphic factors, especially transport costs, in the historical generation and reproduc-
tion of spatial inequalities in Brazil. Empirical evidence is presented by the analysis 
of the spatial patterns of growth of labor productivity and income per capita of the 
Brazilian municipalities from 1872 to 2000.
The main result of the analysis is that spatial inequalities in the density of eco-
nomic activity, income per capita, and labor productivity remained practically 
unchanged with negligible reductions from 1872 to 2000. The maps show clearly 
the secular persistent northwest-southeast divide of income per capita and produc-
tivity of the country.
Econometric estimations of models of growth convergence provide a more rigor-
ous test of the hypotheses. Estimation reported shows that the speed of convergence 
of both income per capita and labor productivity was very slow compared to other 
countries. Disaggregation of the analysis by subperiods, regions, and sectors shows 
8 Regression result not reproduced in the chapter is available upon request.
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Fig. 3 Persistence in time of the effects of railroad stations in 1920 and the share of foreign-born 
population in 1920. (a) Impact of railroad stations in 1920 in the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/POP) and labor productivity (GDP/LF) in selected activities and periods (changing only the 
year of lagged dependence variable for each period; lines show 1 std-error). (b) Elasticity of 
foreign- born population in 1920 in the growth of income per capita (GDP/POP) and labor produc-
tivity (GDP/LF) in selected activities and periods (changing only the year of lagged dependence 
variable for each period; lines show 1 std-error)
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that phases of export-led growth were more dispersive than the import substitution 
phases; convergence was faster inside each region and thus regional disparities rein-
forced spatial inequalities in the country as a whole; and convergence of labor pro-
ductivity was faster in urban activities than in rural activities.
More notably, estimated parameters show that conditions of access to infrastruc-
ture in 1920—as proxied by the existence of railway station in the municipality—
were by far the most important factor conditioning the growth of Brazilian 
municipalities during the twentieth century. Other variables related to accessibility 
like the distance to the state capitals and the market potential of the municipality 
also played roles in the long-run growth of municipalities. This strong result cor-
roborates the perception that Brazilian development strategies during the second 
half of twentieth century had misguidedly disregarded investment in transport infra-
structure, particularly in railways, which as a consequence remains as a crucial hin-
drance to steady growth.
In contrast, institutional factors—as proxied by slavery (in 1872), education and 
human capital, political participation, and landownership concentration—did not 
play a significant role in long-run growth of income per capita or labor productivity 
of Brazilian municipalities. Even when jointly tested, their coefficients remained 
insignificant. The exception is the cultural and institutional innovations brought 
with the European immigrants as evinced by the share of foreign-born population in 
1920 which shows a significant and positive effect on the secular rates of growth of 
both labor productivity and income per capita, specially in the agricultural 
activities.
Needless to say, the results are still preliminary and further extensions and scru-
tiny are required. A research priority, in this way, is the need of a more rigorous 
econometric treatment of the problems of endogeneity which affects the estimation 
of the coefficients of railroad station, foreign-born population, and slavery, among 
other variables.
A related priority is to undertake a panel data analysis including the inter-census 
periods from 1872 to 2010, thus allowing to circumvent some of the econometric 
problems and, consequently, to estimate in more rigorous way the interplay between 
factors conditioning the growth of Brazilian municipalities in the diverse develop-
ment phases, in particular to update the analyses for the period 2000–2010 to disen-
tangle the role played by spatial inequalities in the recent redistributive process 
(Rodrigues-Silveira 2012; Hoffman 2013).
In this way the tasks ahead are to complete the historical database on the condi-
tioning factors—in particular on demographic aspects related to migration and 
dependency ratio; urban and transportation infrastructure; education and human 
capital; political participation, etc.—for the periods from 1872 to 2010.
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There is a broad effort to reduce racial inequality in Brazil and, over the past decade 
or two, it appears to have been successful. Affirmative action was introduced under 
the Secretary of State for Human Rights in 2002, for example, and a new Secretary 
of Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality was established in 2003. Disparities 
between races—formally defined as black (preto), white (branco), mixed-race 
(pardo), Asian (amarelo), and indigenous (indígena)—have declined in terms of 
literacy (Rossetto and Paixão 2010), level of schooling (Marteleto 2012), and 
employment and earnings (International Labor Organization 2007), although not 
university enrollment (IBGE 2008). Is this recent experience attributable to policy 
or part of a much longer trend?
This chapter considers racial inequality in Brazil back to the colonial era (pre- 
1822), addressing the social construction and historiography of race, and illustrating 
the comparative size of racial groups over time. The relative well-being of 
 Afro- Brazilians (pardos or pretos) and whites (brancos) is described across major 
historical periods—the Imperial Era (1822–1889), First Republic (1889–1930), 
Vargas Era (1930–1945), Second Republic (1946–1964), Military Rule (1964–1985), 
and Return to Democracy (1985 to present)—in terms of life expectancy, literacy, 
primary school completion, years of schooling, occupation, and income.
Race is somewhat arbitrary, but nonetheless meaningful given the drastic differ-
ences across groups and their reproduction over time. During the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, Brazil was predominantly black or mixed race; over the twenti-
eth century, white; and in the twenty-first century, again Afro-Brazilian. In the 
Imperial Era, slaves were employed throughout the economy, but they comprised a 
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declining share of the population: 5 % of Brazilians and fewer than 10 % of blacks 
and mulattos upon abolition. Net hire rates for slaves between 1870 and 1887 from 
Mello (1977) and wage rates for day laborers from Dean (1976) suggest that a slave 
received in kind just 35 % of what a free laborer could earn.
In the southeast after abolition, favored colono or settler contracts were given 
to European immigrants, whereas blacks left the plantation or found unstable 
employment as camaradas or day laborers. Elsewhere in Brazil, former slaves were 
integrated back into the plantation economy as wage laborers. In urban São Paulo, 
the race and occupation of individuals from Incident Reports spanning 1912–1920 
(from Jacino 2012) combined with average salaries from the 1920 census reveal that 
blacks were overrepresented in the lowest paying jobs; further wage discrimination 
suggests that blacks earned as little as 40 % of whites.
The situation of Afro-Brazilians improved after Vargas took power in 1930, and 
through the economic boom of the 1950s, as blacks became politically organized 
and made relative gains in terms of both industrial employment and literacy. During 
the military dictatorship, however, black activism was curtailed and occupational or 
wage discrimination appears to have increased. In contrast, recent decades have 
witnessed the public recognition of Afro-Brazilian disadvantage and the introduction 
of targeted policies to ameliorate racial inequality.
Overall, racial groups became more equal during the twentieth century. There 
was a rise in literacy, education, and income for all groups, and a decline in occupa-
tional segregation; the relative status of nonwhites was variable, however, and only 
began to noticeably improve around 1980. Black-and-white income during the 
1980s and 2000s converged moderately, in contrast to the divergence of Asian and 
indigenous income during the former period and real declines for both groups in the 
latter. Only in the past 10 years has the black-white income gap narrowed beyond its 
1960 level, although it is now probably at its lowest point ever.
This investigation expands upon the analyses of Hasenbalg (1978), Silva (1985), 
and Lovell (1999) which parts from the 1960 decennial census, and integrates addi-
tional census and annual survey data after 1980 as employed by Arcand and 
D’Hombres (2004), Arias et al. (2004), and Campante et al. (2004). Race is an 
important aspect of inequality and this analysis is unique in providing a narrative 
of national trends in relative well-being which spans the breadth of Brazil’s postco-
lonial history.
2  Conceptualizations of Race in Brazil
A “race” is defined as a group of people with a common ancestry, or sharing certain 
physical markers such as skin tone, hair texture, and facial features. Such traits may 
not necessarily be indicative of one’s genetic origins, though, particularly within the 
demographic milieu that is the New World. Regardless, there is no biological basis 
for classifying humans into racial groups, and the (untestable) postulate must there-
fore be accepted that no so-called race is inherently inferior to another.
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If race is an arbitrary concept, why is it so powerful in explaining relative 
outcomes? Race—“a socially constructed mode of human categorization,” (Loury 
2002; p. 5)—is imbued with meaning upon which individuals act, for which it 
retains its currency. If a group is stereotyped as being inexperienced, for instance, 
people within this group may receive fewer job offers and, indeed, come to have less 
experience. In this section, the origins of “race,” the changing social meanings 
which have been attributed to groups in Brazil, and the historiography of race in 
Brazil are described from the early twentieth century to present.
Prior to the fifteenth century, when slave production was introduced on the 
Atlantic islands and the “New World” was revealed to Europeans, the nature of 
slavery was quite different: one’s status as a slave was less directly related to his or 
her race or ethnicity, and slaves had a greater possibility of someday integrating into 
society as freemen (Klein 2010). In the colonies of the Americas, the scale and 
harshness of slavery were unprecedented: over ten million African slaves survived 
the middle passage over the course of the traffic (Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
Database), many of whom spent the remainder of their lives producing sugar, 
coffee, cotton, and other commodities. The system required justification, an under-
lying ideology which could ensure its continuation amidst acute inequality, hence 
the invention of race.
The differential status of Europeans, Natives or “Indians,” and Africans in the 
New World was institutionalized by both church and state. The legacy of fifteenth- 
century inquisition thinking was that Indians possessed a soul whereas Africans did 
not; in response to the rapid decline of native populations during colonization, the 
Spanish and Portuguese crowns prohibited their (unjust) enslavement in the 1540s. 
The result was an increasing reliance on African slaves: in Brazil, the workforce 
on coastal plantations came to be predominantly African by the beginning of the 
following century (Klein and Luna 2010).
The relative size of Afro-Brazilian and white populations over time is a rough 
indicator of inequality because similar numbers of African slaves and European 
immigrants ultimately arrived in Brazil—what better measure of long-run adaptive 
success is there than a group’s ability to survive? Consider the cumulative number 
of slaves imported up until each period and, separately, the cumulative number 
of immigrant arrivals: the size of the “flow” versus the “stock” gives a crude sense of 
the fate of each group.
An estimated 5.5 million African slaves were shipped to Brazil (4.9 million 
disembarked) over three centuries of the Atlantic slave trade, relatively close to the 
population of 5.8 million “blacks” in 1872.1 While this implies a zero natural 
increase, there is ample evidence of positive growth of the free black population 
during the eighteenth century, suggesting an offsetting negative change among 
slaves. Negative growth of the slave population implies, in turn, high mortality rates 
and low living standards. In contrast, the white population increased sixfold between 
1820 and 1890, to six million; yet fewer than two million immigrants had arrived 
1 Estimated number of slaves who embarked for Brazil, according to the Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade Database (http://slavevoyages.org), accessed 11/2014.
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until that time.2 In short, the demographics imply a very big gap in the black-white 
mortality rates and in living standards in the nineteenth century. The flow of immi-
grants only reached the volume of the slave trade in 1950, at which point the white 
population numbered over 32 million.
The Portuguese who settled colonial Brazil were predominantly men (as were 
two-thirds of African slaves), and had children of mixed indigenous, African, and 
European ancestry. According to Ribeiro (1995), the children of Europeans and 
Indians (mamelucos or mestiços) and Africans (mulattos) were prototypical of a new 
unified people: Brazilians. The importance of racial markers, however, indicates a 
lesser degree of assimilation than Ribeiro implies; nonetheless, race is a qualitatively 
different concept in Brazil than in other countries.
The current classifications of race can be traced to at least the eighteenth century: 
In 1776, Portugal issued a circular which ordered a census to include counts by age 
and sex; although not required, some governors decided to collect racial informa-
tion as well (Alden 1963). The population was classified into three or four racial 
groups: brancos (whites), pardos (literally “browns”; mulattos), pretos (“blacks”; 
Negroes), and indios (Christian Indians). In subsequent regional censuses, alternative 
terms like caboclo (Indian or mestiço) have been used, always omitting un- contacted 
aboriginals.
Beginning with the first national census of 1872 and continuing through the most 
recent decennial censuses, the same general racial categories have been employed—
branco, pardo, preto, and índigena—as well as amarelo (literally “yellow” or 
Asian); however, race was not included in the 1920 or 1970 censuses, and “Indian” 
was not a category in the 1940 census. The racial makeup of Brazil, according to 
national censuses from 1872 to 2010 and earlier figures as compiled by Bucciferro 
(2013), is shown in Fig. 1.
The population of the colonies, excluding un-contacted aboriginals, was primarily 
indigenous until 1725; around 1750, people of African descent became the pre-
dominant racial group and remained so until the mass immigration of whites 
between 1890 and 1940. During the twentieth century the majority were white, but 
in the most recent census it was again Afro-Brazilian. Two key questions emerge: 
Is such a broad color-based classification meaningful? Does it correspond to the 
social construction of race as formalized by individuals?
One issue is that mestiço, of mixed Indian and European descent, is not included 
as a category in the census; therefore such individuals may classify as either pardo 
or branco. Furthermore, individuals of mixed African and European descent may 
also be classified as pardo or branco, hence such outmoded terms as branco da 
terra (light-skinned mestiço) and branco da bahia (light-skinned mulatto). 
Individuals within each group are invariably of mixed descent, which belies the 
biological determinism associated with race.
Scholars have generally considered racial disparities in terms of a white/
nonwhite or white/brown/black categorization, but its validity has been questioned 
2 Number of immigrants who arrived in Brazil, according to IBGE, 500 anos de povoamento, Rio 




(Harris et al. 1993; Silva and Leão 2012): the first of these studies involves an 
experiment which indicates a substantially different racial distribution depending 
on whether the official term (parda) or vernacular term (morena) is used to refer to 
the mixed-race population; the latter cites wide variation in the size of the black 
population depending on how it is defined, as well as a differing perception of race 
and discrimination among pardos. These results are consistent with Bailey et al. 
(2013), who show that alternative combinations of racial subcategories could result 
in Brazil having either a white or a black majority.
The potential drawbacks of the current configuration have not been overlooked, 
however. In the 1976 household survey, individuals were asked both an open-ended 
question on race and one with the four standard options (branca, parda, preta, or 
amarela): just six racial categories—including branca, parda, and preta, as well as 
morena, morena-clara, and clara—encompassed 94 % of respondents (Wood et al 
1988). Although morena was as common a response in the open question as was 
parda in the structured one (34 % of respondents in each instance), its usage is per-
haps too general to function as a census category (Telles 1995).3
3 A similar survey was conducted by the newspaper Folia de São Paulo in 1995 that produced 
consistent results; also, interviewers recorded what they perceived as the person’s race and found 
that people of higher socioeconomic status were more likely to classify into “whiter” categories 
than those assigned by interviewers (Silva 2001).
Fig. 1 The racial composition of Brazil. Sources: Figures before 1850 are from Bucciferro (2013; 
for 1825–1850, these refer to regional censuses across proximate years excluding the state of 
Ceará); the population and its racial makeup for the periods from 1872 to 2010 are from the IBGE 
(http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/): “Tendências demográficas: uma análise dos resultados da 
amostra do censo demográfico 2000,” Rio de Janeiro: IBGE (2004); 2010 Demographic Census; 
Directoria Geral de Estatística (1930[187?]), “Recenseamento do Brazil 1872/1920”; Censo 
demográfico 1940/2010; “Estatísticas do Século XX,” Rio de Janeiro: IBGE (2007) in Anuário 
Estatístico do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: IBGE 54 (1994)
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Racial identity may be fungible, but the schemas employed in Brazil nonetheless 
correspond to real social divisions, shaped by ancestry as well as class: the pro-
gressive “whitening” of the population was a result of racial mixing and the higher 
fertility/lower mortality of whites, not only the implicit incentive for pretos and 
pardos to self-select as pardos and brancos (Ribeiro 1995). Although the current 
categories of race are oversimplified, they reflect the heritage of Brazilian people 
and are preferable to a simple white/nonwhite dichotomy which groups together 
indigenous, African, and Asian elements.
3  Race and the Labor Force
This section recounts social, political, and economic developments as they affected 
whites and Afro-Brazilians after independence, across six time periods which mark 
key changes in their relative status: the Imperial Era (1822–1889), First Republic 
(1889–1930), Vargas Era (1930–1945), Second Republic (1946–1964), Military 
Rule (1964–1985), and Return to Democracy (1985 to present). The independence 
of Brazil contrasts other Latin American countries because a constitutional monar-
chy was formed, as opposed to a republican democracy, and slavery expanded, con-
trary to being abolished.
3.1  The Imperial Era
The royal court relocated to Rio de Janeiro upon Napoleon’s 1807 invasion of 
Portugal; João VI became king in 1816, returned to Portugal in 1821, and the ensu-
ing year his son Pedro I declared Brazil independent and himself emperor (Merrick 
and Graham 1979). Pedro I abdicated in 1831 and was succeeded by Pedro II, only 
5 years old, who was crowned in 1840 and served until the republican coup of 1889. 
While there was much continuity with the colonial era, this period spanned the 
unprecedented expansion of the southeast slave economy, suspension of the interna-
tional slave trade in 1850, and ultimate abolition of slavery in 1888.
Coffee—whose cultivation was introduced into São Paulo during the mid-
1700s and spread to Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and Minas Gerais (Filho 
1952)— surpassed sugar as Brazil’s most valuable export by the 1830s (Bethell 
and Carvalho 1989). To satisfy growing labor demand, the external and internal 
slave trades reached new heights: An estimated one million African slaves disem-
barked in Brazil between 1801 and 1825 and another million between 1826 and 
1850, together 42 % of the entire volume of the slave trade (Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade Database). Internally, up to 200,000 slaves were transported by sea from 
northern to southern states between 1850 and 1888 (Klein 1971); substantial num-




For coffee producers, investment in slaves yielded above average rates of return 
around 12–15 % (Mello 1977). To quantify the relative standard of living of slaves, 
I consider the fraction of earnings which they would have received in goods and 
services (e.g., clothing, food, and medical care) versus the wages of free workers. 
The ratio of free to slave “wages” is based on monthly slave hire rates from Journal 
de Comerçio advertisements compiled by Mello; slave productivity in coffee from 
Soares (1860), Taunay (1939), and Conrad (1972); and estimated annual earnings of 
immigrants on coffee plantations from Dean (1976) and Hall (1969).
In Fig. 2, the daily hire rate paid to the slave owner is shown against the value of 
goods and services consumed by a slave, half the daily earnings of an immigrant 
family (colono), and the going wage rate for a day laborer (camarada) from 1870 to 
1915. The “in-kind wage rate” corresponds to the difference between the gross and 
net hire rates, or the cost of slave maintenance. The immigrant family wages, with 
two working adults, and slave hire rates are not very different, but the family could 
potentially double its income by selling subsistence crops or animals and was pro-
vided with housing: the immigrant family money wage is therefore a good proxy for 
the earnings of an adult.
The individual daily colono money wage (calculated as one-half of the family 
wage) is relatively close to the average value of goods and services received by 
slaves per day. Including proceeds from the sale of subsistence crops estimated 
by Dean (1976), the colono daily wage approximates the daily slave hire rate. Both, 
however, are below the going rate paid to day laborers. This does not imply that 
Fig. 2 Daily wages for slave/free workers, 1855–1915 (Nominal Milreis). Sources: Slave hire 
rates and in-kind slave receipts (cost of slave maintenance) are from de Mello (1977); colono 
wages, including and excluding crops, and day-laborer (camarada) wages are from Dean (1976) 
and Hall (1969); daily earnings based on 52 6-day workweeks
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camaradas were better off: on the contrary, their employment was relatively 
infrequent and annual wages were probably at or below those of colono families. 
In 1886, slaves received in kind just 35 % of the daily wage of a free laborer.
Slaves were not just producing coffee but employed in every conceivable 
occupation, from gang laborers on the plantations to shipbuilders and urban mer-
chants (Klein and Luna 2010). In relative terms, however, they formed less than half 
of the black-and-mulatto population.4 The free Afro-Brazilian population was a 
growing majority: circa 1825, 61.0 % of the population was black or mulatto but 
“only” one- third (33.2 %) was enslaved; circa 1850, 62.8 % of the population was of 
African descent with one-quarter (25.5 %) enslaved; and in 1872, 58.0 % was black 
or mulatto and less than one-sixth (15.2 %) slaves.5
The numbers of free Afro-Brazilians, as well as their diverse employments and 
those of slaves, give the impression that discrimination was relatively subdued 
(e.g., Luna and Klein 2004). Flory (1977) considers the ambiguous nature of race 
after independence: free and slave blacks were often treated indifferently by con-
temporary legislation—vagrancy laws did not explicitly mention race, for instance 
(but were selectively enforced)—and the citizenship of free native-born blacks was 
recognized by the 1824 constitution. Periodicals catering to mulattos were founded 
in the 1830s, but race was more frequently referred to within the context of politics 
rather than discrimination.
The topic of race was nominally taken up in the press and public discourse, but 
deeper issues were at stake which could not be articulated. As Pierson (1942) has 
implied, social mobility existed for people of mixed descent—the “mulatto escape 
hatch” referred to by Degler (1971)—yet it was limited and beyond the reach of the 
third of the population who were slaves. Brazil was already an outlier in the inter-
national context: the Haitian revolution (1794) and cessation of the north-Atlantic 
slave trade (1807) were decades passed.
In spite of gestures that it would end the international trade, it was condoned until 
1850 when the British intervened and escorted intercepted slaves back to Africa 
(Bethell 1970). The newly inelastic supply of labor prompted panic. The basis for 
continued economic growth was connecting labor with abundant land on the frontier 
and this was at risk; although there were many native Brazilians, they were over-
whelmingly in the subsistence sector and withdrawn from the money economy 
(Furtado 2006[1959]). Cognizant of the potential end to slavery, planters began to 
experiment with European immigrant labor.
The movement towards abolition accelerated after 1850: in 1871, the Law of the 
Free Womb declared the children of slave mothers were free upon maturity and gave 
4 For example, the population of Mariana, Minas Gerais, included 22,130 free blacks/mulattos 
compared to 19,020 enslaved blacks/mulattos and 8914 whites (Bergad 1996). In 1775, among the 
combined populations of Pará, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul, 45 % were slaves and 55 % 
free (regional censuses compiled by Alden 1963). On the positive growth of Afro-Brazilian 
populations in Minas Gerais, see Boxer (1962) and Russell-Wood (1982).
5 Sources: circa 1825 and 1850, data are from state censuses in Klein and Luna (2010); 1872 and 
1890, national censuses (IBGE). The slave population is from Stein (1957) and Conrad (1972), as 
published in Hasenbalg (1978).
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slaves the right to purchase their own freedom; the Sexagenarian Law followed in 
1885, which freed slaves over 60 years of age; and the Golden Law ended slavery 
altogether in 1888 (Andrews 1991). Even though the princess regent signed the law, 
it was not a political victory: active rebellion by slaves had made abolition imminent 
and the monarchy was overthrown the following year.
3.2  The First Republic
Freedom brought its challenges to former slaves in Brazil. In the southeast, dis-
crimination by employers and ex-slaves’ demands for independence led to the latter’s 
substitution by European immigrants. In other regions, after the immediate upheaval 
of abolition, life resumed a pattern similar to the previous regime. There was notice-
able variation, however, in the adaptation of workers to the new situation. Abolition 
was a mixed blessing in that it awarded slaves freedom but not necessarily a material 
improvement in quality of life.
Racism, prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century, contributed to employers’ 
preference for workers from Europe but cannot fully explain it. If there were large 
numbers of freed slaves (libertos) and other Brazilians (trabalhadores nacionais) 
available, why were planters determined to hire European immigrants? On one side, 
whites blamed Afro-Brazilians for the disruptions in the labor force associated with 
abolition (Ianni 1962); on the other, freed slaves only desired to return to the planta-
tion on certain terms, and not the money wage per se.
The conditions under which ex-slaves would transform into wage laborers were 
very limited (Furtado 2006[1959]): if freed slaves were given a “subsistence” salary 
the old system would remain fundamentally unchanged, but if there were abundant 
unoccupied lands they would prefer to engage in subsistence agriculture. In Brazil, 
the northeast sugar zone was already fully settled and bound by the caatinga (scrub-
lands) to the west, under which circumstances the labor of former slaves could be 
secured at a relatively low wage; in the southeast coffee zone, in contrast, lands 
were abundant and wages relatively high.
Free blacks wanted to distance themselves from the plantation because physical 
work was culturally considered demeaning and associated with slaves (Ianni 1962). 
Afro-Brazilian families withdrew women and children from the fields, and occa-
sionally the workforce entirely; immigrant families, in contrast, supplied female 
and child labor in order to make ends meet, an attractive feature for employers 
(Andrews 1991). The solution to the labor scarcity problem was consequently to 
flood the market with immigrants and thereby drive down wages.
Beginning in 1881, programs were created in collaboration with the São Paulo 
provincial government to subsidize the transportation of migrants from Europe to 
Brazil. The Society for the Promotion of Immigration was created in 1886 and 
worked with the province until its dissolution in 1895 (when the government 
assumed this function), having facilitated the immigration of nearly 220,000 people 
(Hall 1969). The immigration program was successful: Compared to 195,000 
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immigrants who arrived in Brazil between 1870 and 1889, immigration between 
1890 and 1909 totaled 1,100,000, half of whom (515,000) were Italian (Kodama 
2007). In the 1890s, about as many immigrants entered São Paulo as there were 
slaves in all of Brazil the year before abolition.6
Many labor arrangements existed on the fazendas (plantations), but immigrants 
to São Paulo commonly became colonos; other salaried positions were camaradas 
and empreiteiros. The colonos, named for the groups of homes they inhabited 
among the groves, received a fixed monetary income for maintaining a certain num-
ber of coffee trees plus a variable payment depending on the volume of the harvest 
(Furtado 2006[1959]).7 The camaradas, who commonly resided on the plantation in 
dormitories (usually remodeled slave quarters), were individual laborers paid daily 
or monthly (Stein 1957; Monsma 2006). Finally, empreiteiros (or, more precisely, 
gangs of laborers working under an empreiteiro, or contractor) travelled from plan-
tation to plantation completing jobs at a flat rate (Stein 1957).
The estimated daily wages of a typical colono family between 1884 and 1915 are 
presented in Fig. 2.8 Wages were favorable for immigrant families in the years 
around abolition, declined in real terms from 1892 to 1894, and then spiked in 1895 
when the value of output per worker reached an all-time high above $2,000,000 réis. 
After 1900, the increasing price level and stagnant earnings prompted hundreds of 
thousands to return migrate: on net, only 50,000 immigrants came to São Paulo 
between 1900 and 1910 (Hall 1969).
In the rest of Brazil, there was no subsidized immigration program and the post- 
abolition experience of Afro-Brazilians varied. Hasenbalg (1978) writes, “In the 
Northeast, abolition occurred without great readjustment, and the ex-slaves were 
incorporated into the various fractions of the northeastern peasantry” (p. 153). 
Domingues (2008a) summarizes three recent works describing the situation of blacks 
outside São Paulo: (1) In Sergipe, the elite adopted a series of vagrancy laws whose 
purpose was to force the free population back onto the sugar plantations (Subrinho 
2000); (2) in Bahia, freed slaves wanted to limit their labor in the sugar industry as 
much as possible, and dedicate more time to subsistence farming (Filho 2006); and 
6 The overall slave population of Brazil in 1887 was 723,419 (Conrad 1972); between 1890 and 
1899, 734,985 immigrants entered São Paulo (Kodama 2007; from Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, 
1973).
7 Hall (1969) describes the wages on São Paulo coffee plantations: in 1884, the fixed payment 
(carpa) was about $50 réis per 1000 trees plus $500 réis per 50 L of coffee; in 1895, it was $90 and 
$600 réis; in 1904, $60 and $450 réis; and in 1914, $80 and $400 réis, respectively. After adjusting 
for the price level (using the cost of rice as a proxy), he concludes that real wages declined by more 
than 50 % between 1884 and 1914.
8 Each worker tended an average of about 3000 trees and produced 1500 kg of coffee per year, the 
equivalent of 25 sacks or 100 arrobas, based on Filho (1952)—yields are based on 3000 trees per 
worker; Sobrinho (in Hall 1969)—figures refer to the 1890s in São Paulo; Carvalho de Mello 
(1977)—based on slave yields during 1850–1888 period; Dean (1976)—based on 225 arrobas 
produced by two-adult family; Hall (1969)—estimate based on aggregate figures for 1910–1914; 
Klein and Luna (2010)—no. of trees based on 543 plantations during early 1880s, yield/worker 
from 1820s plantations; Oliveira (in Klein and Luna 2010)—yield/slave referring to 1854; and 
Stein (1957)—planter’s approximation of average output per slave.
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(3) in Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, some libertos stayed with their former employers 
while others migrated to the city in search of work (Guimarães 2006).
In Vassouras (northeast São Paulo State), blacks refused to work under condi-
tions associated with slavery. According to Stein (1957), former slaves faced less 
competition with immigrants because they went to the more profitable plantations 
of the west; black and mulatto women resigned from field and domestic labor after 
abolition, but many eventually returned at a piecemeal rate, likewise with men, who 
were pressured back onto the plantations (by vagrancy laws, for example) and took 
up positions as camaradas or colonos not altogether different from their previous 
occupations. In the city of São Paulo, blacks in many occupations (e.g., artisans, 
small merchants) were substituted by foreigners; new arrivals found only inconstant 
and menial work (Fernandes 1965; Hasenbalg 1978). Immigrants comprised the 
majority of the industrial workforce; while this may owe to their relative mobility, 
they regularly hailed from rural areas and had little previous urban manufacturing 
experience (Leff 1982).
Knowledge of racial inequality during the early twentieth century is limited 
because there was only one national census (1920) and it omitted race. A new data 
source on occupational segregation in São Paulo, however, reveals widespread 
employment inequality: incident reports (Boletins de Ocorrências) collected from 
1912 to 1920, including information on race and occupation, suggest the wholesale 
exclusion of blacks from certain jobs. These statistics (from Jacino 2012) are com-
bined with salary data from the 1920 São Paulo census (Table 1), making it possible 
to calculate the extent of wage inequality caused by occupational segregation.
Blacks tended to be employed in lower paying occupations: they were overrepre-
sented as domestic servants and underrepresented in construction, clothing, health, 
and liberal professions. Nonetheless, there was proportional representation of blacks 
among operators (unskilled factory workers), carpenters, painters, and shoemakers. 
If there was hypothetically no discrimination by race within each occupation, 
then the average black worker would have earned $4046 réis per day compared to 
$4911 réis for the average white worker—in other words, the average income of 
Afro-Brazilians could have been no greater than 82 % of whites.
It was actually far less than that because of wage discrimination within job 
classes. According to Domingues (2003), a woman advertised her domestic service 
in the black journal O Alfinete in 1921 at a rate of $60,000 to $80,000 réis per month 
(then thought “exorbitant”). This amount corresponds to $2000 to $2667 réis per 
day, versus $2640 earned by the average female domestic and far short of the 
 average $3750 ($112,500/year) for a native-born worker. Adjusting for the racial 
distribution of the Brazilian population, blacks or mulattos may have been paid 
wages that were around 50 % of white workers within the same industry.9
9 In São Paulo State, the census reported that 82 % of the population was Brazilian and 18 % was 
foreign in 1920; furthermore, the best estimate from Fernandes (1965) of the black or mulatto 
share in the overall population of São Paulo City is 9 %. About 11 % of the native-born population 
was therefore Afro-Brazilian, and the average wage of white Brazilian domestics would have been 
several percentage points higher than that for national workers.
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Table 1 Racial segregation and wages by occupation, São Paulo, 1920
Industry and occupation Whites Blacks Total Avg. wage
Domestic service
Domésticos 12,185 3191 15,376 $2759
Agriculture
Lavradores 241 0 241 $5391
Lenheiros 108 0 108 $4979
Tropeiros 102 0 102 $4062
Agrónomos 31 0 31 $4049
Lenhadores 28 0 28 $4392
Leiteiros 179 36 215 $4115
Civil construction
Pedreiro 731 84 815 $7268
Oleiros 137 0 137 $6000
Marmoris tas 96 0 96 $6727
Pintores 289 53 342 $3205
Eletricistas 216 0 216 $6197
Transportation
Carroceiro 1871 60 1931 $4374
Maquinistas da Railway 42 0 42 $7684
Metalwork
Mecânicos 721 0 721 $8821
Ferreiros 144 0 144 $8228
Caldeireiros 121 0 121 $9547
Polidores 53 0 53 $5626
Fundidores 42 0 42 $8405
Torneiros 42 0 42 $7506
Serralheiros 6 5 11 $7380
Wood
Carpinteiros 415 61 476 $6433
Marceneiros 84 0 84 $7409
Textiles
Tintureiros 162 30 192 $5363
Tecelões 137 0 137 $6307
Clothing
Alfaiates 432 102 534 $6382
Bordadeiras 108 0 108 $3700
Costureiras 150 0 150 $3911
Chapeleiros 72 0 72 $6500
Sapateiros 307 41 348 $5687
Operators (general)
Operários 9137 1351 10,488 $5700




In some aspects, abolition brought more equality among races—now citizens, 
former slaves could choose where to live and work—and in others, it brought less—
libertos were often relegated to inferior employments than previously held. In much 
of the country, repression and a lack of options for blacks impeded broader material 
improvements in their welfare; in the southeast, massive immigration operated to 
undercut wages and push blacks into the subsistence sector or insecure urban 
employment. Nationalist sentiment after the Revolution of 1930, however, opened 
up new opportunities for Afro-Brazilians.
3.3  The Vargas Era, Second Republic, Military Rule, 
and Return to Democracy
During the First Republic, institutions of black civil participation were fomenting. 
Numerous societies (beginning with Clube 28 de Setembro in 1897) and periodicals 
(starting with A Pátria in 1899) were established to discuss issues pertinent to 
Afro-Brazilians (Domingues 2007). This culminated in the early 1930s, when black 
organizations mobilized support and garnered political influence. The black move-
ment would produce tangible benefits for workers, but would fail to breach higher 
level political constraints.
Getúlio Vargas overthrew the republican government in 1930 with the support of 
landowners in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul, as well as Minas Gerais and the 
Table 1 (continued)
Industry and occupation Whites Blacks Total Avg. wage
Commerce/proprietors
Empregados no comércio 2089 150 2239 $8974
Capitalistas 60 0 60 $48,077
Health
Barbeiros 66 0 66 $2564
Enfermeiros 84 0 84 $5929
Médicos 65 0 65 $10,121
Liberal professions
Professores 97 0 97 $12,019
Advogados 61 0 61 $9615
Engenheiros 30 0 30 $12,543
Total obs./avg. wage 30,995 5164 36,159 $4787
Sources: Occupational distribution by race and sex (not shown) is from Boletins de Ocorrências 
spanning 1912–1920 in Sao Paulo, compiled by Ramatis Jacino (2012). Mean daily nominal wages 
for Sao Paulo state are principally from the 1920 Recenseamento do Brasil, Vol. V, part 2 
(“Salarios”), complemented by some national wage figures from this source, and in a few instances 
annual wage data for neighboring Rio de Janeiro in 1920 (based on 52 6-day workweeks) from 
Eulalia Lahmeyer Lobo, História do Rio de Janeiro (1978)
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northeast (Andrews 1991). Afro-Brazilians, who had suffered under the Republic, 
initially supported Vargas; in turn, he helped integrate them into politics and the 
economy. The Ministry of Labor was established and the Law of Nationalization 
of Labor passed in 1931, which required that at least two-thirds of the industrial 
workforce be native Brazilian (Andrews 1991).
The Brazilian Black Front (FNB) was established in 1931 and by 1936 it had 
thousands of members and 60 delegates in other states (Domingues 2008b). The 
organization supported Vargas because, like him, it championed Brazilian nationalism. 
The FNB promoted the well-being of blacks, and even established an elementary 
school and health clinic, but became increasingly affiliated with fascism. 
Disillusionment with the Estado Novo (New State) lessened the imperative for 
political organization, but the following period was nonetheless one of notable 
economic progress for blacks (Andrews 1991).
After Vargas lost hold of power, new groups would lead the Afro-Brazilian move-
ment: namely the União dos Homens de Cor, founded in Porto Alegre in 1943, and 
the Teatro Experimental do Negro, founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1944 (Domingues 
2007). The UHC sought to “raise the economic and intellectual level of people-of- 
color” (p. 108), and the TEN promoted Afro-Brazilian culture and anti- discriminatory 
legislation. The situation of blacks and mulattos nonetheless remained very differ-
ent from that of whites: the literacy rate for whites was 46.9 % in 1940 and 52.7 % 
in 1950, versus 22.6 % in 1940 and 25.7 % in 1950 for nonwhites (Hasenbalg 1978). 
In São Paulo, however, the rate of growth of industrial employment among 
Afro- Brazilians was comparatively high (Hasenbalg and Salazar 1994).
The military coup of 1964 marked the beginning of the dissolution of progressive 
Afro-Brazilian societies (Domingues 2007). As stated by Lovell (1999): “Military lead-
ers quickly denounced any criticism of racial democracy as an ‘act of subversion’ and 
brutally silenced all opposition movements through imprisonment, censorship, and 
decree” (p. 400). The race/color question was removed from the 1970 census; partial 
information is available from other sources for 1976, but statistics on racial inequality 
are generally unavailable until 1980. In the 1976 National Household Survey (PNAD), 
whites earned on average 2.8 times more than blacks (3433 Cr$ to 1210 Cr$), and 2.0 
times more than people of mixed race (3433 Cr$ to 1722 Cr$); Silva (1985) estimates 
that 32.9 % of the difference between white and mixed-race individuals is attributable to 
discrimination, and 26.3 % of that between blacks and whites.
Only in 1978 did black civil society reemerged in the public sphere, with the 
foundation of the Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU) or Unified Black Movement 
(Domingues 2007). From the 1980s forward, efforts to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion grew and with them public awareness of and scholarship on race. The new 
generation of Afro-Brazilian organizers, inspired by pan-Africanism and the US 
black power movement, emerged with a more militant orientation after two decades 
of suppression by the dictatorship (Andrews 1992).
Many improvements in the social status of Afro-Brazilians followed: the MNU 
adopted the term “negro” for both blacks and mulattos, and it lost the negative 
connotation it had during the First Republic; the holiday commemorating abolition 
was moved from the 13th of May to November 20th, and the 13th was named the 
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National Day for the Denunciation of Slavery; school curricula were revised, 
recognizing multiculturalism and the historical role of blacks; and African cultural 
heritage was generally asserted (Domingues 2007). In the political arena, the 
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PDMB) held majority control of 
the government after 1982 and created a state agency, the Conselho de Participação 
e Desenvolvimento da Comunidade Negra, directed towards protecting the rights of 
the black community (Andrews 1992). Over the 1990s and 2000s, improvements in 
income, life expectancy, and education were greater for blacks than for whites 
(Charão 2014).
The last decade has witnessed some promising, yet controversial, developments 
in the effort against discrimination: In 2003, the Secretary of Policy for the Promotion 
of Racial Equality was established by law (http://www.seppir.gov.br). Its broad 
charge is to aid in the creation and implementation of public policies regarding racial 
equality, including the National Program of Affirmative Action enacted on the 13th 
of May 2002 under direction of the Ministry of Justice, Secretary of State for Human 
Rights (http://www.planalto.gov.br).
4  Trends in Racial Inequality from Abolition to the Present
Important strides have been made in Brazil towards racial equality, but are recent 
advances part of a larger trend or do they form a unique historical episode? The 
previous section describes the experience of whites (brancos) and Afro-Brazilians 
(pretos and pardos) over the past two centuries. This section reports available 
quantitative evidence on absolute and relative changes, by race, in life expectancy, 
literacy, education, occupation, and income.
4.1  Life Expectancy
Available statistics on life expectancy at birth for whites (brancos) and nonwhites 
(pardos and pretos), and the difference between them, are presented in Table 2. The 
white/nonwhite dichotomy is shown here because it was standard in the sources 
where these figures were published; hereafter, each race is presented separately.
Table 2 Life expectancy at birth (years) by race, 1950–2008
1950 1960 1980 1991 2008
White 47.5 54.7 66.1 70.8 73.1
Nonwhite 40.1 44.7 59.4 64.0 67.0
Difference   7.4 10.0   6.7   6.8   6.1
Source: Data from the 1950 and 1980 censuses, as presented in Wood et al. (1988), and Lovell 
(1999), who adds the 1960 figures; data for 2008 are from LAESER (2010; p. 197/9) based on the 
1991/2000 censuses and Ministry of Health 1997–2000 micro-data
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As of 1950, life expectancy at birth was 47.5 years for whites and 40.1 years 
for nonwhites—a difference of 7.4 years that increased to 10 years a decade later. 
The white/nonwhite difference in life expectancy at birth is much lower today than 
it was in 1960: the largest gain in terms of race equality was between 1960 and 
1980, although this gap slightly increased in the 1990s. It appears that recent experi-
ence reports a steeper decline than the average since 1980.
4.2  Literacy
The comparative illiteracy rates of racial groups in Brazil are illustrated in Fig. 3 
(white = 1.00) based on census data (for 1970, when figures are not available, the 
linear trend is shown). Asian illiteracy rates went down relative to whites through 
1960, were flat from 1960 until 1991, and then rose after 1991. Black/mixed-race 
illiteracy was increasing compared to whites, who were becoming literate at a faster 
rate, and only falling during the 1990s. Indigenous illiteracy is at a high level, and 
was also increasing in relative terms from 1960 onwards, with the exception of the 
decade after 1990.
Prior to 1940, there is no literacy information by racial group in the censuses. 
The figures shown for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 are the illiteracy rates for the 
70–79, 60–69, 50–59, and 40–49 cohorts in the 1950 census: individuals who would 
Fig. 3 Illiteracy of racial groups in Brazil relative to whites. Sources: Recenseamento Geral do 
Brasil 1940, 1950. IBGE census microdata 1960, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 from the Minnesota 
Population Center, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), International. Minneapolis: 




have been from 20 to 29 in each respective decade, and having literacy levels typical 
of the population. This method is similar to that of Musacchio et al. (2014), but 
more robust because the sample is older: the illiteracy rates of the 30–39 racial 
cohorts in 1950, for instance, are within 5 % of those for the 20–29 cohorts in 1940, 
whereas the 15–19 and 5–9 age groups differ by as much as 66 %.
The illiteracy levels of all groups noticeably declined across the twentieth 
century: they ranged from 81 % for blacks to 40 % for Asians in 1940, compared with 
29 % for indigenous peoples and just 8 % for whites in 2010. This process accelerated 
after 1980—there was an impressive drop in the indigenous illiteracy rate during the 
1990s—although in the last decade illiteracy among Asians increased, possibly as a 
result of migration. Relative declines for whites outpaced those of blacks/mulattos 
between 1940 and 1980, but stabilized afterwards and Afro- Brazilian illiteracy fell 
versus whites during the 1990s; there was convergence after 1980, with the exception 
of a comparative jump in indigenous illiteracy after 2000.
4.3  Education
There are various measures of educational completion but the one which is compa-
rable across the twentieth century, and particularly meaningful in terms of individual 
capabilities and public policy, is primary school completion. Figure 4 presents the 
Fig. 4 Relative primary education achievement, 1910–2010. Sources: Recenseamento Geral do 
Brasil 1940, 1950. IBGE census microdata 1960, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 from the Minnesota 
Population Center, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), International. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 2014. Observations for 1910–1930 correspond to 56–60 age cohorts in 
1960 (Musacchio et al. 2014)
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percent of individuals within each race who report having completed primary 
school, defined as grades one through four. The responses are standardized for the 
1940/1950 and 1960–2010 periods.10 Five percent of the sample had attained a basic 
education in 1940: 13 % in 1950; 9 % in 1960; 26 % in 1980; 33 % in 1991; 42 % in 
2000; and 51 % in 2010.
There were sustained gains in primary educational attainment among mixed- 
race, black, and indigenous peoples: black or mulatto attainment shows an 
increasingly positive trend, going from 10 % in 1910 to 84 % of whites in 2010. 
Indigenous peoples were less likely to have reported completing primary school, 
and the size of the relative gap with Afro-Brazilians was roughly constant between 
1940 and 1980 (ranging from 18 to 22 %), and wider in 1991 and 2000. Asians 
were at parity with whites in both 1940 and 2010, with completion rates about 
40 % higher in intermediate years. In general, there was a smooth convergence of 
educational attainment after 1980, with the indigenous experience of the 2000s 
being the sole outlier.
Table 3 presents data for whites and nonwhites from an alternative source, annual 
household surveys, for another education indicator, average years of schooling. 
The PNAD was first administered in 1976, and then every year after 1980, and is used 
in most current studies of racial inequality. In terms of average years of schooling, 
there was essentially no trend over the 1976–2008 periods.
In 1976, whites had on average 1.8 years more schooling than nonwhites, and 1.5 
extra years a decade later; by 1998, however, the achievement gap was higher than 
before, and in 2008 at the same level as in 1976. This pattern is somewhat congru-
ous with Fig. 4—education is increasing for all groups in reversing magnitudes—
but there was greater educational equality in primary school attainment as opposed 
to average years of schooling, likely explained by proportionally higher secondary 
and tertiary completion among whites.
10 The 1940/1950 censuses report those who have completed elementary, middle, or superior edu-
cation, whereas the standardized responses after 1960 include many intermediate classifications. 
The frequency with which responses are coded into certain categories alternates, but only signifi-
cantly in 2010 when there were many vague replies.
Table 3 Average years of schooling, 1976–2008
1976 1986 1998 2008
White 4.5 5.4 6.8 8.3
Nonwhite 2.7 3.9 4.7 6.5
Difference 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.8
Sources: Figures from PNAD household surveys; the 1976 and 1986 figures are published in Silva 
and Hasenbalg (2000), and 1988–1998–2008 overlapping series in LAESER (2010)
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4.4  Occupational Distribution
The degree of occupational segregation over time is examined using census data 
from 1940 to 2010, as well as three regional observations for previous decades 
when the national censuses did not consider race: urban São Paulo circa 1920 from 
the incident reports compiled by Jacino (2012); São Carlos (western São Paulo 
state) in 1907 from Monsma (2006); and Salvador (the capital of the northeast state 
of Bahia) for 1936 from Pierson (1942).
I adopt the Duncan and Duncan Index of occupational segregation, which was 
originally applied to gender (Wolff 2009). The D-D index is the summation across 
occupations of the absolute value of the difference between the percent of total white 
(wi) and black (bi) employees in occupation i, divided by two (DD = Σ|wi–bi|/2). 
The results are shown in Table 4, along with the percent of the population that was 
Afro-Brazilian.11
Occupational segregation tripled between 1960 and 1980, from moderate levels 
in the 1940s and 1950s, and has since gradually declined back to its earlier level. 
It dropped from 12.8 to 6.5 (on a scale of 100) between 1950 and 1960, and then 
reverted to a high of 21.1 in 1980. The degree of employment segregation decreased 
during the 1980s and 2000s, settling slightly above its 1940/1950 level in 2010. 
Before 1940, it was relatively high in urban São Paulo (36.5) and Bahia (54.1), and 
11 The employment segregation indices are based on a consistent grouping of individual jobs into 
ten common occupational classes: public administration, agriculture-fishing-forestry, commerce of 
real property, commerce of merchandise, national defense-public safety, manufacturing industry, 
extractive industry, liberal professions, services-social activities, and transport-communications.
Table 4 Occupational 
segregation by race
Year (sample) D-D index % Afro- Brz.
1907 (S. Carlos) 8.98 12.80
1920 (S. Paulo) 36.51 17.24








Sources: 1940 and 1950 Recenseamento geral do 
Brasil; 1960–2010 decennial censuses from IBGE 
National Census Microdata, IPUMS International, 
University of Minnesota (2014); São Carlos 1907 
from Monsma (2006); São Paulo 1920, Boletins 
de ocorrência in Jacino (2012); and Bahia 1936, 
Pierson (1942)
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relatively low in rural western São Paulo (9.0). There appears to be more segrega-
tion where blacks comprised a greater share of the population, although the sample 
sizes and methods of data collection require caution in making such comparisons.
4.5  Income
Life span, literacy, education, and employment—human capital in general—affect 
one’s income; hence, racial inequality must also be salient in terms of earnings given 
the disparities in these areas. I consider differences in reported income by race using 
the 1960–2010 census micro-data. The average real annual income was $111 in 1960: 
$236 in 1980; $430 in 1991; $645 in 2000; and $749 in 2010.12 Figure 5 displays the 
ratio of each race’s mean income to that of whites (the highest in 2010).
The paths of relative incomes after 1960 are relatively flat: the income gap wid-
ened through 1980 and has since narrowed, with little change during the 1990s—an 
unexceptional record in comparison with the improvement of the preceding 75 years. 
The ratios of indigenous- and Asian-to-white incomes fell between 2000 and 2010, 
12 Mean incomes expressed in 2010 reales by the author adjusting for currency revaluations and 
using consumer price indices from 10/1980 to 7/1999 and 1/1994 to 10/2014 (IBGE, Sistema 
Nacional de Índices de Preços ao Consumidor), as well as benchmark 1960–1980 inflation rates 
from Allen (2009).
Fig. 5 Brazilian income by racial group relative to whites. Sources: IBGE census microdata 1960, 
1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 from the Minnesota Population Center, Integrated Public Use Microdata 




but there was a rise in the relative incomes of whites and Afro-Brazilians—the two 
predominant racial groups in Brazil.13 LAESER (2010) confirms that the multiples 
of average per capita nonwhite to white household earnings for 1988, 1998, and 
2008 were 0.433, 0.417, and 0.505, respectively.
The pre-1960 trend of Afro-Brazilian-to-white income—based on slave in-kind 
earnings and urban occupational segregation, respectively—shows a big positive 
change: In terms of goods and services consumed, a typical black or mulatto slave 
in 1886 could earn 35 % of a free white worker; in São Paulo, the employment dis-
tribution and classified advertisements suggest that blacks or pardos in 1920 may 
have earned 41 % of whites; the census data for 1960 give a corresponding figure of 
49 %. Although Afro-Brazilians today earn just over half of whites, this is more than 
in 1960 which makes it the smallest recorded income gap.
5  Conclusion
Racial equality in Brazil has been getting a lot of attention, and for good reason: 
health, education, employment, and income have become more similar across races, 
accompanied by increased public policy and activism targeting discrimination. This 
chapter explores changes in these variables for pretos, pardos, brancos, índigenas, 
and amarelos after 1900 and between whites (brancos) and Afro-Brazilians (pretos 
and pardos) since independence in 1822.
During the Imperial Era (1822–1889), Afro-Brazilians comprised a majority of 
the population and the fraction enslaved gradually diminished until abolition in 
1888. The transition to freedom under the First Republic (1889–1930) was difficult 
as libertos had to compete with immigrants in the south; elsewhere, freed slaves 
settled back into agricultural life or moved to cities. The status of blacks improved 
during the Vargas Era (1930–1945) as industrial positions opened; was set back by 
the repressive Estado Novo; advanced along with the economy in the Second 
Republic (1946–1964); and was again hindered under Military Rule (1964–1985).
In summary, economic outcomes improved for most races relative to whites from 
1940 to 1960, though their comparative levels of education and life expectancy 
worsened. The general trend was poor from 1960 to 1980 in terms of occupational 
segregation and the size of the income gap, but there were relative advances in life 
expectancy and completion of basic education. Over 1980–2010, there was a posi-
tive overall experience in terms of reducing racial inequality, although gains were 
somewhat muted during the 1990s. The situation of Afro-Brazilians is better than it 
was a few decades ago, and race has become imbued with pride; yet progress has 
been irregular and opportunity remains far from equal.
13 Real incomes were strictly increasing over this 50-year span, with the exception of 2000/2010 
when there was a stunning 51 % decline in the average income of Asians and moderate 8 % reduc-
tion in that of indígenas. There were relatively few Asians in Brazil in 2000, but by 2010 their share 
of the population had doubled.
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The Expansion of Public Spending and Mass 
Education in Bolivia: Did the 1952 Revolution 
Represent a Permanent Shock?
José Alejandro Peres-Cajías
1  Introduction
Being one of the most unequal regions in the world (De Ferranti et al. 2004), inequal-
ity has a central role in the explanation of Latin American long-term development. 
A widespread view suggests that the current high levels of inequality are not any-
thing new but one of the most salient features in the region since colonial times 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 2012). According to this literature, 
Latin American countries inherited very unequal societies in terms of wealth, politi-
cal power, and human capital at the time of their independence. Furthermore, it is 
argued that, given this initial level of inequality, the new Latin American states 
became rapidly controlled by small elites that did not have any interest in tax collec-
tion (Sokoloff and Zolt 2006) (since this would imply taxing themselves) or education 
spending (Engerman et al. 2009) (which would involve a redistribution of resources). 
By assuming the existence of institutional path dependence, these authors finally 
suggest that a fiscal equilibrium with low taxation and low spending in education 
persisted in the region until very recent decades, with only minor changes.
This view has been challenged (i.e., Coatsworth 2008; Herranz-Loncán and 
Peres-Cajías 2016). Recently, Williamson (2015) has suggested that inequality has 
not been constant in Latin America and, therefore, the region has not always been 
the most unequal in the world. Indeed, he suggests that inequality rose dramatically 
in Latin American countries and converged towards the most unequal ones during 
the First Globalization. More importantly, whereas inequality was reduced in most 
parts of the world during the twentieth century (the “Great Leveling”), it increased 
or stayed constant in Latin America. Therefore, the current high levels of inequality 
would not be the result of Iberian colonial powers but the outcome of a more 
contemporaneous process.
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Whether a colonial legacy or a contemporaneous outcome, further research has 
proved that Latin American governments have had a relatively low interest in the pro-
motion of public education during most of the twentieth century. For instance, Lindert 
(2010) indicates that, in contrast with developed economies, Latin American govern-
ments have invested in education less than what would be expected given its GDP per 
capita. Moreover, this author stresses that most public expenditure was devoted to 
tertiary education, restricting thus the redistributive impact of education spending. 
Likewise, Frankema (2009) points out that the higher priority of tertiary education also 
holds when the region is compared with other developing economies. He also affirms 
that, whereas Latin America has undertaken significant progress in terms of primary 
education enrollment, the region’s achievements are not outstanding by international 
standards and are negatively affected by the absence of quality increases.
Taking into account these antecedents, this chapter aims at analyzing whether 
educational spending in Bolivia fits well into this regional description or, by con-
trast, changed radically and took distance from the regional pattern after the 1952 
Revolution. The former hypothesis would seem a priori more likely, given that 
some of the main determinants of education spending expansion—such as eco-
nomic growth or political voice (Lindert 2004; Espuelas 2012)—showed very bad 
records during several episodes after the revolution. For instance, following Brown 
and Hunter (2004)’s results, it would be expected that public spending in mass 
education was relatively low during the military dictatorships (1964–1982). 
Likewise, the low yearly long-term rate of Bolivian economic growth (below 1 %) 
during the second half of the twentieth century would also restrict the expansion of 
mass education spending. In the same vein, on the basis of the economic literature 
which suggests a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public 
spending,1 or taking into account Dell’s (2011) study for Peru, the Bolivian colo-
nial legacy might be assumed to have restricted the expansion of education ser-
vices towards the Bolivian indigenous population, a sector which constitutes a 
substantial share of total population—between 40 and 60 %, according to the 2001 
national census (INE 2001).2
Nevertheless, it is also critical to consider the relevance of social empowerment 
and its ability to change public policies. Indeed, according to Kosack (2012), politi-
cal entrepreneurs may foster (whatever the political regime of a country) the politi-
cal organization of the poor which, in turn, may force governments to invest 
massively in mass education. In this context, it cannot be ignored that the 1952 
Revolution represented a considerable shock in Bolivian history (Grindle and 
Domingo 2003; Klein 2011a, b: 209–222). This shock, in turn, generated some radi-
cal redistributive policies which in some cases had long-term consequences. For 
instance, Fundación Tierra (2007) has suggested that the 1953 Agrarian Reform 
allowed the recovery and total expulsion of former white terratenientes in the west 
side of the country by the Aymara population—the most important indigenous 
1 See Go and Lindert (2010) for a historical test of this hypothesis.




group in that region. The 1952 Revolution also brought up an educational reform. In 
relation to this, previous work (Peres-Cajías 2014) has presented some evidence 
which suggests that these changes generated a substantial increase in social public 
spending (which includes education spending) from the 1950s onwards. In the same 
line, Klein (2011b) has stressed that these modifications in public policies are criti-
cal to understanding the continuous political empowerment achieved by the indig-
enous population during the second half of the twentieth century (Zavaleta Mercado 
2011; Calderón 2010).3 Therefore, these ideas suggest that the long-term impact of 
the 1952 Revolution on public education spending is far from obvious.
On the basis of quantitative evidence previously presented (Peres-Cajías 2014), 
this chapter offers for the first time a long-term and comparative analysis of Bolivian 
public education spending.4 To begin with, following the framework proposed by 
Booth (2007) and Frankema (2011), the chapter shows that, after the 1952 
Revolution, the Bolivian Central Government moved from a “minimal state” fiscal 
equilibrium to a “benign state” one, in which relatively low tax collection levels 
coexisted with non-negligible investments (by Latin American standards) in public 
education. However, looking at the evolution of education spending per capita, it 
becomes clear that this paradoxical fiscal equilibrium did not necessarily grant the 
sustainability of educational expenses. Furthermore, when controlling by per capita 
GDP, the evolution of public education spending in Bolivia does not stand out by 
international standards until recent decades, which is in contrast to the experience 
of other small Latin American countries. Likewise, following Lindert’s (2010) sug-
gestions, this chapter shows that the postrevolutionary increase in education spend-
ing did not imply any significant change in the tax support given to primary 
education. By contrast, the relative importance of primary over tertiary education 
spending was not different from the rest of the region and, more strikingly, today is 
relatively low even by Latin American standards.
It could still be assumed that, despite these limitations, the increase in Bolivian 
education spending since the Revolution was enough to foster substantial modifica-
tions in educational outputs. Rather than measuring the profitability of public 
expenditure, the last section of the chapter addresses this issue by analyzing if the 
increase in education spending was contemporaneous of any significant change in 
several educational outputs. The analysis of the available “quantity indicators” 
seems to confirm the pessimistic assessment previously offered by other authors, 
such as Contreras (2003). Furthermore, in the case of “quality indicators,” Bolivia 
appears often in the lowest ranks of the region, which illustrates the limited impact 
of the public efforts in the educational area. Therefore, apart from its increase as a 
3 The most salient example of this progressive political empowerment is the arrival of Evo Morales 
to the Bolivian presidency in 2006. Additionally, previous researches have stressed that, during the 
last decades, and beyond the persistence of considerable inequalities, the Bolivian population has 
benefited from public education spending as an efficient instrument for social mobility (Andersen 
2003; PNUD 2010: 58).
4 Previous analyses on the impact of the 1952 Revolution have focused mostly on education out-
puts, such as literacy or enrollment rates (Contreras 1999, 2003).
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share of the GDP, the chapter stresses that the 1952 Revolution does not seem to 
have fuelled any significant long-term differentiation of Bolivia from the rest of the 
region in terms of education spending and education outputs.
2  Why Bolivian Politics Should Matter: A Historical 
Background
Bolivian history has often been analyzed by stressing the ability of nonindigenous 
elites to impose their own interests on the entire society.5 Despite its popularity, 
another view has stressed the nonelites’ capacity—and particularly that of indigenous 
communities—to resist and propose alternative political projects.6 In this context, it 
has been suggested that although the evolution of formal institutions in Bolivia reflects 
a very unequal society until very recent decades, informal institutions may have coun-
teracted these inequalities in different conjunctures of Bolivian history (Peres-Cajías 
2012). This perspective is used in the following paragraphs to revise Bolivian history 
from independence onwards and to illustrate why a specific institutional shock such 
as the 1952 Revolution may have had long-term redistributive impacts.
A few years after Bolivian independence (1825), the National Congress approved 
a law which restricted the right to vote for those who had some economic and 
 educational qualifications. This fact has been used to illustrate the idea that the vast 
majorities of the country did not participate in the configuration of the Bolivian state 
during the postindependence decades. However, thanks to the seminal work by Platt 
(1982), it has been proved that the indigenous political power has shaped the 
Bolivian state through alternative ways. Indeed, it has been stressed that in exchange 
of the re-instauration of the colonial capitation tax on the indigenous population—
the so-called Contribución Indigenal—the Bolivian Government accepted the social 
and political autonomy of indigenous communities.
This implicit political pact between the Bolivian state and the indigenous com-
munities ended in the early 1860s, once the government was able to exploit alterna-
tive and reliable fiscal revenue sources. This event, in turn, represents the beginning 
of the so-called oligarchic era (1860s–1930s), a period which is characterized by the 
consolidation of new political and mining elites and the expansion of latifundia at 
the expense of indigenous communities. Undoubtedly, both economic and political 
inequalities grew during this period. This, however, does not necessarily mean that 
5 According to this view, the elites’ ability to configure economic and political institutions since 
colonial times up to recent decades has generated several long-term negative economic effects. 
One of the latest contributions on this perspective is that of Dell (2011) who suggests that the mita 
(a forced mining labor system instituted by the Spanish colonial power in Bolivia and Peru from 
1573 to 1812) may explain present-day lower well-being indicators in those zones where this 
institution was imposed.




mining elites were able to constantly impose their interests on the configuration of 
the Bolivian state (Gallo 1991; Barragán and Peres-Cajías 2007), a statement fre-
quently stressed by the common knowledge. Moreover, recent research has also 
underlined the ability of indigenous communities to resist the advance of latifundia 
either by legal or violent means (Gotkowitz 2007).
The Great Depression and the Chaco war against Paraguay (1932–1935) modi-
fied the previous political context.7 Indeed, new political groups arose (among these, 
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR, a middle-class political orga-
nization) with the explicit goal to overcome the institutions imposed by the oligar-
chy. Moreover, mining workers achieved a higher degree of political organization 
through the creation of a unified union; political pressure from peasant organiza-
tions also increased considerably. In this context, after the revocation of the MNR 
victory at the national election of 1951, its leaders decided to seize power by violent 
means. This was made in April of 1952 and, after 3 days of combat, the MNR, with 
the key support of urban workers, mining workers, and peasant organizations, con-
solidated the National Revolution.
Shortly after these events, permanent pressure from the social base of the 
Revolution forced the promulgation of different radical measures: universal adult 
suffrage, the nationalization of the three biggest mining companies (which repre-
sented three-quarters of mining output), and a radical land reform. Likewise, an 
educational reform was applied in 1953–1955 which met considerable consensus 
and was intended to reflect “… the new correlation of economic and social forces 
arising from the revolution” (Contreras 2003: 262).
The MNR also imposed a new economic model characterized by a higher inter-
vention of the state in the economy and the increase of redistributive policies. 
Initially, this new model was financially unsustainable and, as a consequence, hyper-
inflation arose as one of the main characteristics of the Bolivian economy from 1952 
to 1956.8 The 1956 fiscal reform solved these initial macroeconomic disorders. The 
reform, however, was implemented with the technical and financial support of the 
IMF and the US Government. Both the left-wing group of the MNR and mining 
workers saw this process as a betrayal to the principles of the 1952 Revolution, so 
they reduced its support to the government. Anyway, the MNR won the national 
election of 1956 by a significant majority and, thanks to the maintenance of the land 
reform, peasants continued as key allies of the government. Moreover, despite some 
changes introduced by the 1956 fiscal reform, state intervention and redistributive 
policies continued as a central feature of the government’s economic orientation.
The MNR won again by a significant majority the 1960 national election. 
Nevertheless, its political support reduced significantly during the victory of the 
1964 election and, shortly after this event, a military coup took place. The coup 
modified the political alliances of the Bolivian Government. Indeed, following the 
principles of the National Security Doctrine, political and violent repression 
increased considerably towards left-wing groups and mining and urban workers. 
7 For further references, see Klein (2011a) and Cajías (2015).
8 See Peres-Cajías (2014) to understand the causes and the dynamics of Bolivian hyperinflation.
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In contrast, the military maintained the political support from peasants through the 
so-called Pacto Militar-Campesino (Military-Peasant pact), which implied the main-
tenance of the land reform process as well as the increase of state investment in rural 
areas. Thus, whereas the military tended to repress some of the main political groups 
of the 1952 Revolution, the Military-Peasant pact assured the maintenance of one of 
the key redistributive measures implemented during the revolution.
The political context changed dramatically during the 1970s. On the one hand, 
the Military-Peasant pact ended with the Tolata’s massacre (1974). Moreover, 
whereas military governments maintained the high degree of state intervention in 
the economy, its redistributive goals were different from those implemented during 
the 1952 Revolution and its aftermath. Likewise, a higher degree of political 
repression emerged in the country. Despite these changes, pressure from peasant 
organizations, mining workers, and urban workers was often able to resist or coun-
teract government’s actions. Thus, not surprisingly, the strength of these organizations 
was critical in the recovery of democracy (1982).
Taking into account these events, it becomes logical to question if, among the 
radical measures implemented by the 1952 Revolution, there was a major change in 
the evolution of public education spending in Bolivia. It also appears reasonable to 
believe that this hypothetical change may have had long-term consequences. On the 
one hand, the increase of public education spending may have persisted throughout 
time since the political party which managed the Revolution remained in power 
until 1964. On the other hand, a persistent indirect effect would be expected until 
1974 through the “Pacto Militar Campesino.” Finally, following Kosack (2012), it 
could be argued that the political strength of peasants and workers organizations 
forced the Bolivian Government to maintain a high level of educational expenses. 
These ideas are explored in the following sections.
3  The Puzzle: The Bolivian Paradoxical Equilibrium 
Between Low Taxation and Human Capital Investment
During the last decades, public finances have increasingly been considered as an 
instrument to understand the evolution of the implicit fiscal pact between the state 
and society. This approach has been used by political scientists (Lieberman 2002), 
economists focusing on the analysis of developing economies (Brautigam et al. 
2008), or international organizations such as the World Bank. These have suggested, 
for example, that the size and composition of public finances reflect the institutional 
equilibrium achieved by each state, given the economic, political, and social restric-
tions it must face (De Ferranti et al. 2004; OECD 2009; CEPAL 2010). Economic 
historians have also used this approach as an efficient tool to assess, for instance, the 
institutional framework established by European colonial powers both in Southeast 
Asia (Booth 2007) and sub-Saharan Africa (Frankema 2011).
This section uses this approach to depict the plausible evolution of the Bolivian 
fiscal pact from the first decades of the twentieth century onwards. My analysis is 
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based on Frankema (2011), who identifies four different types of institutional equilib-
riums on the basis of the relationship between tax pressure and a (human and physi-
cal) capital expenditure ratio. According to this author, those countries where both 
tax collection and the fiscal priority of capital investment are small and in a “night-
watchman” equilibrium—i.e., under a minimal state. The “extractive” scenario corre-
sponds, in turn, to those cases where tax collection is high but is not reinvested in 
capital formation. If capital investment is high but tax collection is low, the equilib-
rium is characterized as a “benign state” one. Finally, a “developmental equilibrium” 
is reached when both tax collection and public capital formation are high.
In my case, I analyze the relationship between tax pressure levels9 and the fiscal 
priority of human capital spending (namely education and health) exclusively, and con-
sider those four institutional equilibrium categories as implicit fiscal pacts. My analysis 
is limited to human capital investment, firstly, because the main interest of this chapter 
is education spending and, secondly, because (especially during the ISI period) public 
investment in physical capital was carried out not only by the Central Government 
(which is the object of this research) but also by state-owned companies. In order to 
distinguish between those four different fiscal pacts, I assume that the minimum ratio 
required for a significant impact of state intervention in the  economy is around 20 % of 
GDP for tax pressure and 6 % of GDP for human capital investment.10
Graph 1 compares the Bolivian experience throughout the twentieth century with 
two of the most developmental states in Latin America (Chile and Uruguay; see Azar 
and Fleitas 2012). As a reference, it also shows the evolution of France, Spain, and the 
USA from 1960 onwards.11 As might be expected, during the second half of the twen-
tieth century Latin American governments have had both lower revenue levels and 
less human capital spending than France and the USA. Indeed, during most of the 
period under analysis, tax pressure levels and public expenditure in human capital in 
both Chile and Uruguay did not exceed 20 % and 6 % of GDP, respectively. By con-
trast, those levels were surpassed both in the USA and France already in the 1960s.12 
Likewise, whereas tax pressure and public expenditure in human capital in Spain were 
9 Tax revenues represent the most relevant part of Latin American current revenues and, conse-
quently, fairly reflect the evolution of overall public revenues throughout the period under study. 
Moreover, since taxes are a transfer of money from citizens with neither proportional nor instanta-
neous counterparts from the government (IMF 2001) political scientists consider that the higher 
the government’s dependence on tax revenues, the higher the incentives to negotiate and respond 
to the citizens’ demands (Lieberman 2002; Moore 2007). Therefore, the study of the tax pressure 
may be used as an instrument to analyze the evolution of both the government size and the govern-
ment’s legitimacy in the public opinion.
10 These are arbitrary figures, but they represent a good reference point of the experience of the 
most developed economies in the second half of the twentieth century (Lindert 2004).
11 France and the USA have been chosen because they are representative examples of the so-called 
European and Anglo-Saxon Welfare States, respectively. The Spanish case is introduced in the 
analysis as an example of a country that caught up recently with the European Welfare State 
(Lindert 2004; Comín 1996).
12 From the 1960s to 2007, whereas the evolution of tax pressure diverged—it remained more or 
less constant in the USA while it expanded in France—public expenditure in human capital 
reached levels above 10 % of GDP in both countries.
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fairly similar to those of Chile and Uruguay during the 1960s, Spanish indicators 
converged steadily with the US and French ratios thereafter.
In the case of Bolivia, both tax collection and human capital investment were 
particularly small until the first half of the twentieth century. However, from the 
1960s to the 1980s, the human capital ratio tended to converge with the Chilean and 
Uruguayan ones, despite the fact that tax pressure remained well below 10 % of 
GDP. Later on, from the 1980s onwards, whereas Bolivian tax pressure levels have 
become similar to those of Chile and Uruguay, the ratio between human capital 
spending and GDP has approached the Spanish one.
Table 1 expands the previous comparison by incorporating information on the 
evolution of tax pressure in some of the most developed Latin American countries, 
as well as in some of the poorest ones. The table confirms the small size of the 
Bolivian Government and the persistence of a tax pressure gap with several countries 
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Graph 1 Evolution of the fiscal pact in some Latin American and OECD countries (10-year aver-
ages), 1900–2007. Sources: (a) Bolivia, from Peres-Cajias (2014); (b) Chile: from 1900 to1989, 
Base de datos EH CLIO LAB, Iniciativa Científica Milenio Mideplan; from 1990 to 2007, ECLAC 
database: www.eclac.cl.; (c) Uruguay: Azar et al. (2009); (d) OECD countries data come from 
Peter Lindert web page (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/), from Sergio Espuelas web page (https://
sites.google.com/site/sergio1espuelas/) and from the OECD database (www.oecd.org). Notes: 
Data referred to Latin American countries are 10-year average; data for France, Spain and United 
States correspond to 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2007
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around 7 % of GDP in Chile during the 1880s and 1890s, they amounted to ca. 3 % 
of GDP in Bolivia, i.e., less than half the Chilean figure. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, tax pressure in Bolivia reached a level similar to Colombia and 
Peru, but still well below the Chilean and Uruguayan figures.13 The 1952 Revolution 
did not change this and, until the 1980s, Bolivian tax levels remained similar to 
those of Colombia and Guatemala, and much lower than those of Chile, Peru, 
Uruguay, and even Brazil—a country with relatively low Central Government 
revenues due to its federal structure. It was not until the 1990s when Bolivian tax 
levels started to converge with the regional average.
As for human capital spending, Peres-Cajías (2015) has contrasted the Bolivian 
experience with that of Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. The analysis stressed that both 
education and health spending in Bolivia were lower than 1 % of GDP during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Thereafter, whereas health spending remained 
marginal, Bolivian public spending in education increased up to 3 % of GDP, on 
average. Hence, in contrast with tax pressure levels, public spending in education as 
a share of the GDP was higher in Bolivia than in Uruguay already in the 1970s. 
13 Bolivian tax levels were similar to those of Brazil, one of the biggest economies in the region. 
However, Brazil is a federal country and, therefore, the underestimation of Brazilian total tax rev-
enues—defined as tax collection of General Government—are higher than in the case of nonfed-
eral countries.
Table 1 Latin American Central Governments’ tax revenues as a share of GDP (%, 10 years’ 
average), 1882–2007
Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Guatemala Peru Uruguay
1882–1889 3.14 N.a. 7.06 N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a.
1890–1899 2.74 N.a. 6.96 N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a.
1900–1909 3.30 8.89 7.92 5.04 N.a. 4.10 11.90
1910–1919 3.91 6.57 7.01 3.87 N.a. 3.89 10.22
1920–1929 3.51 5.37 7.58 3.69 N.a. 3.95 11.05
1930–1939 4.44 6.88 9.33 4.31 N.a. 5.10 12.94
1940–1949 4.44 8.46 10.50 4.29 6.58 6.91 12.14
1950–1959 4.19 10.17 12.69 6.72 7.74 7.59 13.61
1960–1969 7.53 12.46 16.57 6.85 7.40 10.82 14.28
1970–1979 8.89 18.34 19.76 8.14 8.50 14.09 15.72
1980–1989 6.57 17.69 21.95 7.45 7.26 12.68 17.21
1990–1999 13.79 18.96 16.98 8.18 9.40 12.82 14.57
2000–2007 17.71 22.36 18.12 11.76 11.81 13.37 17.49
Sources: (a) Bolivia, from Peres-Cajías (2014); (b) other countries from 1900 to1989: Brazil: 
IBGE. Estadísticas Históricas do Século XX; Chile: Base de datos EH CLIO LAB, Iniciativa 
Científica Milenio Mideplan; Colombia: Kalmanovitz (2011); Guatemala: ICEFI (2007); Peru: 
Portocarrero et al. (1992); Uruguay: Azar et al. (2009); (c) other countries from 1990 to 2007 from 
ECLAC database: www.eclac.cl
Notes: N.a.: Not available. Because of the lack of total tax collection from 1882 to 1899 and from 
1936 to 1939, the Bolivian averages in the 1880s, the 1890s, and the 1930s have been calculated 
by using total current revenue figures
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During the 1990s, Bolivian public education spending continued growing and, at 
the eve of the twenty-first century, public education spending as a share of GDP was 
around 6 %, i.e., double that of Peru and Uruguay.
Summing up, in coincidence with the pessimistic view on Latin American institu-
tions, the analysis suggests that a “minimal state” fiscal equilibrium has characterized 
Bolivian history during the twentieth century. However, it cannot be ignored that 
during the second half of the twentieth century the Bolivian State has moved from 
that “minimal-state” equilibrium to a “benign-state” one. This transition has been 
spurred by the increase of public education spending. Indeed, over the second half of 
the twentieth century, the ratio between Bolivian public spending in education and 
GDP has converged and then surpassed the equivalent figures in some of the most 
developmental countries of Latin America. Therefore, the next sections explore if 
this peculiar transition may allow affirming that public education spending in Bolivia 
was an exceptional case in the Latin American context after the 1952 Revolution.
4  The Evolution of Public Spending in Education: 
Was Bolivia a Special Case in the Latin American 
Context?
The goal of this section is to assess the Bolivian pattern of public spending in educa-
tion. Firstly, given the low level of Bolivian taxes until the 1980s, it is analyzed to 
what extent the Bolivian convergence in the ratio of education spending to GDP that 
has been identified in the previous section was affected by a limitation that can often 
be found in Latin America: the conflict between the presence of good policy objec-
tives and the absence or instability of internal resources to achieve those objectives. 
According to some authors (Morales and Sachs 1990; Dornbusch and Edwards 
1989; Weyland 1998), this conflict may end up by affecting negatively in the long- 
run previous public policy achievements. In this context, the following paragraphs 
analyze how the fiscal vulnerability of the Bolivian Government affected the sus-
tainability of education expenditure during the Revolution and thereafter.
To begin with, Table 2 looks at the effects of public revenue cycles on the evolu-
tion of public expenditures; specifically, it displays the annual average growth rates 
of public revenues and each category of public expenditure in those periods when 
current revenues rose or fell. Regarding the former ones, the table indicates that the 
jump in current revenues from 1904 to 1913 generated a more than proportional 
increase in the different categories of expenses, with the exception of defense. 
By contrast, during the 1922–1929 years, the expansion of expenses was less than 
proportional than revenue growth. During the Chaco War (1932–1935) and after, 
while general administration spending grew less than current revenues, economic 
expenses grew at the same rate and social public expenditure at an even higher rate. 
From 1956 to 1978, once again general administration expenditures grew more 
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same rate and both education and health spending grew at higher rates. Finally, 
whereas in 1986–1999 all kind of expenses—with the exception of defense—grew 
more than current revenues, the opposite effect took place from 2003 to 2007.
What happened in those periods when current revenues decreased? During the 
unstable years of the First World War and the postwar years, the reduction of reve-
nues was in line with a general reduction—at different rates—of all expenses. This 
was also the case during the post-Great Depression years—defense expenditures 
being the exception because of the Chaco War. The persistent reduction in real rev-
enues that took place from the early 1940s to 1956 fuelled the reduction of general 
administration, defense, and economic expenditure, but not that of social public 
expenditure. Later on, during the years of the external debt crisis, by contrast, edu-
cation and health spending were among those expenditures which decreased more 
than current revenues. Finally, the slight reduction in revenues of 1999–2003 did not 
generate a similar stagnation or decrease in any category of expenditures.
Therefore, focusing on the period after the 1952 Revolution, whereas education 
spending was particularly benefited from the expansion of public revenues from 
1956 to 1978, it was also among those spending categories that were more affected 
by the subsequent public revenue crisis. This finding does not allow saying that the 
Revolution was ineffective in the expansion of education services, but it recalls the 
initial warning of this section: the lack of correspondence between good policy 
objectives and internal resources may end up by reversing previous achievements.14
This idea is further explored in Graph 2, which shows the evolution of education 
spending per capita in real terms. The graph shows a considerable increase at the 
eve of the twentieth century, which was derived from the centralization of education 
and the liberal educational reform. According to Contreras (1999: 486–487), this 
process can be understood as the government elites’ effort to change the main char-
acteristics of the educational public system by taking advantage of ideas and meth-
ods developed in Europe.15 In this context, the stability of education spending per 
capita from the early 1910s to the late 1920s can be interpreted as an indication of 
the stability of the new model of public education. Beyond this political commit-
ment with educational spending, the effects of both the Great Depression and the 
Chaco War on public revenues ended up affecting the evolution of education 
expenses per capita, which decreased substantially from 1930 to 1935.
Immediately after the war and until 1940, education spending grew spectacularly 
in per capita terms. In contrast with the previous experience, this increase was driven 
by the new role assigned by the Military-Socialist regimes to public education—the 
instrument to build the Nation—as well as by the demands from indigenous and 
popular classes, which identified education as an efficient tool to better defend its 
long-term claims towards the Bolivian state (Contreras 1999: 488–489).
Whereas these political elements remained, education spending per capita 
decreased in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution. This process persisted until 1955 
14 It must be recalled that the new configuration of the state brought by the 1952 Revolution did not 
generate any substantive change in tax pressure or tax composition (Peres-Cajías 2014).
15 See also Cajías (2011) for an analysis of the main characteristics of this educational reform.
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and was driven by the initial macroeconomic disorders generated by the revolutionary 
process. Thereafter, education spending per capita increased until the late 1970s. 
Some structural determinants may explain this expansion. On the one hand, after 
the stabilization program of 1956, foreign aid, initially, and both external debt and 
the steady growth of the Bolivian economy, thereafter, allowed the growth of 
government expenses. On the other hand, the increase in education spending was 
also a government response to the dramatic expansion of the Bolivian population 
during this period.
However, it stands out that the expansion of education spending per capita was 
not steadily from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s. This suggests the existence of 
different political goals related with education spending during this period. Indeed, 
the growth in education spending until 1964 was closely related with the revolutionary 
goals and the willingness to expand educational services across the entire country 
(Dirección Nacional de Informaciones 1962). In this context, whereas the growth 
rate of education spending decreased after the initial jump from 1956 to 1958, it was 
sufficient to recover and overpass those levels of education spending per capita 
which prevailed before the Revolution.
The evolution of education spending per capita accelerated dramatically from 
1965 to 1967 and was followed by a steady increase from 1968 to 1975. In contrast 
to the previous period, these changes were related with the military government’s 
intentions to consolidate the Military-Peasant pact through the expansion of education 
services to the rural areas (Klein 2011a,b: 222–228). The widespread idea that more 













































































Graph 2 Bolivian Central Government’s education spending per capita (Bs. 2000), 1900–2007. 
Source: Peres-Cajías (2014)
















































































Graph 3 Public spending in education per capita in Bolivia as a share of the Chilean and 
Uruguayan ones (%), 1911–2007. Source: See Table 1. Notes: These figures have been expressed 
in 1990 Geary Khamis international dollars and divided by total population. GDP and population 
series have been taken from the New Madisson Project Database
in the country also played a significant role (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 
1967: 14–22; PNUD 2010: 106). This last idea would be also critical to understand 
the expansion of education spending from 1976 to 1979.
Beyond the existence of different political goals and different intensities in the 
expansion of education spending, Graph 2 also confirms that the macroeconomic 
disorders of the early 1980s generated a new crisis in education spending per capita. 
This confirms once more that education spending has clearly been affected by 
the fiscal fragility of the Bolivian Government. Indeed, during those years when the 
main revenues of the Bolivian Central Government (external taxes, external 
borrowing, or external donations) decreased (1952–1956; 1979–1985), education 
spending also decreased substantially.
As can be observed in Graph 3, these fluctuations seriously affected the conver-
gence of Bolivian education spending in per capita terms to the Chilean and Uruguayan 
figures. Firstly, during the years of the MNR government (1952–1964), the expansion 
of education spending just allowed recovering those levels achieved before the 
Revolution; that is, Bolivian education spending per capita moved around 20 % and 
30 % of the respective figures in Chile and Uruguay. Thereafter, education spending 
per capita in Bolivia quickly converged up to 70 % of the level of education spending 
per capita in both countries. However, it decreased to just 30 % during the first half of 
the 1980s. Nowadays, there is not a convergence process and education spending per 
capita in Bolivia is still far away from the levels reached by these countries.
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Education spending increased more steadily from 1986 onwards. Initially, this 
was the consequence of macroeconomic stabilization and the educational reform 
of 1994. According to Contreras (1999: 491–493; 2003: 271–282) the goal of this 
reform was to expand education services both in quantity and quality across the 
country, in order to consolidate education as an efficient instrument for social 
mobility and economic growth.16 This reform was contemporaneous to similar 
changes in neighboring countries and received strong support from international 
organizations such as the World Bank or the Interamerican Development Bank. 
Later on, Evo Morales’ administration (2006 onwards) made a new educational 
reform and showed a particular interest in the expansion of educational services 
towards the most disadvantaged groups of the Bolivian population—see Paz 
Arauco et al. 2013. Overall, all these changes fuelled the expansion of education 
spending as a share of GDP.
Hence, the new evidence stresses the reduction of educational spending during 
the initial years of the revolution. It also shows that, once the initial macroeconomic 
disorders were corrected, education spending increased and, interestingly enough, 
this increase continued until the late 1970s. During the early 1980s, however, fiscal 
instability substantially affected once more education spending. This event stopped 
a convergence process in terms of education spending per capita which has not been 
recovered since then. Altogether, these findings suggest that the non-existence of a 
reliable internal tax base affected the sustainability of education spending and, 
therefore, the long-term impacts of the 1952 Revolution.
An alternative way to evaluate the long-term impact of the revolution on education 
services is to analyze the evolution of public spending in education in correspon-
dence with per capita GDP levels. Thus, following Lindert (2010), Graph 4 relates 
the ratio between education spending and GDP with the log of per capita GDP for 
Bolivia and different Latin American and OECD countries. As was stated in the 
introduction, Lindert (2010) suggests that Latin American governments have sys-
tematically invested in education much less than would a priori be expected given its 
level of economic development. Graph 4 helps assessing if the Bolivian experience 
fits into this classification; it also allows identifying if the Bolivian position changed 
after the revolution and the timing and magnitude of this hypothetical change.
Graph 4 stresses once more the impact of the initial macroeconomic disorders 
led by the 1952 Revolution. In effect, whereas the level of economic development 
in 1955 was quite similar to that of 1945 and 1950, education spending was lower 
than during these prerevolution years. The graph also stresses that education spend-
ing in 1960 was still lower than expected given the Bolivian GDP pc (i.e., below the 
international trend). Thus, it was not until the mid-1960s when Bolivian education 
spending increased and, contrary to Lindert’s hypothesis, moved around what one 
would expect given the Bolivian GDP pc. However, the graph also shows that this 
relatively high level of Bolivian education spending (by Latin American standards 
and relative to its pc GDP) has been shared by other poor Latin American countries, 
such as Dominican Republic. This indicates that the Bolivian experience would not 
16 See also Contreras and Talavera (2005).
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be necessarily a Latin American exception. This idea can be reaffirmed by considering 
that public spending in education as a share of GDP has been systematically higher 
than expected in Cuba,17 Costa Rica, Panama, and Jamaica from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s; it has also been higher than expected in Nicaragua during the 1980s.
The volatility of Bolivian education spending as a share of GDP and relative to 
its per capita GDP from the early 1980s to the early 1990s stresses once more the 
impact of fiscal instability. It also stands out that Bolivian education spending has 
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Graph 4 Public spending in education as a share of GDP and GDP pc in Bolivia, Latin America, 
and OECD countries. Sources: (a) GDP per capita: for Bolivia, Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías 
(2016) and the New Madisson Project Database; for the rest of countries: New Madisson Project 
Database. (b) Public spending in education as a share of GDP: for Bolivia, Peres-Cajías (2014), 
for Uruguay, see Table 1; for the rest of Latin American countries: Frankema (2009: Table A3); for 
Spain and Portugal: Sergio Espuelas’ webpage (https://sites.google.com/site/sergio1espuelas/); for 
the rest of OECD countries: Peter Lindert’s webpage (http://lindert.econ.ucdavis.edu/). If unavail-
able, data was also obtained from UNESCO Institute of Statistics webpage (http://www.uis.
unesco.org/). Notes: The green squares show particular Latin American cases which do not neces-
sarily fit in Lindert’s (2010) hypothesis. Bolivia presents data each 5 years from 1900 to 2005. 
Latin American countries present data each 5 years from 1960 to 2005; it corresponds to Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. OECD 
countries present data for 1960, 1975, 1990, and 2005; it corresponds to Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA
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been systematically higher than expected given the Bolivian per capita GDP from 
the  mid-1990s onwards. This confirms the idea that the 1994 educational reform 
and the support of multilateral organizations increased education spending up to 
high levels by worldwide standards (Contreras 1999: Table 2). Likewise, the con-
tinuous relatively high level of Bolivian education spending also confirms the 
Morales’ administration interest in the expansion of education services. Thus, this 
stresses that it was not the 1952 Revolution, but the structural reforms of the 1990s 
and the recent political changes which systematically prompted public education 
spending in Bolivia up to high levels by international standards.
Finally, any analysis concerned with the long-term consequences of the 1952 
Revolution on education spending must be able to answer one critical question: Did the 
expansion of public expenditure benefit the poor? Due to the lack of micro-data, Peres-
Cajías (2015) has analyzed the allocation of public education spending from the early 
1950s onwards through two indirect indicators: the tax support ratio for primary pupils 
and the primary tertiary double ratio.18 The reconstructed evidence allows saying that 
the 1952 Revolution did not have any long-term impact on the distribution of educa-
tional expenditure. On the one hand, there was no major change in the support ratio to 
primary education from 1950 to the mid-2000s, around 12 %, on average, a similar 
figure to those of other Latin American countries. On the other hand, although there 
was a change in the prioritization of primary over tertiary education during the early 
1970s, this was hardly sustainable over time. More strikingly, the relevance of tertiary 
over primary education spending is still highly noticeable in the most recent years and 
much higher than in several Latin American countries.19 Therefore, whereas it is not 
possible to say that Bolivian public  spending in education since 1952 has not benefited 
the poorest, it cannot be stated either that it was particularly pro-poor.
5  Were the Educational Achievements Revolutionary?
It could be argued that, although restricted, public investment in primary education 
from the 1950s onwards was enough to improve Bolivian educational outputs. 
This section does not measure the profitability of education spending, but analyzes 
18 The first indicator measures the relative importance of public subsidies per attending student in 
primary education in relation to pc GDP. The second indicator measures the relative importance of 
public subsidies per attending student in primary education in relation to public subsidies per 
attending student in tertiary education. The rationale behind these indicators suggests that the 
higher the relative support to primary education, the higher the redistributive impact of public 
education spending.
19 According to Lindert (2010), the optimal value for the primary tertiary double ratio is 50 %. The 
Bolivian figure has constantly been below this value. Moreover, whereas the ratio in most of Latin 
American countries is nowadays around or above 50 %, in Bolivia is still around 30 %. For a bet-
ter understanding of the political economy factors behind the allocation of a considerable share 
of expenditures in tertiary education see Contreras (1999, 2003), Rodríguez (1998), and Peres-
Cajías (2015).
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if the increase in education spending was contemporaneous to a similar increase in 
both quantity and quality indicators of educational output. To begin with, Table 3 
shows the evolution of both the Bolivian literacy rate and the gross enrollment ratio in 
primary school throughout the twentieth century. At the eve of the twentieth century, 
no more than 20 % of total population was able to write and read. Although the lit-
eracy rates increased thereafter, their growth rate was certainly low (around 1.1 % 
per year, on average). Likewise, whereas literacy rates increased at a higher pace 
after the 1952 Revolution (2.5 % per year, on average) a non-negligible share of the 
Bolivian population was still unable to write and read at the eve of the twenty-first 
century. As a consequence of this restriction, the Morales’ administration enacted the 
so-called Yo si puedo program, an aggressive alphabetization project exclusively 
oriented to the elderly. Hence, it was not until 2008 when the UNESCO could finally 
declare that Bolivia was a territory free of analphabetism (PNUD 2010: 167).
Table 3 also presents estimates of the evolution of the gross enrollment ratio in 
primary education and allows calculating its growth rate throughout the twentieth 
century: 3.2 % from 1900 to 1920, 2.8 % from 1930 to 1950, and 5 % from 1950 to 
1970. Undoubtedly, therefore, the expansion of the gross enrollment rate in primary 
education has been faster after the 1952 Revolution. However, it was not until 
the 1990s when Bolivia achieved a full primary school enrollment, which implies a 
substantial delay both by regional and international standards (Frankema 2009).
As for the analysis of the quality of educational services, the Bolivian literature 
offers some partial evidence which suggests that no major change took place after 
the Revolution. For instance, Contreras (2003: 266) quotes the claims by Fernando 
Díez de Medina—Minister of Education at the time—which in 1958 regretted the 
restricted impact of the Revolution on a system in which pedagogical practices were 
Table 3 Literacy rates and gross enrollment ratio in primary schooling (%), 1900–2001




1900 18.5 1910 13
1920 22.5 1920 15
1930 24.9 1930/5 16
1940 27.9 1940/5 21
1950 31.1 1950/5 28
1960 43
1976 63.21 1970 76
1980 84
1992 79.99 1990 95
2001 86.72 2000 110
Sources: Own elaboration based on (a) Literacy rates: from 1900 to 1940 obtained from Contreras 
(1999: Cuadro 1), from 1950 to 2001 obtained from National Censuses; (b) gross enrolment ratio: 
from 1880 to 1920 obtained from Benavot and Riddle (1988: Appendix), from 1930/35 to 2000 
from UNESCO statistical yearbooks
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still dominated by archaic methods. In this regard, the curricula of 1948 survived in 
both primary and secondary education, at least, until the late 1960s (Ministerio de 
Educación 1967). In the same vein, Contreras (2003: 270) quotes several studies 
which regretted the low productivity of educational expenditure as well as the consid-
erable magnitude of dropout and repetition rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The evolution of this last problem can be indirectly analyzed through the use of 
the methodology developed by Frankema (2008). Taking advantage of UNESCO 
statistical yearbooks, which presents the enrollment distribution per grade in both 
primary and secondary education, the author identifies the distribution of students 

















where Xp and Xs refer to the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary, 
respectively, and gpi and gsi refer to the percentage share of students enrolled in the 
ith grade of primary and secondary, respectively (Frankema 2008: 440).
Following this methodology, I have estimated the evolution of the enrollment 
distribution during the 12 years of school in Bolivia from 1965 to 2005 (Table 4). 
As in the case of developing economies, my 1965 estimations show a distribution 
considerably skewed towards the first degrees of school—i.e., most of the students 
enrolled in primary and secondary education were concentrated in the first three 
grades. Other variables constant, this skewed distribution would be reflecting that a 
non-negligible share of Bolivian children “… was either repeating one or more 
years or dropping out before reaching the higher grades.” By looking at the 1975 
estimations in Table 4 and Frankema’s Figure 1, repeating and dropout problems in 
Bolivia seem to have been more severe than in Ghana or Syria, or as bad as in 
Colombia, which stresses that Bolivian education indicators were not necessarily 
better than in the rest of the region.
These distributional distortions would also reflect that children enrolled in pri-
mary education had a low probability to finish primary education and to graduate 
up to secondary education. The magnitude of this problem, which is certainly a 
current restriction in the Bolivian educational system (Contreras 2003: 279) and 
particularly identifiable in the case of rural (Urquiola and Calderón 2006) and poor 
families (PNUD 2010: 169), can be measured by looking at the grade distribution 
ratio. This indicator has been estimated by Frankema (2008) and shows the proba-
bility of the children who enter to the school had to reach the sixth grade—i.e., the 
probability to finish primary. Table 5 presents these estimations for a selected 
sample of countries which share some common features with Bolivia: poor coun-
tries of delayed demographic transition (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua); small 
countries in which education spending was high by Latin American standards 



































































































































































































































































































































(Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, Jamaica); or small countries in which the indigenous 
population represents a non-negligible share of total population (Guatemala, Ecuador).
This ratio shows again the restrictions of Bolivian educational outputs. During the 
early 1960s, the Bolivian indicator was not very different from other countries (with 
the exception of Panama). However, during the 1970s and 1980s, this indicator 
improved considerably in countries characterized by high investments in public 
education (Cuba, Costa Rica, and Jamaica), but stayed below 50 % in the Bolivian 
case. Similarly, the probability of children to finish primary has constantly been higher 
in Ecuador than in Bolivia during the last three decades of the twentieth century. 
Thus, it has not been until the eve of the twenty-first century that the Bolivian indica-
tor converged to better records. Therefore, the analysis of both quality and quantity 
indicators suggests that education spending and educational achievements did not 
present any significant correlation from the 1952 Revolution onwards.
6  Conclusions
This chapter has offered for the first time a long-term and comparative analysis of 
public education spending in Bolivia. The chapter has shown that, whereas tax col-
lection levels remained among the lowest in the region until the 1980s, education 
spending as a share of GDP converged to the levels of Chile and Uruguay—two of 
the most developmental states in Latin America—after the 1952 Revolution. This 
paradoxical fiscal equilibrium, however, did not imply a substantial modification of 
the quality and redistributive character of the Bolivian education system. Four main 
findings support this claim: public spending in education was hardly sustainable over 
time; education spending, controlled by per capita GDP, was not outstanding by 
international standards; the non-existence of a substantial support to primary educa-
tion may have reduced the redistributive impact of education spending; and education 
outputs, either in quantity or quality terms, were often among the worse in the region.
Table 5 Grade distribution ratio 6-1 (%), 1960–2005
1960/1965 1970/1975 1980/1985 1990/1995 2000/2005
Bolivia 0.32 0.44 0.47 0.63 0.83
Costa Rica 0.41 0.68 0.85 0.79 0.9
Cuba 0.34 0.54 0.98 0.99 1
Ecuador 0.35 0.54 0.64 0.71 0.81
El Salvador 0.29 0.46 0.54 0.67 0.7
Guatemala 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.49
Honduras 0.2 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.61
Jamaica 0.69 0.92 0.96 0.94
Nicaragua 0.18 0.35 0.32 0.41 0.59
Panama 0.57 0.59 0.79 0.8 0.83
Source: Frankema (2008: 445, 452)
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1  Introduction
The composition of the labour market in most Latin American countries has changed 
greatly in the last four decades with a huge increase in the proportion of women in 
the urban labour market (Camou 2012). Female labour force participation began to 
increase in the 1970s and this continued through the 1980s and 1990s. In Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico and Chile the female participation rate of around 20 % in 
1960 increased to 40–50 % in 2000.
The demographic, technological and economic factors behind this process are dis-
cussed in the literature. Although this change opens new opportunities for women to 
become more economically independent, a high proportion are still inactive, and 
increased women’s participation has not eliminated segregation in the labour market.
Recent studies show that the Latin American countries are heterogeneous in this 
respect. The predominant trend in the 1980–1990s was increased inequality, 
although this began to reverse in the twenty-first century (Bourguignon et al. 2004; 
Bértola and Ocampo 2012). However, the gender component of inequality change 
has not been sufficiently incorporated into these results.
Our main aim in this study is to reconstruct the gender wage gap for a sample of 
Latin American countries to frame explanations of its evolution and impact on inequal-
ity. Our data come from the Censuses and Household Surveys in each country.
Our research involves an exhaustive analysis of wage differences between men 
and women and focuses on how the gender gap has changed over time and its rela-
tion to inequality in the different countries. Our sample consists of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Our emphasis is on reconstructing gender indicators for the long run, insofar as 
this is possible with the sources available, and we analyze the different trajectories 
and patterns of inequality that are specifically related to gender, and check them 
against global income distribution trends.
Our hypothesis is that the evolution of the gender wage gap is an important 
component of overall inequality and it has nonlinear effects. Although this gap has 
narrowed in recent decades, it is still wide, especially in the Latin American coun-
tries where inequality is high and where the incorporation of women into the labour 
force has lagged behind.
In the next section, we summarize the theoretical links between the increasing 
female labour supply and inequality, and set the most important results from Latin 
American research on the subject and the goals of the chapter. Section “The Current 
Situation” presents our methodology and the sources used. Section “Data and 
Methodology” discusses the latest data documenting the evolution of female labour 
force participation and education in twentieth-century Latin America. It also 
explores the relation between the levels of women’s participation in the labour mar-
ket and their education. In section “The Evolution of Female Labour Force 
Participation and Education Achievement During the Twentieth Century” we exam-
ine the evolution of the gender wage gap and inequality indicators. Section 
“Measuring Inequality and the Gender Wage Gap” estimates the impact of female 
labour supply, overall inequality and education on the gender gap. The last section 
draws some conclusions.
2  Theoretical Approach
Latin America has always had high levels of inequality, and today, in spite of recent 
improvements, it is still the second most unequal region in the world, just below 
sub-Saharan Africa.
Latin American studies agree that the main cause of increasing inequality in the 
region has been the process whereby political power, wealth and income have 
become concentrated in the hands of landowning and capitalist elites and of the 
people who control work and trade relations (Bértola and Ocampo 2012).
In the First Globalization period inequality in Latin America increased, and 
while the gap was not as wide as in other regions at that time like Africa and Asia it 
was still too great to enable these Hispanic countries to catch up with the developed 
world.
In the industrialization period (1930–1980), Latin American social development 
indicators had higher growth rates than at any other time in the region’s history, 
although the improvement was more marked in some countries than others.
There was also an improvement in equity levels in the countries that managed to 
develop welfare state systems such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. However, other 
countries had high levels of inequality either because there were big differences in 
the composition of the population (indigenous people, peasants, descendants of 
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slaves) or because their labour markets were strongly segmented with gaps between 
formal and informal workers that highlighted the differences in state regulation.
Starting in the 1970s, the levels of equity that had been attained previously began 
to diminish. This was due to the drastic deregulation of labour markets, increasing 
segmentation in job markets, a widening gap between the skilled and the unskilled 
workforce, along with an industrialization slowdown, less state participation and a 
cutback on policies to redistribute wealth.
Many authors consider that the persistence of inequality is related to social, cultural 
and economic frameworks and the fact that discrimination and prejudice are embedded 
in formal and informal institutions. This particularly affects gender inequality, which 
according to the literature (Sarasúa and Gálvez 2003) is related to false beliefs and 
stereotypes that permeate education, family and functioning of the labour market.
Since 1970, women in Latin America have had considerably higher levels of 
well-being, measured in terms of health and education, than women in other devel-
oping regions. However, in spite of this progress, Latin American women have not 
had equal opportunities to earn income and have largely been excluded from posi-
tions of power in political and economic institutions. This makes the region an inter-
esting context in which to consider the effects of globalization, both because the 
moves toward liberalization have been substantial and because women have had 
many of the prerequisites to participate in the market economy.
There is considerable discussion in the literature about the consequences of 
increasing women’s participation in the labour force during the globalization period, 
and interpretations of the evidence are diverse. According to the neoclassical view, 
as exemplified by the Stolper-Samuelson model, in developing countries free trade 
leads to rising wages for unskilled work, which is the relatively abundant factor in 
these economies (Samuelson 1948). Since unskilled work is often done by women 
we can infer from the Stolper-Samuelson model that globalization leads to increased 
demand for women to work, and hence should have as a final consequence a relative 
expansion of female participation and a narrowing of the gender gap (see the case 
of Mexico in Dell 2005; Artecona and Cunningham 2002; Garcia Cuellar 2001).
However, the evidence for the period 1970–1990 does not support this theory inso-
far as the growth of demand for female labour has not produced any robust decline in 
the gender earnings gap, which varies greatly between different regions of the world 
(Çağatay and Ertürk 2004). Moreover, the narrowing of gender gaps cannot be attrib-
uted only to the globalization process because other changes also had an impact. It 
may be that the improved quality of female labour with the incorporation of workers 
who were more experienced and better educated (O’Neill and Polachek 1993, Goldin 
2000) and the fall in wages for less skilled male workers (Blau and Kahn 1997) came 
into play, rather than just an increase in the demand for female labour.
The most common heterodox approach to this question has been to consider the 
effect of gender wage gaps on successful export-led growth. Given that women are 
excluded from certain occupations and sectors, trade opening brought with it an 
increase in the labour supply of women in certain kinds of work, and this raised 
unemployment rates and reduced wages (Bergmann 1974) or perpetuated wage 
gaps (Joekes 1999; Seguino 2000; Berik et al. 2003).
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Another approach in the literature has focused on the sacrifices that globalization 
has forced women in developing countries to make (Beneria 2003; Beneria et al. 
2000). With very small or in some cases no improvements in household technolo-
gies, greater female participation levels in paid occupations have meant more total 
hours of work for women than for men. Adjustment policies and public expenditure 
cutbacks in the same period have had negative effects on welfare, health and other 
human capital services. This affects women more than men, since the former are 
usually responsible for the human capital formation of their children. Therefore 
changes in women’s economic situations must be analyzed together with other 
human and social capital conditions that determine their final market power.
3  The Current Situation
Research on the evolution of the gender gap in the globalization era in Latin America 
has been addressed in various ways but there is scant literature with a historical 
perspective. One reason for this is that the data is very difficult to obtain. Prior to 
1970 and before the first Household Surveys there is little aggregate statistical 
evidence relating to the gender wage gap.
Reyes Campo (2012) has studied the evolution of the gender wage gap in Chile 
using new sources of pre-1960 data. Prior to her work, there was no data for wages 
by gender for Chile. She has been able to document the gender gap from 1939 to 
1974, using social security data. Although the gender wage gap diminished over 
time, the ratio of women’s wages to male wages only increased 14 percentage points 
from 1939 to 1968. So the evidence points towards discrimination.
For Uruguay, Camou (2010) studied the evolution of the gender gap in the textile 
and meatpacking industries, based on business archives for the period of 1915–
1957. Her research also shows a trend towards a shrinking gender wage gap in these 
industries of about 20 %. Another paper compares the forces responsible for the 
evolution of gender gap and wage inequality in South Asia, East Asia and Latin 
America (Camps et al. 2006). Human capital, health improvement, labour market 
liberalization and equal treatment enforcement laws seem to be the main exogenous 
variables affecting women’s economic situation. Between 1975 and 2000 the gen-
der gap narrowed, the main exception to the rule is China, where the economic gap 
between men and women increased. Everywhere else, the erosion in the gender gap 
has resulted in a fall of wage dispersion. In short, the narrowing of the gender gap 
during the second global era has tended to reduce wage inequality measured by both 
the Gini and Theil indexes.
Hoyos and Ñopo (2010) focus on the changes in the 1990s and 2000s and ana-
lyze Household Survey data for 1992 and 2007, controlling by education, number 
of children and other characteristics of the population. Their research explores the 
impact of changing characteristics of the labour supply on gender earnings inequal-
ity. The research shows that the gender gap decreased by 7 % overall during the 
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period but with great heterogeneity among countries, and that cohort effects linked 
to life cycle influence gender earnings.
For the same two decades, Gálvez (2001) examined the dynamic of women 
joining the labour market and concluded that, despite improvements in the female 
activity rate, education level and the gender gap, their situation continued to be 
worse than men’s on indicators like the unemployment rate, the activity rate and the 
persistence of the wage gap. Greater gender equality is reduced less to economic 
aspects and more to institutional, cultural or regulatory aspects. Mexico and Chile 
are good examples of this negative correlation as they have the lowest levels of 
women’s income related to higher GDP per capita. Considering the impact of these 
changes on inequality, Gálvez remarks that the increase in inequality among women, 
which was due to uneven education gains, may have contributed to an increase in 
overall inequality.
Our research adds to this literature by extending the period under study thus to 
capture the impact of previous gender inequality on the present gender gap. Our 
purpose is to learn more about path dependency. Are the countries with an early 
high level of gender discrimination those in which it is more difficult to bring 
women into the workforce?
Lastly, we look at the relationship between overall inequality and gender inequal-
ity. We examine whether gender inequality and total inequality share the same 
trends, whether and why they can have an opposite trend.
4  Data and Methodology
Our research concentrates on the differences between women and men in paid work. 
We do not take into account women who do unpaid work, although this was the big-
gest group in the female population in the period. It is clear that although gender 
inequality cannot be reduced merely to a comparison between the sexes, the first 
step in the analysis must be to focus on a statistical breakdown by gender.
International comparisons are still constrained by the lack of reliable data. Part 
of the work that women do in poor countries is in the informal economy and at 
home and/or for piece rates. The information documenting this kind of work is 
scarce and is often not comparable across countries. Thus, we focus on market earn-
ings only. Income inequality is higher than earnings inequality because wage earn-
ings are less disperse than property and self-employment incomes.
Data on wage earnings disaggregated by gender come from Household Surveys1 
in each country, and we use it to calculate the wage per hour for each sex. In most 
of the datasets we exploit, the unit of observation is the household, and this gives us 
Gini coefficients for income and expenditure (Deininger and Squire 1996, 1998; 
World Bank 1995; Higgins and Williamson 2002). Other approaches have focused 
on individuals instead of households, using national account information (see 
1 Household Surveys include individual and household information.
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Bourguignon and Morrison 2002; Sala-i-Martin 2003). Since our unit of analysis 
has to be the individual and not the household, Gini coefficients for household 
income hide important information about the unequal economic position of women 
in the household.
We calculate the Gini index for earnings inequality in the economy as a whole, 
and for inequality among men and among women. We supplement this measure 
with calculations of the so-called generalized entropy measures, the best known of 
which are the Theil indexes. These indexes enable us to estimate how much overall 
inequality is explained by inequality within groups and how much by inequality 
between groups. We use these indexes to disaggregate inequality into its gender 
sources.
5  The Evolution of Female Labour Force Participation 
and Education Achievement During the Twentieth 
Century
There is a line of research that documents female labour force participation in the 
long run. Important studies have been done by Goldin (1994, 2006) for the USA, 
and she finds a “U” relation between female employment rates and economic 
growth. This is due to the relation between education and economic development. 
At low levels of development, education increases more for men than for women. 
As income rises, women’s participation decreases. When income increases further, 
education resources expand and women receive more education, which promotes 
their participation in the labour market. With more education and the expansion of 
non-industrial employment, women’s participation continues to increase and thus 
forms the “U” (Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1989; Schultz 1990). This evolution 
has been explored for countries with different income levels. The results show that 
those with higher or lower levels of income have higher female labour force partici-
pation rates than middle-income countries (Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Psacharopoulos 
and Tzannatos 1989; Tzannatos 1999).
Documentation of the evolution of female labour force participation in Latin 
America is very recent (Camou and Maubrigades 2013). Researchers have to strug-
gle with the fact that, in general, women workers have not been well documented. 
The censuses carried out in the first decades of the twentieth century are inconsis-
tent in the way they register women’s participation in the primary sector. This 
makes the total primary sector employment change atypical because work there 
tends to be less formalized and many women are involved in productive as well as 
home care activities.
There is another problem with the first censuses in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
carried out at the end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth 
century. These record each individual’s occupations regardless of whether or not 
that person was employed at the time. The present-day concept of “unemployed” 
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was less applicable when wage labour was the exception rather than the rule. 
However, this was a period of rapid economic growth which implies that unemploy-
ment was probably very low.
Three periods can be distinguished:
 1. 1910–1940: a fall in female labour participation in some countries like Argentina 
and Chile
 2. 1940–1970: few changes in the Latin American countries studied
 3. 1970 to the present: explosive growth in female labour participation rates
The data collected for the years 1930–1970 give quantitative support to the thesis 
that female participation in labour markets decreased during the import substitution 
period. The state promoted a sort of male-breadwinner model during this period in 
Uruguay and Chile, which fostered a decrease in women’s participation in the 
labour market (Todaro 2004; Espino and Azar 2007).
Female labour force participation began to increase moderately in the 1970s and 
this trend continued into the 1980s (Table 1). However, only in the 1990s did the 
region see a significant improvement, in general, and it still remained lower than in 
the developed countries (Camou and Maubrigades 2013).
Besides this, the trajectories of female activity rates diverged across Latin 
America. Chile, Uruguay and Argentina had a relatively high rate of female labour 
participation from the beginning of the period, while Brazil, Colombia and Mexico 
were much further behind. By the end of the period, Brazil and Colombia had 
caught up with the first three. The other countries considered in Table 1 have much 
lower participation rates and, despite some improvement, they have never reached 
the levels of the Latin leaders.
Although the long-term trend was upwards throughout Latin America, the evi-
dence shows no single pattern in how these countries incorporated women into the 
labour market during their various stages of development.
As regards education, over the last 60 years the educational level of Latin 
American countries has progressed to an unprecedented degree. In 1950, the illit-
eracy rate was about 40 % among persons aged 15 and over; by 2005 it had fallen 
below 10 %. The speed of progress has varied between countries and the illiteracy 
rate remains high in some countries, in particular those with large indigenous 
populations.
In the second half of twentieth century, in most of Latin America, female years 
of schooling increased to near or even slightly higher than men in countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay. Moreover, gender schooling differences 
have been reduced especially in recent decades. Only in countries with high illiter-
acy rates and/or large indigenous communities like Guatemala, Nicaragua or 
Honduras do we still see big gender gap in schooling.
Considering the expansion of primary education coverage followed by continual 
growth in basic education, Latin America has presented a set of education policies 
geared specifically to less privileged groups (in terms of ethnicity, geographical 
location and socioeconomic status). However, gender inequalities persist in a group 
of countries but are hidden behind overall averages.
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of education during the period of analysis, comparing 
average female to average male schooling. Both sexes improved but girls had not 
yet reached the boys’ levels. The gender catching up in schooling started with the 
massive intake of women into primary education; it advanced with greater female 
participation in secondary education and progressed still further with more and 
more women at the higher education level.
However, when we examine the countries individually we find differences 
among them. One group of countries started the period with an average of years of 
study almost twice as high as the others. These were Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
and to a lesser degree Costa Rica. This group implemented public policies to pro-
mote the enrolment of boys and girls in primary and secondary education. This 
resulted in sustained growth in years of schooling for both sexes during the second 
half of the twentieth century and women in Argentina and Uruguay performed even 
better than male.
In the second half of the century, another group of countries had average school-
ing of only 2 years, and girls still lagged behind boys even at the end of the period. 
This group included countries with larger indigenous and rural populations, and this 
may help explain why enrolment in formal educational institutions was so low. The 
group contains countries like Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Mexico and Brazil are examples of good improvement in the period. The popula-
tions of both had low education levels in the late 1950s, but by the end of the period 
years of schooling had increased greatly in both. Although the causality has to be 
firmly established, it appears that rapid economic growth raised the demand for 
schooling during the period, and that both were proactive in education policies 
intended to improve human capital fast.
Fig. 1 Education attainment by sex. Sources: Based on Barro, R. J. and J. W. Lee (2012)
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The relationship between activity rates and education has not been linear. At low 
levels of schooling, there is a strong correspondence between years of schooling and 
female labour force participation. At higher levels of female years of schooling the 
elasticity of the female activity rate decreases.
Although average years of schooling increased in most of the Latin American 
countries during the period, there are big differences in the sample. In 2000 Chile 
and Costa Rica had high schooling rates and low activity rates, while Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay and El Salvador had high activity rates but only modest increases 
in years of schooling. Towards the end of the period the countries in the region 
returned to the free market model and opened up to trade. This shift increased the 
demand for technical skills and reduced the demand for low-skill workers, a sector 
in which the percentage of women is higher than the percentage of female economy- 
wide (Bértola and Ocampo 2012).
6  Measuring Inequality and the Gender Wage Gap
Although overall female labour force participation has increased over the last 
50 years, there are still gender differences among countries. Gender discrimination 
in wages has persisted over time and is common in many countries. The persistence 
suggests structural causes rooted in institutions and cultural norms. For instance, 
women are more likely to respond positively to increased economic opportunities in 
the labour market when childcare services are available or when their participation 
is socially accepted. In contrast, where significant barriers remain their progress is 
more limited (Fig. 2).
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Latin American women typically 
received less than 35 % of total national income, although the figure was around 
40 % in six leaders (Fig. 3). The women’s share increased strongly between 1990 
and 2000 in Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
In Costa Rica, Ecuador and El Salvador the reason behind this trend is more related 
to improvements in the female activity rate than to a narrowing of the gender wage 
gap but in Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela the gap became consider-
ably smaller during this period (Fig. 4).
In the first decade of the new century the countries with the narrowest wage gaps 
were Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The other countries in our sample are falling behind. We can only partially recon-
struct some countries’ trajectories because sources are scarce. The data we have 
indicates that the countries that had a narrower gender wage gap in the past are the 
ones performing better at present. In the period 1970–2010 the gap in Brazil was 
wider than that in Argentina or Uruguay.
In Latin America, inequality among men has more weight in the total Gini level 
due to their greater participation in the labour market and to greater inequality 
among males (see Appendices 1, 2 and 3). The distribution of schooling and skills 
among sexes may be part of the explanation.
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There is no a clear trend in the evolution of inequality among women. While the 
overall average remains unchanged over the period, there is a group of countries 
(Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Peru) with increasing inequality in 
women’s wages. The overall inequality increase during the period probably affects 
women as well as men. The reason the spread among women’s wages is greater is 
probably that they join the labour market with greater human capital because their 
years of schooling and work experience are increasing.
7  Explaining the Gender Wage Gap
In an international comparison, Blau and Kahn (1997) found that labour markets 
with highly unequal rates of remuneration also have high levels of gender inequal-
ity. Next we tested their relation between overall wage inequality and gender gap for 
Latin America.
At first glance, Latin American evidence confirms the postulated relation. The 
countries that are more unequal (with Gini ratings above 0.5: Fig. 5) also have wider 
gender gaps. When we look at the differences among countries over the period we 
can identify two groups. First, there are those in which overall inequality remained 












































































































Fig. 2 Female activity rate and years of schooling, 1950–2000. Sources: Activity rates idem 
Table 1. Years of schooling—Barro and Lee (2012)
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remained lower than male. This was the case in Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, 
Nicaragua and Ecuador. Brazil was a special case with high inequality and a wide 
gender gap (see Appendices 1, 2 and 3).
There is a second group with relatively low total inequality and a narrowing 
gender gap, and here we find Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Venezuela. In 
particular, Argentina and Uruguay are also countries with a lower gender gap in the 
past and a higher activity rate. In any case, path dependence does not seem to be the 
only way to achieve a narrower gender gap: Venezuela belongs to this group 
although traditionally it has had low female participation rate.
Another factor that probably impacts on the gender wage gap is the historical 
pattern of women’s participation in the labour market. In the period 1940–1970, 
gender inequality was high in Latin America and this was expressed in a low level 
of female labour participation and a wide gender gap. There are few data available 



















Fig. 3 Women’s share of wage bill, 1990–2000. Sources: Household surveys
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Fig. 5 Overall inequality and gender wage gap. Sources: Household surveys
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for the 1980s, the so-called lost decade, and in the 1990s we entered a new phase 
with a narrower gender wage gap and greater variability in women’s activity rates 
across the region. At the end of the period women’s participation in labour markets 
was still rising but the gender gap had not significantly narrowed. It can be seen that 
this correlation between the two variables is not very strong towards the end of the 
period in which many countries have similar gender gaps and there is a wide spread 
in the participation rate.
The trends in women activity rates in Latin American labour markets in 2000s 
are very different between countries. While the general trend is rising over time, 
only in very few cases does the average reach 50 %. The heterogeneity revealed in 
Fig. 6 could have many explanations and is probably linked to the liberal  deregulatory 
economic policies prevailing since the 1980s. But the gender gap remained stable in 
the 1990s and 2000s.
These results also show that increases in women’s participation in the labour 
market do not necessarily mean a substantial change because as the participation 
rate increases the female occupation and wage dispersion also increase. Gender gap 
trends depend on individual investment in education and the returns to that educa-
tion. In recent years, female education levels have risen relative to those of men. 
Although countries have achieved high female labour market participation rates, it 
is clear that educational equality is not sufficient to secure gender parity in income. 




















































Fig. 6 Female activity rate and gender wage gap, 1940–2000. Sources: Activity rates idem 
Table 1. Gender wage gap: ILO and household surveys
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higher levels of education. The evolution of the wage gap between men and women 
is different at different educational levels. In the tertiary education group the gender 
gap was wide at the start of the period and there was little subsequent improvement, 
which shows the glass ceiling effect, whereas in the group with only primary education 
the gap narrowed more during the same period.
Women’s education improved considerably in the 1990s but, as we saw above, 
the increasing skill premium that accompanied the new economic model was less 
favourable for better educated women. Increasing female labour force participation 
and improved educational attainment in a context of relatively stable male labour 
force participation and educational attainment contributed to an overall narrowing 
of the gap. As we saw above, a steady convergence between the wages of women 
and those of men is not automatic. The portion of the wage gap that cannot be 
explained by labour market characteristics related to workers’ skills is generally 
attributed to discrimination and to differences in preferences between men and 
women. Women tend to enter different careers than men.
There is still a tendency for occupations to be “male dominated” or “female 
dominated,” and the female-dominated ones tend to pay less even when men and 
women have the same educational level. The majority of women work in the ser-
vices and agricultural sectors, and the fact is that areas in which women are the vast 
majority—secretaries, teachers and nurses—are poorly paid.
In the last 50 years, schooling levels have increased and the upgrading of the 
occupational structure as a result of technological changes and economic growth 
has created a demand for more skilled and educated labour. The increasing demand 
for a skilled and highly educated labour has resulted, among other things, in policies 
to raise the overall educational level of the population. In spite of that Fig. 7 shows 
a high level of sex segregation persisting among employees with tertiary education, 
despite the relative equalization between men and women in overall level of educa-
tional attainment. There are wage disparities between men and women with the 
same educational qualifications in all Latin American countries analyzed and at all 
educational levels, but in particular among the more educated population.
Our in-depth study of the wage gap between men and women shows that the big-
gest differences that remain are among those with the highest levels of qualifications 
and incomes (Fig. 8). When we compare the evolution of the gender gap among the 
more educated population in the decade of 1990s and 2000s, we find that although 
the differences decrease, men’s average wages stayed at around 25 percentage points 
higher than women’s. At the end of that decade there were still large wage differen-
tials between men and women with the same level of educational attainment.
In the light of these results, whether these wage differences in the group of ter-
tiary education are related to women’s human capital being underused in the labour 
market. One way to approach this is to examine the distribution of the most highly 
educated peoples by their income levels. However, we have been able to confirm 
that 80–90 % of people of both sexes with tertiary education levels are in the highest 
wage level (see Appendices 1, 2 and 3). Even though our data do not show the struc-
ture of occupations by sex inside the group of high income level, we can assume that 
this might be different among female and males.
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Fig. 7 Education and the gender gap. Sources: ILO and household surveys
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8  Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to help to bring the gender perspective into the 
discussion of the evolution of overall inequality. Our results enable us to map trends 
in female labour participation rates and schooling achievement in Latin America in 
the twentieth century.
First we find that the most unequal countries are also those with the greater 
gender wage gap, and recent history reveals much inertia. The most “advanced” 
countries in terms of gender equality are those in which female labour participation 
rates increased in the first half of the twentieth century and also have higher levels 
of educational attainment and a narrower gender wage gap. In the less “advanced” 
countries, women’s entry into the labour market lagged behind that of the advanced 
group average, and this was associated with less developed economies with large 
indigenous and black population.
These results suggest that labour market structures are different in the two groups 
and that a narrowing of the gender gap does not depend only on women’s participa-
tion at the end of the period but also on path dependence in labour occupational 
segregation. Contrary to what we expected, the gender gap widens gradually 
throughout as years of schooling rise.
The increased participation of women in the labour market impacts overall 















Fig. 8 Gender wage gap among people with high wage levels and tertiary education. Sources: 
Household surveys. Note: Population was classified according to their wages in three levels: low, 
middle and high
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moved up the educational ladder, they have found the more skilled occupations to 
have higher gender wage gaps so that overall inequality has risen on that account.
Interestingly, the group that combines high wages with the highest average years 
of schooling is also the most resistant to this egalitarian trend. It seems that this 
group does not obey a logic that is purely economic but that there is an invisible 
barrier against incorporating these new actors into decision-making positions.
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Total Men Women Men Women
1990s Argentina 1992 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.63 0.37 93
Bolivia 1997 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.69 0.31 79
Chile 1990 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.76 0.24 76
Colombia 1996 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.65 0.35 90
Costa Rica 1992 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.72 0.28 98
Ecuador 1995 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.67 0.33 91
El Salvador 1991 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.66 0.34 86
Guatemala 2000 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.67 0.33 85
Honduras 1997 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.69 0.31 78
Nicaragua 1993 0.54 0.57 0.49 0.36 0.34 90
Paraguay 1997 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.66 0.34 88
Peru 1997 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.67 0.33 82
Uruguay 1992 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.64 0.36 83
Venezuela 1992 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.70 0.30 86
2000s Argentina 2006 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.40 100
Bolivia 2005 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.33 88
Brazil 2008 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.63 0.37 87
Chile 2006 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.69 0.31 89
Costa Rica 2006 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.67 0.33 99
Colombia 2006 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.42 95
Ecuador 2006 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.42 95
El Salvador 2005 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.58 0.42 89
Guatemala 2006 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.67 0.33 100
Honduras 2006 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.60 0.40 97
Nicaragua 2005 0.52 0.55 0.45 0.70 0.30 85
Peru 2006 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.67 0.33 81
Paraguay 2007 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.65 0.35 84
Uruguay 2006 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.58 0.42 93
Venezuela 2006 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.63 0.37 95
Average 
1990s
0.50 0.51 0.49 0.66 0.32 86
Average 
2000s
0.50 0.50 0.49 0.63 0.37 92
Sources: Household surveys
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 Appendix 2: Gender Inequality in High Income Level and Tertiary 
Education Population
Country Inequality measures (%)
Income share 
(%) Gender gap
Total Men Women Men Women
1990s Argentina 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.54 0.46 67
Bolivia 0.41 0.43 0.34 0.68 0.32 68
Chile 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.76 0.24 53
Colombia 0.38 0.40 0.32 0.63 0.37 70
Costa Rica 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.68 0.32 79
Ecuador 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.66 0.34 78
El Salvador 0.40 0.42 0.28 0.76 0.24 63
Guatemala 0.44 0.45 0.35 0.79 0.21 62
Honduras 0.41 0.43 0.30 0.72 0.28 60
Nicaragua 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.69 0.31 72
Paraguay 0.44 0.46 0.35 0.70 0.30 64
Peru 0.38 0.40 0.32 0.66 0.34 78
Uruguay 0.40 0.40 0.32 0.61 0.39 57
Venezuela 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.63 0.37 77
2000s Argentina 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.45 0.55 89
Bolivia 0.38 0.41 0.31 0.64 0.36 80
Brazil 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.57 0.43 66
Chile 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.63 0.37 68
Costa Rica 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.61 0.39 69
Colombia 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.51 0.49 87
Ecuador 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.41 85
El Salvador 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.50 0.50 86
Guatemala 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.77 0.23 56
Honduras 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.60 0.40 80
Nicaragua 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.67 0.33 63
Paraguay 0.40 0.43 0.34 0.62 0.38 65
Peru 0.38 0.41 0.32 0.63 0.37 83
Uruguay 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.53 67
Venezuela 0.28 0.32 0.25 0.49 0.51 83
Average 1990s 0.39 0.41 0.33 0.68 0.32 68
Average 2000s 0.39 0.41 0.33 0.58 0.42 75
Sources: Household surveys
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Low Medium High Low Medium High
1990s Argentina 24.6 11.0 64.4 23.2 17.7 59.1
Bolivia 2.5 16.7 80.8 3.3 17.4 79.3
Chile 4.0 10.4 85.6 7.6 21.0 71.4
Colombia 1.8 7.5 90.7 1.6 12.3 86.1
Costa Rica 0.9 5.6 93.5 4.4 5.9 89.7
El Salvador 2.5 3.1 94.4 1.1 6.5 92.5
Guatemala 4.4 4.4 91.2 5.8 10.7 83.5
Honduras 1.5 5.8 92.7 0.0 8.8 91.2
Nicaragua 1.7 16.9 81.4 3.5 25.6 70.9
Paraguay 0.6 1.7 97.8 0.0 7.8 92.2
Peru 5.8 20.2 74.0 8.0 23.6 68.3
Uruguay 5.8 14.2 80.0 4.6 21.3 74.1
Venezuela 5.6 11.1 83.3 5.6 11.1 83.3
2000s Argentina 8.8 19.4 71.8 10.5 19.4 70.1
Bolivia 2.4 7.5 90.1 3.7 9.0 87.3
Brazil 4.6 9.5 85.9 4.6 12.0 83.5
Chile 5.5 11.8 82.7 8.6 16.6 74.8
Costa Rica 2.8 2.4 94.8 2.1 5.9 91.9
Colombia 6.1 13.3 80.7 7.0 12.2 80.8
Ecuador 13.1 15.6 71.3 21.1 15.8 63.2
El Salvador 11.5 5.3 83.2 7.3 7.0 85.7
Guatemala 1.4 3.4 95.2 5.6 5.0 89.4
Honduras 4.8 5.3 89.9 4.3 3.2 92.5
Nicaragua 4.5 6.2 89.3 4.7 9.2 86.1
Paraguay 2.7 8.0 89.4 4.4 9.1 86.6
Peru 8.0 21.1 70.9 12.5 23.2 64.3
Uruguay 5.6 11.4 83.0 5.7 12.8 81.5
Venezuela 4.6 16.2 79.3 6.0 17.6 76.5
Sources: Household surveys
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1  Introduction
Economic historians now know that inequality has not been a constant feature of the 
Latin American landscape since the original colonization by Spain and Portugal. Rather 
it has fallen and risen several times over the two centuries of independence, and the 
dawn of the twenty-first century has also brought a welcome slight retreat from extreme 
inequality.1 Why the movements, and why the differences between countries?
Fortunately, the dawn of this century has brought not only a slight reversal of 
earlier inequality trends in Latin America, but also a blossoming of research on the 
sources of income inequality in the region today, lead by the World Bank and other 
international development agencies.2 This impressive wave of research has deliv-
ered an important part of what was promised by a World Bank call to arms back in 
the 1970s. Under the Presidency of Robert McNamara, a Bank team co-published 
the often-cited Redistribution with Growth, outlining how developing countries 
could produce more and share it more equally, and generating research momentum 
on these themes. Redistribution told a parable of some wise pro-growth egalitarians 
(Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan), in contrast to four Latin American countries that failed 
1 See in particular Frankema, Has Latin America Always Been Unequal? (2009); Williamson 
(2010); the entire special issues of Revista de Historia Económica, 28, 2 (2010); and Abad (2013a, 
b). See also the downloadable data set on inequality from around the world, 1820–2000, referenced 
and explained in van Zanden et al. (2014).
2 See DeFerranti et al. (2004), Lindert et al. (2006), Braceda et al. (2009), ECLAC (2010, 2012, 
2014), Lustig et al. (2011), the World Bank’s Aspire database, Public Finance Review (2014), and 
the Commitment to Equity project led by Professor Lustig.
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to follow this True Path. Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Peru were characterized by 
some of the world’s sharpest inequalities and not particularly strong growth. In 
later years, ECLAC (1990, 1992) and the World Bank study Inequality in Latin 
America: Breaking With History? explored the same questions more deeply.3
Did government fiscal preferences add to the inequality? That is, what distribu-
tional role has been played by movements in government fiscal policy, versus such 
market forces as changes in technological bias, trade expansion, shifts in labor sup-
ply, and shifts in the rate of private accumulation of human capital? For most of the 
two centuries of post-colonial history, inequality movements must have been caused 
largely by the ebb and flow of such larger forces outside of government, for the 
simple reason that government remained so small. Yet government’s share of Latin 
American economies grew across the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, 
causing us to wonder how and when the region’s regimes became “progressive” or 
“regressive” in their fiscal redistribution, breeding equality, or inequality.
The spate of recent studies suggests that countries’ income inequalities in Latin 
America now differ as much from each other, and from inequalities in OECD coun-
tries on other continents, in their fiscal redistribution as in the pre-fisc original 
incomes they get from market forces. Among data-supplying countries, the Latin 
American countries stand out as the most unequal countries in terms of people’s 
final incomes, partly because they have more unequal original incomes and partly 
because their governments redistribute less.4 Why have they had so little progressive 
redistribution lately, even after the much-heralded retreat from peak inequality? 
And has the same been true for a century or longer?
This chapter’s strategy exploits the deep analysis of the twenty-first century 
distributional impact of fiscal policy, and uses it to explore episodes since the nine-
teenth century to initiate a history of fiscal incidence. We offer these tentative 
results:
 (1) Social spending has accelerated in the postwar era: Tax-funded social spend-
ing has risen throughout the region since the 1980s.5
3 Chenery et al. (1974), ECLAC (1990, 1992), and DeFerranti et al. (2004). Within the Redistribution 
with Growth study, most relevant for present purposes are Montek Ahluwalia’s chapters on inequality 
and the policies for alleviating it (Chaps. 1 and 4). Its brief coverage of Cuba as of the early 1970s 
(pp. 262–268) identified this as an egalitarian experiment, but was guarded and inconclusive.
4 This statement is based on a comparison of pre- and post-fisc inequalities in several countries in 
the first decade of this century. The sources are Lustig et al. (2011) for five Latin American coun-
tries, Buchele et al. (2013) for Uruguay, Sauma and Trejos (2014, Table 3, benchmark case) for 
Costa Rica, and Wang et al. (2012) for the rest. See these for the assumptions regarding fiscal 
incidence.
The estimates we are comparing here refer to the year 2004 with the following exceptions: 
Belgium—year 2000; Australia—2003; Sweden, France, and Israel—2005; Bolivia—2007; 
Chile—2008; Costa Rica 2010 and Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay—2009. For alternative 
measures of the primary and final gini coefficients, 1979–2011, see Solt (2009, 2014).
5 Like many of the statements in the literature and in this paper, this one must be read with the 
proviso “except for Cuba”. Most comparisons have been forced to keep Cuba off to one side, for 
want of sufficient data. We will note Cuban results where we can.
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 (2) The region invests little in its future today: Latin America redistributes less 
toward future generations than do other regions. Rather, the region is one of 
those, like Mediterranean Europe, where redistribution tilts away from 
investing in future generations and favoring the elderly in privileged formal 
sectors.
 (3) It has invested relatively little in infrastructure and education ever since inde-
pendence: Relative to other regions at comparable income levels, Latin 
America has invested less in its younger generations since the nineteenth cen-
tury, and since the middle of the twentieth century it has favored its privileged 
seniors than other regions have done. Even before the 1990s, when public 
education was the main form of social spending, less was committed to mass 
education than in East Asia, East Europe, or the Middle East at similar levels of 
average income. In what follows we note some important historical exceptions 
to this rule.
 (4) Progressivity has been meager. Aside from the Cuban Revolution, governments 
have redistributed only modestly, preferring a conflicted mix of “redistribution 
to the rich and the poor.”6
 (5) The rise of non-contributory public pension subsidies to retirees from the for-
mal sectors stands out as a path-dependent legacy that will continue to retard 
progressivity and public investment. A telltale sign of the strength of this com-
mitment is the design of the pension “reform” in Pinochet’s Chile and the coun-
tries that sought to emulate it later.
 (6) Chile has stood out, as a volatile, and initially regressive, redistributor since 
1973. Redistributive policy was visibly regressive in the Pinochet era, both on 
the expenditure side and with a seemingly regressive tax structure. Yet since 
1990 the net impact of its fiscal redistribution was slightly progressive in 
conventional Gini measures, because it benefited the rich less than their share 
of pre-fiscal income.
 (7) Military autocracies differed in their redistributive strategies. Military rule peri-
ods did not affect redistribution in the same way in all countries. Unlike Chile 
(1973–1989), the junta in Uruguay (1973–1985) left the tax and social spending 
mix alone, at low absolute levels. Argentina’s military rule (1976–1983) consoli-
dated the social security system for most of the period, whereas Peru’s military 
regime (1968–1980) was quite progressive.
 (8) Human investments have brought more durable, though delayed, gains relative 
to transfers, both in the growth of GDP and in holding down inequality. In par-
ticular, Costa Rica has gained ground against Uruguay by emphasizing primary 
and secondary education over pensions.
 (9) Social spending has been not only volatile but also pro-cyclical. Relative to GDP 
growth, annual changes in real social spending are at least two times or more 
variable. Moreover, they tend to follow the swings in economic activity.7
6 This expression is borrowed from the title of Lindert et al. (2006).
7 Clemens et al. (2007) have identified this pattern for 1990–2000s.
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2  Strategies for Tracing a History of Fiscal Incidence
Starting from the fiscal mix of this century and the distributional impacts on each 
household income quintile, we explore the implications of the historical movement 
in the fiscal mix. Like previous studies of fiscal incidence, ours uses imperfect and 
incomplete measures to provide insights into differences in progressivity and 
regressivity. These limitations are so strict that the fiscal incidence calculations are 
useful only as plausible suggestions about the direction of effect and the general 
orders of magnitude. As public finance textbooks warn their readers repeatedly, one 
should never imagine that all the possible effects of a particular set of budgetary 
flows have been worked out.
To be true to real-world budgetary processes and to pose interesting counterfactu-
als, one must weigh fiscal incidence on both the revenue side and the expenditure 
side, using a consistent definition of fiscal neutrality on both sides. Most studies have 
failed to do so. On the revenue side, studies of the progressivity (or regressivity) of 
taxation have typically assumed that the revenues are spent in proportion to pre-fisc 
original income, a rare outcome. On the expenditure side, studies of expenditure 
progressivity typically assume that the expenditures are financed by taxes that are 
fixed per person, another rare outcome. Real-world budgetary processes adjust rev-
enues and expenditures together, requiring a two-sided measure of progressivity.
In Latin American history, the expenditure side of the fiscal coin reveals more about 
differences between countries, and also yields more data. On the revenue side, Kenneth 
Sokoloff and Eric Zolt have noted a strikingly consistent regional pattern: Latin 
America, more than any other region, relied on taxing domestic consumption, with 
little or no direct tax on individual incomes or property. Latin America also tended to 
concentrate fiscal authority more in the hands of the central government (Sokoloff and 
Zolt 2006). In what follows, we extract most of the information on differences in pro-
gressivity or regressivity from differences in the size and composition of social expen-
ditures, rather than from differences in taxes or non-social expenditures.
To pose sensible counterfactuals about countries’ fiscal incidence, the analysis 
should also make international comparisons. There should be little interest in com-
paring the actual fiscal patterns with the zero-government counterfactual, as in the 
presentation of most estimates. Rather we should compare governments’ fiscal inci-
dence with those of well-documented real-world alternatives, such as Chile or the 
USA. In our overview of the longer history of redistribution, we will take up the 
Chilean case first, and compare other countries to Chile.
2.1  Redistribution Through Each Year’s Social Spending 
and Taxes
Governments channel their tax revenues into three kinds of expenditures: social 
spending, non-social spending, and debt reduction. The three have very different 
effects on the distribution of income. Estimating such effects requires figuring out 
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which levels in the income ranks get more or less from each kind of expenditure and 
the revenues that back it.
The first effect is that of a given social spending budget. That is the traditional 
focus of much of the fiscal incidence scholarship, and it has been updated skillfully 
and energetically in the recent literature on Latin America. We shall pursue the same 
theme at length, taking care to include public spending on health and education as 
well as social transfers, while also incorporating tax incidence into the calculations 
of progressivity or regressivity when we can.
To define our measures of impact on the rich, the middle, and the poor, we start 
with a budget identity for government:
 
S S SS N D Rit jt t kt+ - =  
Here Sit = the amount of the ith kind of social spending in time period t. Similarly, Njt 
is the amount of the jth kind of non-social spending (general administration, police, 
the military, infrastructure, and so forth), and Rkt is the kth kind of government rev-
enue (income tax, tariffs, other taxes, or income from government enterprises and 
assets). The revenues can cover less than the expenditures to the amount of Dt, this 
time period’s government budget deficit. All magnitudes are in current prices. Later, 
to add economic meaning, they will be converted into per-household magnitudes 
and divided by national product or by an income class’s average income.
The budget identity leads to measures of redistribution by following how the 
direct effects of spending and taxes on household incomes are divided among the 
five quintile ranks, from the poorest twenty percent of households (q = 1) to the rich-
est (q = 5). Like most of the literature on fiscal incidence, we humbly acknowl-
edge—and then ignore—all the serious reasons why these simple “flypaper” 
measures of redistribution fail to measure the full range of effects, including general- 
equilibrium effects through factor markets. To allocate each kind of social spending, 
and the taxes paying for it, across the income ranks, we define the benefits minus the 
costs for each quintile, or Bnet,qit, as
 
B S b cnet qit it qit qit, ,= -( )  













8 Each is the result of two components that are not separated in our paper. One is the distribution of 
“benefits per recipient” in each quintile, and the other is “coverage,” i.e., the number of persons in 
the quintile who receive any benefits at all. Incompleteness of coverage looms large in Latin 
America, and therefore affects the progressivity greatly: “Overall, about half of the population in 
LAC is not covered by any public transfer. Within the region, however, there is significant variation 
in coverage, with only 23 % of Peruvian citizens not receiving any public transfer as compared 
with 73 % of Mexicans without benefits” (Lindert et al. 2006, p. 23). Similarly, for each on the tax 
side, a quintile’s tax burden is a combination of the tax collected person paying and the share 
paying any at all.
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To explore “effects” or “impacts,” one must return to the familiar question of 
counterfactuals: “the effect of the observed budget—relative to what?” As we have 
already mentioned, the usual analysis unrealistically implies a zero-government alter-
native, because it tries to assign effects to the entire budget. To pose more realistic 
counterfactuals, we shrink the scale of the comparisons. We consider the social pro-
grams one by one, posing the counterfactual of removing that one real-world social 
program and the revenues that financed it, while leaving other social programs intact. 
Imagining a zero option for that one social program is not so unrealistic, since Latin 
America had done without most of these small social programs until just recently.
The other dimension of our implicit counterfactual about each social program 
hides within our phrase “and the revenues that pay for it.” Which revenues? There 
is no point in imagining that all government revenues are at stake, since their amount 
far exceeds the social expenditures under discussion. Lacking any sound economet-
ric estimates of which revenues increased at the margin when a given social pro-
gram was introduced and expanded, we make a reasonable simplifying assumption 
about the revenues that would not have existed in the absence of each social pro-
gram: For most of our historical measures, we assume that the same mix of revenue 
types would have held at the social program margin as we observe on the average. 
Thus if income tax were 16 % of all government revenue, state monopoly proceeds 
were 6 %, indirect taxes were 70 %, and tariffs were the other 8 %, these same shares 
would be assume to apply to the scaled-down amount of the social expenditures in 
question. We do not assume any deficit finance of the social programs, in order to 
keep the issue of the deficit separate.9
To give the measures meaning as commitments to redistribution shares of 
income, we need to divide the absolute net benefit measures of Bnet,qit by an income 
denominator, also expressed in current prices. For convenience and brevity, we 
divide all quintile groups’ benefit measures from social spending, whether gross or 
net of taxes, by the same common GDP denominator. We then compare such impacts 
on rich, middle, and poor income groups.10
One other shortcut is dictated by data limitations. The net benefit measures 
change over time in response to changes in three components of any social program: 
the program’s existence in a given year; its size as a share of national income; and 
its target efficiency, namely the extent to which it redistributes in favor of a particu-
lar group, usually the poor. We cannot pursue historical changes in the target effi-
ciency of the social spending programs. Their history is just too complex and 
under-documented. Accordingly, our journey back into the redistributive history of 
social spending can only follow changes in the existence and size of each category 
9 In later writings, we will apply the same assumption to the revenues that finance non-social 
spending, such as military or infrastructure spending.
10 A more common procedure is to divide all absolute redistributions to or from an income group 
by that same group’s income. To trace a history of such measures, however, requires a running set 
of income distributions. No such time series is available before mid-twentieth century, apart from 
occasional benchmark years. The one virtuous exception consists of Javier Rodriguez Weber’s 
time series on Chilean income inequality.
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of social spending, with the restrictive assumption that a given program had the 
same target efficiency in the past that it has today. This retreat is regrettable in large 
categories of social spending and taxation that kept the same name but shifted their 
progressivity or regressivity over time. As it happens, the Latin American history of 
fiscal redistribution limits the historical errors we commit by not following the 
changes in target efficiency over time. Many of the most progressive social pro-
grams did not exist before the 1980s, and have changed only a bit since. Also, the 
sizes of the individual social programs themselves capture most of the redistribu-
tion. We will also limit the loss from not knowing target efficiency by breaking up 
the historically dominant category of social spending, namely public education, into 
primary and secondary and tertiary education, which offer very different rewards to 
the different income ranks.
Fixing the target efficiency of social programs (again, the i’s) at their present-day 
patterns means that our absolute measures of net fiscal benefits for any income class 
(q) in years past (the variable t’s) will be
 
B S b cnet qit it qiT qiT, ,= -( )  
where the “T” subscript signals that the redistributive patterns (b’s and c’s) are those 
from “today,” usually a year at the start of the twenty-first century. In plainer words, 
our calculations of the fiscal incidence on different income classes will repeatedly 
ask The Question about any given year in the past:
The Question: How would the amounts of social spending programs, and the extra taxes 
that paid for them, have affected the incomes of the top, middle, and poorest income classes 
in that past year, if the benefits of those social programs, and those extra taxes, were distributed 
between income classes the way they are today?
In what follows we take advantage of the new information on how fiscal impacts 
are divided among quintiles to look not just at the movements of redistribution 
between rich and poor, but between rich and middle and poor, to explore the relation-
ship of the “middle-income class” to the observed fiscal redistribution. When did the 
fiscal climate favor, or disfavor, the middle-income ranks relative to those at the top 
and bottom of society? To supplement the usual emphasis on overall inequality 
between rich and poor, we will break it into two parts, looking separately at move-
ments in the fiscal treatment of the rich versus middle-income groups (top quintile 
vs. middle quintile) and at movements in the fiscal treatment of the middle and 
poorest groups (middle quintile vs. bottom quintile).
2.2  Non-social Expenditures and the Deficit: Investment 
and Redistribution Over Time
It would be tempting to explore how the different income ranks are affected by those 
other two kinds of public uses of funds: the government’s non-social expenditures 
(Ns in place of Ss), or to the overall budget surplus. Unfortunately, the paucity of 
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data on these incidences prevents our pursuing them in depth, and fixes our focus 
mainly on social spending and the revenues that pay for it.
Still, there is one major division within the non-social spending that has power-
ful redistributive meaning and is easy to document. Some kinds of non-social 
spending are investments that will clearly raise the incomes of future generations. 
If they are paid for by current taxes, these redistribute from older to younger gen-
erations. The most obvious examples are such infrastructure investments as trans-
portation structures, public buildings, science centers, and experiment stations. 
Other kinds of non-social spending have a more questionable claim to being 
investments in future generations. Running a budget deficit similarly redistributes 
from future generations toward the current generation. While such inter-genera-
tional redistribution is not at all the usual focus of the now-conventional studies of 
“fiscal redistribution” within a single year, the inter-generational issue proves to 
have been a distinctive problem for Latin America, and we must confront it first, 
before launching a longer exploration of the redistributions that play out completely 
within 1 year.
3  Today’s Redistributive Patterns in Latin America
The region redistributes income in distinctive ways. Before turning to today’s 
richly documented patterns in social expenditures, let us first stay with the theme 
of the inter-generational redistributions implicit in the patterns of recent non-social 
spending. The simple redistributive pattern in non-social expenditures is one that 
carries over to the shares of human investments in social spending.
3.1  Low Investment in Future Generations
Perhaps the most pervasive kind of redistribution between parts of society in modern 
peacetime is the redistribution between present and future generations of adults. 
Governments, businesses, and households all decide what share of their current 
incomes should be borrowed from the future or invested in it. Borrowing from the 
future may or may not raise inequality, now and later, depending on economic 
growth and how the borrowed funds are spent.
Was Latin American policy worse at investing in the future than policy in other 
continents? When? What roles were played in investment setbacks like the Latin 
American debt crisis of 1982? And was the failure to invest especially bad in 
income-leveling types of human investments, such as public education for the 
masses?
The investment component of government spending is notoriously difficult to 
separate out in the data for most countries, blocking our view of how Latin America 
contrasts with other regions in public non-social investment. Our view is also 
clouded by the long-standing difficulty in resolving how private investment in the 
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future is affected by taxation and by government capital formation. Our best short 
route is to look at the official, and imperfect, measures of total private and public 
formation of non-human capital in the national product accounts. Taking this one 
step delivers a much clearer view of something distinctive about the region.
The best-known measure of a region’s investing in the future is the share of 
national product that is channeled into forming non-human capital, both by private 
parties and by government. Ever since the 1960s we have been able to compare the 
private investment share for Latin America with the rest of the world’s shares, with 
the results shown in Fig. 1. Latin America has consistently shown less sacrifice of 
current consumption for accumulating future assets than the world as a whole, and 
particularly less than East Asia and the developing countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa.11 Eastern Europe and Central Asia have also invested greater shares 
than Latin America, even in the austere 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and central planning. Granted, India had a lower investment share than Latin 
America from the 1960s to the debt crisis of the 1980s, when Latin America’s 
investment rate was briefly the lowest among large regions; and granted, Africa 
South of the Sahara became the lowest-investing region from the late 1980s to the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Through it all, however, Latin America 
remained a below-average investor in future structures and equipment.
11 The low investment share has already been underlined by United Nations, ECLAC (2012, 
p. 117).
Fig. 1 Capital formation as share of GDP, World Regions, 1960–2012
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The region also invests little in human form. A cornerstone of modern growth has 
always been education in human skills and health. The traditional mechanism used 
by governments to promote such human development has been tax-based expendi-
tures on formal education. Ever since the dawn of publicly funded mass education 
in Western Europe and its English-speaking offshoots in the nineteenth century, 
Latin American countries have lagged behind other regions, even where they had 
comparable incomes per capita and similar capacity for raising government reve-
nue.12 Figure 2 and Table 1 underline this point with a present-day global snapshot. 
Latin American countries commit less to each child’s public education than other 
countries, where commitment is reflected in the generosity of funding per school-
age child and the ability to pay for it is reflected in GDP per capita.13 Some countries 
12 For a quantitative historical overview of the region’s disinclination to invest public money in 
mass schooling since 1870, see Lindert (2010). In terms of schooling outputs, its lagging behind 
all regions other than South Asia in the education attainment of adults since 1950 has been shown 
in Reimers (2006), Székely and Montes (2006, pp. 636–641), and Cohen and Soto (2007).
13 In general, having lower average education expenditure per child of school age also tends to be 
correlated with having greater inequality in education inputs and education outcomes. To see this 
tendency within Latin America, compare the figures in Table 1 with the measure of inequality in 
educational attainment found in ECLAC (2014, pp. 78–79).
Fig. 2 Supporting pensions vs. education: Latin America vs. others, 2010
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Table 1 Supporting pensions versus educating the young: Latin America versus other countries, 
2010
Support ratios
Public spending as 
a percent of GDP 
pensions education
Pension spending per 
person 65-up,/GDP 
per capita
Education spending per 
person 5–19/GDP per capita
Latin America
Argentina 7.4 5.8 0.58 0.24
Bolivia 1.5 7.6 0.28 0.22
Brazil 6.2 5.8 0.74 0.23
Chile 5.0 4.2 0.45 0.18
Colombia 3.5 4.8 0.53 0.17
Costa Rica 2.8 6.3 0.35 0.24
Dominican Rep 0.7 2.0 0.09 0.07
Ecuador 1.8 4.2 0.24 0.14
El Salvador 1.7 3.5 0.20 0.11
Guatemala 1.2 2.8 0.24 0.08
Guyana 0.1 3.7 0.02 0.10
Jamaica 0.7 6.4 0.07 0.22
Mexico 1.4 5.2 0.18 0.18
Paraguay 1.2 3.8 0.20 0.12
Peru 2.5 2.7 0.35 0.09
Uruguay 8.8 4.2 0.53 0.19
Venezuela 5.0 6.9 0.77 0.24
Other countries
Australia 3.4 5.8 0.20 0.31
Canada 4.2 5.5 0.24 0.33
France 12.5 5.9 0.59 0.35
Germany 10.7 5.1 0.44 0.37
Greece 13.5 4.1 0.60 0.30
India 2.2 3.3 0.40 0.11
Italy 14.1 4.5 0.57 0.34
Japan 8.8 3.8 0.32 0.29
Korea, Rep. 1.6 5.1 0.12 0.28
Poland 10.0 5.2 0.61 0.33
Portugal 10.8 5.6 0.50 0.38
Russian Fed’n 4.7 4.1 0.31 0.28
Spain 8.0 5.0 0.38 0.37
UK 5.4 6.2 0.27 0.37
USA 6.0 5.4 0.37 0.28
Vietnam 2.5 6.3 0.35 0.25
Sources and notes for Table 1 and Fig. 2: Public pension expenditures as shares of GDP are taken 
from Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012, Annexes II and III), and based in turn on the World Bank 
Pensions Database. The latter source explicitly notes that their pension expenditure data included 
both contributory and non-contributory pension benefits, contrary to our preference for data on 
non-contributory only
Government education spending as a percent of GDP, 2010: Unesco 2013 estimates from http://
stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer
UN populations by age group, 2010:http://esa.un.org/wpp/ExcelData/population.htm, accessed 17 
May 2013
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are reluctant to support anybody of any age group with taxpayers’ money, as in the 
Dominican Republic or Guyana. Others support their average elderly person quite 
generously, yet still commit much less to each child of school age, two global 
extreme cases being Brazil and Venezuela.14 Whether the pension money goes to 
rich retirees or to poor ones is a question to be taken up shortly. The essential point, 
though, is that the share of income going into educating children for future earning 
power is lower in Latin America than elsewhere in the world.
3.2  New Light on the Social Expenditure Side: Today’s 
Redistribution to Rich and Poor
What is now becoming clear about social expenditures comes to us mainly from 
some impressive team research efforts in The World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and now the Commitment to Equity project headed by Nora 
Lustig.15 Taking advantage of the international agencies’ vast accumulation of 
household surveys since the 1990s, these teams have been able to allocate the annual 
benefits from social programs among the different parts of the income spectrum, 
from the richest quintile (top 20 %) down to the poorest.
Table 2 displays what the international research teams have found about the 
“progressivity” or “regressivity” of distribution through different social expendi-
tures in the decade 2000–2009. Our usual yardsticks for progressivity and regressiv-
ity of a public expenditure lie in the range between two popular assumptions about 
the taxes that pay for them. One assumption is an equal absolute tax, or foregone 
equal subsidy, on every household. This “poll tax” assumption divides the “clearly 
progressive” social programs of Table 2, in the left-hand column, from all the rest. 
Programs listed there on the left would prove to be progressive even if they were 
paid for by a (famously regressive) poll tax, a fixed amount of tax on each house-
hold. A more popular assumption, used by economists to define fiscal neutrality, is 
a flat percentage tax on all income or expenditure. This assumption divides the 
“clearly regressive” social programs, on the right-hand side of Table 2, from all 
the rest. The regressive ones are so tilted toward high-income recipients that they 
distribute benefits even more unequally than the distribution of pre-fisc original 
incomes, meaning that the distribution of final post-fisc incomes is even more 
unequal than the original distribution.
14 Here, as will happen again in what follows, the measure of pensions is not the “redistributive” 
measure we seek. Rather we seek the amount of “non-contributory” payments for pensions, at the 
expense of the general taxpayer. All too often the available measures include pension benefits that 
are matched by the contributions of the employed, mixing such self-insurance in with true redistri-
bution. Nonetheless, the available measures offer the right qualitative contrasts, even when they 
overstate the redistributive part of public pensions.
15 DeFerranti et al. (2004), Lindert et al. (2006), Braceda et al. (2009), Lustig et al. (2011), Buchele 
et al. (2013), Sauma and Trejos (2014), and Public Finance Review (2014).
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Table 2 Progressive and regressive social spending programs, Latin American countries, 
2000–2010
Redistribution result (see notes for definitions)













Education Pre-primary Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
” Primary Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Peru,
Guatemala








Health Uruguay, Mexico Brazil
Consumption subsidies
” Food aid Costa Rica, Peru, 
Uruguay
” Gas, electricity 
subsidies
Bolivia Mexico







” Airline subsidies Argentina
” Water, potable Chile
Family aid Argentina, Brazil, 













The sources = Lindert et al. (2006), Lustig et al. (2011), Sauma and Trejos (2014, Fig. 6) and 
Buchele et al. (2013)
The definitions of redistribution results are
• “Clearly progressive” = Delivers more dollars per household to the poorer (lower quintiles) 
than to the richer. Thus it would be progressive even if financed by a poll tax
(continued)
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• “It depends” = Regressive in $, progressive in income shares = Fewer net dollars per household go 
to the poorer, but they receive a greater percentage of income than do the rich. It would be regres-
sive if financed by a head tax, but progressive if financed by a flat percentage tax on income
• “Regressive” = The distribution of benefits favors the rich even more than the distribution of 
original (pre-fisc) income
Some cases that straddle the border between "clearly progressive" and "it depends" are some pro-
grams that work out as nearly flat in absolute $ terms
• Argentine water and sanitation aid, and PAMI health
• Bolivia pensions
• Costa Rica health care and hospitalization
• Peru's two health subsidy programs (clearly progressive SIS health vs. ESSALUD health), and
• Uruguay secondary education
Table 2 (continued)
The results have rightly been summarized as “redistribution to the poor and the 
rich” among Latin America’s social expenditure programs since around the year 2000. 
Many programs were meant to be progressive, shifting income from rich toward poor; 
yet some programs may not do so, and a few programs clearly redistribute toward the 
rich. The most clearly progressive programs are basic family assistance and “condi-
tional cash transfers” (CCTs). The latter involve giving cash to poor parents (usually 
mothers) conditional on proof that their children were attending school and getting 
essential health care. The idea of means-tested CCTs was successfully invented and 
implemented in Brazil (bolsa familia, an extension of the previous bolsa escola) and 
Mexico (oportunidades, previously progresa). The clearly progressive CCTs have dif-
fused to other countries in Latin America and to other continents.
In the case of public subsidies to education, the progressivity of subsidies 
depends on the level of education. Having the taxpayers pay for primary education 
clearly helps out lower-income families in nearly every country studied in the recent 
literature on redistribution. Yet government subsidies to tertiary education, such as 
university, are often not progressive. The students getting the subsidies tend to be 
from better-off families than the average taxpayers, given that most taxes in Latin 
America are levied on items of mass consumption. Thus the progressivity or 
 regressivity subsidies to tertiary education “depends,” as shown in Table 2, on 
whether the government paid for the subsidies by levying the same absolute tax on 
every household or by levying a fixed share of household income.16
Consumption subsidies vary widely between clearly progressive and clearly 
regressive. The result depends on whether the subsidized commodity is a necessity 
of life or a luxury. Table 2 illustrates this variability by contrasting the means-tested 
subsidies on essential foods (Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay) and water (Chile) with the 
subsidies on airlines and agricultural estates (Argentina).
The impacts of public pension programs vary greatly, as Table 2 illustrates. 
Some are found to be clearly progressive (e.g., in Costa Rica, and Chile’s PASIS 
16 Cases of regressive or near-regressive subsidies to higher education abound throughout the 
globe. For a pioneering demonstration of the likely regressivity of funding for the University of 
California, see the widely cited and controversial study by Lee Hansen and Weisbrod (1969).
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pension benefits), while others are clearly regressive in four countries, and still 
others are in between.
In reaching these conclusions, the research teams have taken special care to iso-
late the effects of those pension benefits that are truly redistributed from those that 
are not. What they have isolated in their recent studies, and what we must isolate as 
much as possible in the historical data, are the non-contributory parts of the public 
pension programs, the parts paid for by general taxpayers. We need to avoid counting 
the pension benefits that are paid for by contributions from the employees them-
selves and by their employers. These are just part of the labor contract, and not 
redistributions through the government’s budgets.17 The recent wave of research has 
revealed some very large average shares of pension benefits not paid for by the 
recipients or their employers. Table 3 illustrates with recent information on pension 
program deficits as a share of the benefits paid. The researchers’ judgment is that 
these are true non-contributory (deficit) shares, and not run-downs from past 
 contributions. We return to the issue of pension deficits when exploring the quanti-
tative history of each country’s redistributive social spending.
The same kind of research on redistribution through social programs is extend-
ing around the globe. Some more global comparisons restricted to developing coun-
tries suggest a split in the Latin American degree of inequality reduction recently 
achieved by social protection and labor market programs. At the regressive end of 
17 In the case of pension benefits for government employees, whose employer is also the spender of 
tax revenues, redistribution cannot be identified just by looking at who paid the pensions. Rather 
one needs data on the deficit or underfunding of the public employee pensions, i.e., the amounts 
not covered by employer or employee contributions past or present.
Table 3 Average net pension subsidies in the early twenty-first century









Source and notes: The source is Lindert et al. (2006, p. 116)
For Brazil, pensions included (a) the system for private sector workers (RGPS) and (b) a system 
for public sector workers at the federal and sub-national levels of government (formerly RJU, then 
called RPPS). The deficit rates on these were averaged
For Chile, the authors used a weighted average of the 94 % deficit on INP benefits and an assumed 
zero percent deficit on AFP benefits. The figures necessarily exclude military pensions, for which 
the deficit was a high share
For the Dominican Republic, the general policy was for all pensions to be covered by contribu-
tions, even though not on a same-year basis
Mexico = weighted average for IMSS and ISSSTE
Peru = weighted average for SNP and Cedula Viva
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the scale, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru are among the few data-supplying countries 
with slightly regressive programs, ones that actually raise the Gini coefficient of 
inequality above that for original market incomes (along with Ghana, Rwanda, and 
Cambodia). Toward the more progressive end of the developing-country ranks are 
the four Southern Cone countries (ABC and Uruguay). Yet even these redistribute 
less progressively through their social programs than do the countries of the former 
Soviet zone.
Latin America’s status as an unequal and not-so-progressive region would likely 
show up in the intergenerational immobility, as distinct from inequality, of its 
incomes if we had sufficient data comparing income mobility around the world. As 
a workable proxy for such income mobility, we have a global comparison of inter-
generational mobility in years of schooling for the late twentieth century. Of the 42 
countries studied, the seven Latin American countries studied had the least educa-
tional mobility from parents to children. Clearly, the region has formidable barriers 
to one’s chances of changing ranks in education, given the position on one’s par-
ents.18 These barriers will soon reappear when we look at the restraints on the pro-
gressivity of public education finance.
Why is there so little redistribution in Latin America today? The near-null result 
has not emerged because of lack of scale, at least not for the whole region. In some 
Southern countries social spending has surpassed 20 % of GDP, a threshold that 
could define a “welfare state.” Rather, the politically implemented design of social 
spending and taxes is itself a mix of “redistribution to the rich and the poor,” with 
inconsistent social targets.
4  How Did This Happen?
4.1  The Evolution of Fiscal Mixes Since the Nineteenth 
Century
We can easily see the overall net result of fiscal redistribution since Latin American 
countries gained their independence. Indeed, if we were content to take a single leap 
back to the historical horizon of 200 years ago, the net result is obvious. Back then 
there was essentially zero government, as in most countries around 1820. The net 
changes over 200 years are simply the present-day patterns we have summarized in 
Table 1 and in Figs. 1, 2, and 3.
How did this happen? To know what forces have led to the present redistribu-
tions, and their limits, one needs to know the where and when. Narrative histories 
have painted an historical landscape filled with regime changes and clashes between 
18 See Hertz et al. (2007). To this list of 42, Mexico has now been added, and has the 14th lowest 
educational mobility between generations out of 43 (Velez-Grajales et al. 2014), just below the 
USA (16th lowest). We have not yet been able to determine whether the research procedures were 
the same for the Mexican study as for the other 42 countries.
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ethnic groups and special interests. New numbers can frame and support such 
paintings. We turn to the histories of some data-supplying countries, from which 
some patterns will emerge.
4.1.1  Chile Since 1842
Chile’s experience with fiscal redistribution is the mostly richly documented, and in 
recent years the most dramatic and controversial, of all countries in the region, aside 
from the Cuban Revolution. We shall use the size of Chile’s social budgets as a 
convenient baseline for commenting on the social spending efforts of each of our 
other five countries.
The rise of social spending as a share of GDP. Like the rest of the region since the 
1960s, the central government of Chile has expanded social spending, a prime vehi-
cle for fiscal redistribution, as shown in Table 4. And like the rest of the region, social 
spending evolved away from its being tiny and dominated by public education in the 
nineteenth century to devoting a rising share to transfers, especially  pension pay-
ments, rather than to human investments like public education and public health. The 
annual detail behind Table 4, however, shows the instability of Chile’s spending dur-
ing the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989). Education spending 
Fig. 3 Relative social spending benefits and tax burdens for Chile’s top, middle, and bottom 
income classes, 1965–2013. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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Table 4 Social spending shares of GDP
Average social spending as % of GDP, current prices




1842–99 0.40 n.a. 0 0 0.40
1900–29 1.08 0.03 0 0.03 1.14
1930–39 1.94 0.56 0 0.17 2.67
1940–49 2.11 0.95 0 0.22 3.28
1950–59 2.15 1.31 0 0.11 3.57
1960–73 3.60 1.93 0 0.91 6.44
1974–79 3.40 2.42 0 8.44 14.27
1980–89 3.18 2.72 1.92 10.52 18.34
1990–99 2.90 2.27 5.68 1.83 12.67
2000–09 3.68 2.99 6.71 0.62 14.00
2010–13 4.05 3.64 6.34 0.60 14.64
Argentina, central government
1870–99 0.07 n.a. 0.04 n.a. 0.11
1900–29 0.34 n.a. 0.09 n.a. 0.43
1930–39 1.97 n.a. 0.44 0.32 2.74
1947–49 1.91 n.a. 0.41 n.a. 2.31
Argentina, central, provincial, and municipal
1950–59 1.95 1.10 1.50 n.a. 4.55
1960–69 2.45 1.35 1.75 a 5.55
Argentina, consolidated government
1970–79 3.55 1.95 5.22 4.62 15.33
1980–89 3.15 3.62 5.31 2.80 14.88
1990–99 4.13 4.65 8.01 3.45 20.24
2000–09 5.09 4.80 7.42 4.36 21.67
Uruguay, central government
1910–29 1.20 0.96 1.30 0.01 3.47
1930–39 1.56 1.27 3.99 0.05 6.87
1940–49 1.48 0.95 4.11 0.03 6.57
1950–59 1.56 1.12 5.44 0.15 8.27
1960–69 2.81 1.29 6.73 a 10.84
1970–79 2.63 1.79 8.48 0.37 13.27
1980–89 2.37 2.26 10.50 0.54 15.68
1990–99 2.25 3.02 12.03 0.84 18.14
2000–08 3.12 3.64 12.69 1.45 20.89
Costa Rica, central government
1936–39 1.37 0.48 0.22 n.a. 2.06
1940–49 1.52 0.49 0.30 n.a. 2.31
1950–59 1.44 0.29 0.39 n.a. 2.11
1960–69 2.83 0.40 n.a. n.a. 3.23
(continued)
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Table 4 (continued)
Average social spending as % of GDP, current prices
Public education Public health
Non-contributory public 
pensions Other Total
1970–79 3.00 0.32 n.a. n.a. 3.32
Colombia, central government
1905–29 0.37 n.a. 0.00 1.12 1.49
1930–39 0.33 0.27 0.00 0.95 1.55
1940–49 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.93 1.46
1950–59 0.52 0.31 0.00 1.33 2.17
1960–69 1.26 0.45 0.00 1.63 3.34
1970–79 2.12 0.91 1.73 1.32 6.08
1980–89 2.63 0.79 2.55 1.02 6.99
1990–99 2.50 1.03 4.29 0.95 8.76
2000–09 3.04 1.88 5.84 0.42 11.19
2010–13 2.98 1.99 7.36 0.88 13.20
Costa Rica, consolidated government
1980–89 4.04 4.80 4.26 1.98 15.07
1990–99 4.06 4.66 4.53 1.82 15.06
2000–09 5.41 5.39 5.46 1.89 18.15
2010–13 7.17 6.56 6.62 2.28 22.63
Peru, central government
1900–29 0.08 b b b 0.66
1930–39 0.38 0.21 b b 1.14
1940–49 0.97 0.37 b b 1.42
1950–59 1.92 0.43 b b 2.48
1960–69 3.85 0.97 b b 5.27
1970–79 3.48 1.00 b b 4.99
1980–89 2.57 0.99 b b 4.00
1990–96 2.43 0.89 b b 3.86
Peru, general government
1997–99 3.13 1.25 2.55 0.59 7.52
2000–09 3.05 1.72 3.27 1.66 9.70
2010–13 3.01 2.24 2.41 1.79 9.45
Sources: See Appendix 1
Notes
n.a = positive, but unknown and excluded from “other” and from “total”
(a) = included in pensions
(b) = included in total social spending
For each decade, the averages refer to the data-supplying years within that decade, sometime refer-
ring to fewer than 10 years
For the underlying annual data, see http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, folder on “Government budget his-
torical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”
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gyrated, and pension spending gyrated even more. Let us first describe our resulting 
estimates of how these gyrations in overall social spending twisted the incomes of 
the rich, middle, and poorest income groups, before turning to our interpretation of 
the complex pension reforms that were at the center of the storm.
The distribution of social spending since 1965. How did social spending affect 
people in different income ranks? To answer this question requires the procedure we 
previewed above, in which we apply today’s fiscal incidence of different social 
expenditures, and the average tax mix that is assumed to pay for them, to each 
year’s social spending as a share of GDP. Table 5 summarizes the recent unit impacts 
Table 5 Fiscal benefits and costs as shares of GDP for benchmark years
Social spending Taxes Benefits






0.8 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.5 2.1 2.6 −0.4
Quintile 2 0.8 0.7 0.5 2.3 0.5 2.0 2.5 −0.2
Quintile 3 0.8 0.6 0.9 2.5 0.5 2.0 2.4 0.1
Quintile 4 0.8 0.4 1.7 3.1 0.5 2.0 2.5 0.6
Quintile 5 (top) 0.7 0.2 3.1 4.9 1.0 4.0 5.0 −0.1




1.8 2.4 4.4 9.6 0.0 1.6 2.6 7.0
Quintile 2 1.3 1.3 1.3 4.8 0.0 1.8 3.0 1.8
Quintile 3 1.0 0.8 1.1 3.7 0.0 2.2 3.7 0.0
Quintile 4 0.6 0.4 0.8 2.4 0.0 2.2 3.9 −1.5
Quintile 5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 4.5 2.1 8.3 −7.3
All households 5.0 5.0 7.9 21.4 4.5 9.8 21.4 0.0
Uruguay 2000
Quintile 1 1.8 2.1 11.5 16.4 0.4 4.3 4.7 11.6
Quintile 2 0.6 0.9 2.4 4.3 0.8 3.0 3.8 0.4
Quintile 3 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.8 1.2 2.6 3.8 −2.0
Quintile 4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.9 2.7 4.5 −3.7
Quintile 5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 4.1 2.6 6.7 −6.4
All households 3.0 3.8 15.0 23.5 8.3 15.2 23.5 0.0
Colombia 1966
Quintile 1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4
Quintile 2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4
Quintile 3 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
Quintile 4 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.3
Quintile 5 0.8 0.0 1.0 2.5 −1.4
All households 2.6 0.5 3.5 3.5 0.0
(continued)
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of each social program or tax on each of the five quintiles of households, in Chile 
and in three other countries.19
Concentrating on Chile’s experience since 1965, Fig. 3 reveals the estimated 
effects on different ranks by following two kinds of ratios. The ratio of the social 
payments to households in the top income quintile to those in the middle quintile, or 
Q5/Q3, represents (one plus) the “upper gap” we introduced earlier, and the ratio of 
the payments to households in the middle and bottom quintiles (Q3/Q1) represents 
the “lower gap”. During the military regime, the emphasis in social spending shifted 
in favor of the top 20 % of the income ranks, and their advantage in such payments 
has persisted ever since, although it is slowly declining. The bulk of this increase 
consisted of rising pension benefits favoring higher income households, and the 
pension movements cry out for explanation.
Untangling the pension reforms of 1979–1981. The pension system set up by 
Chile’s famous pension reform was, and still is, a huge share of annual GDP. To clear 
the way for understanding its effects, one should begin by noting that it is not what it 
19 Our estimates actually use greater detail by social program than is shown in Table 5. For example, 
different unit impacts are applied for primary versus secondary versus tertiary education. See the 
Excel files within the Government Budget Historical Series folder of http://gpih.ucdavis.edu.
Table 5 (continued)
Sources and notes
Our estimates actually use greater detail by social program than is shown in Table 5. For example, 
different unit impacts are applied for primary versus secondary versus tertiary education. See the 
Excel files within the Government Budget Historical Series folder of http://gpih.ucdavis.edu
As noted in the text, the total taxes are equal to social expenditures, with the assumption that such 
expenditures are paid for in the same revenue-type proportions as in the aggregate budget
For Chile, the main sources are Engel et al. (1999), Lindert et al. (2006), Jorrat De Luis (2009), 
Rodriguez and Flores (2010), Cruz-Saco and Mesa Lago (1998, 69), and Acuña Rodrigo and 
Augusto Iglesias (2001, Table 5)
Note that for Chile the total social expenditures include more than the three subcategories (educa-
tion, health, and pensions). Chile's tax incidence shares are from Engel et al. (1999), and refer to 
1996. These shares of total revenue are applied to revenues and GDP for the year 2000
For Argentina the main sources are: Gasparini (1999), Sabaini et al. (2002), and Lustig et al. 
(2011). Note also that for Argentina the total tax revenues exceed the subcategories, due to inclu-
sion of social security contributions. For Argentina's social security contributions, the quintiles 
paid these shares in 2000: Q1 paid 0.98 % of GDP, Q2 paid 1.19 %, Q3 paid 1.57 %, Q4 paid 
1.65 %, and Q 5 paid 1.73 %
For Uruguay, we lack a historical time series on social security taxes. We have, however, the esti-
mated distribution of such taxes across quintiles. With this Uruguayan exception, we have included 
social security contributions separately in the revenues covering social expenditures. For the 
Uruguay estimates we had to allocate social security contributions to direct and indirect taxes, in 
the proportions assumed by the latter two
Around the year 2000, Uruguay’s bottom quintile (Q1) paid 13.81 %, Q2 paid 16.74 %, Q3 paid 
22.03 %, Q4 paid 23.21 %, and Q5 paid 24.20 %
For Colombia 1966, the main source is Berry and Urrutia (1976) Estimates covering the expendi-
ture side for Colombia in 1974 can be found in Selowsky (1979). There were no public pensions 
in 1966
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is often described to be. It was not a privatization of Social Security, as many have 
thought. There was no social security system to replace, but only a flawed and incom-
plete pension system for the privileged occupational groups of the formal sector. 
The reform also did not exactly privatize or liberalize pensions. It forced individuals 
to place pension contributions and benefits more firmly in the hands of the state and 
the private pension managing funds (AFPs) that the state appointed. It also raised the 
state’s commitments and pension deficits, and these are projected to continue until 
2045. Government pension spending, far from phasing out, truly soared.
The 1979–1981 pension reform needs to be understood as a system with these 
key features:
 (1) The Pinochet regime inherited a badly broken and underfunded pension system 
in which formal sector workers were being subsidized. The regime chose to 
honor their underfunded entitlements by creating new government obligations 
to be covered by general taxpayers.
 (2) The reform exempted the military from individualized forced savings or the 
defined-contribution feature. Military personnel continue to get generous net 
defined benefits from the taxpayers.
 (3) To convert from defined benefit pensions to a defined-contribution system for 
civilians, the regime and its post-1989 successors have had to pay deficits to the 
transition generation. The deficits continue.
More specifically:
First, as mentioned, the previous system was badly broken, and the rise of unsus-
tainable obligations was hidden from the official data of those pre-reform years. The 
occupational system for the more established formal-sector occupations, dating 
back to the 1920s, was increasingly mismanaged after about 1955. What had been a 
contributory system that should have funded itself slid into deficit, as more and 
more employees evaded making contributions while keeping their benefit entitle-
ments. Between 1955 and 1979 the ratio of contributors to pensioners fell from 12.2 
to 2.5, a result which cannot be explained by demographic trends, but rather resulted 
from allowing evasion of contributions while delivering generous benefits to those 
covered (Acuña Rodrigo and Augusto Iglesias 2001, p. 20).
For our accounting framework, this poses a huge problem of fiscal timing. As 
we had warned earlier, fiscal programs often give tax or benefit accruals in years 
that can be quite distant from the years of collection or payout. The 1979–1981 
Chilean reform is perhaps the region’s largest case of such a discrepancy. The obli-
gations taken on in the 1980s in effect honored formal sector workers’ evasion of 
pension contributions dating back to the 1950s, with benefits to be paid over sub-
sequent years in ways that our studies have trouble tracking year by year. The mili-
tary regime found itself inheriting a dilemma, one forcing it to choose between a 
shocking markdown of all occupational pension benefits and honoring the obliga-
tion to cover the full deficit. They chose the latter, with the result that the huge 
pension expenditures favoring higher-income beneficiaries suddenly show up in 
our graphs around 1975, even though they had secretly accrued over the previous 
two decades.
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Second, as we have noted, the Pinochet regime did not dare to slash military 
pensions, nor did it include them in the forced-saving reform, even when holding its 
firmest grip on power.
Third, like any change in pension regime that tightens up, in pursuit of eliminat-
ing deficits, Chile’s new system faced the threat of double-taxing the transitional 
generation, forcing it to pay for the preceding generation’s retirement while also 
paying for its own. Like the military exemption, this necessitated deficits lasting for 
a generation, from 8.4 % of GDP in 1982 to 3.9 % by the close of the century.20
At face value, the pension benefits suddenly became huge after the coup, and 
have stayed that way. In giving this impression Figs. 3 and 4 correctly portray what 
happened on an “accruals accounting” basis; yet they may mislead by portraying 
the movements as though the resources were paid out, in the cash accounting sense, 
at peak years like 1981–1986.
20 One further drawback of the reform design was avoidable, rather than inherent. The Chilean AFP 
(private pension fund administrators) system levied charges that are widely agreed to have been 
exorbitant. “One quarter of net (of insurance fees) mandatory contributions of the average Chilean 
contributor who retired in 2000 went to administration fees.” The fees loomed somewhat larger for 
lower earnings savers.
Fig. 4 Net benefits minus taxes paid, on social expenditure in Chile, 1965–2013. Sources and 
notes: see Appendix 1
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To portray the level, and the distribution, of pension benefits correctly, we have 
taken care to use measures of just the redistributive, or non-contributory part of all 
pension payments. Again, the part covered by current contributions is not redis-
tributive. For 1981 on, we can interpret the Acuña Rodrigo and Augusto Iglesias 
(2001, Table 5) social security deficit part of pension payments as the redistributive 
component. It was the “total social security deficit,” most of which was the “transi-
tory social security operational deficit,” with much smaller amounts for Recognition 
Bonds and for the more permanent welfare and minimum pensions.21 The measures 
for the 1970s and earlier are less straightforward, for want of a clear measure of the 
pension deficit in those years.22
The deficit was huge, taking at least 8.4 % of GDP in 1982, and still over 4 % at 
the dawn of this century. Clearly, the transition from a broken and underfunded 
system to a fully funded “defined contributions” system was fiscally costly for 
Chile, as it has also proved for other countries imitating Chile’s transition. It was 
also not progressive in Chile’s case, since the beneficiaries of the deficit were, and 
still tend to be, upper income groups, largely the same formal sector groups that 
underpaid for their pension entitlements before the reform.23
Adding in the tax side. For Chile we have an opportunity to complete our counter-
factual on the tax side. That is, there exist studies of how different kinds of taxes are 
distributed across the income groups “today,” where today is the year 1996, thanks to 
Engel et al. (1999). Their article on “unpleasant redistributive arithmetic” derived 
Chile’s distribution of direct taxes versus two kinds of indirect taxes in 1996, and we 
were able to apply their separate distributions to the shares of direct and indirect taxes 
back to 1965. This yields the distribution of taxes between high-, middle-, and low-
21 Had we instead used the “state subsidy to social security” share of GDP given by Cruz-Saco and 
Mesa-Lago (1998, p. 69), the estimates would have been slightly higher—e.g., 8.8 % of GDP 
instead of 8.4 % for 1982, and 6.6 % instead of 4.8 % for 1993.
22 We assume that before 1955 there was zero net deficit and zero redistribution. That is, we assume 
that the pre-1955 pensions in the public accounts were wholly contributory. Acuña Rodrigo and 
Augusto Iglesias (2001) note that there were many contributors per recipient then, but that the sys-
tem fell apart under mismanagement until the Pinochet reforms. What to do about the years 1955–
1981? It would seem natural to imagine a drop in the contributory share from 100 to 0 % over these 
years. This would understate the rise in regressive redistribution toward the rich, since the official 
data on pension payments record only low out-payments in these years, and not the hidden buildup 
of obligations that were recognized only after 1981. We have no choice but to go with the available 
data, using a current cash-flow approach and assuming that the out-payments occurred only from 
1981 on. Much post-1981 regressivity actually accrued earlier. For 1976–1980, we interpret the 
“otros funciones sociales” as fully non-contributory and as regressive as the non-PASIS pensions at 
the end of the century. From 1981 on, we apply the Acuña-Iglesias social security deficit as the non-
contributory part of both social security (previsión) and “other social programs.”
Note that these pension payments and the special “otras funciones sociales” payments remain 
outside the usual calculations of annual disposable or final income in the year in which they are 
paid by the government. They trickled into benefits in earlier years in the case of pensions, and 
possibly later years for other programs.
23 The quantitative embodiment of this statement is that for the pension recipients’ payments out of 
the deficit we used the quintile shares estimated for Chile’s non-PASIS pensions in Lindert et al. 
(2006, Tables 7 and 8).
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income groups shown already in Fig. 3, and now in Fig. 4. Both portrayals show that 
the years of military rule were remarkably favorable to top income groups and unfa-
vorable to the bottom, relative to the earlier and later regimes of democratically 
elected governments. Adding taxes into the picture shows an additional reason why: 
the top 20 % got a relative tax break, one that was largely reversed by the concertación 
government starting in 1991, as is also clear in Figs. 3 and 4.
Chile’s shift toward more progressive redistribution, and lower post-fisc inequal-
ity, since 2000 has been widely noted.24 Our Figs. 3 and 4 confirm the rise in redis-
tributive progressivity. The middle income groups regained a net positive fiscal 
effect across the 1990s, and the poorest quintile gained positive redistribution from 
2005 on. The underlying mechanism, while not entirely clear, seems to have worked 
mainly on the tax side. Direct tax collections rose considerably as a share of govern-
ment revenue, while the value added tax dropped. Given that the former fall mainly 
on the top quintile and the latter are neutral or slightly regressive, the revenue shift 
should have been progressive, as our figures imply.
4.1.2  Argentina Since World War II
Argentina’s commitment to social spending gained steam during Perón’s adminis-
tration with expansion of education and social security; however, these policies 
were consolidated in later decades, as social spending became a larger share of the 
budget. This evolution was far from steady, as the Argentine economy failed to 
achieve stable economic growth. The social welfare state suffered a setback in the 
late 1970s with a sharp impact on the social security and labor market programs 
paired with a more regressive taxation system. Employer contributions were seen as 
detrimental to the private sector’s competitiveness, resulting into their subsequent 
abolition. With lower direct tax collection and increasing inflation tax, the net ben-
efits of the bottom quintile stagnated at best. From the 1980s onwards, while social 
spending increased in terms of GDP, this rise was far from stable. Social spending 
has been more volatile than GDP growth and has run pro-cyclically. This combina-
tion has eroded its effectiveness as progress in education and health requires sus-
tainable social spending. That said, the sheer magnitude of Argentina’s tax effort on 
behalf of social spending, as a share of GDP, jumped far ahead of Chile’s in the 
1990s, under Menem. Argentina’s greater social spending share has not fallen back 
in the twenty-first century, despite the depth of the 2001 crash and the steepness of 
the subsequent recovery.
State-induced redistribution. With the advent of populism in Argentina, income 
redistribution towards the popular class became a priority for the new government. 
Under Perón’s initial presidencies (1946–1955), the public sector quickly expanded 
24 For example, see Chile’s redistribution coefficients in global perspective in Solt (2009, 2014). 
Rodriguez Weber (this volume) finds a leveling in pre-fisc labor earnings from 1988 to 2000, but 
no pre-fisc leveling after 2000. Combining his result with the others would suggest, again, a shift 
toward progressive redistribution after 2000.
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with the proliferation of ministries and the takeover of public utilities.25 Social 
spending followed the trend, with education rising from 6 % of the budget to nearly 
15 % by the end of the term. This commitment to education translated into a rise in 
enrollment reaching 50 % of the children in schooling age, a net 12-percentage- 
point increase from 1945 (Véganzonès and Winograd 1997). While education was 
an important component of social spending before 1970, the expansion of the pen-
sion system’s coverage turned into an important source of benefits, mostly to the 
urban population.26 The redistributive efforts worked, as wage earners’ GDP share 
climbed ten percentage points by 1954 to reach over 48 % of GDP by 1954.27 This 
impressive gain, however, was mostly due to public credit policies increasing mon-
etary wages, including a very popular innovation of the compulsory Christmas 
bonus (the “Aguinaldo”).28 Taking advantage of the taxation infrastructure estab-
lished in the 1930s, the government expanded taxation by increasing rates . Faced 
with insufficient revenue, sales taxes rose from 1.25 to 8 % while profit and export 
taxes were also targets (Blanco 1956; Gerchunoff 1989). Later, the government 
attempted to ameliorate the regressive character of the tax system by decreasing 
taxes of basic necessities (Banco Central 1955).
More significant was the progressive role of the income tax (see Fig. 5). The top 
rates were increased from 7 to 22 % in 1942 to be revised again a decade later 
(Alvaredo 2007). Income tax collection grew accordingly reaching 2.7 % of GDP 
during the Peronato compared to 0.7 % during the previous decade.
The revenue-enhancing reforms failed to cover the growing public expenditure, 
and the government resorted to tapping social security funds. The growing imbal-
ance of the fiscal accounts translated into inflation, reaching nearly 10 % of GDP in 
1949. Though it decreased subsequently, the inflation tax was to remain a feature in 
the fiscal and daily lives of Argentina.
Consolidation and retreat of social spending with less progressive taxation, 1955–
1989. Life after Perón was plagued with sudden changes in economic policy. The 
intermittent and interrupted long-term and stabilization programs hampered economic 
growth. In terms of social spending, the central government devoted considerable 
resources in the 1960s and 1970s to reach around 10 % of GDP, and over 25 % for all 
levels of government combined. Social assistance transfers (pensions and “other”) 
represented nearly 40 % of all social spending by the central government. Progressive 
taxation remained in place for another decade post Perón but it had unraveled by 
mid-1970s with a substantial decrease in direct taxes as a source of revenue.29
25 Moreover, an increasing share of public expenditure was off the treasury records such as state 
railroads, the trade institute (IAPI), and the national mortgage bank.
26 By the turn of the twentieth century, the pension system in Argentina included only public 
employees. Before Peronist times, the system expanded to include employees from banking, insur-
ance, press, and naval and air transportation (Arza 2010).
27 Estimations based on CEPAL (1958) considering only salaries.
28 Established by Decree number 33.302/45. Technically, this extra salary was established before 
Perón’s presidencies; however, the origin of this idea is traced to Perón’s stint as Secretary of Labor 
between 1943 and 1945.
29 Again see Fig. 5. Gaggero (2008) maintains that the elites and their short-run macroeconomic 
policies are to blame for this development.
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Curiously the military governments did not eradicate the welfare state introduced 
by Perón, but consolidated it with an array of inefficient policies within the frame-
work of a state-oriented economy.30 Dubbed as paternalistic and rooted in Catholic 
views of a more unified society, the state expanded social security to include a new 
national housing system (FONAVI) funded by employers’ tax contributions. 
However, this expansion was short-lived. In 1979 the employers’ contributions are 
abolished, defunding the pension system and the public housing program. This sharp 
turn in social policy reduced the relative benefits of the top and middle quintiles as 
shown in Fig. 5. This slash of the benefits was outweighed by the government’s rising 
use of the sales tax to recoup revenue (Marshall 1988). With inflation graduating 
from moderate to high (and even reaching hyperinflation in 1989 and 1990), 
the taxation system turned much more regressive.31 For the 1980s, the inflation tax 
incidence on wage earners hovered around 2.2 to nearly 6 % of GDP per year. 
However, the impact was 3:1 when comparing the first to the fifth quintile, making 
the tax incidence more regressive due to the increasing monetization of the fiscal 
30 Franco (1992) claims that the social policies in Latin America during this period were useless as 
they only granted segmented access and excluding universalism.
31 As our estimations for relative tax incidence are based on 2009 figures, the impact of inflation tax 
is absent. Given its regressive nature, our estimates of tax incidence for the late 1980s most likely 
appear more progressive than they probably were.
Fig. 5 Benefits of social spending, rich vs. middle vs. poor, Urban Argentina, 1870–2009. Sources 
and notes: see Appendix 1
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deficit (Ahumada et al. 1993). Figure 6 shows the regressive net effect of this combi-
nation in the 1980s.
The rise of social spending along with changes in taxation, 1990–2013. Since 
1992 Argentina’s social spending has been more volatile, pro-cyclical—and more 
progressive, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Spending on social security has expanded, 
and the pension system alone reached almost 74 % of total spending in 2013. This 
time, however, the rise in pensions was progressive. The extension of coverage and 
the rise in social security paychecks explains most of this increase. Consistent with 
the retreat of post-fisc inequality observed in the 2000s, the net fiscal benefits for the 
bottom quintile increased substantially to nearly reach 5 % of GDP.32 On the taxa-
tion side, the Menem government introduced a two-sided change. On the regressive 
side, it relied more on the value-added tax with rates climbing to 21 % while the 
income tax rate for the top bracket was reduced to 33 % in 1997 (to be increased 
32 On volatility and pro-cyclicality, the correlation between real GDP and real social spending is 
above 0.8 for using both central and total government spending. When testing changes in real GDP 
vs. changes in real social spending the coefficient drops to 0.5. The volatility of real social spend-
ing relative to real GDP (measured as the standard deviation of the annual real changes) is three 
times higher.
On the changes in the design of social security, see Selva and Iñiguez (2009).
Fig. 6 Net Benefits minus taxes paid, on social spending by consolidated government, Argentina 
1970–2009. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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2 percentage points 3 years later). Yet at the same time, it improved tax collection 
by reducing evasion. This latter, progressive, side of the coin takes on a strong form 
in our Figs. 5 and 6, which show a trend toward progressivity shared by the other-
wise very different presidencies from Menem to the Kirschners.
The impact of this mix actually worsened inequality in the late 1990s, according to 
CEPAL estimates.33 Still, the expansion of social spending with an increase of overall 
tax collection gave rise to a more progressive fiscal redistribution since 1992.
4.1.3  Uruguay, the Social Spending Leader Over the Last 100 Years
Though the region has lagged in public education spending ever since Independence, 
Uruguay was an early leader in education levels, helped by its initially high income 
(Lindert 2010; Rodriguez Weber and Thorp 2013). Its commitment to primary 
and secondary education did not flag, although Chile and Argentina caught up by 
the 1930s.
In terms of social assistance, the 1930s saw a jump, due to enlarging the social 
security system, and to expanding the pension system to cover workers in the for-
mal industry and commerce sectors.
What shows up even more clearly in the history of social spending is a consistent 
Uruguayan tendency toward equalizing incomes. As shown in Fig. 7, Uruguay’s 
33 Cetrángolo and Gómez-Sabaini (2006).
Fig. 7 Benefits of social spending benefits minus taxes for them, rich vs. middle vs. poor, Uruguay 
1910–2008. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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social spending has been highly progressive throughout the last 100 years. The long 
rise of the redistribution in terms of GDP, so conspicuous in Fig. 7, is due mainly to 
the expansion in the size of social budgets, rather than to any shift toward greater 
unit progressivity of social programs. For at least a 100 years Uruguay has had a 
more progressive mix of social programs than in Chile.34 Certainly the mix is more 
progressive today, as Table 5 testifies.
One potential interruption to the upward march of social spending came with 
military rule in 1973–1985. In this respect Uruguay’s time path could have resem-
bled that of Chile and Argentina. Yet in Uruguay the military rule did not reverse 
either the expansionary trend or the progressivity of social programs, as evident in 
Fig. 7. Thus Uruguay stands out as the region with the longest-standing trend toward 
progressive redistribution.
4.1.4  Colombia—Half Progressive, Half Regressive
Colombia’s patterns of fiscal incidence are decidedly mixed, according to two stud-
ies of social spending and taxes in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, public 
primary education and all rural public services have been progressive, even in the 
“clearly progressive” sense delineated in Table 3 above. Subsidies to university 
education were highly regressive, in Colombia as elsewhere, although the magni-
tude of university subsidies was small in relation to the amounts given out in the 
other programs. Also regressive were urban public services. On balance, the entire 
fiscal system seems to have redistributed only a small share of national income, 
perhaps 1.4 %, from the top quintile the other 80 % of the population as of 1966.35
On the pension front, once public pensions were started in 1967, Colombia has 
followed in Chile’s footsteps, both in the under-contribution problem inherited by 
reformers in 1993 and in the regressive deficits that the reforms brought to light. 
Again, as in Chile, repairing and removing the handover from the previous defined 
benefit system have proven difficult ever since the reforms were launched, in this 
case by Law 100 in 1993. Though the reform tried to set up a pension reserve, it was 
exhausted as early as 2004. Since the pension system covers only 25–27 % of the 
labor market, under a dual private-public regressive scheme, the central government 
has been forced to cover pension deficits out of about a third of its total tax revenues, 
or nearly 5 % of GDP. As shown in Table 4, Colombia fits the regional pattern of 
veering toward dominance of non-contributory pensions in its social programs, 
despite attempts to curb this tendency.36
34 Azar et al. (2009) and Rodriguez Weber and Thorp (2013).
35 For Colombia 1966, the main source is Berry and Urrutia (1976). Estimates covering the expen-
diture side for Colombia in 1974 are found in Selowsky (1979). For the net result in 1966, see 
Table 5.
36 Clavijo 2009, pp. 3–14.
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4.1.5  Costa Rica Since the 1940s
As the available numbers in Table 4 suggest, Costa Rica has had a steadier growth 
of social spending than some of the other countries.
As compared with Uruguay, Costa Rica redistributes less progressively each year, 
in the sense of reducing the Gini coefficient of inequality. Yet as of 2003, it has 
achieved greater equality of final income, and also greater equality of original (mar-
ket, or pre-fisc) income. How? The contrast can have many explanations, including 
the countries’ fortunes in international trade. One element of social policy seems to 
have contributed. Since at least 1900, Costa Rica has poured a greater share of 
national product into public primary and secondary education than has Uruguay, and 
the difference persists in this century. Its broader skill base has produced more equal-
ity in the long run by equalizing basic earning power, thereby achieving a greater 
reduction in inequality than Uruguay’s more ambitious pensions and other transfer 
payments, even though both have existed since the dawn of the twentieth century. 
Here again, we must remember that each year’s egalitarian investments have a longer 
lasting, though delayed, effect on equality than that year’s expenditures can show.
On the public pension front, Costa Rica started developing its system early. Its 
pre-1948 institutional innovations became a permanent feature of Costa Rica's 
equity oriented policy framework, despite the defeat of the system’s original design-
ers during the civil war in 1949–1950. Costa Rica has more recently had the same 
problems of incomplete pension coverage and underfunding as in other countries, 
but these never became as serious as in Chile or Brazil or Colombia. The guidelines 
of social policy, like the larger issues of governance, were effectively resolved in the 
middle of the twentieth century, with a combination of political cooperation, fore-
sight, and a lucky boom in coffee exports.37
4.1.6  Peru Since the 1940s
Peru has always spent a lower share of GDP on social programs than even Chile, as 
Table 4 has shown. And on balance, its fiscal redistributions have not yielded any 
net progressivity. The social policies since the 1940s in Peru have derived from the 
role that the state played in the economy, swaying from interventionism to (neo)
liberalism. The steady growth of social spending since the 1940s was abruptly inter-
rupted with the crisis of the late 1980s, and then resumed in the following decades.
Modest progress under an interventionist state. From 1945 to 1948, the govern-
ment adopted a pro-distribution stance through income policies (such as price 
freezes and wage increases) and extension of social policies (including free and 
universal secondary education and the Sunday wage). The state was seen as a means 
of economic development and social integration and social spending increased 
accordingly. With a change to a more liberal regime the government implemented a 
37 On the early innovations, see Gonzalez-Vega and Céspedes (1993, pp. 82–85). For an appraisal 
of Costa Rica’s redistributive policies today, see Oviedo et al. (2015, pp. 23–61).
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more pragmatic social policy with selected programs in education and health. From 
a macroeconomic point of view, none of these initiatives amounted to more than 2 % 
of GDP. The government intervention to foster social progress had limited impact 
by the early 1960s. While the net benefits were progressive, they did little to over-
come the initial market-based inequalities, especially for the rural traditional sector. 
Confronted with this reality the military government headed by President Velasco 
(1968–1973) initiated an ambitious plan to redistribute income and wealth. This 
conscious commitment to redistribution translated into a significant increase in 
social spending.38
Crisis and reform. The 1980s meant a continuous struggle to achieve macroeco-
nomic stabilization resulting in a decrease of social and total public spending cul-
minating in hyperinflationary episodes in 1987–1990. In the following decade the 
reorganization of the public sector included an expansion of social spending, espe-
cially in education and health. That expansion notwithstanding, Peru’s fiscal redis-
tribution failed to be progressive overall, as shown by the studies that have led to 
Table 2.
5  Summary: What the Emerging Historical Patterns Suggest
Most countries’ social expenditure programs end up redistributing to an intermedi-
ate degree—that is, in the intermediate range shown in Table 2. They deliver a 
greater absolute value of benefits to higher income groups, relative to a flat per 
capita “poll subsidy.” That looks regressive. On the other hand, they deliver rewards 
that are less unequal than the distribution of original incomes. That means that their 
expenditure pattern dampens the serious inequalities of original income. This 
slightly progressive tendency is reinforced by the modest progressivity in tax rates 
as a share of original market income.
Of the six countries covered here, the two most progressive have been Uruguay 
and Argentina, which have historically met the standard of absolute progressivity 
for a few decades. To judge from the region-wide situation at the start of the twenty- 
first century, those two countries may have been the only absolutely progressive 
countries in all of Latin America, aside from Cuba.
To this pattern of only middling progressivity in social programs and taxes, we 
have added the easily documented tendency of Latin America to redistribute toward 
the current senior generation by investing little in the younger generations. Over 
recent decades the countries in the region have increasingly squandered lost eco-
nomic capital and growth by spending their political capital on subsidizing the older 
generations with non-contributory public pensions. Of the countries studied here, 
the Southern Cone has redistributed away from future generations the most, and 
38 On social policies up through the 1960s, see Contreras and Cueto (2004) and Webb (1975). 
President Velasco’s wealth redistribution policies included land reform, nationalization, and 
worker cooperatives (Figueroa 1995).
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Costa Rica has done so the least. While Peru and Colombia have also tended to tilt 
toward pensions, they have done so with smaller overall budgets in relation to GDP, 
and their regressive side has manifested itself in more conventional ways.
This low-investment tendency has featured a hundred-year history of lower 
investment in primary and secondary education. The implied prescription is to seize 
the opportunity, at last, of achieving both more equality and faster growth with 
broader investments in human skills. In this prescription our study seems to be in 
accord with the present-day prescription of Augusto de la Torre and co-authors:
“[E]fforts to equalize opportunities for human capital formation, particularly by broadening 
the access to high quality education regardless of socio-economic background, must be at 
the core of the search for shared prosperity in [Latin America and the Caribbean].”39
The region as a whole still has time to reduce the pension deficits that even 
Chile’s reform have not yet tamed. The opportunity is there because the region’s 
populations are still younger than those of the core OECD countries or Eastern 
Europe. Yet the political will may not be there, in view of how readily the appetite 
for non-contributory public pensions has grown since the 1960s, and how half- 
hearted the commitment to public education remains.
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 Appendix 1: Data Sources and Notes for Table 4 and Figs. 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Table 4
Argentina
Revenue = 1900–1931: Vasquez-Presedo (1971), 1932–1964: AFIP (2009), 
1965–2006: Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2006), 2007–2013: AFIP 
(2010), AFIP (2011), AFIP (2012), AFIP (2013).
Expenditure = 1900–1915: Dirección General de Estadística (1915); 1929–1939: 
Vasquez-Presedo (1971); 1940–1962: Based on national budgets, Infoleg (2014), 
and IEERAL (1986); 1965–2006: Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2006), 
Oficina Nacional del Presupuesto (2014).
Nominal GDP = 1900–1932: Ferreres (2005); 1932–2013: Ministerio de 
Economia y Finanzas (2014ab).
Chile
Revenue and expenditure = until 2000: Díaz et al. (2010); 2000–2013: online data 
from Banco Central de Chile and Ministerio de Economía.
Nominal GDP = Warner et al. (2000).
Colombia
Revenue = 1900–1920: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(1973); 1920–2003: Junguito y Rincón (2007); 2004–2013: Banco Central de 
Colombia (2014). For detailed data on income and wealth taxes: Anuario de 
Estadística General, various numbers and Dirección General de Presupuesto Público 
Nacional (2014).
Expenditure = 1900–1920: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(1973); 1920–2003: Junguito y Rincón (2007); 2004–2013: Banco Central de 
Colombia (2014). For detailed data on public expenditure by type: Anuario de 
Estadística General, Banco Central de Colombia (1997), Dirección General de 
Presupuesto Público Nacional (2014).
Nominal GDP = GRECO (1998, 1999) and Banco Central de Colombia (2014). 
Note that nominal GDP experienced significant increase in the 1990s and over 35 % 
from 1999 to 2000 due to a change in methodology. For the data series, see in http://
gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government budget historical series,” under the 
heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”, the file “Colombia central gov’t 
budgets 1901–2013.”
Costa Rica
Revenue = 1870–1958: total public revenue and by type kindly provided by Juan 
Diego Trejos. According to the tables, the data correspond to central government as 
reported by Román Trigo (1995). 1959–1970s: total public revenue and by type 
from Ramírez (1977); 1970–2013: total public revenue and by type from the 
Ministerio de Hacienda and the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Resource revenue cor-
responds to taxes on bananas and coffee. 1997–2012: Total revenue (including local 
government and decentralized units excluding the financial sector): Ministerio de 
Hacienda. Gobierno General: Ministerio de Hacienda (2014).
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Expenditure = 1870–1958: total public revenue and by type kindly provided by 
Juan Diego Trejos. According to the tables, the data correspond to central govern-
ment as reported by Román Trigo (1995). 1973–2013: Total and debt expenditure: 
from the Ministerio de Hacienda and the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 1991–2013: 
Social expenditure estimated based on CEPAL. 1997–2012: Total expenditure 
(including local government and decentralized units excluding the financial sector): 
Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria Unidad de Análisis y Seguimiento 
Fiscal (2014) and Sauma and Trejos (1999).
Nominal GDP and nominal investment = 1950–2003: data kindly provided by 
Juan Diego Trejos; 2004–2014: Central Bank of Costa Rica. Note that the GDP was 
re-estimated starting in 1991 resulting in a 25–35 % increase in GDP.
For the data series, see in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government 
budget historical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”, 
the file “Costa Rica fiscal 1870–2013.”
Peru
Revenue = Total and composition: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992), 1990–
2013: Banco Central de Peru (2014).
Expenditure = Total: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992), 1990–2013: Banco 
Central de Peru (2014). Composition: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992); 1970–
2013: Debt payments: Banco Central de Peru (2014); 1998–2013: Education and 
Health: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2014b), Defense and Pensions: 
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2014a).
Nominal GDP = 1900–1949: Seminario and Beltrán (1998); 1950–2013: Banco 
Central de Peru (2014).
For the data series, see in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government 
budget historical series,”under the heading“ Latin American fiscal redistribution,” 
the file “Peru gov’t budgets 1900–2013.”
Uruguay
Revenue, expenditure, and nominal GDP = until 1999 Azar et al. (2009); 2000–
2008 online data from Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas.
Figure 1 (gross capital formation)
The source is World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/), accessed 13 
March 2014.
Figure 2 (education versus pensions)
The sources are as listed for Table 1.
Figures 3 and 4 (Chile)
The sources for fiscal data and nominal GDP are as listed for Table 4. The esti-
mates of fiscal redistribution have utilized the studies by Engel et al., K. Lindert 
et al., and Lustig et al., as quantified in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for 
“Government budget historical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal 
redistribution,” the file “Chile quintile effects 1842–2013.”
Figures 5 and 6 (Argentina)
The sources for fiscal data and nominal GDP are as listed for Table 4. The esti-
mates of fiscal redistribution have utilized the studies by Gasparini, Gómez Sabaini 
et al., Subsecretaria de Coordinación Económica, Lustig et al., SEDLAC, and 
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UNU-Wider cited in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu the folder for “Government budget his-
torical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution,” the file 
“Argentina fiscal incidence 1870–2009.”
The level of government portrayed here varies by parameter and by time period. 
As far as we can determine from Gasparini (1999) and Lustig (2011), the allocation 
of recent-benchmark fiscal incidence effects refers to the effects of all consolidated 
government, not just central government. These recent-benchmark allocations are 
based on survey data, without any clear distinctions as to the level of government 
doing the taxing or making the social expenditures. When it comes to the historical 
fiscal data, however, the scope of government differs as follows:
For 1870–1949, central government budgetary data only
For 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965, central, provincial, plus municipal govern-
ments; and for 1970–2009, consolidated accounts for all levels of government
Figure 7 (Uruguay)
The historical series on social budgets are from Azar et al. (2009). The distribu-
tion of household income per capita by decile, year 2000 is from WIID2c, down-
loaded January 2014, www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/. The 
fiscal incidence assumptions are borrowed from Buchele et al. (2013). See the cal-
culations in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government budget historical 
series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution,” the file “Uruguay 
quintile fiscal effects 1910–2008.”
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Inequality in Latin America: ECLAC’s 
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Verónica Amarante and Antonio Prado
Equality has been at the center of ECLAC´s analysis of the region since structuralist 
times. In those pioneering writings, the distribution of assets and the concentration 
of power in the hands of elites were crucial aspects to understand (the lack of) 
equality in the region. Following this tradition, the last three documents that the 
institution submitted for consideration by the Governments of Latin America and 
the Caribbean at its three last sessions have put equality back in the center of the 
regional agenda, expanding the conception of equality beyond distributive fair-
ness—whose scope tends to be confined to the distribution of transferable, quantifi-
able resources—taking in other dimensions and considering equality in a “relational” 
context of socialization, autonomy, and recognition.
As put forth in Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (ECLAC 2010), the 
quest for equality is part of the drive to abolish privileges and establish equal rights 
for all individuals, regardless of origin, affiliations, or position in society. It calls not 
only for universal civil and political rights but also for advancing towards distributive 
justice in which everyone enjoys the benefits of progress. Time for equality argued 
that equality stands at the crossroads between economic growth, social inclusion, and 
recognition of diversity, advocating a kind of development that forges a positive link 
between greater equality and gains in productivity, capacities, and sustainable 
growth. The document postulated that social equality and the kind of economic dyna-
mism that transform production patterns are not at odds with each other and that the 
challenge is to find synergies between the two. The growth strategy should include 
less structural heterogeneity and more productive development, and the pursuit of 
equality through the enhancement of human capacities and the mobilization of state 
energies. The basic idea is the need of building more cohesive societies around pro-
ductive dynamics, constructing positive social and territorial synergies, and strength-
ening the protection of individuals through improvements in labor markets.
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The economic content of this approach was further developed in Structural 
Change for Equality: An Integrated Vision of Development (ECLAC 2012), which 
understands structural change as the path leading to greater equality. In this vision, 
structural change means putting qualitative changes in the production structure at 
the centre of the growth dynamic. Improved global insertion and virtuous growth 
in domestic productivity and employment call for greater participation by knowl-
edge-intensive sectors in overall production. This fosters the building of capaci-
ties, knowledge, and learning in coordination with production and investment 
across the economy. For the region, structural change must take place on two 
interconnected fronts: enhancing the share of more knowledge-intensive sectors 
in production and trade, and diversifying towards sectors where domestic and 
external demand is expanding rapidly, so that demand can be met with domestic 
supply and imports and exports can grow in a balanced manner without putting 
unsustainable pressure on the balance of payments. By centering growth on the 
creation of new sectors and the dissemination of technology throughout the 
system, structural change creates job opportunities in higher productivity sectors 
while pushing labor market participation rates up and unemployment and informal-
ity rates down. In the long run, this strategy would lead to poverty and inequality 
reduction. When the production structure is very polarized, purely redistributive 
fiscal and social mechanisms do not solve the problems of inequality and slow 
growth in the long run. Sooner than later, policies will have to target the generation 
of job and training opportunities in the framework of structural change. The adop-
tion of industrial policies that encourage this transformation should be considered, 
along with social policies, as they are key dimensions of the equality horizon. 
For example, production linkages are part of structural change; they prevent con-
centration and disseminate gains throughout society. Conversely, social and redis-
tributive policies should accompany industrial policy. For one, they improve 
distribution and reduce vulnerability in the short term, creating an intertemporal 
linkage that enables structural change-oriented policies to achieve their redistribu-
tive impacts, which are longer term. Moreover, social policy should protect the most 
disadvantaged sectors during the disruptive periods of structural change (when sec-
tor realignment can involve periods of adjustment with unemployment), as well as 
from the social impacts of external or other shocks.
The most recent session document, Compacts for equality (ECLAC 2014a), 
gets deeper into the concept of equality that ECLAC wants to promote, stating 
that it includes equality of means, opportunities, and capacities, but in the frame-
work of a deeper understanding of equality as the equal dignity of citizens, in 
which individuals are simultaneously autonomous and vulnerable and should be 
acknowledged for both qualities mutually. In this framework, the document pro-
vides a detailed analysis of inequality in different dimensions in Latin America, 
arguing that equality gains in the region in the last decade are not seen in all 
dimensions but mainly confined to means, most notably income inequality. The 
document also points to warning signs relating to structural components that drive 
inequality, both  productive and social. Although many improvements took place, 
the main warning signs refer to the absence of structural changes mainly in the 
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production sectors, but also in some aspects of social sectors. The closing part of 
the document focuses on how strategic visions of a more egalitarian and sustain-
able development can be built into the rationale for collective accords between 
stakeholders.
Embracing a broader conception of equality which goes beyond means or 
resources does not imply at all that resource inequality is considered unimportant 
in ECLAC’s view. Indeed, alongside its history, ECLAC has contributed substan-
tially to the analysis and understanding of income inequality in the region, consid-
ering its determinants both in terms of structuralist theory and from the various 
perspectives developed within the institution itself. Given the scope of this volume, 
the following pages aim to reflect some of the most recent contributions from 
ECLAC in relation to the analysis of income inequality. But this is done within this 
wider scope, reinforcing different dimensions of inequality and considering the 
importance of labour market institutions. In the following sections, we first describe 
the recent evolution of income inequality in Latin America (Sect. 1) and then con-
sider the role that the labour market, and specifically the minimum wage and the 
formalization process, has had in some countries in the region (Sect. 2). We then 
turn into gender inequalities, analysing female labour participation and its poten-
tial impacts on poverty and inequality (Sect. 3). Finally, we present some conclud-
ing remarks (Sect. 4).
1  Recent Evolution of Income Inequality in Latin America
Inequality in resource distribution, and specifically in income distribution, is one 
distinguishing feature of Latin America. Recent comparisons of Gini coefficients 
on household consumption per capita calculated for developing regions do con-
firm that the median Gini is higher in Latin America and the Caribbean, although 
the mean Gini is slightly lower than in sub-Saharan Africa (Alvaredo and 
Gasparini 2015). In any case, the levels of inequality are high for almost every 
country in the region, and undoubtedly inequality is a persistent characteristic of 
LAC.
In the last 15 years, income inequality has shown a significant decrease. 
This decline in inequality derives from higher income growth at lower income 
percentiles in the region. Figure 1 illustrates this evolution, based on pooled country- 
specific household data for 18 countries. We consider two alternative exchange rates 
to convert national currencies into a common numeraire: purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rates, and ECLAC poverty lines for each country. For both vari-
ables, income growth has been significantly higher among lower income house-
holds, consistently with the important reduction in income poverty that the region 
experimented in this period (see ECLAC 2014b).
Inequality in Latin America: ECLAC’s Perspective
288
If we turn into inequality by country, in all countries in the region, with the 
exception of Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala, household surveys 
report a decrease in the Gini coefficient of household per capita income between 
2002 and 2013 (Table 1). The decreased trend is present when data for 2009 is con-
sidered, and continues for most countries for the latest available data. The magni-
tude of the decline has been differential by countries, with decreases above 5 % in 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. All other measures of income inequality show a 
similar pattern of statistically significant reduction in inequality (see ECLAC 2013, 
2014b) among others.
Abundant research has tried to understand the distributive turnaround in Latin 
America. A microeconometric decomposition exercise presented by ECLAC (2011) 
notes that income per adult, and specifically earnings, was the main factor in the fall 
in inequality. The demographic factor was found to have had a modest effect on 
inequality, as the dependency ratio fell fairly evenly across all income levels. On the 
basis of an analysis of four middle-income countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Peru), López-Calva and Lustig (2010) conclude that two main factors 
account for the easing inequality in the countries: a narrowing of the wage gap 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and, to a lesser extent, an increase in 
government transfers to the lowest income households. This leads them to assert that 
in the famous “race between education and technology”, to use Tinbergen’s (1975) 
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Fig. 1 Latin America: Growth incidence curve of household per capita income 2002–2012. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries, and 
World Development Indicators
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supply in the 1990s, the opposite appears to have happened in the past few years. 
Azevedo et al. (2013), analysing the employed population in 15 countries of the 
region, also conclude that the decline in the education premium has been driven by 
a greater supply of skilled workers.
A different view is put forward by Gasparini et al. (2012), who estimate the rela-
tive contribution of supply and demand factors to recent trends in the education 
premium in 16 countries of Latin America. They show that the relative supply of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers has been increasing since the 1990s. In both the 
1990s and the 2000s, the returns on completion of secondary education diminished, 
while the returns on tertiary education increased in the 1990s but declined again in 
the 2000s. These authors argue that the rise in the skilled labour supply is not the 
only factor explaining the recent decline in inequality, and that the slowdown in 
relative demand for skilled labour in the last decade has also played a role. This shift 
in relative demand for workers with tertiary education appears to be a result of the 
commodity price surge, which has boosted demand for unskilled labour and driven 
down the education wage premium. De la Torre and Pienknagura (2012) also stress 
the importance of labour market changes, with workers moving from manufacturing 
sectors to service-intensive sectors tied to natural-resource-related production. The 
Table 1 Income inequality in Latin America













Argentinaa 0.578 0.510 0.475 −1.8 −1.8 −4.8
Bolivia 0.614 0.508 0.472 −2.7 −1.8 −6.4
Brazil 0.634 0.576 0.553 −1.4 −1.0 −3.4
Chile 0.552 0.524 0.509 −0.7 −0.7 −2.0
Colombia 0.567 0.553 0.536 −0.4 −0.8 −1.4
Costa Rica 0.488 0.501 0.512 0.4 0.5 1.2
Ecuador 0.539 0.500 0.477 −1.1 −1.2 −3.0
El Salvador 0.525 0.478 0.453 −1.3 −1.3 −3.6
Guatemala 0.542 0.585 1.1
Honduras 0.588 0.554 0.573 −0.8 0.8 −0.6
Mexico 0.514 0.515 0.492 0.0 −1.1 −1.1
Nicaragua 0.579 0.478 −2.7
Panama 0.567 0.526 0.527 −1.1 0.0 −1.8
Paraguay 0.563 0.512 0.522 −1.3 0.5 −1.9
Peru 0.530 0.469 0.444 −1.7 −1.4 −4.3
Dominican Rep. 0.537 0.574 0.544 1.0 −1.3 0.3
Uruguaya 0.455 0.446 0.380 −0.3 −3.9 −4.4
Venezuela 0.500 0.416 0.407 −2.6 −0.5 −5.0
AL (simple average) 0.548 0.513 0.492 −1.0 −1.0 −2.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys in the respective countries
aUrban areas
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case studies presented in Cornia (2014) also show that the recent drop in inequality 
in the region has been facilitated by the commodity price boom, especially in the 
countries whose exports are most commodity intensive. It is argued that this has not 
been the only cause, however, as inequality has also been falling in countries that 
are semi-industrialized or heavily dependent on remittances.
These findings are disturbing, to say the least. They suggest that a situation 
could be occurring in which sectoral composition, heavily influenced as it is by 
natural- resource- centred economies, is generating greater relative demand for low-
skilled workers, narrowing the gap in returns on education. Rather than a sign of 
development being reconciled with equality, this would be a warning that the com-
bination of stagnating productivity and the region’s specialization pattern is send-
ing out signals that discourage educational progression and capability development. 
While this evidence is not yet conclusive and the debate is still open, it is necessary 
to consider this possible scenario and assess the potential implications of this inter-
pretation of the region’s recent decline in inequality. This recent story reminds us 
about the importance of the productive structure in the determination of income 
inequality.
It is also relevant to consider the political dynamic behind the recent decline in 
inequality in the region. Democratic life has given rise to new electoral preferences 
and brought social demands to greater prominence. This means that, in a positive 
cycle of economic stability, governments respond to these demands for social inclusion 
with new, more redistributive policies. In most cases, these are reforms inspired by 
the idea of “prudent redistribution with growth” (Cornia 2010) by way of fiscal, 
employment, and progressive transfer policies. Indeed, the fiscal system has gener-
ally become more redistributive than it was, although its contribution in this area 
remains limited.
Redistributive policies and social reforms have not been the sole preserve of 
left- wing governments in the region; rather, the institutionalization of electoral 
competition in contexts of pronounced economic and social inequality seems to 
have led parties and governments of different ideological stripes to strive to 
respond to popular demands for equality and social inclusion (Roberts 2014). In 
some of the countries of the region, labour market institutions do seem to have 
played a key role, although it has been mainly neglected by most of the related 
literature. As the next section discusses, some important changes in labour mar-
ket institutions and dynamics may have played a key role in some specific 
countries.
2  Inequality and Labour Market Institutions
As discussed in the previous section, recent explanations for declining inequality in 
the region have focused on factors driving supply and demand for workers at differ-
ent qualification levels. Some recent research from ECLAC suggests the importance 
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of considering, in addition, the role of labour institutions in the distributive improve-
ments in some countries of the region. Narrowing wage differentials could indeed 
be affected, in some countries of the region, by strengthening the minimum wage 
and other tools, such as formalization in the labour market. The following para-
graphs, based on ECLAC (2014a) and Amarante and Arim (2015), provide some 
insights about the role of labour market institutions in the recent decline in wage 
inequality in the region.
2.1  Inequality and Minimum Wage
The potential effects of minimum wage hikes on labour market variables are contro-
versial (see ECLAC 2014a). Given the fact that in some countries in the region the 
minimum wage rose and wage inequality declined simultaneously in a context of 
employment growth, it is important to assess the potential link between both fea-
tures. In the following paragraphs we report some results presented in ECLAC 
(2014a) which illustrate the effects of minimum wage increases in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay (three countries where recovery of the minimum wage has 
been substantial) and Chile (where growth has been less striking).1
In Argentina, the minimum wage had remained at the same low nominal and 
real value since 1993 and plummeted in 2002. A forceful minimum wage updating 
policy was rolled out in 2003, leading to a sharp real increase of more than 200 % 
between 2008 and 2012. But this uptrend faltered in 2007 as accelerating inflation 
ate into the gains in minimum wage purchasing power (Fig. 2).2 In Brazil, recov-
ery began earlier than in Argentina, towards the mid-1990s, but really gathered 
momentum in the 2000s as the minimum wage rose around 100 % in real terms 
between 2000 and 2012. The trend was similar, albeit less marked, in Chile, which 
posted an increase of about 40 % over the same period. And Uruguay, the last 
country in which income inequality began to trend downwards, was also the last 
to start bolstering the minimum wage. The real value of the minimum wage in 
Uruguay had been dropping steadily in recent decades. The slide reversed in late 
2004, with the purchasing power of the minimum wage soaring 180 % between 
2005 and 2012.
The ability of governments to use the minimum wage as a labour policy instru-
ment depends on the extent to which the economy is indexed to the minimum 
wage. Brazil and Uruguay are two cases in which the minimum wage has been 
linked to social benefits. In Brazil, under the 1988 Constitution, the minimum 
wage is the threshold for social benefits. In Uruguay, until 2004, the minimum 
wage was the reference point for determining eligibility for and the value of a 
1 These results are based on Maurizio (2013). It should be noted that this analysis covers countries with 
relatively low levels of informality in the region. In countries with highly informal economies, the mini-
mum wage can influence informal sector wages more and tend to maintain segmentation barriers.
2 Real variation is calculated using a weighted index of price indices for the provinces.
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comprehensive package of social benefits, with the resulting fiscal impacts. The 
real minimum wage in Uruguay had to be de-indexed first before it could be increased. 
By contrast, Argentina and Chile do not use the minimum wage for setting other 
wage levels or social benefits, so raising it does not lead directly to higher fiscal 
costs.
The relationship between the minimum wages and salaries actually paid in each 
economy is tracked in Table 2 using the ratio between the minimum wage and vari-
ous measures of distribution (average wage, the median (Kaitz index), and the lowest 
wage distribution percentiles). In the countries reviewed, the minimum wage repre-
sents approximately 50 % of the median for the most recent year, except in Uruguay 










Argentina 2003 0.30 0.39 0.79 0.61
2012 0.47 0.53 1.06 0.81
Brazil 2003 0.25 0.44 0.88 0.65
2011 0.30 0.50 0.86 0.72
Chile 2000 0.31 0.49 0.92 0.82
2011 0.37 0.60 0.84 0.82
Uruguay 2004 0.13 0.18 0.43 0.31
2012 0.30 0.37 0.74 0.59
Source: ECLAC (2014a)
Fig. 2 Latin America (selected countries): Change in the real minimum wage, 2000–2012. (Local 
currencies, constant prices at latest observation.) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), on the basis of 
official data for the minimum wage and consumer price index (CPI) from countries
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where the ratio is lower. In all countries, the minimum wage recovered more sharply 
than did other pay scale indicators, driving the ratios up. This indicates that the mini-
mum wage has become more “operational” for all of the countries. Argentina has 
the highest minimum wage (equivalent to tenth-percentile wages). Uruguay has the 
lowest (74 % of tenth-percentile wages).
For the minimum wage to play its role properly, it must not only be appropri-
ate in relation to the wage distribution—but it must also be complied with. In this 
regard, it is useful to break down employment by minimum wage brackets for the 
years taken for the simulation set out below.3 About 8 % of wage workers in 
Argentina were drawing less than the legal minimum wage in 2012, and a similar 
portion were at or near the minimum wage. The remaining 84 % were earning 
wages above the figure established by law. Among participants in the pension 
system (referred to here as formal workers), only 2 % were below the minimum; 
this figure climbs to 27 % for informal workers. The proportion of formal work-
ers in the area of the minimum wage was very low (4 %), while 20 % of informal 
workers were in that range. This means that in 2012, 94 % of the reported work-
ers were earning more than the statutory minimum wage. This figure was almost 
100 % in 2003 because the minimum wage was very low, making it completely 
non-binding.
In Brazil, compliance with the minimum wage seems to be higher than in the 
other three cases. In 2011, only 1.3 % of wage workers were paid less than the mini-
mum; 8 % were at or near the minimum wage (Table 3). Therefore, 90 % of the 
workforce had incomes above the minimum wage. The percentage of unreported 
workers whose wages were below the minimum is also very low (8.3 %), signifi-
cantly lower than, for example, in Argentina (27 %). Moreover, in Brazil the distri-
bution of workers (wage earners and non-wage earners) with reference to the 
minimum wage has not changed substantially, even during a period when the mini-
mum was strengthened considerably. This suggests that in Brazil the minimum 
wage is a reference value for setting wages for informal workers. Thus, minimum 
wage hikes translate into  effective wage increases for them, confirming prior evi-
dence of the “lighthouse effect”.4 In Chile, about 3 % of the wage-earning workforce 
is paid less than the legal minimum wage; a similar percentage is at or near that 
threshold. Together with Brazil, Chile has the lowest percentage of informal work-
ers earning less than the minimum wage. But Chile also has a small percentage of 
these workers (around 7.5 %) at or near the minimum wage.
Lastly, Uruguay has the highest percentage (95 %) of wage workers drawing 
more than the minimum wage; only 3 % are below it. This reflects the fact that 
almost all reported workers are wage workers. However, when it comes to informal 
workers, Uruguay is somewhere in the middle, with about 20 % drawing less than 
3 The following criteria were used to determine whether workers were above, at, or below the mini-
mum wage for any given value: (1) below the minimum wage—less than 90 % of the value set by 
law; (2) at or near the minimum wage—between 90 and 110 % of the legal minimum wage; and (3) 
above the minimum wage—equal to or greater than 110 % of the legal minimum wage.
4 Neri et al. (2000) and Lemos (2004).
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the minimum wage. This is twice the number in Chile and Brazil and 7 percentage 
points below Argentina.
So, the differences among the four countries with regard to the distribution of 
wage workers by minimum wage brackets reflect largely the situation for informal 
workers because the percentage of formal workers at or near the minimum wage is 
similar and very low in all four cases. Between 94 and 97 % of formal workers earn 
more than the legal minimum wage.
The impact of changes in the minimum wage on wage inequality is estimated using 
the methodology proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996). By estimating counterfactual 
density functions, it assesses what the wage distribution would have been at the 
starting point if, keeping worker attributes constant, the minimum wage were the one 
in force at the endpoint. This new counterfactual distribution is then used to estimate 
wage inequality indicators such as the Gini coefficient, Theil index, and percentile 
ratios. Simulating changes in the minimum wage alone while holding other potential 
causes of distributional change constant makes it possible to deduce the distributive 
impact of an increase in the minimum wage by comparing inequality indicators at the 
starting point with those resulting from the simulation.5
The key findings are set out in Table 4. The first and third columns show the 
starting and final value of the average wage (expressed in the currency of each 
country, at beginning-of-period prices), the percentile ratios (percentile 90/percen-
tile 10, percentile 50/percentile 10, and percentile 90/percentile 50), the Gini coef-
ficient, and the Theil index. The second column shows counterfactual density, 
which is the one that would have prevailed at the beginning if the minimum wage 
at the starting point had been the one at the endpoint. Thus, the difference between 
column 1 and column 2 shows the impact attributable to the change in the mini-
mum wage (absolute and relative variation). In all cases the increase in the mini-
mum wage drove the average wage up by between 1 and 4 %, depending on the 
country. In all of the cases there is also evidence that the minimum wage has an 
equalizing impact, although this impact is not significant in Chile. In Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay, the drop in inequality is explained solely by compression at 
the lower end of the distribution.
In Chile, none of the slight decreases in all of these indicators (except for vari-
ance) were statistically significant. The real increase in the minimum wage in 
Chile was, at some 30 %, lower than the 100–200 % seen in the other countries 
reviewed. This could be one of the reasons why the rise was not enough to signifi-
cantly alter the inequality indicators, which changed only marginally in absolute 
terms. And in Chile, unlike the other countries, the minimum wage seemed to lose 
5 See Maurizio (2014) for a more detailed discussion of methodological aspects. One of the limita-
tions of this methodology is that it excludes potential negative impacts on the employment rate. 
However, employment grew sharply during this period in the countries under review, with a 
marked gain in formalization (except for Chile). A sustained rise in employment and in formal jobs 
would seem to suggest that increasing the minimum wage would not have had an adverse impact 
on employment. On the other hand, only those individuals with income below the minimum wage 
would be affected by any change. This lack of spillover effects points to conservative outcomes 
because the impacts could be larger if the intensity of the minimum wage effects decreased across 
the distribution.
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effectiveness during the second part of the subject period. As noted above, Chile 
is the only country where the percentage of wage workers earning one minimum 
wage or less is lower in year one than in the final year. Meanwhile, the minimum-
wage-to-first-percentile ratio declined sharply over the past few years.
In Argentina, the increase in the real minimum wage seems to be associated with 
a 2.6 percentage point drop in the Gini coefficient, equating to a 7 % decline in this 
indicator compared with the initial year. About one-third of the decline in the Gini 
coefficient between 2003 and 2012 is attributable to changes in the minimum wage. 
Something similar is true of the Theil index. The ratio between the median and the 
90th percentile does not change, but the percentile 50/percentile 10 gap narrows 
significantly, reflecting compression in the lower income brackets.
In Brazil, the Gini coefficient fell by 2.4 percentage points (5 %). The rise in 
the minimum wage has a very significant impact, accounting for 84 % of the total 
drop in the Gini. As in Argentina, the equalizing impact is seen only at the bottom 
of the distribution. Unlike in the case of Argentina, however, the decrease is large 
enough to significantly narrow the gap between the outlier percentiles, 90 and 10. 
The results suggest that with the minimum wage effect alone, the ratio between 
percentile 50 and percentile 10 of the end year would have been even lower than 
was actually recorded.
In Uruguay, the equalizing effects were smaller than in the two other cases. 
The Gini coefficient fell 0.5 percentage points; changes in the minimum wage 
accounted for some 7 % of the total decline in the Gini between 2004 and 2012. 
Outcomes for the Theil index were similar. Once again, the narrowing of the gap 
between the outlier percentiles of the distribution reflects only the impact at the low 
end, where the portion attributable to this factor was 77 %.
2.2  Inequality and Formality
A recent study for five Latin American countries (see Amarante and Arim 2015) 
performs a statistical decomposition of inequality measures, in order to separate 
what part of their changes can be attributed to changes in the distribution of observ-
able worker characteristics (composition effect) and what part obeys to changes in 
returns to characteristics (price effect). Five countries are considered—Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay—and the potential roles of human capital and 
labor informality are explored. The main finding that arises from the joint analysis 
of the five countries under consideration is that labour formalization, together with 
the combination of norms and institutional mechanisms that determine wage cre-
ation in the formal sector, contributed significantly to the decrease of inequality in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century in some countries of the region.
The recent body of literature investing the evolution of wage inequality over the 
last 15 years has identified the reduction of wage differentials conditional on educa-
tion levels as the main factor explaining the recent fall. The results of the 
 microeconometric decomposition exercises conducted in Amarante and Arim 
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(2015) confirm the importance of this factor. However, changes in terms of formal-
ization levels and wage differentials between formal and informal workers are fac-
tors as important in magnitude as returns to education and changes in workers’ 
education levels—although there is high variation across the countries studied.
In the following table, results from these national studies are summarized. 
Tables 5 presents changes in informality (lack of contribution to the social secu-
rity) and wage inequality for employees in the five countries, and then displays the 
Gini index decomposition highlighting the effects of formality and education. A 
large portion of the informality reduction observed in the five countries is explained 
by the impact of formality and returns to working in the formal sector. Indeed, the 
total impact of formality accounts for a fall of the Gini index that ranges from 2.8 
percentage points in Argentina to 9 percentage points in Uruguay. In all countries 
except Chile, the total equalizing effect of formalization is higher than that of edu-
cation. A differential pattern is observed in Chile, where changes in inequality and 
in the degree of formalization were of minor magnitude. In this country, even when 
the increase in the number of formal workers leads to greater equality, this impact is 
offset by the higher wage differential in favour of formal workers, and the overall 
effect of formalization ends up being unequalizing (increase of the Gini by 0.5).
In all five countries, the increase in labour formality—captured by the disaggre-
gation of the composition effect (row A)—has an equalizing effect, although it var-
ies in magnitude. The countries where the decrease in informality was the highest 
(Ecuador, Brazil, and Uruguay) exhibit a major impact. In all three cases, it 
Table 5 Decomposition of the Gini index
Argentina Brazil Chile Ecuador Uruguay
Informality 
(employees)
First year 40 % 35 % 37 % 63 % 36 %
Final year 33 % 23 % 31 % 47 % 24 %
Total change −7 % −12 % −6 % −16 % −12 %
Gini (wages) First year 0.414 0.529 0.413 0.441 0.410
Final year 0.353 0.482 0.394 0.372 0.351
Total change −0.061 −0.047 −0.019 −0.069 −0.059
Composition 
effect
Total 0.001 0.031 0.020 −0.011 −0.010
Formalization (A) −0.008 −0.030 −0.006 −0.028 −0.020
Education (C) 0.004 0.055 0.016 0.013 0.010
Others 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.000
Return effects Total −0.062 −0.077 −0.024 −0.079 −0.062
Formalization (B) −0.020 −0.002 0.011 −0.064 −0.030
Education (D) −0.025 −0.049 0.024 −0.007 −0.040
Others −0.017 −0.026 −0.059 −0.008 0.008
Total effect of 
formality
(A + B) −0.028 −0.032 0.005 −0.092 −0.050
% of Total change 46 % 68 % −26 % 133 % 85 %
Total effect of 
education
(C + D) −0.021 0.006 0.040 0.006 −0.030
% of Total change 34 % −13 % −211 % −9 % 51 %
Source: Amarante and Arim (2015)
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 represents three percentage points of the Gini index. In contrast, the impact of the 
increase in employees’ education level is of the opposite sign, thus leading to high 
levels of dispersion in wages.
As for the decrease in the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors 
(row B, return effect), it favours low levels of inequality in all countries except 
Chile, where it has a concentrating effect. The equalizing impact of the return effect 
is particularly significant in Ecuador, which is directly followed by Uruguay and 
Argentina. The fall in wage differentials conditional on education levels leads to a 
decrease in inequality, again with the exception of Chile.6
Why does the reduction of informality appear to be such an important channel to 
reduce wage inequality? Figure 3 which displays the marginal impact of having a 
6 The case of Chile differs from others insofar a systematic reduction of returns to education is not 
observed. In particular, the gap between workers who have completed their tertiary education and 
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Fig. 3 Marginal unconditional effect from being a formal worker, by deciles. Source: Amarante 
and Arim (2015)
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formal worker status for given deciles of the wage distribution, gives some hints to 
this question. In almost all cases, the returns to being in the formal sector appear to 
decrease monotonically with the decile. Given this pattern of marginal effects, a 
marginal increase in the degree of formalization is expected to have a greater impact 
in the lower parts of the distribution. In other words, these patterns are the reason 
why the composition effect associated with formalization results in an equalizing 
factor.
3  Gender and Inequality
Inequalities are generated in various dimensions of the market, in connection with 
variables such as income, participation, and access to different occupations. Not 
only does the labour market offer an unparalleled space for social relations, mutual 
recognition, and building autonomy and identity, it is also one of the arenas in which 
the struggle to overcome poverty and extend citizenship plays out, making it a cru-
cial sphere for advancing towards the goal of equality. Several studies on the 
region’s labour markets show significant changes in female labour force participa-
tion in recent decades. However, these changes have taken place at different rates in 
each country, and even among women in the same country, depending on their 
socioeconomic status, their education level, and the number of dependent minors in 
their households, among other factors. In the last decade, most countries have nar-
rowed their gender gaps in labour participation and employment; yet these remain 
wide despite the fact that in the same period women overcame the educational dis-
advantages that were long considered the reason for their limited and poor labour 
market integration. With respect to income gaps and occupational segregation, the 
picture is more diverse across the countries and cannot be painted as one of progress 
for the region as a whole (ECLAC 2014b).
It is necessary to reduce gaps in participation, employment, and income, and to 
introduce policies for reconciling work and family life for men and women, as 
doing so will have positive effects at different levels. For one, there will be produc-
tivity gains, higher household income, and lower levels of socioeconomic inequality 
and household poverty. But it will also give impetus to equality in other spheres, 
such as the full exercise of autonomy, development of individual capacities and 
potential, access to contributory social protection, and broader participation in soci-
ety beyond the household. All of these are central issues on the region’s equality and 
rights agenda. A chapter in the recent Social Panorama (ECLAC 2014b) considers 
the gender inequalities in labour market and household income inequalities in the 
region. It examines the impact of women’s employment on household well-being, 
measured in terms of their income and the distribution of that income. The following 
paragraphs are based on that chapter.
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3.1  Participation, Employment, and Unemployment
In the last decade, the overall participation rate in Latin America has held relatively 
steady, notwithstanding small fluctuations in different countries. The female partici-
pation rate, despite losing some momentum in relation to previous decades, contin-
ued to show moderate growth in some countries. Yet even with those increases in 
labour force participation, a third of working-age women still have no income of 
their own (ECLAC 2014a) and are classified for statistical purposes as economi-
cally inactive, regardless of their high workloads associated with their domestic 
responsibilities. Meanwhile, the growth in labour force participation rates for men 
has been less pronounced (see Fig. 4).
On the back of these developments, the gender participation gap has narrowed in 
most countries (ECLAC 2014b) (see Fig. 5). In 2002, the weighted average female 
participation rate was 63 % of the rate for men, rising to 67 % in 2012. Although the 
gap has narrowed, it nevertheless remains significant (Fig. 6). For example, the 
female participation rate in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua is on average half 
the male rate, and even in countries where the gap is smaller, the participation rate 
for women falls short of 80 % of the rate for men (this is the case in Peru, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Uruguay). This means that, despite the consider-
able differences between the countries, there remains a broad scope for increasing 
women’s labour market participation in all cases.
The moderate economic growth in the last decade has led to declines in the 
unemployment rate for both men and women. In aggregate terms for the region, 
the female-to-male unemployment ratio held relatively steady, although there are 
significant variations between countries in a context of low regional unemployment 
rates. However, in all countries of the region unemployment rates are significantly 
higher for women than for men (see ECLAC 2014b). As a result of these develop-
ments, the gender gap in employment between men and women has narrowed 
significantly, although broad differences still remain in all countries, as is the case 
for participation (see Figs. 4 and 5). On average for the region, the female employ-
ment rate stood at 65 % of the male employment rate in 2012, compared with 61 % 
in 2002. The largest gender gaps in employment were found in Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua (see ECLAC 2014b).
3.2  Labour Income of Women and Men
A persistent feature of the region’s labour markets is the systematic discrepancy 
between the average wages earned by men and women. In all countries of the region, 
women’s average monthly earnings are lower than men’s (see Fig. 7). The gaps vary 
significantly between countries: in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru men 
earn on average over 50 % more per month than women, but in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Panama this difference is less than 10 %. This gap may in part be attributable to 
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the lower number of hours that women devote to paid work per month compared with 
men. Indeed, in 2012, men spent an average of 8 h per week more than women on 
paid work. But even when this factor is taken into account, there remains a consider-
able difference in average earnings by sex in most countries, although the gap does 
narrow somewhat. As in the case for monthly earnings, the largest gaps in hourly 
earnings to the detriment of women are seen in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
Peru. In some countries, such as Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Fig. 4 Latin America (18 countries): Female and male labour force participation rates, around 
2002 and 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. aWeighted average
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Nicaragua, wage differentials tend to disappear when controlling for hours worked. 
This means that in these countries, women’s average hourly earnings are not lower 
than men’s (and are even higher in some cases) (Fig. 7).
Differences in participation rates, employment, and wages between men and 
























































































































Fig. 5 Latin America (18 countries): Female-to-male participation ratio, around 2002 and 2012. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (b), on the basis of special 





































Fig. 6 Latin America (18 countries): Female and male participation rates, around 2012 
(Percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries. aWeighted average
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less to household income than male earnings. Indeed, women consistently account 
for less than half of total household labour income. In fact, that proportion fell 
short of 40 % in all of the countries in the region in 2012. Women make the largest 
proportional contribution in Uruguay, furnishing 39 % on average of total house-
hold earnings, and the smallest in Dominican Republic, where their share is 26 % 
(see Fig. 8).
Even greater heterogeneity is detected in the region regarding women’s contribu-































































































































































































































Fig. 7 Latin America (18 countries): Difference between average wages for men and women, 
around 2012 (percentages of female income). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries
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Women’s share of household labour income in the lowest quintiles ranges between 
9 and 34 %, averaging 26 %. Meanwhile, in the highest income quintile in each coun-
try, women’s contribution exceeds 29 % in all cases and averages 36 % (see Fig. 9). 
The significantly smaller share in the lowest quintile may reflect the reduced labour 
















































































































Fig. 8 Latin America (18 countries): Women’s contribution to total household labour income, 
around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 


















































































































Fig. 9 Latin America (18 countries): Women’s contribution to total household labour income in 
the first and fifth income quintiles, around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from house-
hold surveys conducted in the respective countries
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There is therefore scope for increasing women’s contribution to household 
income, either by expanding their labour market participation or by eliminating 
wage discrimination. Depending on the starting position of each country, the 
greatest gains can be achieved by advancing on one of these two fronts, although 
they are obviously not mutually exclusive. The next section examines the potential 
gains to be made, with the aim of promoting the formulation of public policies that 
are  conducive to greater equality. The two scenarios taken into consideration 
would lead to advances in development for the countries and in the exercise of 
women’s rights.
3.3  Women’s Labour Income and Its Effects on Inequality 
and Poverty
Previously we have examined the profound differences and inequalities in the 
employment and earnings of men and women, showing that there is scope for 
improvement in terms of greater equality in these two dimensions, which will result 
in increased household well-being, and a more level playing field for men and 
women with regard to resource availability and economic capacities, and in the 
exercise of their social and economic rights. We now turn into quantifying the prog-
ress that could be made on some basic well-being indicators (namely the levels of 
socioeconomic inequality and poverty) if advances in gender equality were made in 
the region’s labour markets.
In particular, it sets out to ascertain what the levels of income inequality and 
poverty would be in the region in two scenarios: (1) if the participation gap between 
men and women was closed, and (2) if women earned the same as men (with the 
same qualifications). The aim is to reflect on what the contribution of female earn-
ings to overall household well-being could be if women’s labour participation 
increased or the wage gap narrowed. The simulations are based on the latest infor-
mation available from household surveys conducted in the respective countries, 
which in most cases corresponds to 2012.
Setting out to close these gaps is not a utopian exercise. The fact that these 
disparities are ingrained in multiple mechanisms of cultural reproduction may make 
them difficult to reverse, but international experience has showed that public policies 
on labour and care have much to contribute in these areas.
3.3.1  Closing the Participation Gap
The first analysis looked at what would happen if the participation rate for women 
in the intermediate age group (14–65 years) was similar to that for men. The first 
step was to develop a model of the female participation rate in order to better under-
stand the variables determining women’s participation and to be able to predict the 
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probability of each woman actively entering the labour market.7 The exercise essen-
tially consisted in simulating the incorporation of inactive women into the labour 
market, sorting them according to the probability predicted using the estimated 
model of labour force participation, and matching the female participation rates to 
the male rates by age group.8 That is, the women simulated as entering the labour 
market were those of the inactive group who were deemed most likely to become 
active. Once the participation gap had been closed, the probability of these newly 
active women being employed or unemployed was predicted, assuming a constant 
rate of female unemployment (that is, the percentage of unemployed women as a 
share of active women did not vary).9 A labour income was calculated for the 
women who were simulated as gaining employment, similar to the earnings of other 
women with the same characteristics (age and education level). A new vector of 
female earnings and household income was thus obtained, having knock-on effects 
on levels of household income, poverty, and inequality.
The simulation introduced significant changes in the participation rates for 
women by age group, almost closing the participation gaps between men and 
women (see Fig. 10).
7 A probit model was estimated using the female participation rate as the dependent binary variable.
8 The following age groups were considered: 15–24 years, 25–49 years, and 50–65 years. The labour 
force participation of women aged 65 years and older is not altered (that is, if they were originally 
active, they remain so).
9 A second scenario was estimated matching both the participation rates and unemployment rates 
for men and women, thus closing the employment gap. As the results were very similar (although 
slightly higher) to those for the scenario of closing the participation gap, a decision was taken not 
to present them. The finding was attributable mainly to the low levels of unemployment recorded 
















































































































Fig. 10 Latin America (18 countries): Participation rates for men (observed) and women (observed 
and simulated), around 2012 (percentages). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys con-
ducted in the respective countries
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Such a rise in the female participation rate would lead to an increase in average 
household income ranging from 3 to 4 % in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Uruguay, and reaching over 10 % in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Peru. The countries with the largest gender gap in participation rates would gain the 
most in terms of average household income if those participation gaps disappeared. 
Evening up the rates of female and male participation would reduce poverty and 
inequality in the countries. The massive incorporation of women into the labour 
market could be expected to lead to declines in the poverty rate ranging from 1 per-
centage point in Argentina and Uruguay to over 10 percentage points in El Salvador 








































With labour participation gap eliminated






















































































































































































Fig. 11 Latin America (18 countries): Poverty and inequality levels as a result of closing the 
labour participation gap compared with a baseline scenario (percentages). Source: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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the labour market it would help reduce inequality, measured using the Gini index, 
by 4 percentage points in Nicaragua and Panama, and by 3 percentage points in the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay. The Theil 
index would drop sharply in some countries (6–8 percentage points in Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay) because this measure of inequality is 
particularly sensitive to movements in the lower income segments and these 
 countries would see a large increase in the proportion of women with lower levels 
of education entering the labour market.
The above findings show that if more women were to enter the labour market, 
great strides would be made in reducing poverty and inequality, with the most sub-
stantial progress being seen in the countries with the widest participation gaps, such 
as those in Central America. It is clear, however, that even the massive incorporation 
of women into the labour market would not eliminate poverty in Latin America 
owing to the structural characteristics of the region’s labour markets. The income 
that these women would earn would help to improve their situation, but only to 
some extent. Nevertheless, some countries would register very significant progress, 
especially with regard to inequality. Even more importantly, the entry of women 
into the labour market would have a profound impact in terms of the full exercise of 
autonomy, the development of capacities and personal potential, access to contribu-
tory social protection, and broader participation in society.
Table 6 Latin America (18 countries): changes in poverty rates and inequality indicators as a 
result of closing the labour participation gap (percentage points)
Country Poverty Gini index Theil index
Argentina −1 −2 −4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −5 −1 −3
Brazil −3 −2 −5
Chile −3 −2 −5
Colombia −4 −2 −3
Costa Rica −4 −2 −4
Dominican Republic −6 −3 −5
Ecuador −9 −3 −5
El Salvador −12 −3 −5
Guatemala −5 −2 −6
Honduras −7 −3 −8
Mexico −4 −1 −2
Nicaragua −12 −4 −7
Panama −7 −4 −8
Paraguay −6 −3 −6
Peru −6 −1 −1
Uruguay −1 −1 −1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −4 −2 −2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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Accelerating changes in the proposed sense would clearly not be possible with-
out active, resolute policies that promote and encourage such changes, including 
policies on care. The region has much ground to cover in this respect, because 
although progress has been made on a legal and regulatory front, scant substantial 
changes have been seen. Care services generally have low coverage and operate in 
a weak institutional framework, thus failing to meet the growing needs of societies. 
Nevertheless, several countries have incorporated the issue into their policy agen-
das and have made different degrees of progress (ECLAC 2012a). Active labour 
market policies can encourage greater participation by women in the labour market 
by helping to ensure that they are properly qualified and by facilitating their labour 
market integration. Of course, there are other policies that can influence the female 
participation rate, such as the provision of preschool education and extended 
schooldays at the primary stage. Lastly, as ECLAC has highlighted in several 
studies, what is needed is a new gender compact that involves a more equitable 
distribution of roles within the household and is thus conducive to female labour 
force participation.
3.3.2  Closing the Income Gap
The second question addressed was what would happen to poverty and inequality in 
the region if the income gap between men and women disappeared. In the simula-
tions carried out for this purpose, a decision was taken to eliminate the monthly 
income gap between men and women, which also effaced the differences in hours 
worked. The first step was to estimate wage equations for employed men. The 
monthly earnings of women were then predicted using the coefficients of these 
equations. This calculation removed the gender differences in labour market returns 
and assumed that men and women receive equal pay in the market according to their 
education level and age.
Closing the gender income gap would lead to milestone achievements in poverty 
reduction in countries such as the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru (see 
Table 7 and Fig. 12) by significantly boosting household income. As noted above, a 
significant percentage of women in these countries are employed but not paid, 
which explains the dramatic changes that would take place if these women were to 
receive a similar income to men with the same level of education and work experi-
ence. The changes to the poverty level in Colombia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua would 
also be very significant. The Gini index would fall by between 2 and 8 percentage 
points, depending on the country, and the Theil index would mark an even larger 
decline in inequality, being more sensitive to the changes that occur in lower income 
households.
Again, the quest for progress on this front calls for public policy. Governments 
in the region have ratified international agreements and passed domestic legislation 
to endorse the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination between 
women and men. However, the figures indicate that these actions alone are insuffi-
cient to ensure the eradication of gender discrimination in the labour market. Once 
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specific legislation on equal pay has been enacted, labour market institutions can 
play a role in helping to close gaps. Expanding the coverage of collective bargaining 
to include workers in traditionally excluded sectors, such as domestic workers, rural 
workers, and home workers, can help to narrow the gender income gap. Another 
approach is to address issues relating to the protection of maternal and paternal 
labour rights (see Maurizio 2010). Improving labour inspections can also help to 
eliminate discriminatory practices. Furthermore, as several studies have indicated 
that occupational segregation is responsible for a significant part of the gender wage 
gap (for example, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995), policies to address occupational 
segregation, for example, by training women for occupations that are not considered 
typically female, would narrow the wage gap. Similarly, little progress has been 
made to date on extending training to men for occupations that have traditionally 
been considered female with a view to eliminating the stereotypes and prejudices 
that also translate into wage discrepancies.
Table 7 Latin America (18 countries): Changes in poverty rates and inequality indicators as a 
result of closing the gender income gap (percentage points)
Country Poverty Gini index Theil index
Argentina −1 −3 −5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −14 −8 −12
Brazil −6 −4 −13
Chile −2 −4 −8
Colombia −9 −5 −12
Costa Rica −4 −3 −7
Dominican Republic −5 −3 −6
Ecuador −8 −4 −8
El Salvador −6 −3 −5
Guatemala −4 −2 −7
Honduras −1 −2 −6
Mexico −5 −3 −6
Nicaragua −8 −4 −8
Panama −6 −4 −10
Paraguay −7 −5 −12
Peru −8 −5 −8
Uruguay −2 −3 −4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −4 −2 −3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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4  Final Remarks
ECLAC has consistently promoted and reiterated the idea that the region should 
move towards the horizon of equality, understood in a broad sense. This chapter has 
summarized some recent studies from ECLAC which show that, even if very impor-
tant advances were made during the last 15 years, inequality continues to be a major 
problem in the region. The labor market has a fundamental role to understand 








































Labour participation gap eliminated






















































































































































































Fig. 12 Latin America (18 countries): Poverty and inequality levels as a result of eliminating the 
gender income gap compared with a baseline scenario (percentages). Source: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of 
data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries
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of the region responds to institutional factors, such as increases of the minimum 
wage and formalization in the labour market. Strengthening labour market institu-
tions as well as implementing strategies for achieving gender equality are necessary 
actions in order to achieve higher equality.
 Annex (see Table A.1)
Table A.1 Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita. Developing 
countries. 2010
Mean Median Coef. var. Min. Max.
East Asia and Pacific 38.1 36.7 0.101 31.9 43.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 33.6 33.7 0.144 25.6 43.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 43.8 44.8 0.104 34.7 52.8
Middle East and North Africa 36.0 36.1 0.091 30.8 40.9
South Asia 35.0 36.3 0.081 30 38.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.4 42.1 0.175 33.3 63.1
Developing countries 39.8 39.2 0.181 25.6 63.1
Note: Unweighted statistics
Source: Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015)
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The Inequality Story in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Searching 
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1  Introduction
Income inequality is a salient economic malaise in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
where for decades it has been higher than in any other region in the world (Williamson 
2015). A growing body of literature suggests that after a long period of growing or 
stagnant inequality, the trajectory of household income inequality shows a visible 
kink around 2003—rising during the 1990s and until about 2002, when it started to 
descend, a trend that was particularly steep during the boom period of 2003–2011 
before flattening out during the post-2011 slowdown. This trajectory contrasts with 
that of Latin America and the Caribbean in previous periods or other regions in the 
same period (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015; De Ferranti et al. 2004; De la Torre 
et al. 2014; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 2010).
Although the path of household income inequality in Latin America and the 
Caribbean was not independent of (redistributive) social policy, this chapter argues 
that in the 2000s the behavior of the region’s labor markets had the dominant role. 
In particular, pro-poor labor market dynamics led to a downward trajectory in labor 
income inequality that closely mirrored that of household income inequality. This is 
not to say that transfers to the poor and other social programs introduced or expanded 
during the first years of the millennium did not contribute to the trends. About 
one- third of the changes in household income inequality can be attributed to redis-
tributive policies (Cord et al. 2014). This chapter is about the remaining two-thirds 
that correspond to the workings of the labor market. It examines the trends and 
discusses possible driving factors behind the historical facts.
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An important stylized fact in Latin America and the Caribbean is that the reduction 
in labor income inequality was, in turn, largely driven by changes in the skill 
premium (as measured by the wage returns to tertiary versus primary education), 
which again followed a path that broadly mirrored, over the entire period, that of 
labor income inequality (De la Torre et al. 2014; 2015a, b). Previous empirical 
research on the region has linked this decreasing skill premium to several intuitive 
supply and demand mechanisms:
• Expanded access to education across the region’s countries increased the skilled 
labor supply. The increased supply of skilled workers exerted downward pres-
sure on wage inequality by decreasing the wage skill premium (Azevedo et al. 
2013; Gasparini et al. 2011, Gasparini and Lustig 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 
2010; Lustig et al. 2013).
• Changes in technology and international trade decreased the wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers by expanding the demand for unskilled labor 
relative to skilled labor (Gonzaga et al. 2006).
• Institutional factors that decreased the skill premium exerted upward pressure on 
wages at the bottom by rising minimum wages in Brazil (Barros et al. 2010) or 
enhancing unions’ empowerment in Argentina (Gasparini and Cruces 2010).
This chapter adds to this growing literature by discussing the contribution of 
each of these factors as well as offering new hypotheses, using household survey 
data,1 on determinants of the evolution of the skill premium and the channels 
through which such determinants were transmitted.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes in detail 
the main stylized facts on labor inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Section 3 discusses the supply-side determinants (presenting some new hypotheses) 
and the demand-side drivers. Section 4 concludes.
2  Stylized Facts
2.1  Falling Income Inequality: A Break with Recent History
The 2000s were a period of inequality reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
This trend contrasted sharply with the 1990s, when inequality increased in the 
region (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015; De Ferranti et al. 2004; De la Torre et al. 
2014; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 2010; World Bank 
2011a, b). Between 2002 and 2013, the Gini coefficient of household income 
1 Household survey data were compiled from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (SEDLAC) of the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS) of 
the Universidad de La Plata, Argentina, and the World Bank, Washington, DC, http://sedlac.econo.
unlp.edu.ar/eng/.
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inequality fell by 5.3 points, from 55.6 to 50.3 Gini points (Fig. 1).2 Using other 
inequality measures, the conclusions are the same: inequality fell strongly (Azevedo 
et al. 2013; Cord et al. 2014).
The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measured of income inequality, 
but it is sometimes difficult to grasp its intuitive meaning. One useful way to inter-
pret changes in the Gini coefficient is proposed by Atkinson and Morelli (2014). 
They note that “a Gini coefficient of G percent means that, if we take any two 
households from the population at random, the expected difference is 2G percent of 
the mean.” Thus, the reduction in household income inequality in Latin America 
and the Caribbean implies that the expected income difference between two households 
picked at random in the region has gone down by 10 % of the mean income, from 
111.2 to 100.6 %.
The reduction of inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean was not only 
unprecedented in recent history but also distinct when compared with the rest of 
the world (Lustig et al. 2013). For a global comparison of consumption inequality 
statistics, Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) compiled data for as many as 130 countries 
for the period 1980–2010.3 The trends confirm the sharp inequality reduction in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and the contrast with developing countries in other 
regions, where inequality fell from an average of 40.6 Gini points to 39.4 points.
2 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion representing the income distribution of 
a nation’s residents. A coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality (every resident has the same 
income), whereas a coefficient of one (or 100 %) expresses maximal inequality (one person has all 
the income, and all others have none).
3 The dataset was computed mostly from household survey microdata, using the World Bank’s 









LAC unweighted LAC weighted LAC pooled
Fig. 1 Household income inequality: simple averages Gini LAC 1993–2013. Source: Based on 
SEDLAC (World Bank and CEDLAS). Note: LAC interpolated dataset, built using microdata for 
17 countries. For more information about the interpolation see World Bank (2015). Source: 
Rodríguez-Castelán et al. 2016
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Putting numbers in a (recent) historical perspective, Latin America and the 
Caribbean from the 1970s through the 1990s was nearly 10 points more unequal 
than Asia, 17.5 points more unequal than the 30 countries in the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and 20.4 points more unequal than 
Eastern Europe (De Ferranti et al. 2004). During the 2000s, however, the data 
clearly indicate an inequality convergence, as the less unequal countries experi-
enced larger increases in inequality (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015).
The decline in income inequality was not driven by a single country or a group 
of countries. Instead, it was shared across 16 of the 17 countries in which we can 
consistently measure household income inequality in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The only exception was Costa Rica, where inequality increased by 1.7 
Gini points.4 In spite of the common trends, the reductions are heterogeneous in 
their magnitude, ranging from 1.4 annual Gini points in Nicaragua (2005–2009) to 
0.09 annual Gini points in Colombia (Cord et al. 2014). In general, inequality 
declined more rapidly among the commodity-exporting countries, which suggests 
that the spectacular commodity boom may have played a role in the observed 
inequality dynamics—a hypothesis to which we will return below (Fig. 2).
4 Despite the change since 2010 in the official methodology to measure income in Costa Rica, there 
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Fig. 2 Evolution on poverty and inequality in countries with commodity boom and countries 
without commodity boom, 2003–2013. Source: Based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World 
Bank). Note: The inequality figures are the weighted average of country-specific Gini coefficients. 
In order to analyze the same set of countries every year, interpolation was applied when country 
data were not available for a given year. Commodity-boom countries are those which registered 
annualized growth in terms of trade above 2 % in the 2003–2013 period (Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina). Non-boom countries are the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Uruguay. Due to data limitation, Costa 
Rica, Panama, and Nicaragua are excluded. Source: Castaneda et al (2015)
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2.2  The Role of Labor Income Versus Redistributive Policies
The fall in labor income inequality was the most important factor that explains the 
recent downward trend in income inequality in most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. There is an intimate relationship in the region between individual earn-
ings inequality and household income inequality (De la Torre et al. 2014, 2015a, b). 
This is evident in Fig. 3, which shows similar trends in earnings and household 
income inequality for the region as a whole.
The close relationship between individual earnings and household income inequal-
ity is both an artifact and a reality, reflecting at least two important facts. The first 
regards measurement. The household surveys that we use to measure household 
income inequality do a good job of tracking earnings, but most likely underestimate 
the income from sources other than labor. Since nonlabor income tends to be more 
concentrated in the upper part of the income distribution and labor income is more 
spread throughout the income distribution (Piketty and Goldhammer 2014), our estimates 
of household income inequality are likely to be downward biased. Note, however, that 
in the few countries in which one can correct household income inequality measures 
in the household surveys using data from top income earners, the inequality levels are 
Fig. 3 Labor and total income Gini and the tertiary to primary education wage premium 1995–
2013 (LAC Average). Source: Based on SEDLAC. Notes: The graph plots the simple average across 
countries of the labor income Gini and household income Gini, and the skill premium of tertiary 
education relative to primary education. Included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay
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altered but not the trends: it is still true that inequality in these countries fell during the 
2000s (De la Torre et al. 2014). The second important fact concerns the limited capac-
ity of Latin American states to redistribute income. While these factors might lead to a 
downward bias in the measurement of nonlabor income, as labor earnings account for 
the lion share of total income, they are unlikely to challenge the strong association 
between individual earnings and household income inequality remains.
In Fig. 4 we decompose changes in household income inequality in the evolution 
of three components: labor earnings, the share of occupied household members, and 
nonlabor income. A few messages stand out. In all countries considered except 
Honduras, the evolution of labor earnings contributed to a reduction in inequality. In 
most of the cases, this contribution was predominant: for Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole, the reduction in annual Gini points was 0.52, with labor earn-
ings representing 54 % of the overall trend (Azevedo et al. 2014; Cord et al. 2014). 
Notwithstanding the crucial role of labor incomes—the main asset of the poor—in the 
reduction of household income inequality, the contribution of nonlabor income cannot 
be disregarded as minor. In Brazil, in fact, the rapid growth of social programs had a 
redistributive effect similar in weight to labor income in the annual fall of inequality.
Although the Gini coefficient is a useful summary measure of inequality, other 
inequality measures are more informative about the potential mechanisms behind labor 
market developments. A common measure of inequality used by labor economists is 
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Share of Occupied Labor Income Non-labor Income
Fig. 4 Decomposition of the evolution of household income inequality in LAC (circa 2003–2012). 
Source: World Bank (2014). Note: Graph plots the change in the composition of the household 
income Gini between share of occupied people, labor income, and nonlabor income
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the log ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile in the distribution of earnings. This measure 
can be further decomposed into separate trends for bottom inequality (defined by the 
log(p50/p10) ratio) and top inequality (approximated by log(p90/p50)). In most Latin 
American and Caribbean countries during the 2000s, the reduction of inequality was as 
important at the top of the earnings distribution as at the bottom (Table 1).
The reduction in inequality during the 2000s constitutes a unique phenomenon in 
the recent history of Latin America. Figure 5 shows that there is a turning point in 
the extent of earning inequality in most countries during the 2000s, the exact 
moment of the trend reversal depending on each country. In many countries 
(Argentina, Colombia, Peru) the turning point is around 2002–2003, coinciding 
with a period of rapid growth and the commodity boom. Note, however, that this 
rapid decline contrasts with the upward trends of the 1990s, and some signs of 
stagnation and even raising earnings inequality started around 2012.
2.3  Decline in the Skill Premium: A Primary Driver of the Fall 
in Earnings Inequality
Why did labor earnings contribute so greatly to the reduction of household income 
inequality? This section shows that the evolution of labor earnings was intimately 
related to the evolution of the wage premium associated with schooling. More gen-
erally, the fall in earnings inequality was associated with a reduction in the returns 
to workers’ skill, for which educational level serves as a proxy.
The evolution of the education premium is always a prime factor behind the 
evolution of labor earnings inequality. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the labor 
income Gini (dark blue line), household income per capita Gini (light blue line), and 
tertiary versus primary education premium (gray line). As we can see, inequality 
has shown the same trend as the skill premium—increasing in the 1990s and 
decreasing throughout the 2000s.
The reduction in the skill premium and the parallel trends with wage inequality 
are shared across the vast majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
(Gasparini et al. 2011). Figure 3 shows the tertiary education premium in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In all those countries except Colombia, 
the education premium fell rapidly as earnings inequality declined.
The reduction in the returns to education was paralleled by a reduction in the 
returns to other observable skills. Figure 6 shows the evolution of earnings inequal-
ity (as measured by the log ratio p90/p10) and the evolution of earnings inequality 
net of changes in the composition and returns to labor market observable skills (that 
is, labor market experience, approximated by the age of workers and education).5 
Figure 6 plots the log ratio p90/p10 and the residual log p90/p10 from a Mincerian 
type of equation for four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It is 
5 Residual wage inequality is obtained by calculating the percentile ratios from the distribution of 
the residuals from a flexible Mincer equation with a quadratic term in age, a set of education dum-
mies, and a full set of interaction terms that is estimated year by year.
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Fig. 5 Evolution of earnings inequality by country 1995–2013. Source: Based on SEDLAC. Note: 
Male and female full-time workers (worked at least 35 hours a week), ages 16-65, employed and 
self-employed. First and 99th percentile trimmed at the year-country level
1.36
1995 1998
wages log(p90/p10) residual log(p90/p10)


































Fig. 6 Evolution of earnings inequality net of changes in the composition and returns to market 
labor observable skills 1995–2013. Source: Fernández-Sierra, M. and Messina, J. (2015)
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remarkable how similar the trends are between the two curves in all countries. Thus, 
in the 2000s, Latin America experienced a reduction not only in the returns to 
education but also in the returns to labor market skills in general.
3  Why Did the Skill Premium Decrease?
3.1  Supply-Side Factors: Rising Numbers of More Educated 
Workers
Labor supply developments are a primary determinant of the school premium. In a 
competitive labor market, if labor demand remains constant, changes in the supply 
of a particular type of labor (for example, college-educated workers) translate into 
changes in the education premium. The supply–demand framework has indeed done 
a remarkably good job of explaining the education premium in the USA (Autor 
et al. 1998; Katz and Murphy 1992).
At least since the 1990s, all Latin America and Caribbean countries greatly 
expanded educational attainment. The proportion of the labor force with above- 
primary education increased noticeably (Table 2). The unweighted average share of 











1990 0.09 0.11 0.06
1995 0.14 0.044 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.01
2000 0.14 0.003 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.02
2005 0.13 –0.005 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.02
2010 0.12 –0.008 0.21 0.02 0.12 0.02
2013 0.13 0.005 0.23 0.01 0.14 0.01
Total diff. 0.038 0.11 0.08
Unweighted average
1990 0.20 0.14 0.07
1995 0.22 0.01 0.13 –0.01 0.08 0.01
2000 0.18 –0.04 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.01
2005 0.17 –0.01 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.02
2010 0.16 –0.01 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.01
2013 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.14 0.02
Total diff. –0.04 0.06 0.07
Source: Based on SEDLAC
Note: Estimations used 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries. All female and male workers 
(salaried, self-employed, and employers)
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the working-age population that completed secondary education in the 15 countries 
for which data are available rose from 14 to 20 % between 1990 and 2013. This rise 
is all the more remarkable if we consider the weighted (by population) average, 
which rose from 11 to 23 % in the same period.6
The expansion of tertiary education was equally important. The weighted 
average share of workers who had completed college almost doubled, rising from 
6 % in 1990 to 14 % in 2010 (from 7 to 14 % if we consider the unweighted average). 
In Brazil and El Salvador, the ranks of working-age individuals with completed 
secondary and tertiary education more than doubled. In Argentina, Chile, Honduras, 
and Panama, the share of college graduates doubled. In a third group of countries 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Peru), 
the registered improvements in educational attainment were significant but more 
modest (Table 3).
These broad patterns hide substantial country-specific differences in the temporal 
evolution of educational attainment of the labor force during the 1990s and the 2000s 
(Table 3). Some countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay) only achieved 
gains in years of schooling during the 2000s, after a decade of stagnation or (in the 
case of Paraguay) after a severe deterioration of educational attainment. Others 
(Brazil and Ecuador) rapidly expanded secondary education in the 1990s, followed 
by a more intense expansion of tertiary education in the 2000s. But in contrast with 
the reductions in inequality, which were mostly concentrated during the 2000s, 
several Latin American and Caribbean countries (notably El Salvador and Uruguay) 
expanded education more rapidly in the 1990s than in the past decade.
Education is not the only dimension of human capital that can potentially explain 
wage dynamics. The traditional Mincerian framework highlighted the importance 
of labor market experience, together with education, in determining wages. The role 
of experience is largely neglected in the Katz and Murphy (1992) framework, which 
implicitly assumes that all workers within an educational group are perfect substi-
tutes. This need not be the case, as shown by Card and Lemieux (2001) for the USA 
and by Manacorda et al. (2010) for Latin America during the 1990s.
Changes in the composition of the labor supply may differ across educational 
groups. In a rapidly expanding educational system, younger cohorts are likely to be 
more educated than older cohorts, putting downward pressure on the education 
 premium of workers with little experience in the labor market. These trends may be 
exacerbated if the rapidly increasing demand for education exerts such pressure on 
the educational system that a degradation of educational diplomas results (Campos 
et al. 2014).
Fueled by younger cohorts’ increasing demand for education, the rapid expan-
sion of low-quality higher education institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has sparked concern. One hypothesis put forward, known as the “degraded tertiary” 
6 The large difference between the weighted and unweighted measure is mainly due to the spec-
tacular performance of Brazil, where the share of the working-age population with complete sec-
ondary education more than doubled during the period, from 13 % in 1990 to 31 % in 2009 (De la 
Torre et al. 2014).

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hypothesis (Campos et al. 2014), posits that expansion was accompanied by an 
increasing dispersion in the quality of education centers, pushing downward the 
average quality of tertiary education. The so-called garage universities may be erod-
ing the value of educational diplomas, critics note, contributing to a decline in the 
quality of higher education among labor market entrants and thus to a decline in the 
returns to education. This hypothesis appears at odds with the empirical evidence, 
though. First, in several Latin American countries, the education premium has 
declined more among older cohorts than among younger cohorts. This is explored 
at length in the cases of Mexico (Campos et al. 2014) and Brazil (Wang 2015). The 
available evidence is thus more in line with a skill obsolescence hypothesis than 
with an eroded value of higher education (Campos et al. 2014). Direct evidence for 
Colombia also argues against this channel of decline in the education premium. In 
particular, Camacho et al. (2015) show that the value added of new higher education 
institutions and programs created in the 2000s is very similar to that of the tradi-
tional programs. Hence, there is little evidence that the supply of higher education 
has been degraded.
Another supply-side hypothesis relates to the composition of the supply of edu-
cated workers. According to this hypothesis, demographic changes have resulted in 
an increase in the share of older workers whose skills become obsolete at a more 
rapid pace due to the adoption of new technologies, and this effect outweighs the 
value of work experience. As a result, the wage premium for tertiary education 
(considering all tertiary educated workers) has fallen on average. Campos et al. 
(2014) provide some preliminary evidence for Mexico where the real wages of older 
workers have actually declined in absolute terms. Replicating their analysis for 
other countries De la Torre et al. (2015a, b) find mixed evidence—the relative 
decline of the wages of older workers doesn’t appear to be a widespread phenome-
non in LAC. Certainly more research is warranted in this area, however.
Fernández-Sierra and Messina (2015) disentangle the roles of labor market expe-
rience and education in explaining the observed skill premium trends. They show 
that different education premium trends are present across workers with different 
levels of labor market experience, and such trends are partially explained by relative 
labor supply dynamics. However, an explanation of a reverse trend—the shift from 
increasing demand for highly skilled workers in the 1990s to declining demand after 
2003—is needed to fully account for the observed dynamics in the skill premium.
3.2  Demand-Side Factors: Labor Demand Shifts
As this chapter has broadly concluded thus far, changes in educational attainment 
and other human capital dimensions must have played a role in the falling inequality 
of labor earnings during the 2000s in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, 
the region’s downward inequality trend cannot be explained solely by the increasing 
number of skilled workers. At the macroeconomic level, the shift in labor income 
inequality trends between the 1990s and the 2000s is not consistent with the 
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constant improvement in the supply of education throughout the period. In other 
words, the acceleration in the educational attainment of the workforce during the 
2000s was not sufficient to explain the rapid decline in the education premium. 
Rather, the shift in labor earnings inequality coincided more clearly with substantial 
increases in labor demand during this period.
The 1990s and 2000s were periods of pronounced business-cycle and labor- 
demand trends. After a decade of disappointing growth, the region underwent rapid 
growth in the 2000s in the wake of rising commodity prices and high growth globally, 
particularly in China and the Group of 7 (G7) major advanced economies.7 The com-
modity-exporting countries (mostly in South America)8 grew substantially faster 
during the boom years (roughly 2003–2011) than the commodity-importing countries 
(mostly in Central America and the Caribbean),9 which experienced only small trade 
gains or even losses.
The argument that a reversal in demand trends is needed to account for the shift 
in wage inequality that occurred in the early 2000s is explored formally by Gasparini 
et al. (2011), applying Katz and Murphy (1992) to the Latin American data. Their 
conclusion is that while supply-side forces mattered for inequality dynamics, 
demand-side determinants—the focus of this section—are key.
Several demand factors have been highlighted in the literature as important driv-
ers of wage inequality, including changes in the industrial structure; technological 
change (and, more recently, outsourcing); and international trade. These factors 
(for given (skilled and unskilled) labor supplies) could decrease the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers, and therefore earnings inequality, by 
expanding the demand for unskilled labor relative to skilled labor.
Together with underlying supply-side factors discussed in the previous section 
did labor earnings inequality fall in the 2000s because of
 (a) A specialization pattern (of industrial production) that led to a slower rise in 
skilled labor demand than supply
 (b) Technological change, particularly automation, that was particularly deleteri-
ous to skilled as opposed to unskilled occupations, leading firms in the region 
to become less skill intensive or to move some of the more skill-intensive 
production and service tasks offshore
 (c) Fluctuations in aggregate demand/business cycle that favored unskilled workers 
relative to skilled ones
This section briefly discusses why neither (a) nor (b) provides a sufficient expla-
nation for the inequality patterns in the 2000s and ultimately focuses on (c).
The specialization story refers to that hypothesis that deindustrialization in the 
region by eliminating high-skilled manufacturing job sector in favor of low-skilled 
7 The G7 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA.
8 Net commodity-exporting countries in Latin America and the Caribbean include Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
9 Net commodity-importing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean include Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
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positions in the construction and service sectors would decrease the skill premium 
(Gasparini et al. 2011). Under this hypothesis, we should see a decline in the share 
of the labor force (and a deeper wage compression) in skill-intensive sectors rela-
tive to the rest. This fact, however, is not fully consistent with the fact that sectors 
that in average demand more education grew comparatively more over this period, 
in contradiction to the premise of a demand shift towards low-skill sectors (De la 
Torre et al. 2014). Moreover, the implicit assumption that services in LAC are less 
skill intensive than manufactures is not validated by the data (De la Torre et al. 
2015a, b).
Another hypothesis includes skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu 
1998; Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez 2003). This literature emphasizes that, in 
developed countries, technological change (particularly automation) is comple-
mentary to high-education occupations, a substitute for middle-education occupa-
tions, and neither complementary nor a substitute for low-skilled occupations, 
consistent with a U-shaped change in employment shares across skill levels in the 
recent decades in the USA. However, in Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
evidence suggests that employment shares remained fairly constant across skill 
levels (Messina et al. in press; Silva et al. 2015). In a related strand of the literature, 
Acemoglu (2003) and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) emphasize the role of outsourc-
ing in the USA, an issue that deserves further research in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. However, there is some evidence that skill-biased technical change 
may have actually reduced labor income distribution in LAC through a different 
channel, i.e., by accelerating skill obsolescence in a way that more than offsets the 
effects of work experience. The fact that in some LAC countries (e.g., Mexico and 
Argentina) the wages of older workers fell relative to those of younger workers is 
consistent with this hypothesis, although the relative impact of this effect on over-
all labor income distribution is yet to be ascertained (Campos et al. 2014; De La 
Torre et al. 2015b).
Importantly, in high-income countries, labor demand shifts for skilled versus 
unskilled workers are typically interpreted as emanating from firm-level changes, 
that is, as evidence of skill-biased technological change associated with changes in 
the organization of production (Autor 2007; Autor et al. 1998; Goldin and Katz 
2007). However, in Latin America and the Caribbean—where business cycles are 
much more pronounced and external shocks play a major role in explaining aggre-
gate demand behavior—demand-driven inequality may have a different, more mac-
roeconomic nature. External shocks in the region during the 2000s such as the 
commodity boom had different effects on commodity-exporting countries (winners 
from growing demand for commodities) than on commodity-importing countries 
(losers from higher prices of commodities and import competition) (De la Torre 
et al. 2015a). This divide between these two types of country groups is also reflected 
in wage trends, with commodity-exporting countries experiencing faster growth in 
average wages than commodity-importing countries (Fig. 7). Perhaps even more 
importantly, labor income inequality fell in both sets of countries but for very differ-
ent reasons: In commodity exporters, this happened because both skilled and 
unskilled earnings were rising, but the unskilled component was rising faster in 
commodity importers, low-skilled workers’ earnings were rising, and the skilled 
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workers’ earnings were falling (Fig. 7). This difference and its role behind the 
unexpected decline in the labor income Gini throughout the region is a topic that 
deserves further research.10
Moreover, beyond the commodity boom and China’s economic rise in the 2000s, 
other external shocks shifted demand in the 1990s in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including the important change in trade patterns due to trade liberaliza-
tion.11 Most trade models suggest that changes in output prices drive changes in 
wage inequality. In fact, the links between product prices and factor returns are a 
key element of general equilibrium trade models. Interest in these links was 
10 For a comprehensive discussion, see De la Torre et al. (2015a, b).
11 Importantly, other factors linked with globalization have been shown to contribute to inequality 
trends. These include outsourcing (Acemoglu et al. 2015; Feenstra and Hanson 1997); exchange 
rate movements (Verhoogen 2008); and the rise of China (Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia 2008; 
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Fig. 7 Wage growth by sector in commodity-boom and no-boom countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, circa 2003–2013. Source: Based on SEDLAC. Notes: The graph plots the change in 
the simple average wage across countries for each sector and skill level between 2002 and 2011. 
Countries with commodity boom are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; 
countries without commodity boom are Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. Tradables sector includes 
primary and manufacturing; non-tradable low-wage sector includes construction, hotels and res-
taurants, public administration, wholesale retail, and private households; non- tradable high-wage 
sector includes all other services. Low skilled is up to incomplete secondary education and high 
skilled completes secondary or more
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heightened by the “trade and wages” debate, where lower prices of unskilled 
labor- intensive products were advanced as one explanation for the decline in the 
relative wage of unskilled workers in advanced, skill-abundant countries (Silva and 
Bastos 2008). The underlying argument was based on the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, which implies that trade liberalization in countries where unskilled labor 
is relatively scarce will lead to a fall in both the relative price of unskilled labor-
intensive imports and the relative return to unskilled labor, and therefore to an 
increase in wage inequality as well (Falvey et al. 2010). In contrast, in countries 
where unskilled labor is abundant, the theory would predict that liberalization 
would lead to a fall in wage inequality.
Hence, these models are less fit to explain why while most trade liberalization 
occurred in the 1990s,12 wage inequality was stagnant or rising in Latin America 
and the Caribbean during that period (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). Moreover, in 
this strand of the literature, the mechanism by which trade affects labor markets 
(and thus wage inequality) is through reallocation between sectors, and shifts of 
employment between sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean were limited in 
the 2000s when inequality fell.13
Recent papers provide several intuitive theoretical mechanisms for such a relation-
ship. Specifically, Acemoglu (2003) presents a model whereby increased international 
trade induces skill-biased technological change, and therefore trade opening can cause 
a rise in inequality. Moreover, Halliday et al. (2015) focus on a different factor—firm 
heterogeneity—and present a trade model whereby variations in the relative price of 
tradable goods can explain the decline in wage inequality.14 Fully uncovering the 
channels through which aggregate demand has affected income distribution in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is an important topic for follow-up research.
4  Conclusion
This chapter has examined the main trends in labor income inequality in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and discussed possible driving factors behind the 
historical facts. It documented three main stylized facts:
12 For example, (a) Mexico’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
(later the World Trade Organization [WTO]) in 1986 (Revenga 1997); and (b) Brazil’s trade liber-
alization from 1988 to 1995 (Gonzaga et al. 2006).
13 On labor mobility costs across sectors, see Artuc et al. (2015), Hollweg et al. (2014), and the 
references therein.
14 In addition to market forces that affect supply and demand of skilled and unskilled workers, insti-
tutional factors such as the minimum wage and unionization can also come into play. Barros et al. 
(2010) argue that, in Brazil, minimum-wage policy played an important role in inequality reduction. 
In a linked paper, Ferreira et al. (2014) find that although the minimum wage contributed significantly 
to inequality reduction, factors such as the decrease in wage gaps between urban and rural residents, 
formal and informal workers, and men and women (which could have also been influenced by the 
minimum-wage policy indirectly) were also key. Papers on the role of unionization in Latin America 
and the Caribbean are rarer. An important exception is Gasparini and Cruces (2010), which argues 
that, in Argentina, empowerment of unions contributed to wage compression within firms.
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• After decades of growing or stagnant inequality, household income inequality 
throughout the region fell substantially during the 2000s, a remarkable break 
from the upward trajectory of household income inequality during the 1980s 
and 1990s.
• Such trends in household income inequality were driven predominantly by the 
behavior of Latin American labor markets.
• The reduction in labor income inequality was, in turn, largely driven by changes 
in the skill premium (as measured by the wage returns to tertiary versus primary 
education), which again followed a path that broadly mirrored—over the entire 
period—that of labor income inequality.
The chapter also presented evidence that the region’s rising inequality of labor 
market earnings in the 1990s and falling inequality in the 2000s cannot be explained 
solely by supply-side factors such as the increasing number of more educated work-
ers. Providing evidence in this direction is the region’s experience during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, when household and labor income distribution worsened but the 
rates of increase in the supply of education were very similar (and even higher) than 
during the boom years (2003–2011), when income inequality declined. The decline 
in the quality of supply (lower quality of tertiary education among new entrants to 
the labor force) and faster skill obsolescence due to changes in demand provide 
complementary explanations, but there is relatively little evidence on these factors.
In search of an explanation for the reversal in inequality trends, this chapter 
suggests that more research is needed but that we are not completely in the dark. 
It argues that supply-only stories are not sufficient to explain the skill premium 
trajectory and that demand seems to have played a significant role (not least 
because it can be one of the common factors behind the unexpected decline in the 
labor income Gini throughout the region). Fully uncovering the channels through 
which demand operated is, however, a difficult task and an important topic for 
follow-up research.
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1  Introduction
The recent focus on top incomes at the international level (Atkinson and Piketty 
2010; Piketty 2014; Piketty and Saez 2006) should help placing the spotlight on 
Latin America. The region has traditionally been characterised by high concen-
tration of income and political influence of the elite (World Bank 2003). The 
interaction between economic and political concentration has led to periodic 
social conflicts and often contributed to institutional weakness. Social policy 
has also failed to redistribute income significantly, benefiting small segments of 
the population instead—as shown by Arroyo and Lindert in their contribution to 
this volume.
According to the historical literature, initial control over resources by a rent- 
seeking elite led to a highly skewed development model. Although there is a debate 
on whether this process begun in colonial times (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Engerman 
and Sokoloff 1997 and earlier Furtado 1974; Cardoso and Pérez Brignoli 1979 and 
other authors cited in Bertola 2012) or during the late nineteenth century (Coatsworth 
2008; Williamson 2010), there is no doubt of the negative consequences of inequal-
ity in the last century. The elite profited from commodity booms, often rejected 
progressive taxation and failed to incorporate large segments of the population into 
social policy.1
Given the historical relevance of top incomes and elite power, it is surprising that 
scholarly work on the reduction of income inequality in the last decade has ignored 
them, concentrating instead on short-term growth in formal employment and reduc-
tion in the skill premium (Cornia 2010). According to the most optimistic accounts, 
1 Following Amsden and DiCaprio (2012: 352), I define the elite as “those who enjoy privileged 
status and exercise decisive control over the organization of society”.
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higher education spending increased the supply of skilled workers and reduced their 
relative remuneration (López-Calva and Lustig 2010). The creation of conditional 
cash transfers, non-contributory pensions and other social assistance programmes 
enhanced the redistributive capacity of the state (Cornia 2014).
What has happened with economic and political concentration at the top? Has 
the influence of the elite been eroded? It is likely to decrease in the future? Answering 
this question requires us to go beyond econometric analysis based on flawed house-
hold data available only for a few years. It also demands a more rigorous analysis of 
the ways top incomes are reproduced over time that goes beyond the skilled 
premium.
In this chapter, I consider these questions through the case of Chile—a country 
where the top decile has a major contribution to overall inequality (Torche 2005; 
Yotopoulos 1989). I draw on the recent political economy literature on institutions 
and elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Amsden et al. 2012; Martínez Franzoni 
and Sánchez-Ancochea 2013) as well as the analysis of top incomes across the 
world and available (quantitative and qualitative) data on Chile.
Echoing Javier Rodriguez Weber’s contribution to this volume (see also 
Rodríguez Weber 2014), I illustrate how the Pinochet dictatorship contributed to a 
deepening of concentration at the top and redefined Chile’s political economy. I 
then review studies on income distribution to show that the current share of income 
of the richest 1 and 10 % is very high. I argue that the likelihood of a reversal of this 
situation in the future is limited for several reasons.2 First, market concentration is 
high, large business groups are powerful and production policies have changed 
slowly. Second, trade unions remain weak and cannot act as a countervailing force 
in the labour market. Third, tax reform has only increased slowly, partly due to elite 
opposition. At the same time, the chapter recognises Chile’s gradual move towards 
redistributive universalism in social policy (Huber and Stephens 2012) and explores 
whether these policies can transform the country’s political economy in the future. 
In the conclusion I call for more research on the elites to evaluate future distribu-
tional trajectories in Latin America. Given the lack of data and the need to consider 
the interactions between political, social and economic processes, future studies 
will need to adopt multidisciplinary approaches.
2 There are also political and institutional reasons that also contribute to the persistence of inequal-
ity, including the persistent popularity of right-wing parties (who still receive 40–45 % of the 
votes), the nature of the electoral system, the need for supermajorities to pass some important 
reforms and the role of the media. I thank Alan Angel for pointing out to me these factors, which 
will not be explored in this chapter.
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2  Income Inequality and Top Incomes in Latin America
Historically, in Latin America more resources have gone to the wealthy than 
anywhere else in the world.3 Although we do not have long-term data on concentra-
tion at the top, the situation in the early 1990s may constitute a good representation 
of earlier patterns (Table 1).4 In 1992, the richest decile in Latin America received 
48 % of total income, 1.7 times more than in OECD countries.5
Latin America’s unique pattern of inequality becomes even clearer in Table 2, 
which compares income distribution in each region with the OECD. Each observation 
3 Some of the subsequent discussion borrows from Sanchez-Ancochea (2009).
4 Focusing in the early 1990s is more meaningful than using more recent data because in the rest of 
the chapter we are precisely interested in recent changes. Ideally, we would use comparative data 
from the 1960s in the midst of import substitution, but this is not available.
5 As we will discuss later in the chapter, using household surveys to analyse income concentration 
at the top is problematic. High-income groups tend to be underrepresented in many of these sur-
veys and capital income is poorly measured. Yet comparative historical data on top-income groups 
in most developing countries is so far unavailable (see Piketty 2014).
Decile LA Africa Asia Eastern Europe OECD
1 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.2 2.5
2 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.4
3 3.0 3.7 4.8 5.1 5.3
4 3.4 4.6 5.8 5.7 6.3
5 5.0 5.5 6.5 7.5 7.3
6 6.0 6.5 7.5 8.2 8.6
7 7.6 8.6 9.0 9.4 10.5
8 9.0 10.5 10.5 10.8 12.2
9 14.0 13.3 12.4 12.8 14.8
10 48.8 42.2 37.4 34.7 29.1
Source: World Bank (2003)
Table 1 Various regions of 
the world. Income 
distribution by decile, 1992
Decile LA Africa Asia Eastern Europe OECD
1 0.64 0.84 1.04 0.88 1.00
2 0.71 0.88 1.03 1.12 1.00
3 0.57 0.70 0.91 0.96 1.00
4 0.54 0.73 0.92 0.90 1.00
5 0.68 0.75 0.89 1.03 1.00
6 0.70 0.76 0.87 0.95 1.00
7 0.72 0.82 0.86 0.90 1.00
8 0.74 0.86 0.86 0.89 1.00
9 0.95 0.90 0.84 0.86 1.00
10 1.68 1.45 1.29 1.19 1.00
Source: Own calculations based on data from Table 1
Table 2 Various regions of 
the world. Income shared 
compared to that of the 
OECD, 1992
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represents the income share of a specific decile in relation with the same share in 
OECD countries. For example, the poorest decile in Latin America received 
(in relative terms) just 64 % of what the poorest decile in OECD countries earned.
In Latin America, all deciles but the top one received in 1992 a lower share of 
income than in any other part of the world. The situation was particularly dramatic 
at the bottom of the distributional structure, but the lower middle class was also 
affected. Latin Americans in the middle decile, for example, received just 68 % of 
that in OECD countries (in relative terms). At the same time, the share of the richest 
10 % was significantly higher than in the OECD as well as Africa, Asia and Eastern 
Europe. The emerging literature on top incomes based on tax statistics has con-
firmed this problem for the 2000s. The share of the richest 1 % in the Latin American 
countries where data is available is significantly higher than in the USA (Alvarado 
and Londoño 2012; Medeiros et al. 2014).
The extent of the concentration at the top is also evident when considering the 
distribution of wealth. Merrill Lynch in collaboration with Capgemini publishes an 
annual estimation of the number of high net wealth individuals (HNWI)—people 
who hold at least US$ one million in financial assets (Lynch 2006). In 2006, Latin 
America has 300,000 HNWI (3.6 % of the world total), each of which had an aver-
age of US$14 million in financial assets, more than four times that of rich individu-
als in North America or Europe (Table 3).
2.1  Chile as a Good Example of the Regional Trend
Chile shares with Latin America the extreme concentration at the top, something 
that becomes evident in Fig. 1. While the ratio of the median income to that of the 
poor is lower in Chile than in the USA and Israel, the Chilean top earners get more 
Table 3 Number of high net wealth individuals, total wealth and average wealth 
per person, 2006
Region Numbera Total wealthb Wealth per personc
Europe 2.8 9.4 3.4
North America 2.9 10.2 3.5
Asia Pacific 2.4 7.6 3.2
Latin America 0.3 4.2 14.0
Middle East 0.3 1.2 4.0
Africa 0.1 0.8 8.0
World 8.7 33.3 3.8
Source: Lynch (2006)







than anywhere else in the OECD. Social mobility in Chile among the bottom 90 % 
is also high, while the opportunities to become part of the top decile are extremely 
low (Torche 2005). The Chilean rich have thus succeeded in protecting their social 
position over the long run while maintaining unique political influence (Rodríguez 
Fisse and Thomas 2014).
Have things changed in recent years? Has inequality gone down? For Cornia 
(2010: 109) Chile is a good illustration of Latin America’s success at consolidating 
a “prudent redistribution with growth” paradigm committed to reducing the inequal-
ity inherited from the colonial past. Sandbrok et al. (2007) go as far as to place post- 
1990 Chile as one of their four cases of social democracy in the periphery.
To evaluate the extent to which this is true, Fig. 1 presents the income share of 
the bottom 40 %, the middle 50 % and the top 10 % during the period 1987–2011 
based on household surveys—replicating an exercise in Palma (2011). In the 1990s, 
Chile’s income distribution changed relatively little and the top decile received 
around four times more than the bottom four deciles combined. Yet since 2003 there 
has been a gradual reversal as the income share of the top 10 % decreased from 44.0 
to 40.7 %.
Using household surveys, Friedman and Hofman (2013) argue that the income 
share of the top 10 % actually began going down in 1990. Yet their study also shows 
the inconsistencies in measurements of income at the top and the difficulties to rely 
on household surveys to study the rich. Research based on tax information may be 
more satisfactory and questions the results presented in Fig. 2. Two studies are 
particularly useful: López et al. (2013) and Fairfield and Jorratt (2014).
Fairfield and Jorratt (2014) present the most reliable estimations and also offer a 
longer time spam than other studies. They benefited from access to an unpublished 



































Median income / upper bound value of the bottom decile
Chile
Fig. 1 OECD. Income distribution, comparison of deciles, 2011. Source: Own elaboration with 
data from OECD
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database of all Chileans who paid taxes between 2005 and 2009 and used publicly 
available data to extend their series to 2004, 2010 and 2011. They allocate non- 
distributed profits to different income groups based on information from business 
tax returns—something that no other study has done. According to their results, the 
income share of the top 1 % varies between 15 % with no adjustments for non- 
distributed profits and unreported income and 33 % when adjusting for profits and 
for tax evasion. This last number is significantly higher than the USA (18 %)—the 
most unequal developed country—or even Colombia. Fairfield and Jorratt (2014) do 
not find any clear trend for the period 2004–2011: the income level at the top shows 
some variance from year to year but does not go down or up overall.
López et al. (2013) rely on publicly available data, which is divided into eight 
different tax schedules. Their allocation of non-distributed profits is based on 
shaky assumptions about ownership of assets in Chile. Yet their estimations are 
not that different than those by Fairfield and Jorratt (2014): according to their 
calculations, the income level of the top 1 % varies between 22 % (without 
accounting for non- distributed profits but considering tax evasion) and 31 % 
when all the numbers are considered. Even the lower bound estimation is higher 
than in South Africa, Colombia, Argentina and the USA. They also calculate the 
Gini coefficient adjusted by top incomes and compare it with that based on 
household surveys. The differences are significant: in 2010, the adjusted Gini was 
0.63 and the standard Gini was 0.55.
Two conclusions from these studies are particularly relevant for this chapter. 
First, despite the lack of data, it is hard to believe that distribution at the top has 




































































Fig. 2 Distribution of household equalised income in Chile, 1987–2011, groups of deciles. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from SEDLAC, which comes from household surveys
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gone down significantly in the last decade.6 How much larger than 30 % could the 
share of the top 1 % have been two decades ago? Second, studies of inequality and 
its evolution over time cannot rely only on estimations of income distribution. Even 
rigorous studies like Fairfield and Jorratt (2014) are forced to make heroic assump-
tions and show large variation between the lower and upper bounds. If we are inter-
ested in having a full picture of economic concentration, we may need to consider 
multiple (qualitative and quantitative) sources, including newspaper articles on con-
sumption and investment patterns of the rich.
3  Top Incomes and the Political Economy of Redistribution
Much of the economic literature on inequality has treated the top 1 % like any other 
group, emphasising, for example, the role of human capital in determining its 
income. As a result, the policies proposed to reduce income concentration are the 
same as the ones suggested to decrease the Gini coefficient: (1) increases in the 
minimum wages; (2) expansion in education spending and improvement of its 
quality; and (3) creation of new anti-poverty social interventions (see, for example, 
World Bank 2003).
Yet high-income groups are different than all others in society. They are owners 
of the largest firms and their income depends as much on profits as on wages. When 
studying these groups, we must account for both the functional distribution of 
income and the overall process of redistribution.
In developing countries, a significant share of capital income goes to the richest 
groups in society. For example, in Chile, López et al. (2013) estimate that 85 % of 
retained profits go to the top 1 %. Four-fifths of the income received by the 0.01 % 
richest Chileans actually come from capital earnings (Fairfield and Jorratt 2014). 
Many factors shape the functional distribution, but two are particularly important: 
the level of market concentration and the strength of trade unions. Market concen-
tration partly depends on the strength of family conglomerates, which have tradi-
tionally controlled a larger share of the economy in developing than in developed 
countries (Amsden 2001; Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom 2007; Schneider 
2013). Market concentration also depends on the number of firms per sector and on 
the productivity gap between large and small firms. Strong trade unions will also 
reduce the capital share.
By promoting collective bargaining, trade unions can additionally contribute to 
lower wage dispersion (Bhattacherjee 1987). This is most likely to happen when 
bargaining is centralised across the whole economy (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002). 
The distribution of wages also depends on the skill premium—i.e. the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers. The skill premium is driven by the level of 
6 These findings coincide with recent research in other Latin American countries based on tax 
information and following the methodology proposed by Atkinson, Piketty and Saez; see, in 
particular, the work on Medeiros et al. (2014) for the case of Brazil.
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education—which shapes labour supply—and the productive structure of the econ-
omy—which determines labour demand. While the skill premium has received 
ample attention in the recent literature on inequality in Latin America (López-Calva 
and Lustig 2010; Gasparini et al, 2011; Gindling and Trejos 2013), it may actually 
be less important to explain top incomes than some of the other variables.
Finally, we should consider the redistribution of income, which depends on taxes 
and government spending. Some social policies redistribute in favour of the poor 
without eroding the income share of the wealthy. This is, for example, the case of 
conditional cash transfers, which given their small size do not usually demand tax 
increases. Universal policies, on the contrary, are more likely to create pressures 
towards higher taxation, thus exerting a more powerful downward pressure on top 
incomes (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea in press).
Political forces and struggles influence the functional distribution of income, wage 
distribution and fiscal policy. The way markets are regulated, incentives to large firms 
are set, trade unions are treated and tax and social policies are designed depend 
directly on the strength of different actors. Unfortunately in all these areas, the eco-
nomic elite usually have more influence than others. The elite play a central role in 
shaping political institutions and policies (Robinson 2012). In Shamus Kahn’s words, 
“although elites are not representative of society, the distribution of power in their 
favor often means that elites are the engines of inequality” (Kahn 2012: 362).
The rest of this chapter explores the key factors shaping the distribution of 
income at the top in Chile today. I am not only interested in the situation at a point 
in time (e.g. how redistributive policies are in a certain year) but also in the political 
processes that different policies may trigger (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez- 
Ancochea 2016). To undertake this analysis, it is important to first understand the 
“regressive revolution” that took place in the 1970s.
4  The Pinochet Years: A “Successful” Redistribution 
Towards the Top
During the 1950s and 1960s, the improvements in income distribution—clearly 
illustrated in Rodriguez Weber’s contribution to this book—went hand in hand with 
an erosion of the power of the elite. The political system moved to the left and new 
social groups acted as countervailing forces (Pinto 1970).7
7 The significance of the political changes but also its limitations are clear when one considers 
social policy. During the 1950s and 1960s, social programmes in health, pensions and education 
expanded rapidly and by the early 1970s social security covered 75 % of the economically active 
population (Huber and Stephens 2012). The growing in social spending led to higher social secu-
rity contributions and a larger tax burden. Yet these policies were highly segmented, primarily 
favouring some groups within the middle class. Social insurance involved more than ten different 




Yet all the advances quickly reversed after the 1973 coup d’état, which was 
enthusiastically supported by large segments of the elite (Palma 2011). Pinochet’s 
dictatorship triggered a return to an elite-based political economy model (Silva 
1996) and led to a process of economic concentration. The redistribution of income 
towards the top was extraordinary—even larger than the one the USA has experi-
enced in the last three decades. Between 1973 and 1989 the income share of the top 
10 % increased by 50 % while that of the bottom 70 % decreased by more than 35 % 
(Palma 2011; see also Ricardo 2010).
The coup affected all the channels of economic and political concentration that 
we have previously discussed. First, capital concentration increased significantly, 
particularly as a result of the processes of privatisation. Of the 500 companies in 
public hands in the early 1970s, 481 were transferred to a small number of players 
within the private sector. Privatisation together with the allocation of credit to a few 
business groups “increased the size concentration of firms and further enhanced the 
economic power of the 20 or so major industrial and banking groups” (Yotopoulos 
1989: 696). By 1978, Chile’s five most powerful conglomerates controlled 60 % of 
the assets of the 100 largest firms, compared to 46.5 % in 1969.
Second, trade unions were systematically persecuted and changes in the regula-
tion of the labour market expanded outsourcing and free wage setting (Berg 2006). 
The weakening of trade unions contributed to a reduction in overall wages and 
eliminated a significant progressive political force. In contrast, the influence of large 
business groups in policymaking grew significantly during this period (Rodríguez 
Fisse and Thomas 2014).
Third, the capacity of the state to redistribute income weakened. Collective 
pensions were replaced by individual capitalisation pensions managed by private 
companies. All the redistributive components of the system were eliminated and 
pensions became exclusively linked to the financial returns on contributions (Riesco 
2007). Public healthcare survived, but private providers grew significantly. A large 
share of health costs was passed to individuals (through private insurance contribu-
tions and copayments) and the share of public spending in the total decreased from 
38 to 21 % (Gogna 2004). At the same time, the taxes paid by high-income groups 
compared to those paid by the middle class decreased significantly, thus reducing 
the contribution of the wealthy towards redistribution. According to calculations by 
Arroyo Abad and Lindert presented elsewhere in this volume, the net benefit from 
social spending minus taxes received by the top quintile increased from a negative 
number in 1973 to more than three percentage points of GDP in the mid-1980s.
5  Chile Since 1990: Why No More Advances?
If we accept that top incomes have remained stable after the return of democracy—
something more evident in the tax data than in household surveys—how can we 
explain it? In which areas has Chile experienced advances and where have things 
stayed the same? In this section I review some of the channels discussed in Sect. 3. 
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I show that the concentration of economic power has not changed and public policy 
has not paid enough attention to the reduction of productivity gaps. Trade unions 
also remain weak and cannot act as an influential national force. In contrast, some 
reforms have made social policy more redistributive and could trigger progressive 
political trajectories in the long run. The key unanswered question is not whether 
Chile is still unequal, but whether these new opportunities can truly modify the 
political economy of inequality in the future.
5.1  The Capital Share and Market Concentration
During the last two decades, the capital share in GDP has remained relatively sta-
ble (Fig. 3). It increased by nine percentage points between 1999 and 2006, but has 
then gone back to its 1996 level. Guerreiro (2012) confirms these general patterns 
in a global study that corrects for the level of self-employment. She also shows that 
recent stability has come after large swings in previous decades, in favour of capi-
tal during the Pinochet years and against after the return to democracy.8 Chile’s 
performance in this area is in line with global trends and consistent with many 
8 Studying the evolution of the capital and labour shares leads us to question the dominant dis-
course on the recent improvement in income distribution in Latin America. For example, according 
to CEDLAS data based on household surveys, Peru’s Gini coefficient went down from 0.52 in 
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Fig. 3 Labor and capital share, % GDP, 1996–2013. Source: Own elaboration from National 
Income Accounts, Central Bank webpage
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other countries where capital concentration and income inequality have increased 
simultaneously (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013; Piketty 2014).
Data on market concentration is patchier and does not allow us to explore 
changes over time systematically. Additionally, some of the best qualitative studies 
on business groups and economic concentration rely on data from the 1990s, thus 
limiting what we can say about the last decade. Nevertheless, there is enough empir-
ical evidence to believe that concentration has not decreased significantly and 
remains high.9
Three conglomerates have been particularly prominent: Luksic, Angelini and 
Matte. In the late 1990s, these three groups alone owned all Chilean publicly 
traded companies with market value over 600,000 million pesos. In the last 
decade, large family groups have succeeded in adapting to changing global con-
ditions by creating new ties to transnational corporations, expanding into non-
tradable sectors like commerce and diversifying into many different sectors 
(Fazio 1999; Schneider 2008).
For example, through different holdings like Quiñenco or Madeco, Luksic par-
ticipates in manufacturing activities like copper and aluminium, fibre optics and 
flexible packaging as well as beer, wine and sodas. Luksic has also created strategic 
alliances in other sectors, including banking, telecommunication, electricity and 
tourism (Fazio 1999). The group Matte has built a diversified portfolio that includes 
the largest paper factory in South America together with participation in more than 
30 firms in finance, mining, health, telecommunications energy, ports and others.
To explore the links between market concentration and the highest incomes, I 
consider the 2015 Forbes list of world billionaires. Although this kind of list only 
provides limited information on a few prominent families, it is still helpful to under-
stand economic concentration. In 2015 there were ten Chileans on the Forbes list, 
although several were part of the same families (Table 4). Together these ten indi-
viduals have an estimated wealth of US$34.5 billion, equivalent to 12 % of Chile’s 
GDP. Table 4 also highlights the extent to which a small number of business groups 
are present in multiple sectors and own a large number of companies. The top Chilean 
groups control most retail operations—a sector that expanded by an average annual 
rate of 8.2 % between 2007 and 2011—and have a strong presence in media, banking, 
mining and manufacturing.10
Concentration is also high at the sectoral level. In hardware stores, two  companies 
(Easy and Sodimac) have become dominant players, contributing to the disappear-
ance of almost 3500 companies that operated in the sector in the 1990s. Three phar-
maceutical chains (Cruz Verde, Salcobrand and FASA) are responsible for more than 
90 % of sales. The list of sectors dominated by just two or three companies—many 
2003 to 0.43 in 2013. Yet this happened at the time when the wage share decreased by more than a 
third according to Guerreiro (2012)’s estimations.
9 For a discussion of the persistence of business groups and its economic influence in Chile and 
other Latin American countries, see Schneider (2008).
10 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-15/falabella-billionaires-surface-with-low-
profile-fortune (last accessed 7 May 2015).
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of which are part of larger conglomerates—also includes telecommunications 
(mobile and Internet), cable, supermarkets and electricity (Ruiz and Boccardo 2010; 
Fazio 1999).
Additionally, in the mid-2000s just five groups owned directly or indirectly almost 
half of all shares of the companies in Santiago’s stock exchange (Solimano 2009). 
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In 2007, the three largest companies (administradoras de fondos de pensiones, 
AFPs) controlled 74 % of all pension funds in the country. Solimano also calculates 
an index of economic concentration for six sectors (pharmaceuticals, forestry, 
banking, pension funds, mining and healthcare), showing an increase in four of 
them during the 2000s.
5.2  Structural Heterogeneity and Production Policies
Like other Latin American countries, Chile has been characterised by large produc-
tivity gaps. Data in Infante and Sunkel (2009) for 2003 finds differences in employ-
ment and productivity in two different axes: between sectors and between small and 
large firms. Large firms are more productive than small and medium firms in all 
economic sectors. Also, mining, utilities and financial services are more productive 
than agriculture and community services—although productivity gaps by sector are 
lower than by size. As a result, the difference between a large mining company and 
a small agricultural producer is astonishing: the former is almost 40 times more 
productive than the latter. Most employment is located in low-productivity sectors 
and, as a result, is of low quality (Velasco and Huneeus 2011).
Between 1990 and 2005, successive governments of the Concertación (an alliance 
of centre and left-wing parties that have fought against Pinochet) did little to tackle 
dependence on natural resources and promote productivity diffusion to other 
sectors. The dominance of market-friendly ideas made state-led interventions par-
ticularly difficult (Palma 2011). Things partly changed in 2005 when a new royalty 
on copper, mining and other natural resources was created. The royalty taxed net 
profits from natural resource activities with a rate of up to 5 %, which can be 
deducted from taxable income coming from other taxes. Although Chile still has 
one of the lowest royalty levels in the world—it represents less than 2 % of profits 
and 0.6 % of the value of sales (López and Miller 2008)—the new tax infused the 
government with welcomed new resources.
The royalties were earmarked for innovation and the promotion of new sectors 
and funded the creation of the National Council for Innovation and Competitiveness 
(Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad, CNIC).11 The initial 
design of the CNIC was prepared at the request of the Concertación senators 
Alejandro Foxley and Edgardo Boeninger and borrowed on the experiences of 
Australia, New Zealand, Finland and Ireland. Its creation was a top-down bureau-
cratic initiative: although the CNIC incorporated members from business associa-
tions to its board, the private sector’s involvement and commitment to the project 
were quite small.
Soon after its creation, the CNIC published a White Book (volume 1), which 
established the economic justification for innovation policy. The document proposed 
11 The following discussion is partly based on interview with a former high-ranking official of the 
CNIC, Santiago, Chile, July 2012.
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selective interventions based on the promotion of clusters. The CNIC created then 
11 thematic roundtables in areas like higher education and innovation culture to 
agree on the following steps to take. Composed by experts, government officials 
and some members of the private sector, the roundtables resulted in a shopping list 
of measures that informed the proposals of the White Book’s second volume.12
The CNIC developed an ambitious strategy of cluster promotion and took some 
useful steps to accelerate economic dynamism. Nevertheless, its interventions 
shared at least three common problems with other industrial policy initiatives. 
First, the CNIC was primarily a technocratic project with weak support from the 
private sector and few mechanisms to force private sector cooperation. Its initial 
top-down and technocratic bias continued in subsequent years. When Eduardo 
Bitrán was named president of the Consejo in 2008, he promoted better integration 
between ministries and more support from different political parties. Yet he made 
no effort to embed the organisation within the private sector. The creation of more 
dynamic links between large firms and small and medium firms was never in the 
agenda either.
Second, the main goal of the CNIC was to increase the innovation capacity by 
supporting sectors that were globally dynamic and where Chile had comparative 
advantages. The aim was exclusively to accelerate GDP growth and the strategy did 
not pay any attention to the link between innovation, firm size and income distribu-
tion. Other industrial policies have shared a similar problem, providing insufficient 
support to small and medium firms. For example, CORFO’s GIF lending pro-
gramme—which does concentrate on small and medium firms—managed only 
1.1 % of the total portfolio of the Chilean financial system in 2006, well below 
Mexico’s NAFIN (9.7 %) and Colombia’s BANCOLDEX (5.3 %) (Agosin et al. 
2010). In key sectors like forestry, which are controlled by a few large groups, “the 
lack of a competition policy, as well as comprehensive public policy promotion of 
economic transformation, has impeded the upgrading and/or entrance of small and 
medium sized firms” (Devlin and Moguillansky 2012: 6).
Third, the efforts of the CNIC have lacked continuity: after the election of 
President Piñera in 2010 the sectoral interventions based on cluster promotion were 
discontinued (Devlin and Moguillansky 2012). The new administration (2010–2014) 
discouraged the active promotion of structural change, focusing exclusively on the 
creation of an efficient business environment (Agosín and Grau 2013). The conser-
vative government was also reluctant to use the government’s purchasing power to 
support small and medium firms.13
President Piñera’s decision and Chile’s overall weak and inconsistent approach 
to industrial policy responds in large part to the preferences of the private sector. 
Business groups and business associations have maintained a critical approach 
to direct state intervention (Rodríguez Fisse and Thomas 2014). For example, a 
12 Volume 2 defined nine sectors to promote (including fishery, offshoring, wine and mining) based 
on those discussions as well as a report prepared by the Boston Consulting Group.




high- ranking official from the Confederation for Production and Commerce I 
interviewed argued that innovation policy mobilised a lot of resources but was quite 
inefficient. He also suggested that the private sector should drive innovation efforts 
and, when discussing strategic sectors, came back repeatedly to the central role of 
mining.14 This is not surprising: as previously discussed, the business elite’s main 
interests are in mining, finance and non-tradable goods and services. Promoting 
new sectors is not their priority and could lead to the emergence of threatening 
competition.
5.3  Trade Unions and the Influence of Labor
Trade unions play a significant role in the (re)distribution of income, at least in 
OECD countries (Blau and Kahn 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001). They pressure 
median wages upward and often contribute to reduce the wage gap (see Panagides 
and Patrines 1994 for the Mexican case and a review of the literature in Torrés 
2014). They can also influence the functional distribution between wages and 
profits and reduce top incomes. In the case of the USA, for example, Volscho and 
Kelly (2012) show that a 1 percentage point increase in union membership would 
result in a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the income share of the super-rich.
In Chile, as we mentioned before, trade unions were severely repressed after 
the 1973 coup. The main trade union confederation was outlawed and many of its 
leaders detained. All existing labour contract regulations were suspended and labour 
markets liberalised (Berg 2006). Unionisation rates plummeted: the share of union 
workers in the total labour force went from 33.7 % in 1973 to just 9.8 % in 1985 
while union size halved (Donoso 2013a).
With the return to democracy in 1990, trade unions were free again to negotiate 
contracts and organise strikes, but they never recuperated its previous influence. 
The main trade union confederation was co-opted by successive Concertación 
administrations and played a secondary political role (Donoso 2013a). Unionisation 
rates stagnated and collective agreements remain sparingly used. In 2013 the per-
centage of workers under collective bargaining or under joint contract—a weaker 
type of agreement—was below 12 %, more than four percentage points lower than 
in 1990.15
A combination of political and economic factors explains the ongoing weakness 
of trade unions (Donoso 2013a; Leiva 2012; Winn 2004). On the political front, the 
14 Interview with a member of the Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio, Santiago, 
July 2012.
15 The Labor Department only publishes data on new agreements signed every year. Each collective 
agreement can last between 2 and 4 years but data on the average length is not available 
(Departamento de Trabajo 2014). If all agreements lasted 2 years, only 8 % of all workers would 
benefit in 2013. If all agreements lasted for 4 years, 15 % of workers would be included. I have 
chosen as the best approximation the average of those two numbers (11.6 %). The data for 1990 
comes from Leiva (2012).
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memory of the dictatorship and its terrible consequences contributed to the adoption 
of a moderate strategy. Union leaders were also reluctant to oppose governments led 
by anti-dictatorship colleagues. The dominance of liberal ideologies was also 
important. Successive Chilean administrations focused on growth promotion 
through free markets and trade liberalisation, fighting inequality exclusively through 
social policy (Palma 2011). As part of this policy approach, the government main-
tained “labour legislation that is one of the most restrictive on union bargaining 
power in the world” (Landerretche et al. 2013: 166). The business elite also opposed 
ferociously various attempts to reform labour laws, watering down proposals that 
were quite timid to start with (Sehnbruch 2006).
On the economic front, labour market deregulation and expansion of subcon-
tracting arrangements constrain the opportunities for effective union organisation 
(Berg 2006). Structural heterogeneity—particularly the dominance of small, 
low- productivity firms—and the growing share of services—where unionisation is 
significantly harder than in manufacturing—have also been problematic.16
In the last decade, there have been some advances. Unionisation rates have recu-
perated slightly, going from 10.9 % of the working population in 2000 to 11.9 % in 
2013 (Fig. 4). The size of trade unions has also expanded from a low of 72 workers 
16 According to Landerretche et al. (2013) more than half of all large firms have unions compared 
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Fig. 4 Unionisation rates and trade union size, 2000–2013. Source: Own elaboration with data 
from Departamento de Trabajo (2014). Note: The dots represent the ratio between the unionised 
population and all workers, while the line only considers those workers who can legally associate. 
It thus excludes public servants. The OECD statistics show a similar trend although with slightly 
higher values (e.g. unionisation rate in 2012 is 15.2)
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per union in 2004 to 88 in 2013. The emergence of grass-roots unions with more 
direct links to the rank and file constitutes an even more significant change. Led by 
subcontracted workers, who demand equal treatment to those employed directly by 
companies, the new groups first appeared in the state-owned National Copper 
Corporation (Corporación Nacional del Cobre, CODELCO).17 The first organised 
protests took place in 2003 and led to the creation of the National Association of 
Subcontracted Workers (CNTC) (Hughes 2013). An indefinite strike in 2006 in sev-
eral mines forced CODELCO to negotiate directly with the subcontracted workers 
and grant them a special bonus. The government also passed a Subcontracting Law 
in January 2007. The slow implementation of that law subsequently led to the inten-
sification of the conflict between subcontracted workers and the state, strengthening 
the new labour movement in the process (Donoso 2013a). In recent years, grass- 
roots unions have progressively expanded to private mining companies, forestry 
and salmon processing (Leiva 2012) and have opened new opportunities to devel-
oped countervailing social forces.
Nevertheless, these changes should not be exaggerated: trade unions are weak 
and have a limited influence on income concentration. Unionisation rates are still 
well below the highs of the early 1970s. Laws still discriminate against trade unions, 
which are not allowed to negotiate either at the business group or national levels.18 
The impact of grass-roots unions on collective rights and state behaviour has also 
been smaller than initially expected (Donoso 2013a). New unions will only revitalise 
the labour movement if they can ally with traditional organisations and build more 
productive interactions with left-wing parties—something they have so far failed to 
do. Otherwise, their political influence and contribution to the erosion of top 
incomes in the long run will be limited.
5.4  More Advances in Tax and Social Policies?
While the Chilean Government has been reluctant to adopt an interventionist stand 
in production and the labour market, it has gradually implemented more active poli-
cies in the social realm. Since 2005, Chile has gradually moved “toward a more 
universal system of social protection, inspired by left commitments to social equity, 
justice and solidarity” (Huber et al. 2010: 82). The expansion of social spending has 
in turn created new conflicts over taxation and could gradually consolidate a broader 
redistributed cross-class coalition. Overall, the system has become more redistribu-
tive from a historical perspective: since 1990 the top quintile pay more in taxes than 
17 Subcontracting in the copper sector expanded rapidly in the 2000s. Between 1999 and 2004 the 
share of firms with subcontracted workers went from 37 to 63 %. In 2011 82 % of the companies 
in the sector were subcontractors (Hughes 2013).
18 The minimum wage has also increased less than in neighbouring countries: between 2003 and 
2009, the minimum wage increased by an annual average of 2.4 % compared to 6.6 % in Brazil and 
a double-digit growth in Uruguay (ILO 2010).
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receive in benefits (Arroyo Abad and Lindert, this volume) and the redistributive 
capacity of the state keeps improving.
The creation of basic health entitlements for the population at large through the 
Plan for Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees (Plan de Acceso Universal con 
Garantías Explícitas, Plan AUGE) has probably been the most significant of these 
pro-universal moves (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2014). The AUGE 
plan created a universal mandate for a list of services that every health insurer is 
obliged to provide within explicit timelines, thus stopping the practice of private 
providers offering plans that omitted key procedures such as reproductive health-
care for women (Ewig 2008). The plan introduced price limits on private insurance 
plans and created incentives to reduce age and gender discrimination (Ewig and 
Palmucci 2012). In addition to the AUGE bill (passed as Ley 19.996 of September 
2004), three additional bills were introduced: two established more regulation over 
private providers and a third, the Sanitation Authority Law (Ley de Autoridad 
Sanitaria), gave hospitals greater autonomy.
Financial needs and electoral pressures explain why the government succeeded 
in passing a reform that favoured the poor and the middle class (Pribble 2013). 
Public health spending had increased steadily during the 1990s partly because the 
state covered the costs of services that the private insurance did not include. The 
Lagos administration (2000–2006) had to find new ways to control public spending 
while increasing the state’s funding capacity simultaneously. At the same time, an 
expansionary reform had cross-class appeal as the middle class was increasingly 
using state services.
The ultimate impact of the reform was constraint by the influence of the elite. 
Private insurance companies operating often through right-wing political parties 
succeeded in limiting cross-subsidies between the private and public sector (Pribble 
2013). During implementation, they also adopted pricing strategies that limited 
AUGE’s positive impacts on gender and age inequalities (Ewig and Palmucci 2012).
Despite these problems, AUGE clearly contributed to move Chile’s social policy 
into a universal path. The basket of required treatments has been expanded steadily 
based upon their cost-effectiveness in preventing death and disability (Ewig and 
Kay 2011).19 A draft bill currently discussed following recommendations from a 
public–private commission will likely establish a minimum, common insurance for 
public and private providers, create a common pull with all private contributions 
and establish a new fund for high-cost medicines in both systems (Oxford Analytica 
2014). This process of unification will further enhance cross-class coalitions in sup-
port of further expansions of healthcare.
New pension benefits have also been important. The 2008 pension reform intro-
duced a new redistributive benefit program, the Basic Solidarity Pension (Pensión 
Básica Solidaria). This pension can reach up to $160 per month and involves a 
public subsidy to households earning up to 60 % of the income scale. The reform 
19 The most recent changes added 9 new pathologies, increasing the total number to 80. See, for 




also included a bonus for each live birth that women have, therefore acknowledging 
time devoted to child birth and child-rearing (Ewig and Kay 2011).
While the pension reforms maintained private individual accounts as the core of 
the pension system, they opened the door for subsequent progressive changes in the 
system. Upon taking office for the second time in 2014, President Bachelet created 
a high-level commission to explore the sustainability of the pension system and the 
link between its various components. The most important proposal on the table is 
the creation of a state-led insurance company (a public AFP). If introduced, this 
reform would reduce the large commissions that the private AFPs charge and 
weaken private providers more generally.
The most evident display of cross-class coalition and middle-class “voice” has 
taken place in education. In recent years, secondary school and college students 
have repeatedly protested against the excessive costs of education and the lack of a 
high-quality, public education.20 In a first round of protests, in 2006 secondary 
school students (the so-called Pingüinos) succeeded in putting education reform in 
the agenda, even if they did not have much influence in the design of the subsequent 
legal framework (Donoso 2013b). More recent protests from college students placed 
the demand for free education at the centre of the agenda, and influenced the 2014 
electoral campaign. This messier and less predictable policy process can be consid-
ered as an indication of an emerging politics of redistribution that is less complacent 
with the elite. In fact, according to Fairfield (2014: 16), “the 2011 and 2012 student 
protests … dramatically expanded the scope of debate on progressive taxation”.
This is welcome news for tax policy and a demonstration of the links between 
social policies and taxation politics in Chile. In the last two decades, the need to 
expand social policy in the context of fiscal discipline has created periodic pressures 
to expand revenues (Fairfield 2015; Pribble 2013). Increases focused primarily on 
the value-added tax, whose rate was raised as a result of the creation of AUGE and 
earlier education reforms (Pribble 2013). VAT increases, in turn, were used to 
demand progressive changes in income taxes in several instances including during 
the discussion of the 2001 Anti-Evasion Law (Fairfield 2014).
Successive tax reforms have contributed to a moderate expansion in the tax 
burden. Taxes as percentage of GDP grew from 17 % in 1990 to 23 % in 2007, 
decreasing more recently as a result of the global financial crisis and the end of the 
commodity boom (Fig. 5). More significantly for redistribution, income taxes 
have been behind this positive trend: their share in the total went from only 23 % 
in 1990 to 46 % in 2007. The 2014 reform should further increase both total reve-
nues in general and income taxes in particular, expanding the progressive capacity 
of the state.
Despite these improvements, the Chilean state still struggles to tax high-income 
groups. Fiscal loopholes, which benefit the elite disproportionally, represent an esti-
mated 4 % of GDP, more than in any other OECD country but Mexico (López 2011). 
20 In the late 2000s, the public sector spent just 20 % more than the private sector despite having to 
serve nine times more students (López 2011). The Chilean education system also has significant 
spatial inequalities and the costs of tertiary education remains high.
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Taxes on natural resource rents in sectors like aquaculture, fisheries and forestry 
remain low (López and Miller 2008) and the tax rates of the wealthy are signifi-
cantly below other countries. The average effective tax rate for the richest 1 % is 
around 16 %, compared to 24 % in the USA and a higher level in other OCDE coun-
tries (Fairfield and Jorratt 2014).
These problems reflect the ability of the elite to water down various reform 
attempts. Thanks to its close ties to right-wing opposition parties and its resources 
to lobby the government, the business elite has succeeded in leaving the corporate 
tax and access to bank information outside of the policy agenda (Fairfield 2010). 
The business elite was also successful in watering down Bachelet’s ambitious 
reform proposals in 2015. The results of future struggles over taxes and social pol-
icy will depend on the capacity of the emerging cross-class redistributive coalitions 
to confront this persistent elite power.
6  Conclusion
The recent literature on Latin America’s performance (much of which is discussed 
in other chapters of this volume) has praised the reduction in inequality since the 
early 2000s (Cornia 2014; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; López-Calva and Lustig 2010). 
Yet how sustainable is this positive trend? Is Latin America truly in a new era? 
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To answer these questions, we should consider how much the income share of the 
wealthy is changing and why. Given data limitations and the importance of politics, 
this requires a multidisciplinary approach that combines statistics with the study of 
policymaking and political trajectories.
This chapter adopted this approach to explore the case of Chile—one of the Latin 
American countries where inequality at the top is most striking. I collected a variety 
of evidences to show persistent concentration of income at the top. To understand 
this persistence and consider future trajectories, I studied changes in the structure of 
the economy, trade unions and the state’s redistributive capacity. My analysis illu-
minates some contradictory trends. Economically, capital income and market con-
centration remain high with a few business groups controlling large segments of the 
economy. The state’s capacity to make changes in production and reduce structural 
heterogeneity is persistently low. At the same time, however, social policy has 
become more redistributive and may be contributing towards the creation of new 
progressive cross-class coalitions. Higher social spending has also pushed taxation 
upwards—even if the elite is still paying well below its fair share. A positive 
scenario for the future would be one in which new social policies create new social 
expectations and demands, which, in turn, lead to higher taxes. Given the lack of the 
government’s commitment to more radical measures, only in this indirect way will 
the income share of the rich decrease over the very long run.
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1  Introduction
One oft-noted observation of the twentieth-century economic history of Latin 
America in general and of the import-substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) in 
particular is the neglect of agriculture and the related structural heterogeneity (Baer 
1972; Kay 2002; Bertola and Ocampo 2012). In Latin America, the transformation 
of agriculture has not been regarded as a centerpiece of the adopted development 
strategies and, despite some attempts at rural reform, seldom promoted. It might be 
fair to say that biases against the rural sector have been a defining characteristic of 
Latin American economic development (Lipton 1977; Griffin et al. 2002; Johnston 
and Kilby 1975; Reynolds 1996). The dual structure remained even after the ISI 
period and the switch to the new economic model. A stylized fact is that the conti-
nent, even beyond the so-called lost decade of the 1980s, has been in a state of 
stagnation: weak structural transformation, slow growth, and consistently unequal 
distribution of income (Bulmer-Thomas 2005). Since the early 2000s, however, 
many economic indicators, as reported from Economic Outlooks and Reports by the 
World Bank, IMF or OECD, have been pointing in another direction: steady and 
relatively high income growth per capita, advances on the commodity export mar-
kets, and increasing inflows of foreign direct investments. In terms of social indica-
tors, improvements have also been made: the number of people classified as middle 
class now surpasses the number of poor; poverty declined from 152 million people 
living below 2.5 dollars a day in 2000 to around 83 million people in 2010 
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(World Bank online); and income inequality in the last decade declined in 15 out of 
16 countries with comparable data at a rate of 1.1 % per year (Lustig et al. 2013).
It has been advocated that the fall in income inequality in Latin America pro-
vides support for the Kuznets curve (Tsounta and Osueke 2014; Kanbur 2011). The 
most cited reasons for the improvement relate to policies and political changes over 
the last decades such as the expansion of elementary education, reduction of the 
skill-premium, cash transfer programs, and macroeconomic stability (Lustig et al. 
2011; Cornia 2012). No doubt, redistributive policies and changes in social spend-
ing and legislation are regarded as important proximate causes for narrowing the 
income distribution and lend support to the notion that income distribution might 
follow the inverted U-shaped pattern. True, the rise of the income share of the lower 
segments of the nonagricultural population was already suggested by Kuznets 
(1965) to be the key for narrowing the income distribution, and studies indicate that 
this is what we have witnessed in Latin America over the recent decades (Tsounta 
and Osueke 2014). However, a complementary way to assess whether Latin America 
is moving downward on the Kuznets curve is to capture the deeper dynamics of 
structural change in the form of inter-sectoral inequalities. While overall labor pro-
ductivity has improved only slowly, agricultural labor productivity growth has been 
more impressive, suggesting a potential for diminishing the long-standing urban–
rural duality in the Latin American economies.
In this study we approach the recent decline in income inequality in Latin 
America from the perspective of structural change with a focus on the relative per-
formance of the agricultural sector. Our focus is on the underlying forces implied by 
Kuznets (1965). We zoom in on the relative performance of agriculture in the devel-
opment process and the rural–urban duality and pay particular attention to the last 
couple of decades in relation to the entire post-1950 period. We attempt to estimate 
empirically possible theoretical relations with regard to these patterns by posing the 
following basic questions: how does the resurgence of agriculture relate to the 
reduction of income inequality and to what extent is this an expression of Latin 
America moving downward on the Kuznets curve?
The literature on agriculture’s relation to the recent changes of income distribu-
tion in Latin America is quite limited. For instance, in a recent ECLAC report titled 
“Structural change for equality” (2012), the role of agriculture is not even men-
tioned. By agriculture we mean both farming and agro-business that processes and 
transports that output. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to investigate 
this relationship for the recent decades in the perspective of structural change in 
Latin America. There are strong theoretical reasons to connect agricultural develop-
ment to income distribution. The closing of the rural–urban income gap reflects 
what Reynolds (1975) called a “dynamic” transformation of agriculture and relates 
to the contribution agriculture provides for overall growth of the economy. In addi-
tion, the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to growth is estimated to be 
stronger when growth emanates in the agricultural sector (Ravallion and Chen 2007; 
De Janvry and Sadoulet 2009). Productivity growth in the lagging sector should also 
contribute to sectoral labor productivity to convergence and thus helps to reduce 
inequality (Timmer 1988). For these reasons, the resurgence of agriculture driven 
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partly by improving commodity prices should be given due attention when assess-
ing the decline in income inequality in Latin America. According to the logic of the 
Kuznets curve, the hypothesized “turning point” of the inverted U-curve is gener-
ated by a reduction of income inequality in one or both of the sectors and/or a reduc-
tion of the rural–urban income gap as the weight of the agricultural sector diminishes, 
and the income per capita gap between them declines.
We find that the recent decline in income inequality is related to the recent resur-
gence of Latin American agriculture, and, by inference, its lack of decline across 
most of the twentieth century must be related to a lack of productivity change in 
agriculture. We provide estimates showing that during the recent decades inter- 
sectoral duality has been reduced by agricultural productivity growth. The duality 
expressed as an inter-sectoral Gini shows the shape of an inverted U-curve and as 
such the closing of the rural–urban income gap corroborates with the theoretical 
expectations postulated by Kuznets. The wider implication of the study is, however, 
that with slower growth in agricultural labor productivity, continuing improvement 
in the income distribution becomes more difficult. In the absence of strong manu-
facturing growth, agriculture might be able to reduce income inequality further if 
agro-industries remain unskilled labor intensive, thus raising the opportunity cost of 
unskilled workers. On the other hand, the traditional service sector has perhaps 
become the “new agricultural sector” in terms of productivity and labor surplus. In 
other words, the source of the remaining dualism does not come only from rural 
areas, but also from urban areas.
In the next section, we relate the current agricultural resurgence to previous peri-
ods, in particular the so-called belle époque, and we discuss some possible differ-
ences between these periods. We then explore theoretically the structural relationship 
between agricultural development and income distribution. The subsequent sections 
contain the data and the methodology that we use for OLS (and fixed effects) regres-
sions related to sectoral income inequality and a simple decomposition of agricul-
tural labor productivity. We concluded with a summary of the main findings and the 
conclusions.
2  Commodity Export Booms, Land Inequality, 
and Development in Latin America
The economic history of Latin America indicates that commodity export booms and 
busts have been an important component of its development: in the nineteenth cen-
tury sugar in Cuba and guano in Peru stand out, later nitrates in Chile, coffee in 
Colombia, Brazil, and Costa Rica, and in the twentieth century oil in Ecuador and 
Venezuela, just to mention a few cases (Bulmer-Thomas 1994). The export booms 
have indeed triggered growth spells, but no country in Latin America has experi-
enced sustained structural transformation and industrialization (Sachs and Warner 
1999; Bertola and Ocampo 2012).
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The commodity export boom over the last decade seems to have been driven by 
demand from China and other emerging markets. Many Latin American countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, among others, experienced a 
large increase in investment in land and agriculture (Borras et al. 2012)1 in response 
to a rising terms of trade in spite of the sharp, but temporary, decline of prices during 
the 2009–2011 crisis (FAO 2014). The wave of rising terms of trade lasted 7 years 
compared to 3 years in past episodes in the 1970s and 1980s (Adler and Magud 
2013),2 and its timing coincided with the recent improvement of the income distri-
bution in Latin America. Poverty and income inequality fell simultaneously in most 
countries of the region while other developing regions experienced the opposite 
(Lustig et al. 2011). In Latin America this stands in sharp contrast to the commodity 
boom period of the late nineteenth century. What might be different today in Latin 
America allowing improvements in the income distribution?
Land inequality has been regarded as one of the main historical determinants of 
the income distribution in Latin America (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). Measured 
by Gini coefficients, land inequality has remained high over time and larger than 
income inequality (Solbrig 2006; Frankema 2009; World Development Report 
2008). Likewise, estimates based on agricultural census data indicate that small 
farms in Latin America have less than 1 % of total land while the same statistics is 
around 15 % in East Asia and 55 % in sub-Saharan Africa (Anríquez and Bonomi 
2007). Attempts to redistribute land have been many, but with varying degrees of 
success (Solbrig 2006).3 The recent commodity boom has made land reforms less 
appealing because land prices went up with the recent large increase of land and 
agricultural investments in the region (Borras et al. 2012).
At the same time the impact of land distribution on income inequality is depen-
dent on a variety of factors such as the weight of agriculture in the total economy 
and inter-sectoral linkages. The contribution of agriculture in total GDP and labor 
employment has been in relative decline. The manufacturing and service sectors 
depend less on land than does agriculture, and therefore labor has increased its share 
of total income. Gasparini et al. (2011a) provide evidence that 81 % of total income 
in the region comes from labor for the period 1992–2006. The remaining 19 % is 
nonlabor income, which includes income from capital, rents and profits, pensions, 
1 Borras et al. (2012) indicate that the presence of recent large foreign investment in land occurred 
in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay Mexico, 
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala.
2 Sachs and Warner (1999) developed a theoretical model to study when and how increases in com-
modity prices, including minerals, benefitted or damaged nine Latin American countries for the 
period 1960–1994. They found that on average countries with commodity booms longer than 3 
years did not experience an increase of GDP in the years after, with the exception of Ecuador. 
Countries like Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela even saw a decline in their GDP during and 
after the boom.
3 Mexico in 1917, Bolivia in 1952, Cuba in 1959, Chile in 1965, and Peru in 1971; Venezuela and 
Brazil had minor attempts that can be summarized as colonization policies rather than land reforms, 
and Argentina did not have the need to pursue it because the agricultural sector was the most 
advanced in the economy and the share of landless peasants was small.
M. Andersson and A. Palacio
369
inter-household transfers and remittances, government transfers, and the implicit 
rent from owned property.
There are reasons to believe that the recent boom has provided more room to 
stimulate inter-sectoral linkages today than in previous episodes. During the so- 
called belle époque (1860–1929) the commodity boom enriched the landowning 
elite and marked a turning point upward in the evolution of income inequality in the 
region (Williamson 2010a). During the period increasing international demand and 
declining costs of transportation promoted the expansion of the export sector, but 
labor mobility was constrained by the residuals of slavery and encomienda systems, 
let alone the repression of organized labor and the impact of European immigration 
in the Southern cone (Frankema 2009; Kay 2001; Williamson 1999; Bulmer- 
Thomas 1994, p. 87; Bauer 1975). Not surprisingly, in a period of stable farm wages, 
the landowning elite and the holders of capital reaped bigger benefits, and income 
inequality rose during the period, arguably to Gini levels around 0.60 (Williamson 
2010b; Bertola et al. 2008; Rodriquez Weber 2014).
The main difference between the recent boom and the belle époque might be that 
agriculture is not isolated anymore and that improved terms of trade has translated 
into higher value not only for land but also for rural labor. Since the 1960s, it seems 
as if the emergence of linkages between the rural and urban economies in the region 
became apparent with the massive reallocation of agricultural labor into other sectors 
of the economy. The positive impact on rural labor may also have been stimulated by 
the demand of more commodity processing and internal transport. While agricultural 
employment recorded negative growth rates as the sector shrank, nonagricultural 
employment in rural areas has been growing since the 1970s and continues doing so 
in the 1990s in Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and elsewhere 
(Reardon et al. 2001; Haggblade et al. 2010). On average, 40 % of rural income in the 
late 1990s came from rural nonagricultural employment. Hence, there is reason to 
believe that an agricultural sector fuelled by improved terms of trade would today 
promote the expansion of the rural service sector. Indeed, low unemployment rate in 
the region has been driven by the service sector, which has employed an increasing 
number of workers, including the rural service sector (World Bank 2012).
In addition, the recent commodity boom is also related to the emergence of “flex 
crops.” Flex crops include soya, sugarcane, oil palm, and corn, among others. Their 
main trait is the multiplicity of their uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material), 
which can be interchanged (Da Silva et al. 2010). For instance, soya can be used for 
feed, food, and biodiesel. In other words, the reliance on few export products, which 
has been historically prevalent in the agricultural export sector of Latin America, 
makes their economies less vulnerable to price fluctuations when the final use can 
be altered. As an example, the area planted to soya in hectares has risen in Bolivia 
from 172,354 in 1990 to one million in 2009 (Urioste 2011). In short, technological 
development has allowed agriculture to diversify their risks even within a single 
crop sector (Borras et al. 2012).
Also, the urban bias has receded in most countries for domestic policy reasons. 
After the 1980s price distortions on tradable products fell and enabled producers to 
exploit economic opportunities (Eastwood and Lipton 2004). Brazil, Chile, Peru, 
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and Mexico are good examples of the trend, where the new economic model 
allowed regional groups, which were less able to reap the benefits of their compara-
tive advantages before, to benefit from positive changes in factor and product mar-
kets, and political disposition to invest in health, education, and infrastructure (Da 
Silva et al. 2010; David et al. 2000). The overall urban–rural income gap in the 
region fell from 2.5 in 2002 to 2.2 in 2006 (Gasparini et al. 2011b). Furthermore, 
even though there are few studies linking the role of agriculture in reducing poverty 
at the country level, recent estimates indicate that rural poverty fell more than urban 
poverty for the period 2005–2012 in every country (ECLAC 2014). However, there 
is some contrasting evidence that even though the floor has been lifted, the spatial 
gap in the human development index has remained stable (for Mexico, Campos-
Vazquez et al. 2014).
In short, in the first decade of the twenty-first century we have witnessed one of 
the longest commodity price booms and the fall of income inequality in the region. 
The belle époque, however, marked the upswing of income inequality. The landed 
elite was the winner from the rising terms of trade and rural labor was excluded. 
While land was the main source of income in preindustrial Latin America, it remains 
highly concentrated as before, with land Ginis that go beyond 60 % in most coun-
tries. However, land has lost weight as the agricultural share of labor and GDP has 
fallen over time. Labor benefitted from the boom this time because labor markets 
are less segmented than they used to be, linkages between rural and urban activities 
have opened new job opportunities in the service and construction sectors, and 
safety nets and redistribution policies have protected people against income volatil-
ity. All these changes have an impact on the sectoral structure of the economy and 
therefore on wage inequality marking a turning point in the evolution of income 
inequality in the region.
3  Agricultural Productivity and the Kuznets Curve
It is almost a truism that a sustained increase in living standards requires increased 
productivity in the economy as a whole. Long-term gains in productivity imply 
structural change, which has been forcefully argued by Kuznets (1966), Syrquin 
(2006), and Timmer (2007). One of the major structural changes is the sectoral real-
location of labor into more productive sectors. However, less straightforward is the 
net effect of the different forces of structural change on income inequality. In this 
section we will present some of the theoretical and empirical avenues of how struc-
tural change, here mainly discussed in a two-sector perspective (agriculture and 
nonagriculture), affects income inequality. One of the reasons why agricultural 
development is relevant for inequality is the observation that the elasticity of pov-
erty reduction with respect to growth is typically higher for agriculture than nonag-
riculture. Timmer, for instance, suggests that growth “originating in agriculture 
contributes to a more equal distribution of income” (2007: 60, drawing on the work 
of Kuznets 1955 and Chenery and Syrquin 1975).
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Kuznets (1965, 1966) argued that both reallocation of agricultural labor into 
more productive sectors constitute the major structural change in a developing 
economy, plausibly leading to long-term inter-sectoral convergence in productivity. 
The whole process has repercussions on the pattern of income distribution. 
According to the Kuznets-curve logic, in the initial stages of development the real-
location of agricultural labor into the nonagricultural sector reduces both the rela-
tive share of people employed in agriculture and its share of total GDP without any 
significant increase in agricultural productivity. As a result, the rural–urban income 
gap widens along with the urban intra-sectoral inequality. Later on, the productivity 
(or income) gap between sectors converges as the productivity in agriculture 
improves. When the inter-sectoral convergence gets stronger, and as labor mobility 
increases, the overall income distribution improves. By then, the absolute number of 
employed agriculture falls with rural–urban migration. The inequality is also 
strengthened by distributive policies and legislation following the increasing impor-
tance of the political voice of both urban and rural lower-income classes. This ideal 
model represents a dynamic transformation of agriculture as opposed to a static one. 
Agriculture is mostly driven by its productivity dynamics (Johnston and Mellor 
1961). In the latter, agriculture is instead squeezed out of its resources and inter- 
sectoral linkages are weak (cf. Reynolds 1975).
The Kuznets hypothesis provides broad ideas for thinking about changes in the 
long run income distribution. In a two-sector economy, when the majority at first 
resides in the agricultural sector and the nonagricultural sector is small, average 
income per worker is low as is the variance of the income distribution. When people 
leave agriculture, the average per capita income in the agricultural sector may rise 
but since the more unequal sector will gain in relative importance the overall income 
distribution might become more widespread.
The overall income distribution is the net effect of intra-sector distribution, inter- 
sector income differences, and sector weights. In some cases, the process of structural 
change might create forces working in opposite directions. Yet structural changes in a 
two-sector model may increase inequality in five possible ways: (1) income inequality 
is increased in both sectors simultaneously; (2) income inequality is increased in the 
agricultural sector only; (3) income inequality is increased in the nonagricultural sec-
tor only; (4) a divergence of average income between the poor agricultural sector and 
the rich nonagricultural sector; or (5) shifting weights in the more unequal nonagricul-
tural sector. Estimating such a complex socioeconomic process is difficult. However, 
given the resurgence of Latin American agriculture, we may address the inter-sectoral 
productivity differences and weights. It should be emphasized that Kuznets was very 
careful to discuss the caveats of his hypothesized inverted U-curve; that it was a his-
torical–theoretical speculation rather than an established empirical law.
One way of relating the rise of agricultural productivity with the income distribu-
tion is suggested by Timmer (2004), who argues that the turning point of the Kuznets 
hypothesis can be also associated with the closing gap between the share of GDP 
and employment in agriculture. He has estimated the gap in a sample of eight Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, South 
Korea, and China) for the period 1960–2000 by using the “inter-sectoral Gini 
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 coefficient” as a proxy for the inequality of labor productivity (or income) between 
agriculture and nonagriculture. His results show that the inter-sectoral Gini is posi-
tively associated with the overall Gini and captures one-third of its variation, con-
trolling for relative labor productivity, the GDP share of the service sector, savings, 
rice prices, and other variables.
Using evidence from 86 countries between 1965 and 2000, Timmer and Akkus 
(2008) show that the gap between the GDP and employment shares in agriculture 
does narrow with higher incomes and explains that this convergence is part of the 
structural change, reflecting better financial and labor markets. Furthermore, the 
agricultural productivity gap widens during the early stages of development and 
reaches a turning point at the per capita level of GDP above US 5063 in the year 
2000, controlling for terms of trade, and US 9255 without controlling for them. The 
main implication of these findings is that agricultural price policy can be used to 
influence their domestic terms of trade, connect the agricultural labor to the rest of 
the economy, and thus reduce inequality.
4  Data and Methods
The aim here is to study the relationship between income inequality and agricultural 
development in nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. These countries cover more 
than 82 % of the total GDP of LAC and more than 91 % of the population in 2012. 
The period covered 1950/1960–2010, which we divide into three subperiods that 
reflect alternative policy views: the import substitution (ISI) period between 1960 
and 1975, the turmoil period between 1975 and 1995, and the agricultural resur-
gence/fall in income inequality period between 1995 and 2010.
We decompose aggregate labor productivity change to identify the contribution 
of agriculture relative to other sectors of the economy. Labor productivity is an 
indicator of real income per capita, and its change over time can be decomposed 
into sectoral productivity change and the reallocation between sectors. We follow 
the approach taken by Ocampo et al. (2009) and Roncolato and Kucera (2013). This 
can be expressed as follows:
 

























The sectoral productivity growth is the difference between the growth rate of 
sectoral value added gi and the growth rate of sectoral employment ei, weighted by 
the sectoral output share φi0. Sectoral productivity growth (within) reflects techno-
logical change and rates of investment. Sectoral reallocation is the difference 
between sectoral output share φi0 and sectoral employment share λi0 adjusted by the 
ratio of labor productivity multiplied by the growth rate of sectoral employment ei. 
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Reallocation is usually the most common term to capture structural change. However 
we view structural change as the interplay of both terms. We agree with the idea that 
reallocation of agricultural labor is indeed the major structural change in economic 
development, but realize that without increases in overall sectoral productivity real-
location might not contribute to growth as labor can end up in low productivity 
nonagricultural sectors.
To implement the decomposition, we use the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre Data (GGDC) that contains data on sectoral value added and employment 
for nine Latin American countries. The data cover the period 1950–2010 for all 
countries, except Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela. Their series start from the 1960s 
onward. We convert local currency value added at 1990 prices to dollars using 2005 
deflators by sectors and exchange rates. Labor productivity is computed dividing 
sectoral value added by employment.4 Note that unemployed people are not avail-
able in the GGDC data. We combine two of the original sectors (Government ser-
vices and community, Social and personal services) into a single one, leaving the 
sample with nine sectors. The sectoral distribution and details on the sources of the 
data are available at the GGDC website.
The Gini coefficient is used as our measure of income distribution. We build on 
the work of Timmer (2004) to compute the inter-sectoral Gini from the share of the 
agricultural economy in overall economic activity in relation to its share of the labor 
force. Note that the inter-sectoral Gini is not the Gini of the agricultural sector, but 
the Gini coefficient of the agricultural sector compared with the nonagricultural sec-
tor. The inter-sectoral Gini coefficient should be positively related to the overall 
Gini coefficient.
The inter-sectoral Gini coefficient is computed as
 
Inter sectoralGini agri agri agri agri agri- = - - -( ) - -( )1 2 1 1 1p S S p p -( )Sagri ,  
p is the share of the labor force in agriculture, and S is its share of economy-wide 
income.
 Gini constant Intersectoral Gini controls= + +  
The Gini coefficient is the version 5.0 of the Solt5 dataset that provides inequality 
measures for 153 developing and advanced countries for the period 1960–2010. The 
Gini coefficient we use as the dependent variable is the pre-fisc or market inequal-
ity6 or inequality before taxes and transfers. The literature indicates that taxation 
4 The sectoral distribution is composed of nine sectors: agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing; min-
ing; manufacturing; public utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, hotels; 
transport, storage, communication; financial services, real estate, insurance; other services (com-
munity and personal and government services).
5 Solt (2014) produced the dataset of comparable series of Gini coefficient for net and market 
inequality.
6 Missing data is completed through linearized estimates, in particular for the 1960s and 1970s.
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policies in Latin America have little impact on market inequality (Goñi et al. 2008; 
ECLAC 2012). However, we use the difference between market and net (or post- 
fisc) inequality to capture redistribution in the period 1995–2010. The latter period 
has been characterized by an expansion of redistribution schemes, including non-
contributory pensions, health insurance, and cash transfers to the poor, which have 
been widely praised.
We also recognize that there are many forces acting upon the Gini. The first of 
them is the distribution and changes in value assets or wealth over time. They should 
be studied jointly with the income Gini because the distribution of wealth is the 
result of past income distributions and savings rates. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that on average aggregate savings grew more than in previous boom episodes, and 
that the public sector contributed more to savings than the private sector (Adler and 
Magud 2013).7 In this line, we borrow the idea from Timmer (2004), who studies 
the inter-sectoral Gini in eight Asian countries, that gross domestic savings are a 
crude proxy of nonlabor income. Savings rate in the full sample range from 11 % of 
GDP in Bolivia to 21 % in Chile and 31 % in Venezuela (see descriptive statistics in 
the Appendix). Likewise, we examine the impact of the service sector GDP on the 
Gini coefficient. The decomposition literature indicates that agricultural labor is 
released mostly into the traditional service sector, where productivities are low, and 
in many cases informal.
We examine the hypothesis that increases in agricultural labor productivity has a 
direct impact on the inter-sectoral Gini through its inner components: land produc-
tivity and land/labor ratio. On one hand, the identity below captures increases in 
efficiency that relates to improvements in the agricultural production such as quality 
of crops, or use of fertilizer, but also other effects such as improvement in the orga-
nization of production or institutional changes. On the other hand, the identity 
accounts for changes in the resource endowments such as increases in relative abun-
dance of land relative to labor that can impact income during a commodity boom, 
given that land frontier can be expanded and high yield technology can be used. We 
take the data of arable8 and agricultural9 land from the World Development 
Indicators. We use both datasets, but the results here are presented based on arable 
land alone. The estimates do not vary much.
 
Value added in agriculture









7 Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru saved more out of the boom than the rest, while Chile and Brazil 
stand out on the other extreme with lower marginal saving rates.
8 Arable land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted 
once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and 
land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded.
9 Agricultural land is the share of land area that is permanent pastures, arable, or under permanent 
crops. Permanent pasture is land used for 5 or more years for forage, including natural and culti-
vated crops.
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Combining the GGDC data of agricultural value added and employment with the 
land data from the World Bank Indicators, we run an OLS regression with country 
and year dummies. All variables are logged, and land productivity and land-labor 
ratio are regressed on the inter-sectorial Gini. Finally, we contrast the results with 
the sectoral decomposition, which identifies sectoral productivity and reallocation.
5  Results
The first sign of an agricultural resurgence in Latin America was the rise in agricul-
tural productivity relative to economy-wide productivity. The ratio has been grow-
ing at an unweighted average rate of 1.6 % per year for the period 1960–2010 but 
our results indicate that the period 1995–2010 accounts for 43 % of that impressive 
growth rate.10 Some countries record a faster growth than others like Bolivia and 
Brazil in contrast with Chile and Costa Rica, but the gap between agriculture and 
nonagriculture was closing from 1995 to 2010 in every country in the sample.11
Agriculture has indeed been no obstacle to growth during the last 50 years and 
an engine of growth during the last two decades. In Table 1 we show that since the 
10 The growth rate of the ratio for the period 1960–2010 is 1.8 % (40 % in the period 1995–2010) in 
Argentina, 1.8 % (68 % in the period 1995–2010) in Bolivia, 1.5 % (73 % in the period 1995–2010) 
in Brazil, 2.7 % (34 % in the period 1995–2010) in Chile, 0.6 % (33 % in the period 1995–2010) in 
Colombia, 1.5 % (29 % in the period 1995–2010) in Costa Rica, 0.8 % (58 % in the period 1995–
2010) in Peru, 0.9 % (58 % in the period 1995–2010) in Mexico, 3.6 % (25 % in the period 1995–
2010) in Venezuela.
11 We examined the finding further by trying different specifications of the ratio such as manufac-
turing over agriculture, labor-intensive services over agriculture and even their marginal produc-
tivities, and excluding Argentina, whose agricultural productivity has been larger than the average 
in the economy and in the region.















Argentina 0.32 0.40 0.03 −0.14 0.32 0.93
Bolivia 1.58 −0.01 −0.84 0.13 0.05 0.91
Brazil 1.14 0.31 0.01 0.17 −0.69 0.93
Chile 0.64 0.56 −0.50 0.48 1.15 2.33
Colombia 0.43 0.19 −0.88 0.14 0.62 0.51
Costa Rica 0.43 0.73 −0.52 0.12 0.48 1.24
Peru 0.76 0.42 0.07 0.38 0.41 2.03
México 0.26 0.13 −0.18 0.31 −1.04 −0.53
Venezuela 0.20 0.03 −0.68 −0.12 −0.23 −0.80
Source: Labor productivity growth decomposition estimated with yearly data from the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)
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mid-1990s the agricultural contribution lies ahead that of manufacturing, with the 
exception of Argentina and Costa Rica. In other words, during the period 1995–
2010 the agricultural sector has consistently contributed more than manufacturing 
to aggregate labor productivity in seven out of nine countries in the sample. We also 
confirm the pattern that traditional services such as wholesale retail and trade, hotels 
and restaurants reduce aggregate labor productivity while dynamic services such as 
financial services enhance it, but not to the same extent as agriculture. For instance, 
Chile is a country with low agricultural GDP (5 %) and employment (9 %) shares 
compared to other middle-income countries, but most of the decline in poverty 
seems to be attributed to agricultural productivity growth. Anríquez and López 
(2007) estimate the unskilled labor demand elasticity of agricultural output to be 
three times larger than that of skilled labor. In general, even though our results do 
not account for the informal sector, the falling productivity in the service sector is a 
clear indication that the manufacturing sector cannot fully cope with the realloca-
tion of agricultural labor and therefore the conditions for relatively high inequality 
will probably persist in the region.
Agricultural productivity has a role to play in closing the inter-sectoral labor 
productivity gap. Even though labor productivity does not necessarily translate into 
income in imperfect markets, we think that our estimates of the negative association 
between the inter-sectorial Gini and higher levels of income per head are appearing 
in many Latin American countries. Table 2 indicates that the income elasticity is 
1.56 and the square of income is −0.08. In other words, the gap closes with rising 
income, and the turning point was 17.154 dollars per head at 2013 EKS PPP prices. 
We added the terms of trade12 to check whether increasing trade would reduce the 
turning point, and the result was 10.847 dollars per head at 2013 prices. Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, and Venezuela surpassed that threshold around 2000, and Mexico 
in the early 1980s. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru are coming closer to 10.000 dollars 
per head, and Bolivia is on 4.517 dollars by 2010 (see Table 5 in Appendix).
The literature has ambiguous results with respect to the association between 
terms of trade and inequality during the recent commodity boom. For instance, 
12 We combined the series of terms of trade from the World Bank and the Montevideo-Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database (Moxlad). GDP per head at 2013 prices is taken from the 
Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED-GDCD).
Table 2 Testing the inter-sectoral Gini in nine Latin American countries between 1960 and 2010
Inter-sectoral Gini 1 2 3 4
Ln (income per head) 2.951*** 2.494*** 1.560*** 1.561***
Ln (square income per head) −0.144*** −0.122*** −0.080 −0.084***
Terms of trade −0.00017
Year X X X
Country X X
Constant X X X X
R-squared 20 % 55 % 92 % 92 %
Number of obs. 459 459 459 459
Note: Statistical significance is indicated as * at the 10, ** at the 5, and *** at the 1 % levels
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Astorga (2014) finds no evidence that the commodity price boom has favored 
unskilled labor, but Gasparini et al. (2011a) find that it has shifted resources, includ-
ing labor, toward non-tradable sectors such as construction and services and favored 
the employment of unskilled labor in these sectors. Timmer and Akkus (2008) 
report that as in the case of East Asia the negative association between terms of 
trade and inequality indicate some room to design agricultural policies that improve 
the well-being of the rural population in the income distribution. Our estimates 
show a small and negative coefficient for terms of trade, and even if it is statistically 
insignificant, it seems to support the findings of Timmer and Akkus.
Table 1 shows that the inter-sectoral Gini is positively related to the overall Gini. 
Model 1 indicates that a 1 % increase in the inter-sectoral Gini raises the overall 
Gini by 0.08 %. Adding the controls, the inter-sectoral Gini in model 2 is −0.018 % 
and significant at the 10 % level. We examined the result by running separate regres-
sions for every country and found that the downward bias comes from Argentina. 
Model 2a excludes Argentina and yields a coefficient of 0.04 %. Note that the coef-
ficient is small relative to our first model, but the coefficient is larger and significant 
at the country level: 0.08 % in Bolivia, 0.09 % in Brazil and Peru (see note in 
Table 1). The inter-sectoral Gini explains 21 % and 25 % of the variation in the over-
all Gini coefficient for the period 1960–2010 and 1995–2010, respectively. It is 
worth noting that Timmer (2004) found that the inter-sectoral Gini in eight Asian 
countries for the period 1960–1999 accounted for 25 % of the variation of the  overall 
Gini, but the beta coefficient of the inter-sectoral Gini was around 0.43. We did not 
get coefficients that high in any of the Latin American countries. One wonders 
which Asian country has driven the results: South Korea, with low inequality and 
rapid industrialization; the Philippines and Malaysia with high and relatively stable 
income inequality; or Thailand and China, with high income inequality today in 
comparison with the 1960s. Inequality in Latin America has been very stable and 
high in most countries regardless of their initial or current conditions.
Table 3 Explaining the log of the Gini coefficient across time and countries in Latin America
Logged Gini
1960–2010 1995–2010
1 2 2a: excluding Argentina 3
Inter-sectoral Gini 0.078*** −0.018* 0.044*** 0.03**
GDP service 0.055 0.202 −0.70***
Saving −0.001* −0.0002 −0.003***
Redistribution 1.438*** 1.554*** −0.72
Time period X X X
Country X X X
Constant X X X X
R-squared 21 % 76 % 76 % 87 %
Number of obs. 411 411 374 131
Note: Statistical significance is indicated as * at the 10, ** at the 5, and *** at the 1 % levels. The 
coefficients of the inter-sectoral Gini for the period 1960–2010 is 0.078*** for Bolivia, 0.092* for 
Brazil, 0.035*** for Chile, −0.035 for Colombia, −0.019 for Costa Rica, 0.098* for Peru, 0.069 
for Mexico, and 0.072* for Venezuela. The coefficients for the period 1995–2010 is 2.04 for 
Argentina, 0.14*** for Bolivia, 0.10*** for Brazil, 0.05*** for Chile, 0.005 for Colombia, −0.043 
for Costa Rica, 0.11* for Peru, −0.024 for Mexico, and 0.09** for Venezuela
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Model 3 estimates the inter-sectoral Gini to be 0.031 % in the period 1995–2010,13 
during which the decline in income inequality became clear in most countries of the 
region. The larger coefficients of the inter-sectorial Gini are found in Bolivia (0.14 %), 
Peru (0.11 %), and Brazil (0.10 %), (see note in Table 1). We control for GDP service, 
savings and redistribution, and all coefficients are significant, and of the right sign. 
They all reduce income inequality. This would lead us to think that even though the 
service sector has some low productivity segments, it is absorbing labor and provid-
ing levels of income that might at least be better than in agriculture.
Our findings also show that the inter-sectoral Gini contributes to reduced income 
inequality and that the inter-sectorial gap is closing. The decomposition exercise 
presents evidence of the agricultural productivity growth having a larger impact on 
aggregate labor productivity growth than manufacturing or services. The inter- 
sectoral Gini for the most recent period explains around one-fourth of the variation 
in the overall Gini coefficient. We think that this supports the case for the renewed 
role of agriculture in Latin American development. We decompose agricultural pro-
ductivity into land productivity and the land/labor ratio to connect both pieces of 
evidence, and examine their impact on the inter-sectoral Gini.
For the period 1960–2010, land productivity and land/labor ratio explain around 
86 % of the variation in the inter-sectorial Gini (results not shown here). Both coef-
ficients are highly significant, but land/labor ratio is higher than land productivity in 
every model estimated over the entire period. An increase of 1 % in land productiv-
ity reduces the inter-sectorial Gini by 0.23 %. For the ISI period, only 20 % of the 
variation in the inter-sectoral Gini coefficient can be explained by labor productiv-
ity. For instance, Reis (2014, p. 10) writes that “ISI in Brazil is associated with 
urban concentration, economies of scale and agglomeration and therefore a slow 
decrease in the spatial inequality of labor productivity.” In other words, land pro-
ductivity was still overwhelmed by the abundance of labor in rural areas in spite of 
rural–urban migration. However, in the 1995–2010 period the effect of land produc-
tivity gets stronger, which coincides with the commodity export boom. Over this 
period it seems as if land productivity and the factor endowments reinforce each 
other: the land/labor ratio has increased and so has the productivity per unit of land. 
Reis (2014) confirms the trend in Brazil, where intense use of land and other natural 
resources led to the spatial dispersion of economic activities and faster convergence 
of labor productivity across regions.
Land productivity has played a larger role in the recent period. A look at the 
agricultural productivity in the initial decomposition exercise presents the increase 
in agricultural productivity reliant on technological and institutional changes rather 
than crude reallocation of labor. In other words, as the inter-sectoral Gini is falling, 
the potential for reallocation is diminishing, which is a clear sign of the transition 
toward development. We interpret this as a sign of a more dynamic transformation 
of agriculture not mainly driven by extensive growth and rural to urban migration 
but also internal productivity growth in the sector.
13 The coefficients for the inter-sectorial Gini are not statistically significant during the 1960–1975 
and 1975–1995 periods.
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6  Conclusions
This study explores the agricultural resurgence of the recent decades in a Kuznetsian 
structural change perspective and how it relates to the observed reduction in 
income inequality. We first establish that agricultures’ relative labor productivity 
growth has improved over the last 15 years. Inspired by a recent literature on the 
role of agriculture and Kuznets’ seminal discussion of how the forces of economic 
change might influence the income distribution, we focus on the part of overall 
income inequality made up by rural–urban duality, proxied by inter-sectoral 
income difference. According to our estimates the inter-sectoral Gini explains 
20–25 % of overall inequality in Latin America over the entire period. We find that 
the long-term pattern of sectoral inequality declines with increase in per capita 
income. Based on this, we find support for income equalization due to inter-sec-
toral income convergence. Narrowing of the sectoral productivity gap suggests 
stronger inter-sectoral linkages and together with the expansion of agriculture-
related employment opportunities it is likely that the opportunity cost of unskilled 
labor has been raised. This is consistent with the finding that the effect of agricul-
tural productivity stemming from land productivity growth, rather than only 
changes in land/labor ratio, has grown in importance over the last 15 years. 
Compared to the belle époque, it seems as if improved terms of trade for agricul-
ture not only increased the value of land but also rural labor and possibly also the 
political commitment to invest in rural areas. Interpreted in the framework of the 
Kuznets curve we have only addressed part of the dynamics and can therefore 
neither prove nor disprove whether the decline of inequality over the last decades 
constitutes the downturn of the Kuznets curve. The agriculture-led reduction of 
inter-sectoral productivity is however consistent with Kuznetsian forces bending 
the curve downward.
We also note that while agriculture has emerged as a stronger contributor to 
overall productivity growth, there has been a large expansion of low-productivity 
employment in parts of the service sector. This expansion seems to have contrib-
uted to the decline in overall income inequality, consistent with the implementation 
of policies directed toward the lower income segments of the urban population 
over the last decades. However, the rural–urban duality has transformed into an 
urban one. A remaining caveat is that even if agriculture has started to close the gap 
to other sectors, it is probable that productivity gains have been stronger among 
large capital-intensive agricultural units than smallholders. In this sense, the 
income distribution might not have been substantially narrowed within the agricul-
tural sector.
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Table 5 GDP per capita in 2013 US$ (converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS 
PPPs)
GDP per Capita, in 2013 EKS$
Latin America
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Costa 
Rica Mexico Peru Venezuela
1950 6679 2829 2460 4164 2802 3254 4345 3598 8424
1951 6795 2967 2505 4233 2798 3235 4551 3782 8651
1952 6318 2993 2578 4417 2882 3504 4600 3878 9022
1953 6529 2653 2625 4666 2963 3900 4481 4020 8982
1954 6670 2651 2719 4433 3069 3795 4786 4027 9503
1955 7014 2732 2834 4510 3088 4078 5038 4214 9878
1956 7079 2514 2791 4489 3111 3815 5222 4289 10,300
1957 7314 2379 2934 4838 3123 3988 5446 4380 11,355
1958 7632 2382 3107 4983 3101 4318 5557 4276 11,082
1959 7020 2322 3268 4586 3219 4307 5541 4182 11,286
1960 7446 2368 3436 4845 3249 4502 5796 4629 10,890
1961 7851 2363 3586 4954 3305 4513 5827 4899 10,162
1962 7604 2438 3695 5066 3375 4616 5899 5114 10,226
1963 7307 2536 3625 5264 3380 4839 6140 5198 10,312
1964 7937 2597 3638 5263 3481 4909 6602 5402 10,795
1965 8533 2662 3603 5193 3499 5183 6801 5603 11,110
1966 8466 2787 3718 5655 3579 5402 7004 5906 10,925
1967 8571 2892 3758 5725 3623 5551 7206 5972 11,201
1968 8810 3064 3979 5818 3740 5798 7481 5746 11,571
1969 9426 3124 4208 5923 3873 6005 7689 5732 11,586
1970 9780 3208 4498 5936 4027 6223 7935 6009 12,048
1971 10,086 3249 4824 6351 4157 6448 8018 6105 11,793
1972 10,226 3332 5206 6159 4366 6827 8454 6126 11,566
1973 10,664 3474 5710 5711 4554 7159 8914 6272 11,995
1974 11,163 3564 6005 5664 4708 7344 9209 6422 11,862
1975 10,879 3708 6162 4848 4712 7288 9476 6744 11,822
1976 10,668 3902 6577 4932 4832 7470 9633 6658 12,338
1977 11,123 3967 6718 5333 4936 7906 9724 6481 12,701
1978 10,457 4001 6884 5685 5260 8074 10,278 6312 12,604
1979 11,019 3908 7195 6064 5436 8222 10,963 6518 12,327
1980 10,991 3791 7644 6445 5540 8141 11,611 6646 11,446
1981 10,188 3754 7136 6731 5537 7760 12,339 6770 11,110
1982 9705 3529 7008 5713 5469 7020 11,966 6621 10,562
1983 9894 3315 6619 5458 5433 7012 11,183 5603 9873
1984 9946 3293 6832 5685 5503 7347 11,321 5730 9735
1985 9155 3214 7231 5707 5559 7195 11,379 5715 9620
1986 9675 3057 7654 5931 5772 7371 10,718 6152 9849
1987 9775 3079 7754 6218 5957 7510 10,688 6536 9940
1988 9449 3131 7585 6558 6077 7561 10,601 5872 10,251
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Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in 
the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce 
the material.
GDP per Capita, in 2013 EKS$
Latin America
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Costa 
Rica Mexico Peru Venezuela
1989 8733 3152 7687 7129 6150 7789 10,836 5046 9138
1990 8616 3239 7240 7263 6280 7869 11,178 4690 9385
1991 9315 3330 7192 7698 6299 7866 11,438 4721 10,056
1992 9890 3305 7037 8490 6442 8382 11,635 4603 10,425
1993 10,378 3368 7265 8929 6677 8760 11,645 4724 10,229
1994 10,885 3446 7571 9283 6888 8915 11,948 5225 9783
1995 10,442 3529 7770 10,110 7118 9013 11,025 5570 9970
1996 10,861 3605 7818 10,700 7154 8858 11,407 5611 9764
1997 11,565 3705 7963 11,245 7296 9122 11,989 5897 10,199
1998 11,932 3810 7849 11,449 7239 9652 12,407 5768 10,054
1999 11,448 3747 7755 11,213 6857 10,208 12,705 5737 9300
2000 11,264 3761 7938 11,574 6995 10,172 13,364 5826 9493
2001 10,681 3746 7939 11,830 7040 10,090 13,186 5761 9671
2002 9451 3760 8076 11,958 7127 10,215 13,128 5973 8688
2003 10,108 3784 8070 12,299 7306 10,702 13,151 6138 7898
2004 10,732 3864 8417 12,916 7588 10,989 13,525 6367 9208
2005 11,508 3956 8564 13,505 7837 11,465 13,804 6724 10,012
2006 12,272 4066 8779 13,993 8251 12,293 14,334 7165 10,840
2007 13,105 4172 9191 14,499 8706 13,080 14,646 7716 11,616
2008 13,432 4348 9530 14,886 8901 13,247 14,655 8380 12,048
2009 12,861 4414 9405 14,589 8937 12,931 13,620 8368 11,488
2010 13,787 4517 9958 15,284 9181 13,388 14,185 9009 11,147
2011 14,397 4670 10,139 16,030 9677 13,797 14,578 9534 11,440
2012 14,467 4830 10,139 16,769 9950 14,318 14,965 10,032 11,896
2013 14,683 5007 10,254 17,437 10,206 14,631 15,027 10,468 11,841
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, January 2014, http://www.conference- 
board.org/data/economydatabase/
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1  Introduction
Latin America is a region which has been plagued with persistent problems of social 
cohesion linked to inequality (Bértola and Ocampo 2012; Fitzgerald et al. 2011; 
Huber et al. 2006; Milanovic and Muñoz de Bustillo 2008; Williamson 2010). Over 
the long term, the excessive degree of inequality in Latin America was considered 
an anomaly in international comparisons (Deininger and Squire 1996, 1998). 
However, over the last two decades, income inequality actually decreased across 
most countries in the region, though it still remains above the world average 
(ECLAC 2010; Cornia 2012). With this, Latin America has emerged as a positive 
anomaly, going against the grain of recent world trends which are heading towards 
greater inequality (Hvistendahl 2014, Ravallion 2014).
This historical shift in inequality in Latin America has attracted considerable 
research aiming to uncover the causes of this change (De la Torre 2014; Salazar 
2014; Székely 2014). Contributing to this recent literature, this chapter provides 
new knowledge about the role of fiscal policy on income redistribution in the Latin 
American context. The role of fiscal policy on income distribution has been at the 
heart of some of the most controversial economic and political discussions sur-
rounding the history of economic policy (Bastagli et al. 2012; Lindert 2004; Piketty 
2014). Today, the role of fiscal policy on income distribution remains highly perti-
nent, given the distinct positions scholars have taken about its effectiveness as a tool 
of redistribution in the Latin American context (Arroyo Abad and Lindert 2014; 
Bastagli et al. 2012; Bárcena and Kacef 2011; Goñi et al. 2011).
We use the available historical data on 18 Latin American countries for the time 
period 1960–2012 to investigate the impact of public spending and public revenues 
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on income inequality, using the Gini index. While previous studies examined the 
impact of fiscal policy on inequality using data from 1990 onwards—often using a 
smaller number of countries—our aim is to contribute to the literature by extending 
the time period to the longest possible due to data restrictions while increasing the 
number of countries under study to the maximum, 18. Given the turn in fiscal policy 
from Washington Consensus-style approaches to more progressive ones (Hausmann 
1997), and differences in the methodology used to produce the data, we split the 
time period into two subperiods, 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. Another novelty of 
this chapter is that we analyze results at the national and urban levels for this second 
subperiod, which is of interest given the high degree of urbanization in Latin 
America. We apply several econometric methods, specifications, and definitions of 
variables, based on fixed and random effects and panel-corrected standard errors. 
We test the direction and magnitude of the historical effect that fiscal policy has had 
on income distribution for the period. We examine both the impact of aggregate 
public spending and public revenues and the main functional categories of spending 
and taxation.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. In Sect. 2, we present a brief 
literature review of income inequality and fiscal policy in the Latin American con-
text. In Sect. 3, we present the data and methodology. In Sect. 4, we set out the 
results of our analysis, at both the general Latin American and specific national 
levels. Section 5, concludes by presenting the main findings and their implications 
in terms of fiscal policy.
2  Inequality and Fiscal Policy in Twentieth-Century Latin 
America: A Background
In this section we firstly highlight the main contributions on income inequality, 
highlighting those with particular relevance for the Latin American context. We 
then turn to analyze the literature on the importance of fiscal policy for inequality in 
Latin America, and then set out our approach in this chapter in the context of this 
most recent literature.
2.1  Income Inequality in Latin America: A Contemporary 
Debate
Economic inequality defines in general the differences among individuals or groups 
in a given population—which may be regional, national, or international—as 
regards wealth, resources, income, or opportunities (World Bank 2006). The con-
cern about economic inequality in capitalist development was a central issue for the 
classical political economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill. In contrast, 
economic inequality within and among countries became a secondary concern for 
J. Clifton et al.
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neoclassical economists from the last quarter of nineteenth century onwards. 
As regards income inequality in particular, one of the most influential exceptions 
was Kuznets (1953, 1955), whose studies gave support to the “inverted-U Kuznets 
hypothesis.” This hypothesis predicted a pattern of increasing income inequality in 
the early stages of economic growth, while it also predicted that at higher levels of 
economic growth, inequality would decrease. In general, from the 1950s to the 
1990s, the literature on inequality and development was divided on the validity of 
the Kuznets hypothesis. Much of the earlier literature supported the Kuznets hypoth-
esis (Milanovic 1994; Higgins and Williamson 1999; Barro 2000). However, more 
recently, scholarship identified limits to the general validity of the hypothesis 
(Deininger and Squire 1996, 1998; Atkinson 1997; Bértola 2005). In any case, until 
the 1990s, the main problem characterizing most of the attempts to verify or other-
wise test the hypothesis was associated with the attempts to identify temporal rela-
tions by means of cross-country data. A key contribution was Deininger and Squire 
(1996), which overcame this problem through the use of panel data and regional 
dummies. By introducing Latin American countries as a dummy, their results 
showed that the inverted-U Kuznets hypothesis vanished. In other words, the authors 
demonstrated that the cross-sectional results of previous works that had supported 
the Kuznets hypothesis had been biased by the relatively high level of inequality of 
the group of middle-income Latin American countries.
So, the high levels of inequality in Latin American have been considered an 
anomaly in the international patterns of income distribution. Indeed, the reduction 
of inequality in Latin America over the last few decades, along with the shift of 
some countries from low- to middle-income levels and increasing inequality levels 
among the higher income countries, has significantly flattened the Kuznets curve in 
the world economy. Despite this, with or without empirical evidence for the Kuznets 
hypothesis, many economists and politicians believed that increasing inequality was 
a necessary condition for economic growth at the earlier stages of development. 
Hence, policy efforts to reduce inequality were held to impede or reduce economic 
growth (Ravallion 2014). This assumption was reinforced by argument of the so- called 
big trade-off between equality and efficiency as predicted by Okun (1975). He 
claimed that all “societies inevitably face an invidious choice between efficient 
production and equitable wealth and income distribution.” Moreover, he stated that 
“Not only more equal distribution of incomes reduce incentives to work and invest, 
but the effort to redistribute.”1 Okun’s assumption has been influential in providing 
reasons to avoid income redistribution through fiscal policy.
Latin America constitutes a middle-income region with well-known problems of 
development and social cohesion linked to long-term inequality as regards wealth, 
income, and opportunities (Bértola and Ocampo 2012; Milanovic and Muñoz de 
Bustillo 2008; Huber et al. 2006; Sánchez-Ancochea 2014; Williamson 2010). As 
Fig. 1 shows, from the first decade of the 2000s, income inequality actually 
decreased across most countries in the region, though inequality in Latin America is 
1 This apparent trade-off between efficiency and equality has been recently challenged by IMF 
researchers (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry et al. 2014).
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still above the world average (ECLAC 2010, 2014; Cornia 2012; Salazar 2014). 
Indeed, Latin America now represents a positive anomaly at the international level, 
since the reduction in income inequality goes against the grain of recent trends in 
the rest of the world, which are heading towards greater inequality (Hvistendahl 
2014; Ravallion 2014).
As renewed attention around issues of inequality preoccupies scholars of social 
science, the humanities, and even science2 in the contemporary period, a central 
question is to explain why inequality is decreasing in Latin America, after decades 
of persistent inequality while, in the rest of the world, inequality is again on the rise 
(Atkinson and Piketty 2010; Milanovic 2013; OECD 2008; Piketty 2014; Piketty 
and Saez 2014).
A significant number of scholars have been attracted to the task of identifying the 
major political and economic determinants of the historical shift in income inequal-
ity in Latin America since the 2000s (Anderson and Palacio 2014; Astorga 2014; 
Cornia 2012, 2014a, b; González and Martner 2012; Lustig et al. 2013; McLeod and 
Lustig 2011; Tsounta and Osueke 2014; De la Torre 2014). Regarding the possible 
political determinants, scholars have studied in particular the effects of democracy 
and progressive government on reducing inequality (McLeod and Lustig 2011; 
Milanovic and Muñoz de Bustillo 2008; Montecino 2011). Other scholarly works 
2 See, for example, how inequality has become a key international issue among scientists, as 
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Fig. 1 Gini coefficient in Latin America, 1960–2012. Source: Elaborated by authors using data 
from Milanovic (2014)
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have focused on institutional factors such as human capital and labor market failures 
(Lustig et al. 2013; Tsounta and Osueke 2014; Irigoin and Giardili 2014). Finally, 
scholars have investigated the extent to which economic factors have determined 
reduced inequality, including foreign trade and foreign direct investment (Székely 
and Sámano-Robles 2014; Tsounta and Osueke 2014). However, much less atten-
tion has been paid to the role of fiscal policy as regards this historical shift in Latin 
America, and it is to this we now turn.
2.2  Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution in Latin America
The role of fiscal policy in income distribution has been at the heart of some of the 
most controversial economic and political discussions throughout history (Comín and 
Díaz-Fuentes 2005; Bastagli et al. 2012; Lindert 2004; Piketty 2014). This question 
has also been examined in the Latin American context (Arroyo Abad and Lindert 
2014). The question is a highly pertinent one for Latin America today. Fiscal policy 
has been held to be an important tool of redistribution in the Latin American context 
(Bárcena and Kacef 2011; González and Martner 2012; Goñi et al. 2011). Bastagli 
et al. (2012) demonstrated that, even in the context of a worldwide trend towards 
increased inequality, fiscal policy mattered. This is because the level of available 
income before and after fiscal policy (tax and transfer) shows a wide difference among 
countries due to tax incidence, tax progressivity, and social spending policies.
Despite this debate on fiscal policy and income distribution, there is a lack of 
empirical work which identifies the variables of public spending and revenue 
that affect income distribution in Latin America. Among the existing studies that 
consider fiscal policy and income distribution, Goñi et al. (2011) described the per-
formance of tax and transfers on income distribution in six Latin American coun-
tries in comparison to Western Europe at the beginning of the 2000s. This study 
concluded that the fiscal system proved weak as regards reducing income inequality 
in Latin America. Gómez Sabaini and Martner (2008) compared the Gini indices 
before and after taxes in a broad sample of Latin American countries. They found 
that fiscal policy was slightly more effective than the Goñi et al. (2011) study, but 
this finding was not significant until around 2005. More recently, Cornia (2012) 
concluded that tax, social spending, and other institutional variables were signifi-
cant factors as regards income distribution in Latin America. In a further study, 
Cornia et al. (2014) updated and confirmed their results, that is, that taxation had 
progressive effects on income distribution.
More specifically, two recent contributions sought to identify the effects of taxa-
tion and public spending on income distribution for most Latin American countries 
from the 1990s onwards. Working from the United Nations-Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), González and Martner (2012) iden-
tified a positive role of fiscal policy on income distribution, in particular social 
spending, education, public investment, and a progressive tax system, in addition to 
other institutional and macroeconomic variables. From the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF), Tsounta and Osueke (2014) found that government policies could 
explain more than a half of the reduction in income inequality in Latin American 
countries in the first decade of the 2000s, while education spending and tax reve-
nues were the most significant identified variables of income redistribution.
Our study builds on this literature by analyzing the effects of fiscal policies on 
income distribution for different periods and 18 Latin American countries. We test 
whether public spending and public revenues and its main components determined 
income distribution for the subperiods 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. As regards pub-
lic revenues, we enquire whether the public revenue incidence had a significant 
effect on income distribution and whether each tax category had different effects on 
income distribution. It is generally assumed in the literature that typical direct taxes, 
such as personal income taxes, are more progressive in redistributive terms than 
indirect taxes, such as taxes on goods and services. However, given that there are 
other categories of direct and indirect taxes that affect income distribution, we have 
also considered the effects of property taxes and social contributions. Thus our 
derived questions are these: Which categories of taxes had more effect on income 
distribution? Did the progressiveness of the tax structure determine income distribu-
tion? It is important to state that we have not considered other variables of fiscal 
efficiency such as tax compliance, tax evasion, or horizontal exemptions which may 
also feasibly affect income distribution.
In addition, we enquired whether public spending had a significant effect on 
income inequality. Given that spending categories could have different progressive 
or regressive effects on income distribution, we examined the effects of different 
categories of public spending, including education, health, social security, and 
housing on income distribution. Our approach, therefore, to assessing public 
spending goes beyond examining only education, which is the category most com-
monly dealt with by scholars, and broadens the study to items that typically receive 
much less attention: health, social security, and housing, which may well have a 
significant effect.
As regards the evolution of public spending and public revenues in Latin 
America, as seen in Fig. 2, we observe a great heterogeneity in national fiscal poli-
cies. In some countries, such as Brazil and Ecuador, fiscal policy has assumed a 
great direct relevance while, in others, the public sector has played a more passive 
role, as in the cases of Guatemala and Paraguay. However, we can also note some 
common elements associated with the region as a whole, namely, the growth of 
both public spending and public revenues (Díaz-Fuentes and Revuelta 2011). 
Despite these increases, these variables still have less weight as a percentage of 
GDP in Latin America than do they in the average of OECD countries (ECLAC 
2014; OECD 2015). In addition, there are significant differences between Latin 
American countries and OECD members in terms of tax. Broadly speaking, in 
Latin America there is a bias towards indirect taxation while tax systems in OECD 
countries are biased towards direct taxes (ECLAC 2014; OECD 2015). Another 
important difference is that fiscal policies in Latin America are in general much 
less progressive as regards their capacity to redistribute than those in OECD coun-
tries (Amarante 2014).
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3  Data and Methodology
In order to empirically analyze the impact of fiscal policy on inequality in Latin 
America we first describe the variables used to measure inequality and fiscal policy, 
as well as the control variables. These are set out in Table 1. To measure income 
inequality we use the Gini index. The Gini index is the most common indicator used 
by scholars when analyzing income inequality from the 1960s across Latin America 
(and other regions) for extended periods. Since the aim of this chapter is to conduct 
a historical analysis including the greatest possible time period, the Gini index suits 
our study well.
Given the different sources for the estimation of the Gini index along time, 
we follow the approach as found in Milanovic (2014). This approach reduces the 
problem of temporal and international comparability through the compilation and 
standardization of a wide series of Gini coefficients based on household surveys 
from 1950,3 and thus avoids the use of other sources produced by regressions or 
 shortcuts. These remain today the best Gini indices available for international 
comparison over the long term. However, despite the fact that issues around com-
parability have been reduced, it is still desirable to use other estimations of the Gini 
index from more recent years which are derived from more homogeneous sources. 
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Fig. 2 Public spending and public revenues in Latin America, 1960–2012. Source: Elaborated by 
authors using data from ECLAC (2014) and MOxLAD (2014)
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In the case of Latin America, the ECLAC has provided data on the Gini index since 
1990.4 As this is the higher quality of the two datasets and since the turn of fiscal 
policy from Washington Consensus inspired approaches to more progressive ones 
(Hausmann 1997), we divided the sample of our analysis into two subperiods: 
1960–1998, using the Milanovic Gini standardizations, and 1999–2012, using the 
4 An alternative source to ECLAC (2014) is SEDLAC (2014). However, given the differences 
between the values of the Gini coefficients of both sources, we opt to use the ECLAC data as it 
corrects for income underreporting. According to Montecino (2011) “the key difference between 
data from SEDLAC and ECLAC is that the latter corrects for income underreporting—when 
households in an income survey underreport their true amount of income, thus biasing the mea-
surement of inequality—while the former does not. Because income underreporting is likely more 
pronounced in wealthier households, failing to adjust for underreporting is expected to lead to a 
lower and biased estimate of inequality.”
Table 1 Variable descriptions and data sources
Variable Source Description
Gini Milanovic (2014) Standardized Gini index
Gininat ECLAC (2014) National Gini index
Giniurb ECLAC (2014) Urban Gini index
PubSpe ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Total public spending (% GDP)
PubSpeEdu ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Public spending on education (% GDP)
PubSpeHea ECLAC (2014) Public spending on health (% GDP)
PubSpeSocSec ECLAC (2014) Public spending on social security (% GDP)
PubSpeHou ECLAC (2014) Public spending on housing (% GDP)
PubRev ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Total public revenues (% GDP)
PubIncTax ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Personal income taxes (% GDP)
PubPropTax ECLAC (2014) Property taxes (% GDP)
PubTaxG&S ECLAC (2014) Indirect taxes on goods and services (% GDP)
SocCont ECLAC (2014) Social contributions (% GDP)
GDPpc World Bank (2014) GDP per capita
Unemp World Bank (2014) Unemployment rate (%)
Depend World Bank (2014) Dependency rate; Pop. 65 and over/Pop. 15–64 (%)
Pop World Bank (2014) Total population
Open World Bank (2014) Openness: (Exports + imports)/GDP (%)
ToT World Bank (2014) Terms of trade
Invest World Bank (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Investment (% GDP)
Inf World Bank (2014) Annual variation of GDP deflator (%)
Dem Marshall et al. (2014) Institutionalized democracy
NatRes World Bank (2014) Natural resource rents (% GDP)
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ECLAC (2014) Gini index. In this second subperiod, use of ECLAC data allows for 
the separation of inequality across the nation as a whole (Gininat) and also inequal-
ity in cities (Giniurb). We acknowledge that the Gini coefficient has some limita-
tions (Atkinson 1997), not least, because it is an index of relative concentration 
which provides synthetic information on the income distribution in a single coeffi-
cient. For example, the Gini index has been criticized on the grounds it fails to 
capture issues related to income polarization, at the top and bottom income levels. 
In addition, it does not capture all kinds of incomes, such as those related to income 
from capital. Despite these shortcomings, the advantages of using the Gini index 
as regards its availability, information, and simplicity outweigh the disadvantages. 
In addition, using the Gini index facilitates a longer term comparison, although we 
need to exercise caution as regards potential biases when interpreting results.
Turning to the dimension of fiscal policy, we consider its two principal variables, 
public spending (PubSpe) and public income or revenue (PubRev). We use both 
variables at the aggregate level as well as at the functional level, that is, social 
spending related to income redistribution, on the one hand, and to tax structure, on 
the other. Thus, public social spending is disaggregated into public spending on 
education (PubSpeEdu), health (PubSpeHea), social security (PubSpeSocSec), and 
housing (PubSpeHou). As regards revenues, we consider social contributions 
(SocCont), as well as the main components of the tax structure. These are income 
(PubIncTax), property (PubPropTax), and goods and services (PubTaxG&S). For 
the subperiod 1999–2012, we have data on all these variables, whereas for the sub-
period 1960–1998, less disaggregated data on spending and income is available.
Finally, we use a series of control variables that have been identified as potential 
determinants of inequality, income distribution, and wealth in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Thus, we consider the logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDPpc), 
as considered by González and Martner (2012), Huber et al. (2006), Milanovic 
(1994), McLeod and Lustig (2011), Roine et al. (2009), Tsounta and Osueke (2014), 
and Williamson (2010); unemployment rate (Unemp) as used in González and 
Martner (2012); dependency rate (Depend) as deployed in Cornia (2012) and Lee 
et al. (2013); logarithm of population (lnPop) as used by Roine et al. (2009); trade 
openness (Open) as used in Lee et al. (2013) and Roine et al. (2009); terms of inter-
national trade (ToT) by Cornia (2012), Montecino (2011), and McLeod and Lustig 
(2011); investments (Invest) as found in Lee et al. (2013); inflation (Inf) as used in 
González and Martner (2012), Montecino (2011), and McLeod and Lustig (2011); 
democratic institutions (Dem) as used in Cornia (2012) and Huber et al. (2006); and 
natural resource rents (NatRes) as utilized in Loayza et al. (2013).
To test the adequate use of these variables we estimated the correlation coefficients 
among them, and did not detect serious correlation problems that would impede 
their use, as shown in Table 2. Other variables were considered, such as life expec-
tancy or secondary enrollment rate. However, when estimating the correlations with 
the rest of the variables of the sample we observed problems of high correlation that 
could bias the estimations and invalidate them as control variables.
As regards the appropriate methodology to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on 
inequality, a review of the literature on inequality shows that most authors use OLS 
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regression in order to analyze potential determinants of inequality (González and 
Martner 2012; Lee et al. 2013; Milanovic 1994; Williamson 2010). In our case, 
since we are using an unbalanced panel, which includes a sample of 18 countries 
and 39 or 14 temporal periods, depending on the subperiod under analysis (1960–
1998 or 1999–2012), the use of OLS could produce bias in the results. We therefore 
opt to estimate a series of models which have diverse assumptions about the sample 
and are more robust. Following McLeod and Lustig (2011), Montecino (2011), and 
Tsounta and Osueke (2014), we use as basic models the panel regressions with fixed 
and random effects, depending on the result of the Hausman test. We correct for the 
presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, testing these with the 
Wooldridge test and the modified Wald statistics for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
test, respectively, and correlation across panels using the panel-corrected standard 
error model, also used by Huber et al. (2006). In this way, we perform diverse 
regressions adapting the following general equation to the fixed effect, random 
effect, and panel-corrected standard error models:
 
Gini F Xitg itk itm it= + +e  
where i includes each of the 18 Latin American countries in the sample (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela); t is the year; g is the Gini index considered (Gini, Gininat, 
Giniurb); F is a vector that includes k fiscal variables considered (PubSpeEdu, 
PubSpeHea, PubSpeSocSec, PubSpeHou, PubIncTax, PubPropTax, PubTaxG&S, 
SocCont); and X is a vector of variables of m control variables (lnGDPpc, Unemp, 
Depend, lnPop, Open, ToT, Invest, Infl, Dem, NatRes). Estimations are performed 
separately for the subperiods 1960–1998 and 1999–2012.
4  Results
When the null hypothesis in the Hausman test is rejected we use the fixed effect 
model, using the random effect model in the other case. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis both in the Wald test for heteroskedasticity and in the Wooldridge test 
signals potential problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. This makes 
it worthwhile to consider the panel-corrected standard error model.
We now focus on the results of the regressions, looking first at those obtained for 
the first subperiod, 1960–1998, as shown in Table 3. Looking across the two 
 components of fiscal policy for which we have available information—public 
spending on education and personal income taxes—we find evidence showing how 
these policies were either neutral or regressive in their effect on income distribution. 
In this subperiod, among the control variables, two in particular stand out in most of 
the estimated models. Both an aging population and increasing openness were 
found to have a regressive effect on inequality. Our results confirm the findings of 
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many scholars: in this subperiod, fiscal policy did little or nothing to reduce inequalities 
in the region. This contrasts sharply with the next subperiod, as we now explain.
Since the late 1990s, fiscal policy shifted away from Washington Consensus 
approaches towards more progressive ones. This was mainly due to two main 
changes: firstly, the coming into power of more center-left or left governments, 
starting in Venezuela in 1999, when Chávez was elected president of Venezuela, 
followed by Kirchner’s and Lula’s victory in Argentina and Brazil in 2003, the elec-
tion of Vázquez in Uruguay in 2005, and so on, and secondly, policy transfer as 
regards the dominant ideas circulating in international organizations as to best prac-
tice fiscal policy (Hausmann 1997).
Analyzing this second subperiod, spanning the years from 1999 to 2012, we find 
fiscal policy making a difference to inequality in Latin America. Our findings there-
fore confirm the findings of other scholars that a shift in policy had observable 
progressive consequences. To explore this shift in more detail, we first analyze the 
estimations of the impact of fiscal policy on income inequality at the national level, 
as presented in Table 4. Here, looking inside the functional structure of public 
spending, the evidence is mixed. We can observe that public spending on health has 
reduced inequality, but we can also see how public spending on housing has exac-
erbated inequalities further. However, when we look inside the category of tax 
structure, we can observe that several elements have contributed to inequality 
Table 3 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, at the national level, 18 Latin 
American countries, 1960–1998 (dependent variable: Gini)
FE PCSE FE PCSE
Constant 90.213 *** 32.759 *** 98.161 *** 23.329 ***
PubSpeEdu 0.325 0.199
PubIncTax 0.234 ** 0.141
lnGDPpc 4.524 *** −4.377 *** 1.165 −4.893 ***
Depend 1.337 *** −0.209 1.843 *** −0.114
lnPop −5.414 *** 3.195 *** −4.646 *** 3.587 ***
Open 0.078 *** 0.044 *** 0.120 *** 0.048 ***
Invest −0.179 *** −0.019 −0.054 −0.011
Inf −0.000 * 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
Dem 0.148 ** 0.016 −0.099 0.018
N 478 478 403 403
R2 0.15 0.78 0.15 0.78
F 10.94 *** 11.38 ***
Wald Chi2 78.98 *** 85.12 ***
Hausman test 69.98 *** 67.62 ***
Wald test for heteroskedasticity 3142.71 *** 754.58 ***
Wooldridge test 18.004 *** 17.077 ***
*Significant at 10 %.
**Significant at 5 %.
***Significant at 1 %
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Table 4 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, at the national level, 18 Latin 
American countries, 1999–2012 (dependent variable: Gininat)
FE PCSE FE PCSE
Constant −170.025 ** 26.385 *** 50.495 24.909 ***
PubSpeEdu −0.189 0.186
PubSpeHea −1.217 *** −0.706 **
PubSpeSocSec −0.161 0.230
PubSpeHou 0.391 0.784 **
PubIncTax −0.889 *** −0.500 **
PubPropTax −0.358 0.638
PubTaxG&S −0.604 ** 0.139
SocCont −0.711 ** 0.177
lnGDPpc −6.226 ** −2.456 ** −2.309 −3.043 ***
Unemp 0.202 * 0.324 *** 0.132 0.286 ***
Depend −1.808 *** −0.414 ** −1.467 *** −0.418 *
lnPop 17.541 *** 2.773 *** 2.786 3.128 ***
Open −0.094 *** 0.049 *** −0.030 0.051 ***
ToT 0.003 −0.009 −0.026 *** −0.020
Invest 0.029 −0.118 0.190 *** −0.030
Inf 0.013 −0.026 −0.039 * −0.040 **
Dem −0.089 0.283 0.184 0.403 **
NatRes −0.055 −0.072 0.101 *** −0.025
N 175 175 210 210
R2 0.90 0.98 0.78 0.98
F 18.63 *** 22.58 ***
Wald Chi2 220,286.98 *** 182,262.42 ***
Hausman test 28.68 *** 25.30 **
Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity
87.65 *** 57.16 ***
Wooldridge test 38.589 *** 29.571 ***
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
reduction. Personal income taxes, social contributions, and taxes on goods and 
services are all observed to act progressively on inequality. Overall, we observe 
how public revenues contribute more to reducing inequality than public spending.
We now focus on the determinants of inequality at the urban level. Table 5 pres-
ents the results of our analysis which tracks the evolution of the impact of fiscal 
policies on the Gini index in urban zones in Latin America. We first look inside the 
functional components of public spending, and observe how public spending on 
urban health reduces inequality. In contrast, we observe that spending on urban 
housing and social security is regressive. We then turn to looking inside the func-
tional components of the tax structure, and find that personal income taxes, social 
contributions, and taxes on goods and services help reduce urban inequality. 
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Table 5 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, urban level, 18 Latin American 
countries, 1999–2012 (dependent variable: Giniurb)
RE PCSE RE PCSE
Constant 25.057 ** 34.862 *** 27.113 ** 18.877 **
PubSpeEdu 0.153 −0.012
PubSpeHea −1.728 *** −0.995 ***
PubSpeSocSec −0.119 0.390 ***
PubSpeHou 0.655 * 0.464
PubIncTax −1.070 *** −0.516 **
PubPropTax 0.947 * 0.135
PubTaxG&S −0.914 *** −0.152
SocCont −0.995 *** −0.294
lnGDPpc −0.572 −0.704 0.686 −1.652 **
Unemp 0.309 *** 0.491 *** 0.309 *** 0.418 ***
Depend −0.297 −0.443 *** −0.292 −0.080
lnPop 2.687 ** 1.563 *** 1.932 2.797 ***
Open −0.041 ** 0.003 −0.029 * 0.017
ToT −0.035 *** −0.029 * −0.039 *** −0.022
Invest −0.088 −0.091 0.199 *** 0.003
Inf 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.005
Dem −0.108 0.124 −0.040 0.109
NatRes −0.027 0.041 0.066 * 0.028
N 186 186 218 218
R2 0.88 0.98 0.87 0.98
Wald Chi2 833.22 *** 229,528.65 *** 1105.03 *** 166,914.20 ***
Hausman test 7.35 11.06
Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity
201.77 *** 61.39 ***
Wooldridge test 46.167 *** 19.500 ***
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
However, we find property taxes are regressive. In general terms, tax structure is 
more progressive than public spending in terms of reducing inequality.
It is illuminating to compare the effects of fiscal policy on inequality at the 
national level with those acting in the urban context, since the performance of a 
given policy may have a varying effect depending on the context. For example, fiscal 
policy that may not be observed to influence inequality at the national level may 
well do so at the urban level, with important practical consequences for policy mak-
ers. When we do so, we find some evidence of differential effects of fiscal policy 
according to its context. First, some fiscal policy which is important at the national 
level proves to be even more significant in urban areas. Here we have the case of 
public spending on health, personal income taxes, taxes on goods and services, and 
social contributions. These were significant factors in reducing inequality at the 
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national level, but had an even more intense effect at the urban level. In the opposite 
direction, public spending on housing, which was found to be regressive in urban areas, 
was even more intensely regressive at the national level. Then, we observe some poli-
cies which are important in determining inequality in urban regions, but they are not 
significant at the national level. Here, public spending on social security and property 
taxes show a regressive effect in urban areas, but not at the national level.
As regards the control variables in this subperiod, population size and unemploy-
ment rate are related to more inequality at both the national and urban scales. The 
rest of the control variables are influential at different scales. For example, increases 
in the dependency rate and GDP per capita reduce inequality at the national level. 
Meanwhile, increases in openness and terms of trade reduce urban inequality.
When calculating the interaction effect between the estimated coefficient and 
public spending and revenue levels for each Latin American country, we observe 
important national differences. As regards public spending on health, we find that 
this is most progressive in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, while it is least progres-
sive in Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. For personal income 
taxes, Brazil, Peru, and Chile stand out for achieving the highest degrees of progres-
sivity while, in contrast, Paraguay, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic are the 
countries with the lowest progressive effect. Regarding social contributions, Brazil, 
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela led the way in the region, while the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela, and Chile exhibited the lowest range of progressivity using 
this tool. Finally, as regards public spending on housing, which we generally found 
to be regressive, Guatemala, Brazil, and Costa Rica were those countries with a 
highest regressive effect.
5  Conclusions
This chapter sought to enquire whether fiscal policy impacted upon inequality in 
Latin America from 1960 to 2012. One of the aims of this chapter was to extend the 
number of Latin American countries included in our sample to the longest time 
period possible, given data availability. Given the shift in fiscal policy to progressive 
approaches and the differences in the methodology used to produce the data, we 
split the time period into two subperiods, 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. In this second 
subperiod, we analyzed the effects of fiscal policy on income inequality at the 
national and urban levels, to produce new knowledge about the potentially differen-
tial effects of fiscal policy. Our chapter also contributes to knowing more about the 
role of fiscal policy in the region by disaggregating fiscal policy into subcompo-
nents, both for public spending and for public revenue. Our results clearly show that 
fiscal policy was much more influential on inequality in the second subperiod than 
the first. Our main findings are the following.
For the subperiod 1960–1998, fiscal policy in general seemed to have either a 
regressive or nonsignificant relationship with inequality. Moreover, when some of 
its components were associated with inequality, this was in the direction of increasing 
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income inequality. For example personal income taxes, which could potentially be 
implemented in order to increase income redistribution and level equal, were asso-
ciated with actually increasing income inequality in this earlier period.
This contrasts sharply with our findings in the second period, from late 1990s, 
where we find that fiscal policy significantly reduced regional inequality. Disaggregating 
fiscal policy into its two main components, public spending and public revenues, 
we find that both have a significant and positive effect on inequality reduction. Overall, 
the effect of public revenues on inequality was more significant than that of public 
spending. The most significant components of public revenues and public spending to 
contribute to reducing inequality at the national level were spending on health, personal 
income taxes, taxes on goods and services, and social contributions.
When contrasting analysis across the national and urban levels, we found that 
most of the fiscal instruments under analysis had a much more intense effect at the 
urban than the national level. This means that it is the Latin American urban areas 
which are most seeing the benefits of fiscal policy on income inequality, rather than 
the rural areas. Of particular importance in decreasing inequality at the urban level 
are personal income taxes, taxes on goods and services, social contributions, and 
public spending on health. In contrast, public spending on housing, found regressive 
in urban areas, was even more intensely regressive at the national level. Certain fis-
cal policies show significant effects in urban areas but they are not significant at the 
national level. This is the case of public spending on social security and property 
taxes, which were found to be regressive only in urban areas.
In addition, there are some interesting national differences as regards fiscal 
reform and policy transfers across the region. Broadly speaking, some governments 
have taken strides to deepen income tax reform, including the implementation of 
property taxes, leading to an increased tax incidence, and in turn to greater equality. 
Other governments, however, have proved unwilling or unable to implement real 
reform. To take two extreme cases, the Brazilian Government has successfully 
implemented many progressive taxation reforms, particularly income tax. The other 
extreme is found in the Guatemalan Government, which has proved reluctant to take 
on tax reform; in consequence, inequality levels have failed to decline significantly. 
Further research is required to unravel and evaluate the varieties of fiscal reform 
across countries.
Our chapter shows showed that fiscal policy in Latin America has played an 
essential role in reducing inequality. Moreover, further extension of fiscal policy has 
a huge potential. Fiscal policies—in particular tax reforms—in Latin America have 
embarked on a path of convergence with OECD members, similar to what occurred 
in Spain and Portugal from the 1980s onwards (Díaz Fuentes 1994; Comín and 
Díaz-Fuentes 2005; Díaz-Fuentes and Revuelta 2013). It is interesting to reflect on 
the extent to which there may be a process of international policy transfer going on 
in this field. For example, the OECD is currently expanding to emerging countries, 
now comprises two Latin American countries—Mexico and Chile—and has two 
candidates—Colombia and Costa Rica (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2014). Even 
though there are still differences as regards the tax burden, this amounts to an aver-
age of 34 % in OECD members in 2012 (OECD 2015), and only 25 % in Latin 
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America in the same year (ECLAC 2014), this is to be expected given the different 
levels of GDP per capita by region. The same could be said of the differences in the 
relative weight in favor of direct taxes in the OECD countries and indirect taxes in 
Latin America.
Coinciding with other recent studies, this chapter offers clear empirical evidence 
that certain fiscal policies have significantly contributed to reducing income inequali-
ties in the region. For example, increases in tax incidence and public spending in 
general, and reforms of personal income tax, social contributions, and public spending 
on health, have clearly contributed to diminishing income inequality. Given we found 
that direct taxation was more strongly associated with reducing inequality than indi-
rect taxation, an interesting policy option is to encourage governments to increase 
direct over indirect taxation. This could be a high-impact policy to reduce income 
inequality, considering that the ratio of indirect to direct taxation in the region was 
1.76 in 2012 (ECLAC 2014). This therefore provides solid evidence which can be 
used to support future fiscal reform by governments committed to further reducing 
inequality in the region. Clearly, the redistributive effect will also depend on the effi-
ciencies of tax compliance and public spending (Comín and Díaz- Fuentes 2005).
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in 
the work's Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory regu-
lation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce 
the material.
References
Amarante, V. (2014). Igualdad y desigualdad en América Latina y el Caribe. In Conference on 
Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos Aires.
Anderson, M., & Palacio, A. (2014). Structural change and the fall of income inequality in Latin 
America—Agricultural development, inter-sectoral duality and the Kuznets curve. In 
Conference on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos Aires.
Arroyo, L., & Lindert, P. (2014). Fiscal redistribution in Latin America since the nineteenth cen-
tury. In Conference on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos Aires.
Astorga, P. (2014). Functional inequality in Latin America: 1900–2011. In Conference on Latin 
American Inequality in the Long Run. Buenos Aires.
Atkinson, A. B. (1997). Bringing income distribution in from the cold’. The Economic Journal, 
107(441), 297–321.
Atkinson, A. B., & Piketty, T. (2010). Top incomes over the twentieth century: A global perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fiscal Policy and Inequality in Latin America, 1960–2012
404
Bárcena, A., & Kacef, O. (Eds.). (2011). La política fiscal para el afianzamiento de las democra-
cias en América Latina. Reflexiones a partir de una serie de estudios de caso. Santiago de 
Chile: ECLAC.
Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and growth in a panel of countries. Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 
5–32.
Bastagli, F., Coady, D., & Gupta, S. (2012). Income inequality and fiscal policy. IMF Staff 
Discussion Note SDN/12/08.
Berg, A. G., & Ostry, J. D. (2011). Equality and efficiency. Finance and Development, 48(3), 
12–15.
Bértola, L. (2005). A 50 años de la curva de Kuznets: crecimiento económico y distribución del 
ingreso en Uruguay y otras economías de nuevo asentamiento desde 1870. Investigaciones de 
Historia Económica, 3, 135–176.
Bértola, L., & Ocampo, J. A. (2012). The economic development of Latin America since indepen-
dence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chin, G., & Culotta, E. (2014). The science of inequaltiy. What the numbers tell us. Science, 
344(6186), 819–821.
Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2014). The OECD and the rest: Analyzing the limits of policy 
transfer. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 16(3), 249–265.
Comín, F., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2005). Sector público administrativo y Estado del Bienestar. In 
Estadísticas históricas de España: siglos XIX-XX. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.
Cornia, G. A. (2012). Inequality trends and their determinants: Latin America over 1990–2010. 
UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2012/09.
Cornia, G. A. (Ed.). (2014a). Falling inequality in Latin America: Policy changes and lessons. 
Oxford: WIDER Studies in Development Economics, Oxford University Press.
Cornia, G. A. (2014b). Income inequality in Latin America: Recent decline an prospects for its 
further reduction. DISEI—Università degli Studi di Firenze Working Papers—Economics 
14/2014.
Cornia, G. A., Gómez-Sabaini, J. C., & Martorano, B. (2014). Tax policy and income distribution 
during the last decade. In G. A. Cornia (Ed.), Falling inequality in Latin America: Policy 
changes and lessons. Oxford University Press.
De la Torre, A. (2014). The inequality story in LAC: Searching for an explanation. In Conference 
on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos Aires.
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1996). A new data set measuring income inequality. World Bank 
Economic Review, 10, 565–591.
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1998). New ways of looking at old issues: Inequality and growth. 
Journal of Development Economics, 57, 249–287.
Díaz Fuentes, D. (1994). Fraude y Amnistías Fiscales en la España contemporánea 1940–1990. 
Hacienda Pública, 1(94), 389–402.
Díaz-Fuentes, D., & Revuelta, J. (2011). Gasto público y crecimiento económico en América 
Latina y España entre 1960 y 2000. Revista Uruguaya de Historia Económica, 1, 12–33.
Díaz-Fuentes, D., & Revuelta, J. (2013). La relación a largo plazo entre crecimiento económico y 
gasto público en España (1850–2000). Investigaciones de Historia Económica, 9(1), 32–42.
ECLAC. (2010). Time for equality: Closing gaps, opening trails. Santiago de Chile: 
UN-ECLAC.
ECLAC. (2014). CEPALSTAT. Santiago de Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
FitzGerald, V., Heyer, J., & Thorp, R. (Eds.). (2011). Overcoming the persistence of inequality and 
poverty. UK: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Gómez Sabaini, J. C., & Martner, R. (2008). América Latina: Panorama global de su sistema 
tributario y principales temas de política. Santiago de Chile: Latin American and Caribbean 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES)-ECLAC.
Goñi, E., López, J. H., & Servén, L. (2011). Fiscal redistribution and income inequality in Latin 
America. World Development, 39(9), 1558–1569.
J. Clifton et al.
405
González, I., & Martner, R. (2012). Overcoming the “empty box syndrome”. Determinants of 
income distribution in Latin America. Cepal Review, 108, 7–25.
Hausmann, R. (1997). Foreward. In Latin America after a decade of reforms. Washington, DC: 
Inter-American Development Bank.
Higgins, M., & Williamson, J. G. (1999). Explaining inequality the world round: Cohort size, 
Kuznets curves, and openness. NBER Working Paper no. 7224.
Huber, E., Nielsen, F., Pribble, J., & Stephens, J. D. (2006). Politics and inequality in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. American Sociological Review, 71, 943–963.
Hvistendahl, M. (2014). While emerging economies boom, equality goes bust. Science, 344, 
832–835.
Irigoin, A., & Giardili, S. (2014). The short-run effect of afirmative action on human capital accu-
mulation incentives. In Conference on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos 
Aires.
Kuznets, S. (1953). Shares of upper income groups in income and savings. New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review, 45, 
1–28.
Lee, H. Y., Kim, J., & Cin, B. C. (2013). Empirical analysis on the determinants of income inequal-
ity in Korea. International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology, 53, 95–109.
Lindert, P. H. (2004). Growing public. Social spending and economic growth since the eighteen 
century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loayza, N., Mier y Terán, A., & Rigolini, J. (2013). Poverty, inequality and the local natural 
resource curse. IZA Discussion Papers 7226.
Lustig, N., & Lopez-Calva, L. F., & Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2013). Deconstructing the decline in inequal-
ity in Latin America. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6552. doi: 
10.1596/1813-9450-6552.
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2014). Polity IV project: Political regime character-
istics and transitions, 1800–2013. Center for Systemic Peace.
McLeod, D., & Lustig, N. (2011). Inequality and poverty under Latin America’s new left regimes. 
Tulane Economics Working Paper Series 1117.
Milanovic, B. (1994). Determinants of cross-country income inequality: An “Augmented” Kuznets 
hypothesis. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1246.
Milanovic, B. (2013). The inequality possibility frontier: Extensions and new applications. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6449.
Milanovic (2014). All the ginis dataset. World Bank. http://go.worldbank.org/9VCQW66LA0
Milanovic, B., & Muñoz de Bustillo, R. (2008). La desigualdad de la distribución de la renta en 
América Latina: situación, evolución y factores explicativos. América Latina Hoy, 48, 
15–42.
Montecino, J. A. (2011). Decreasing inequality under Latin America’s “Social Democratic” and 
“Populist” governments: Is the difference real? Center for Economic Policy Research.
MOxLAD (2014). Montevideo Oxford Latin American economic history database. Universidad de 
la República, Montevideo. http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/en.html.
OECD. (2008). Growing unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries. Paris: 
OECD Publishing.
OECD (2015). OECD.StatExtracts. http://stats.oecd.org/
Okun, A. M. (1975). Equality and efficiency: The big trade-off. Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press.
Ostry, J. D., Berg, A., & Tsangarides, C. G. (2014). Redistribution, inequality, and growth. Staff 
Discussion Note 14/2. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2014). Inequality in the long run. Science, 344, 838–842.
Ravallion, M. (2014). Income inequality in the developing world. Science, 344, 851–855.
Roine, J., Vlachos, J., & Waldenström, D. (2009). The long-run determinants of inequality: What 
can we learn from top income data? Journal of Public Economics, 93, 974–988.
Fiscal Policy and Inequality in Latin America, 1960–2012
406
Salazar, H. (2014). Desigualdad en la última década. In Conference on Latin American inequality 
in the long run. Buenos Aires.
Sánchez-Ancochea, D. (2014). Inequality and the elite: Chile in historical perspective. In 
Conference on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos Aires.
SEDLAC (2014). Socio-economic database for Latin America and the Caribbean. CEDLAS- 
World Bank.
Székely, M. (2014). Declining inequality in LAC during the 21st Century: ¿structural shift, or 
temporary improvement? In Conference on Latin American inequality in the long run. Buenos 
Aires.
Székely, M., & Sámano-Robles, C. (2014). Trade and income distribution in Latin America: Is 
there anything new to say? In G. A. Cornia (Ed.), Falling inequality in Latin America. Oxford 
University Press.
Tsounta, E., & Osueke, A. I. (2014). What is behind Latin America’s declining income inequality? 
IMF Working Paper 14/124.
Williamson, J. G. (2010). Five centuries of Latin American income inequality. Revista de Historia 
Económica/Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 28(2), 227–252.
World Bank (2014). World development indicators. Washington: World Bank. http://data.world-
bank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
World Bank. (2006). World development report 2006: Equity and development. Washington: 
World Bank.
Judith Clifton is Professor at the Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences and Editor- 
in-Chief of Journal of Economic Policy Reform. She serves on the editorial board of Utilities 
Policy and Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics and has guest edited in journals such as 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Business History, Review of International 
Political Economy, and Global Policy. She has published in leading international journals includ-
ing Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Regional Studies, 
Health Policy, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Review of International 
Political Economy, Public Administration, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, International 
Review of Applied Economics, Revista de Economía Mundial, and Global Policy.
Daniel Díaz-Fuentes is Full Professor of Economics at the University of Cantabria, Santander. 
He received his Ph.D. from the University of Alcalá (Madrid) and has since been Visiting Research 
Fellow at universities including Michigan, Oxford, London School of Economics, Manchester, 
European University Institute, and Cornell. He has worked as a consultant for the United Nations 
and European Commission. He has published on topics including the Public Service Reforms, 
International Financial Institutions, and Economic Development in prestigious international 
reviews. His main areas of research interest include Fiscal and Taxation Policies, Privatization, 
Regulation, New Public Management, and Foreign Direct Investment policies, with particular 
expertise on Europe and Latin America.
Julio Revuelta holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Cantabria. He is Lecturer in 
the Department of Economics at the University of Cantabria. He has been visiting researcher at 
Trinity College Dublin and Politecnico di Milano. He has published his research work in presti-
gious international journals such as Journal of European Public Policy, Utilities Policy, Economics 
of Governance, International Review of Applied Economics, and Revista de Economía Mundial.
J. Clifton et al.
407© The Author(s) 2017 
L. Bértola, J. Williamson (eds.), Has Latin American Inequality  
Changed Direction?, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-44621-9_17
Challenges for Social Policy in a Less 
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Over the last decade and a half Latin America and the Caribbean have made notable 
advances in reducing poverty and improving social outcomes. Extreme poverty fell 
by more than a third from 19.3 % in 2002 to 12.0 % in 2014;1 and inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, fell from 0.56 to 0.51.2 In parallel, child mortality 
fell from 32 to 18 deaths per 100,000 children from 2000 to 2013 (see UN IGME 
2014). By 2013, school attendance rates among 6–11-year-olds reached 98 %, and 
among 12–17-year-olds rose to 87 %.3 Although gaps remain across income and 
demographic groups, the biggest advances in reducing chronic malnutrition and 
improving school age-attendance profiles occurred for children from the lowest 
socioeconomic groups.
Many of these gains were fueled by the substantive increase in public expendi-
ture. As can be seen in Fig. 1, from 2000 to 2012 overall social spending increased 
at a much faster rate than GDP; indeed, over this period the share of social spending 
in GDP rose from 14 % to almost 19 % of GDP. Rapid increases in GDP per capita 
also directly contributed to improving social outcomes. Decompositions of the 
reduction in inequality attribute between a third and a half to the higher labor income 
of the poor associated with faster growth (Levy and Schady 2013). This report 
suggests that these two channels for improved social outcomes—rapid increases in 
1 ECLAC (2014). The poverty rate for 2014 was predicted.
2 Population-weighted calculations from IDB-harmonized household surveys for the period 
2003–2013.
3 IDB/SCL-harmonized household surveys—16 countries with data 2000–2013, weighted popula-
tion average.
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social expenditures and high rates of growth—may be less favorable in coming 
years. The increasingly constrained fiscal space faced by most countries, combined 
with a possible protracted period of lower growth, indicates that the recent pace of 
increases in social spending is unlikely to be sustainable in the coming years. While 
there is heterogeneity across countries, many are likely to face pressure to accom-
plish more with similar or lower levels of resources.
In this context, it is essential to avoid undercutting recent gains in social out-
comes. In fact, it appears that progress in reducing poverty has already stalled. 
Deploying policies to consolidate and increase social gains is of the essence. More 
precisely, the region faces two challenges: (1) ensuring that the less favorable mac-
roeconomic environment does not translate into increased inequality and poverty, 
and (2) designing social policies that help raise productivity and accelerate medium- 
term growth. Despite their best intentions, social policies that are not aligned with 
productivity will set Latin America and the Caribbean on a path to lower welfare. 
Smarter social spending needs to be a key response to the challenging scenario of 
protracted low growth—by promoting better functioning labor markets, encourag-
ing human capital accumulation, helping workers to be more effective in their jobs, 
and, ultimately, closing productivity gaps with other regions.
This chapter addresses how aspects of social policy in the areas of labor markets 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Index of Social Spending   (2000=1) Index of GDP   (2000=1)
Source: ECLAC (2014) and IMF (2014).  Populaon weighted for countries with spending and GDP data.
Fig. 1 Latin American and Caribbean social spending and GDP 2000–2012. Source: ECLAC 
(2014) and IMF (2014). Population weighted for countries with spending and GDP data
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protect the important social gains achieved, and better position the region for long- 
run growth. The discussion focuses on three areas:
• Improve efficiency with a focus on quality
• Promote income stability and protection without distorting workers’ incentives
• Exercise caution with respect to creating potentially costly and irreversible 
commitments
1  Improve Efficiency with a Focus on Quality
In Latin America and the Caribbean there is ample space to improve the efficiency 
of spending and accomplish more with a similar amount of resources. In sectors 
such as health, social protection, labor training, and education, service quality 
remains the key challenge to be addressed.
1.1  Health
Health systems in the region face pressure from population aging, rising chronic 
diseases, demand to expand coverage, and adoption of technological advances. In a 
fiscally constrained scenario the priority is to adopt policies to increase technical 
and allocative efficiency without sacrificing coverage and quality. Policies should 
focus on two areas: (1) spending better, and (2) shifting more resources toward pre-
ventive services.
An analysis of 191 countries found that Latin America and the Caribbean are 
between 12 and 44 percentage points below the most efficient countries in produc-
ing healthy life expectancy—Evans et al. (2001). Marinho et al. (2012) reveal large 
discrepancies in returns on investment in the countries of the region expressed in 
indicators such as life expectancy, infant survival rate, and years of life recovered 
from communicable and noncommunicable diseases and external causes. 
Inefficiencies relate to human resources, health technology and drugs, organization 
of providers, misuse of resources, and inappropriate intervention packages.
Measures for improving efficiency include (1) closing gaps between planning 
and budget allocation by implementing strategic purchasing or value-for-money 
approaches, in which health financing decisions are based on explicit prioritization 
criteria, evidence of the cost-effectiveness of interventions, and provider quality and 
efficiency, and (2) providing incentives for productivity, quality, and innovation 
through payment mechanisms such as result-based financing.
On the other hand, implementation of preventive services—key to reducing the 
rate of growth of health spending and containing the increasing incidence of chronic 
diseases—is at an incipient stage in the region. An IDB survey of regional users that 
replicates a methodology applied in OECD countries found that only 31–52 % of 
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users of public health services in countries surveyed reported being up to date on a 
minimum set of preventive health measures, in contrast to an average of 80 % in 
OECD countries (see Fig. 2 and Guanais et al. forthcoming). In seven countries in 
the region it was estimated that 20 % of hospitalizations could be avoided with good 
primary care (Guanais et al. 2012). Strengthening the response capacity and quality 
of early care levels, as a gateway to the health system, can reduce the need for com-
plex and expensive services (OECD 2010; Smith 2012).
1.2  Social Protection: Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
Since the 1990s, when cash transfers were complemented with co-responsibility 
mechanisms to encourage human capital accumulation, conditional cash transfer 
programs (CCTs) have expanded rapidly in the region. In 2010 approximately 129 
million individuals in 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—24 % of 
the population—were receiving transfers that represented on average 20–25 % of 
family income. CCTs have been effective in reducing the incidence and especially 
the intensity of poverty. They have also improved school attendance and reduced 
child labor, contributing to school progression (see Levy 2006; Fiszbein et al. 2009; 
Saavedra and Garcia 2012). And they have promoted the use of health services and 
reduced mortality for specific age groups (Gaarder et al. 2010; Rasella et al. 2013).
However, at least three issues need to be addressed. First, expansion of coverage 
has led to more benefits being received by the extreme nonpoor, while the coverage 
of the extreme poor is below universal. Thus, although in general CCTs have 
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Source: Guanais et al., forthcoming.  OECD is average of 11 OECD countries in Internaonal Health Policy Survey.
Fig. 2 Percentage of population up to date in preventive health measures. Source: Guanais et al. 
(forthcoming). OECD is average of 11 OECD countries in International Health Policy Survey
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program leakage and under-coverage, as shown in Fig. 3 and Stampini and Tornarolli 
(2012). To maintain their effectiveness as a tool to combat poverty, CCTs should 
prioritize targeting the poorest groups, particularly in rural areas where poverty is 
chronic.
Second, in several countries the real value of transfers, measured as a percentage 
of household income beneficiaries, has increased to 40 % of household income 
(Stampini and Tornarolli 2012; Levy and Schady 2013). Transfer levels should be 
reasonably modest in magnitude (no higher than 20–25 % of average household 
income of beneficiaries before the transfer). Increases in transfer levels should be 
carefully considered in the context of the potential for negative incentives for labor 
supply. Finally, in some countries benefits have been made contingent on the form 
of workers’ participation in the labor market, in particular on their informal status. 
This has led to incentives to remain informal, which is detrimental to workers’ own 
income and the economy’s productivity.
1.3  Training
Labor productivity is partly determined by the skills that an employee brings to the 
job and how these skills are used by the firm. Decades of poor educational policies 
have left the region with a stock of workers with relatively low skills, a major bot-
tleneck both for the adoption of new technologies and the productive use of existing 





































Coverage between extreme poor (%) % of total beneficiaries who are not extreme poor
Source : Stampini and Tornarolli (2012)
Fig. 3 Conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: Stampini 
and Tornarolli (2012)
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economic growth (Bassanini et al. 2005). Training may be particularly relevant dur-
ing economic slowdowns, when the opportunity cost is lower.
All countries in the region implement labor taxes to finance training for workers, 
ranging from 0.25 % in Uruguay to 3 % of the total payroll in Jamaica. However, in 
many cases there is little or no information on returns and accountability is lacking. 
A recent IDB study finds that on-the-job training appears to raise productivity, but 
only in the case of large firms. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of 
trained employees raises productivity by 0.8 % in firms of more than 100 employees 
(Flores Lima et al. 2014). The study also shows that the vast majority of firms self- 
finance their training rather than using public resources. Only 14–19 % of firms 
reported using public funds for training purposes in the last 3 years while 78–94 % 
reported using self-financing.4 This underscores the need to revise the coverage, tar-
geting, and relevance of the public tools that support on-the-job training in the region.
A greater impact could be achieved by investing these resources in (1) develop-
ing mechanisms to align training with the needs of companies and workers; (2) 
improving the quality of training offered; and (3) establishing systems for monitor-
ing and evaluation. An improvement in the quality of training would promote pro-
ductivity gains, and potentially reduce job loss.
1.4  Education
During the last three decades, Latin America and the Caribbean have achieved enor-
mous progress in school enrollment. Some countries in the region also saw modest 
progress in student learning. However, students from Latin America and the 
Caribbean continue to perform in the bottom quartile in the distribution of student 
test scores in most international assessments, notably the most recent Programme of 
International Student Assessment (PISA). In PISA 2012, the performance of stu-
dents in the seven countries participating from the Latin American and Caribbean 
region was among the bottom 14 out of 65 countries (Bos et al. 2014).
Poor performance in terms of quality contrasts with budgetary outlays. Spending 
on education has risen from 4.2 % of GDP in 2000 to 5.6 % in 2013 (ECLAC 2014). 
Yet there is no consistent evidence that spending on inputs such as physical infrastruc-
ture, classroom technology, flexible education funding grants, or smaller class sizes 
improves students’ learning outcomes. The effectiveness of teachers is the main lever 
to improve student learning and mounting evidence indicates that the performance of 
teachers in classrooms and the quality of teacher–student interactions determine 
learning outcomes (Hamre et al. 2014; Araujo et al. 2014). To improve the quality of 
teaching, the region may wish to consider (1) introducing selective processes to recruit 
the most talented individuals into the teaching profession, and (2) strengthening 
4 The range represents the difference between the average of small and large firms. In other words, 
14 % of small firms reported using public resources for training activities compared to 19 % of 
large firms.
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mechanisms to motivate teachers to perform at their best, including ongoing profes-
sional development and support as well as instruments to reward teacher excellence. 
These factors need not imply more spending, but rather better targeted spending.
In parallel, demographic trends in relation to students and teachers present an 
opportunity for efficiency gains. On the one hand, the overall composition of stu-
dents will continue to shift away from primary school; on the other, approximately 
one-sixth of the teaching force will reach retirement age over the next 5 years. It will 
be important to monitor population shifts to plan appropriate class sizes, and deploy 
newly recruited teachers where needed and with the right skills. Given these changes, 
opportunities exist in some countries to reallocate spending more efficiently by 
merging classes, schools, and/or school districts.
In order to identify these opportunities prospective expenditure monitoring 
requires strengthening various education data management systems (including cen-
suses of students, teachers, schools, and student learning assessments). In turn, this 
will require institutional strengthening of education offices at all levels.
2  Promote Income Stability and Protection 
Without Distorting Workers’ Incentives
There are understandable incentives, particularly during economic downturns to 
extend the coverage of social insurance, and to protect workers against income loss. 
However, some such policies may inadvertently become permanent and may be det-
rimental to long-run growth. This section discusses policy options that are compat-
ible with promoting income stability while maintaining incentives for participation 
in the formal sector to increase long-run productivity.
2.1  Improve Protection for Job Loss
In general, the region has a precarious and truncated system of protection against 
job loss that increases the costs of downturns and impedes automatic income stabi-
lization. Almost all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have mandatory 
severance pay, but only 8 provide unemployment insurance (11 if those including 
obligatory individual savings accounts are included). However, these instruments 
are only available to a select group of formal salaried workers, which constitute 
only 42 % of the workforce.5 So, for most workers, there is no preestablished unem-
ployment protection mechanism.
5 Mean for 19 countries in 2013, from IDB Labor Market and Social Security System of Indicators. 
The figure represents the proportion of formal salaried workers in relation to the total active popu-
lation (employed and unemployed workers).
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Under a severance system, the lump-sum payment paid to a dismissed formal 
worker accumulates over time, and is only due in case of unjust dismissal, provid-
ing firms with incentives to shorten job tenure below optimal levels or enter into 
litigation regarding the cause for separation. A severance pay scheme may also 
generate distortions by encouraging firms to hire permanent workers under tempo-
rary contracts, which has been shown to reduce productivity (Dolado and Stucchi 
2008). There is considerable scope to improve the coverage and design of employ-
ment protection instruments toward those that enhance long-run productivity such 
as unemployment insurance, and away from those like severance pay that can 
inadvertently hinder productivity and discourage the creation of formal 
employment.
Unemployment insurance can help families smooth income loss while provid-
ing consistent incentives for workers and firms with respect to on-the-job training 
and the retention of experienced, productive workers. A reform of severance poli-
cies would lower the labor cost associated with uncertainty arising from the high 
degree of litigiousness, which in turn would promote more formal employment of 
longer duration. The increase in formal employment contracts of indefinite dura-
tion would have the added benefit of improving the coverage of contributory pen-
sion and health programs, providing more fiscal space in the long run. In turn, 
more formality and a lower degree of temporary employment would generate pro-
ductivity gains.
For formal workers, there are advantages to moving away from a standard sever-
ance pay instrument to a mixed instrument that includes compensation, in case of 
dismissal or layoff as well as individual accounts, funded by companies (and pos-
sibly workers) that would be available to the worker in case of voluntary resigna-
tion or dismissal. The pre-savings will improve the effectiveness of the instrument, 
particularly in economic downturns.
A complementary action would be to strengthen public employment services so 
that unemployment insurance and severance pay/individual accounts can be linked 
with active policies for training and job placement. Programs can be integrated 
through “single windows,” which consolidate services and provide synergies to job 
seekers with the ultimate objective to achieve rapid and effective reintegration of 
workers.
In the event of a crisis, temporary employment programs (TEP) or public works 
are often aimed at workers without certification and/or very low skills. These can be 
effective in providing protection for income loss for informal workers, but they 
should be careful not to detract from laying the groundwork for effective systems of 
protection in the long term, that is, from promoting formality. It is also important to 
learn from past experience with TEPs: design projects that are straightforward to 
implement, minimizing administrative costs so that the bulk of the resources reach 
the workers, and set a low transfer level that incentivizes the self-targeting of labor 
supply (entry and exit of work).
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2.2  Reduce Labor Taxes to Promote Formal Sector Jobs
As reviewed in Powell (2015), raising taxes may not be the most appropriate form 
of fiscal adjustment. This is particularly true for labor taxes that tend to promote 
informality. Indeed, there is a negative relationship between the cost of labor and the 
rate of formal job creation, and while this elasticity varies from country to country, 
it is clear that higher taxes on labor can lead to a destruction of formal employment 
(Bosch et al. 2013). As described in the 2014 Latin American and Caribbean 
Macroeconomic Report, lowering labor taxes may enhance productivity and 
medium-term growth in part by reducing informality.
2.3  Promote Female Labor Force Participation
Enhancing female participation in the labor force may also enhance productivity 
as well as promote gender equality and increase income per capita. Estimates from 
the region indicate that the loss from low female participation ranges from 3.4 % 
of GDP in the case of Mexico to 17 % of GDP for Honduras (Mateo Díaz and 
Rodíguez- Chamussy 2015). Estimates for OECD countries include 5 % of GDP 
for the USA and 9 % of GDP for Japan (Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2013). Although 
Latin America and the Caribbean are the regions experiencing the highest growth 
in female labor force participation in the world (increasing from 49 % in 2000 to 
54 % in 2013), participation levels for women still lag behind those in East Asia 
and the Pacific (54 % against 63 % for 2013). Younger cohorts of women are 
achieving similar or higher levels of educational attainment than men in most 
countries of the region. Investing in quality childcare and after-school programs, 
promoting flexible job arrangements, and revising labor and social insurance leg-
islation to ensure equal treatment of women can lower barriers and, in turn, further 
promote labor insertion.
3  Exercise Caution with Respect to Creating Potentially 
Costly and Irreversible Commitments
As recognized by various authors (Duryea et al. 2009), measures considered by 
policymakers as temporary may, due to political economy reasons, become very 
difficult to change, thus creating irreversible commitments. Moreover, some such 
policies may be extremely costly, especially considering the demographic changes 
facing the region. This section discusses some selected policies that are particularly 
vulnerable in this regard.
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3.1  Minimum Wage Policies
Minimum wages continue to grow in real terms in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
generating important gains for some workers. However, minimum wages also 
generate losers: those who cannot find formal employment, or any employment, 
given the higher labor costs associated with the minimum wage. A substantial pro-
portion of the salaried workforce receives wages below the minimum in the region, 
ranging from 15 % to 17 % in Mexico and Uruguay, respectively, to 61 % and 74 % 
in Guatemala and Honduras. These figures increase as the level of the minimum 
wage increases in relation to the average wage. As such, it is important to exercise 
caution before raising the level of the minimum wage to avoid increasing unem-
ployment and reducing formal employment, both of which hurt long-term growth 
and productivity, to the detriment of workers themselves.
3.2  Adjustment Mechanisms and Levels for Noncontributory 
Pensions
Only four in ten adults aged 65 and older receive a contributory pension in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Low coverage of contributory pensions has led to a 
rapid expansion of so-called noncontributory pensions (NCPs), even though, of 
course, in the end somebody must pay. This has allowed coverage of older adults 
receiving a pension to expand. All countries have instituted some form or other of 
an NCP to address poverty in old age. Taking both together, the proportion of older 
adults who receive a pension increases from four to six out of ten, and the number 
of people receiving an NCP continues to increase rapidly in the region.
While this is positive from the point of view of poverty reduction, if appropriate 
measures are not taken, NCPs may become unsustainable from a fiscal and eco-
nomic perspective. This reflects both the weight of demographic trends and the 
incentives to refrain from contributing to pensions that NCPs can generate. In the 
next 35 years, the proportion of adults aged 65 and over will increase from 7 to 20 % 
of the total population. In light of this change in the age structure, fiscal costs of 
NCP will triple. It is therefore important to establish measures to safeguard their 
sustainability. As can be seen in Fig. 4, considerable heterogeneity currently exists 
across countries in the transfer level of NCP. While among eight countries the total 
cost of NCP is currently less than 0.5 % of GDP, in Bolivia expenditures are more 
than double that at over 1 % of GDP. If the current pension is adjusted in real terms, 
current spending on NCP will pass from approximately 1 % in Bolivia and rural 
Brazil to over 2 or 3 % of GDP by 2050 (Bosch et al. 2013). In this context, it is criti-
cal to design automatic adjustment mechanisms and strong institutions capable of 
safeguarding the amount of pensions against short-term pressures associated with 
the political process.
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In addition, if they are not designed correctly, NCPs can produce undesirable 
incentives. This is particularly the case when eligibility for an NCP is limited to 
individuals who do not have a contributory pension; this can provide a disincentive 
to participate in contributory pensions, and increase informality, which is clearly 
undesirable from the point of view of productivity. More broadly, it is important to 
integrate the noncontributory and contributory pension pillars and seek to increase 
the coverage of the contributory system. Mutatis mutandis, similar remarks can be 
made of noncontributory health insurance programs.
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Fig. 4 Public spending on noncontributory pensions in 2012 (percentage of GDP). Source: Bosch 
et al. (2013)
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